CABLE FROM CNET PENSACOLA FL TO NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003600170004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 190
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 16, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

ROUTINE
P2 0 04 65
Approved For lipse 2001/09/05 : 80601554.3600170004-5
***************************
*UNCLASSIFIED*
*c****************** *4, fX*
106 23 30 43
RT TU ZY UW R UC LM HA 09 66 10622134JUU1JRUEDASA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 16 22 13 Z APR 74
FM C NE T PE NS AC OL A FL
TO NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
BT
UN CL AS / /N 01 00 0/ /
OP NA V FO RM ( 10 00 /4 A)
A. 0 PN AV IN ST 1 00 0. 16C
1. THE FOLLOWING ALLOCATION OF STUDENT BILLETS FOR ALL USN N AV WARCOL
COURSES BY F? IS AS FOLLOWS:
FY 7 5 FY 7 6 F Y 77 FY 7 a FY 7 9
25 0 26 0 2 70_
2. IAW REF A REQUEST YOU SUBMIT REORGANIZED OPNAV FORM 10 00 /4A
REFLECTING QUALITY FOR Q UA NI TY OF STUDENT BILLETS ADDRESSED
IN PARA 1.
BT
$10 966
NN NN
DIST:NAVWARCOL
COMES: 23
NAVY
Declassification/Release
Instructions on File
ROUTINE
16/282
App1obeskiFi2r eIas 20011/09/05 :E-Cleik-13DP80601554R003600170004-5
itempproved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
1 - Curriculum Changes
Strategy
Term paper
Nuclear, policy Asia
Xfense
Economics
much contemporary historical cases
Ndpeakers
Tactics
Too much current tactics
Speakers
tem 2 - Grading
Strategy - practice exam
Security of exams
Open vs closed
A,B,C,F
School solution answers
Specific instruction
Item 6 - Faculty Enrichment Programs
V-em 7 -
3 courses?
TAD adequate test?
V/(
Item 8 -
Expunge "integration"
Poor English students withdraw during Strategy?
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proved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301554R003600170004-5
How faculty feel on extra work load?
em 10 -
Not stated properly
What thrust in:
Strategy
Theories/theorists
Contemporary
More cases
Deeper in same cases
Defense Economics
More current data
Write case studies
More quantitative?
Tactics
Fleet exercises
Item 12 -
Beavers
If exert will with nuc's will not
viable nation
Electives for Superiors only?
survive as a
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
14 Jarivary 1974
? NAVAL-:K$Sj.ONS
(Paper prepared for Tactics curriculum of the Naval War
College - to be refined for presentation to CNO Executive
Panel and for publication in Naval War College Review)
PRECIS
In 1970, with the end of the Vietnam conflict in sight,
a new CNO undertook a searching review into the purposes of-.
and reasons for--a Navy. From this introspective inquiry
emerged the definition of four "Navy Mission Areas" -
-
strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of power, and
presence - which contained all the elements of why and how
naval forces are vital to the United States today and
tomorrow.
Historically, broad concepts of seapower and control of
the sea have led to the creation of navies. The unique
character of the newly defined naval mission areas, however,
permits explicit and knowledgeable formulation of specific
naval plans and programs in support of strategies.
Essentially, the four naval mission areas are perfor-
mance functions--the end products which the nation can and
should expect its Navy to accomplish. Assessment of present
and future Navy programs in terms of end products - sea
control, projection, etc., - has proved to be a vastly more
objective process than concentrating on input categories--
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
manpower, aircraft carriers, destroyers, amphibious ships,
and submarines. Thinking in. platform input parameters is
simply not very useful to a naval officer, a Congressman,
a Defense official or a taxpayer when considering-why we
want a Navy, how much of a Navy, and what a Navy should Ado.
In planning strategy, generating procurement programs,
and developing tactics, it is absolutely vital that the
U.S. Navy closely understand its missions and objectives.
With the exception of strategic deterrence forces, most
Navy units are broadly multi-purpose in character. Air-
craft carriers contribute to the sea control and presence
missions as well as the projection mission, and destroyers
are useful to the projection mission as well as the sea
control and presence missions. This interrelationship
becomes even more clear if one breaks down each mission
area into its components. Included in the sea control
mission, for example, are the counter roles of sea control
assertion and sea control denial. Each of these roles can
be further reduced to tasks such as sortie denial, choke
point attrition, open area search and attack, and local
defense.
Accordingly, the aggregate naval forces of a nation
says something--or should say something--about that
nation's naval strategies, objectives, and capabilities.
Naval mission area planning simplifies the choices that
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
a nation must make in developing naval programs in the
proper balance to match its national objective priorities
Perhaps more significantly, thinking in terms of the
four naval mission areas is the most promising approach
to the issues which lie ahead. What level of assertive,
sea control, and what kinds of forces, will be required
to safeguard U.S. interests in the most likely conflict
scenarios? How much sea control capability is essential
to maintain a credible projection potential? What is
the optimum trade-off balance between larger numbers of
moderately capable forces and smaller numbers of very
capable forces--the "Hi-Lo Mix?" Which strategies,
employment concepts, and tactics will maximize perfor-
mance of the naval forces selected? How should the
presence mission be accomplished in the light of varying
perceptions by different nations, in different tension/
conflict circumstances.
In short, the introduction of naval mission area
planning has made it possible to apply all the tools of
intellect, reason, and analysis to the resolution of the
most difficult problems confronting the Navy--today and
tomorrow. Comprehensive understanding of the four naval
mission areas is a fundamental sector of the professional
knowledge of every naval officer.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301554R003600170004-5
14 January 1974
NAVAL :MISS .ONS
(Paper prepared for Tactics curriculum of the Naval War
College - to be refined for presentation to CNO Executive
Panel and for publication in Naval War College Review)
PRECIS
In 1970, with the end of the Vietnam conflict in sight,
a new CNO undertook a searching review into the purposes of--
and reasons for--a Navy. From this introspective inquiry
emerged the definition of four "Navy Mission Areas" -
strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of power, and
presence - which contained all the elements of why and how
naval forces are vital to the United States today and
tomorrow.
Historically, broad concepts of seapower and control of
the sea have led to the creation of navies. The unique
character of the newly defined naval mission areas, however,
permits explicit and knowledgeable formulation of specific
naval plans and programs in support of strategies.
Essentially, the four naval mission areas are perfor-
mance functions--the end products which the nation can and
should expect its Navy to accomplish. Assessment of present
and future Navy programs in terms of end products - sea
control, projection, etc., - has proved to be a vastly more
objective process than concentrating on input categories--
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
manpower, aircraft carriers, destroyers, amphibious ships,
and submarines. Thinking in. platform input parameters is
simply not very useful to a naval officer, a Congressman,
a Defense official or a taxpayer when considering why we
want a Navy, how much of a *Navy, and what a Navy should do.
In planning strategy, generating procurement programs,
and developing tactics, it is absolutely vital that the
U.S. Navy closely understand its missions and objectives.
With the exception of strategic deterrence forces, most
_
Navy units are broadly multi-purpose in character. Air-
craft carriers contribute to the sea control and presence
missions as well as the projection mission, and destroyers
are useful to the projection mission as well as the sea
control and presence missions. This interrelationship
becomes even more clear if one breaks down each mission
area into its components. Included in the sea control
mission, for example, are the counter roles of sea control
assertion and sea control denial. Each of these roles can
be further reduced to tasks such as sortie denial, choke
point attrition, open area search and attack, and local
defense.
Accordingly, the aggregate naval forces of a nation
says something--or should say something--about that
nation's naval strategies, objectives, and capabilities.
Naval mission area planning simplifies the choices that
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
a nation must make in developing naval programs in the
proper balance to match its national objective priorities.
Perhaps more significantly, thinking in terms of the
four naval mission areas is the most promising approach
to the issues which lie ahead. What level of assertive ,
sea control, and what kinds of forces, will be required
to safeguard U.S. interests in the most likely conflict
scenarios? How much sea control capability is essential
to maintain a credible projection potential? What is
the optimum trade-off balance between larger numbers o
moderately capable forces and smaller numbers of very
capable forces--the "Hi-Lo Mix?" Which strategies,
employment concepts, and tactics will maximize perfor-
mance of the naval forces selected? How should the
presence mission be accomplished in the light of varying
perceptions by different nations, in different tension/
conflict circumstances.
In short, the introduction of naval mission area
planning has made it possible to apply all the tools of
intellect, reason, and analysis to the resolution of the
most difficult problems confronting the Navy--today and
tomorrow. Comprehensive understanding of the four naval
mission areas is a fundamental sector of the professional
knowledge of every naval officer.
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A?roved11E8152104LS : L541
Strategic Deterrence
ASSURED SECOND STRIKE
CONTROLLED RESPONSE
DETER THIRD POWERS
BALANCE OF POWER IMAGE
Sea Control (Assertive Controi/Sea Benil
?SORTIE CONTROL -
CHOKE POINT. CONTROL
OPEN AREA OPERATIONS
LOCAL ENGAGEMENT
..--I)ErzrEPET4e43
1-11
Proj8ction of Power Ashore
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS IBRIGADE.
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT
? RAID
NAVAL BOMBARDMENT
DIRECT
INDIRECT
TACTICAL AIR
DEEP INTERDICTION
BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
couNITERAIR/ANTi AIR
ava
Presence
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENTS
REACTIVE DEPLOYMENTS
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
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BI=
DESIG DESIG RANK IPRD 'RELIEF
10 RANK/NAME
LCDR D.G. CLARK
LCDR D.L. SCHNEIDER
LTJG C. L. SYMONDS
CDR J.L. CARENZA
1110
1310
1105
3100
CAPT R.V. HANSEN 1310
Empty
CAPT CK. MOORE
CAPT Wt. ABROMOTIS
CDR L.E. KREKEL
CDR W.G. CARSON
CDR R.C. KEMPER
CDR L.T. FUREY
CDR C. P. PFARRER
CDR D.R. MAHER
Note
CDR J.H. GRAHAM
1110
1110
1110
1110
1110
1110
1110
1110
1110
1300
1000
3100
Excess
1000
1110
1000
1120
1100.
1110
Excess
Excess
Excess
Internal
1310
CAPT C.O. BORGSTROM 1310
CAPT W.K. MALLINSON 1110
OFFICE OF PRESIDENT
LCDR
8/74
OFFICE OF DEPUTY
LCDR 1Gone
STRATEGY
CDR 19/74 ICDR W.L. STEVENS
DESIG ETA
LCDR E.J. LISCETE 1310 Stu
.MANACEMENT
CDR
CDR
7/74
1/75
TACTICS
CAPT
CAPT
CDR
CDR
LCDR
6/74
7/74
6/74-
6/74
Gone
7/74
7/74
7/74
CAPT D.W. WHELAN
None
(Shift incumbent to TAC
as KREKEL's relief)
CDR J.F. McNULTY
CDR C.P. HAMMON
CDR L. B. hDWARDS
CDR H. B. KUYKENDALL
None
None
None
shift by HAMMON.
COMMAND AND STAFF
Excess 7/74 1None
NCC
1000 CAPT 8/74
1000 CAPT 5/74
LCDR H.D. STURR 1820 1820 I CDR10/741Pers nom
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1310
Stu
3100 8/74
1110 . Stu
1310 Note
1310
1110
-5
Stu
Stu
Approved For Release 2001/09/05
NSC
: CIA-RDP801301554R003600170004-5
CDR R.K. LOCEVCOD
1110
1110
CDR
6/74 CDR J.A. MAJOR
.1110
Stu
LCDR J.A. MORIARTY
1310
3100
LCDR
9/74 LCDR L. ANDERSON
3100
8/74
LCDR J.A. LOFTUS
1110
1110
LCDR
7/74 LCDR E.L. GIBSON
1110
Stu
ADMIN
CDR J.B. MOORE
1630
1630
LCDR
7/74 ICDR G.C. STEIGER
1630
Stu
CDR T.J. MORAN
1310
Excess
6/74 None
CDR C.F. AKE
1110
1100
LCDR
7/74 CDR L.L. ALLEY
1110
5/74
CCE
CDR R.C. TRAUX
1310
1300
CDR
11/74 CDR E.F. LLINS
1310
Stu
CDR D.C. FAUL
3100
3100
LCDR
8/74 LCDR J.L. SMITH
3100
9/74
LCDR R.F. BECKHAM
1110
1100
LCDR
7/74 LCDR J.S TURNER
1110
6/74
CWG
CDR R.N. BLATT
1310
1000
CDR
9/74
CDR C.W. BUZZETT,
1310
1000
CDR
7/74
LCDR R.T. DAVIS
1310
1110
LCDR
Gone LCDR B.V. TIERNAN
1110
LCDR G.E. KOUBA
1110
1110
LCDR
4/74 LCDR C. CRIGLER
1110
LCDR P.R. JACOBS
1310
1310
LCDR
7/74
Empty
1310
LCDR
LT P.P. GUTELIUS
1110
4/74
LCDR J.D. SHEWCHUK
1110
1110
LCDR
8/74 LCDR A.M. PYBARCZYK
1110
8/74
Billet Being Established
1000
CDR
CDR R.D. LONGMAN
1110
4/74
(HUMAN RESC. MGMT)
SUMMARY
BILLETS ALLOWED ON BOARD LOSSES GAINS FUTURE
CAPT 25 25 5 1 21
CDR 42 - 57 15 8 50
LCDR 28 24 11 9 22
LT-ENS 8 13 1 I 13
TOTALS 103 119 32 . ---ff 106
Total billets allowed will be increased by one CDR on establishment of Human
Resources Managatticiproloetilreatr. Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
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03600170004-5
03600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
?
?
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP801301554R003600170004-5
DRAFT CNO Letterhead
Dear Duke,
On the 4th of December I indicated in a letter to
you my support for your efforts to foster a broader
association with the Washington area academic community.
Since then I have had an opportunity to give your program
more thought and, quite frankly, have developed some
reservations. Although your PROTAP Program has many
attractive features, it also presents problems worthy
of further consideration.
First, upon review of the ten disciplines identified
as PROTAP areas of study, I notice only Political Science
relates to validated Navy billet requirements. There are
only 80 P-coded billets in the Navy in Political Science
and, of those, only 58 are identified for 05/06 officers.
Second, the cost of detailing officers for an extra
four months to a Senior Service College to participate
in PROTAP appears to me to not be a very effective way of
spending money, especially in view of the limited::.Navy
need for officers with graduate work or degrees in the ten
disciplines of PROTAP.
Third, your successor's hands may be tied by having
to maintain the National War College curriculum in
consonance with the participating consortium of Washington
area universities. It seems to me that it would be
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
DRAFT
difficult to expand or modify the National War College
curriculum while involved in PROTAP, since, presumably,
the participating consortium universities would have to
base a considerable amount of their degree credit upon the
National War College course.
Finally, I worry a bit about the subtle pressures
that the PROTAP Program may exert on our officers to pursue
advanced degrees as points for promotion rather than because
they want or need education for professional reasons.
No doubt you have weighed these, and other, arguments
and may be able to persuade me that my doubts are not well
founded. Accordingly, I will look forward to hearing from
you on this matter.
Warm regards,
E.R. ZUMWALT, JR.
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Vice Admiral M.G. Bayne, U.S. Navy
Commandant, The National War College
Washington, DC 20319
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600170004-5
14 January 1974
NAVALLMIS.STONS
(Paper prepared for Tactics curriculum of the Naval War
College- to be refined for presentation to CNO Executive
Panel and for publication in Naval War College Review)
PRECIS
? In 1970, with the end of the Vietnam conflict in sight,
a new CNO undertook a searching review into the purposes of--
and reasons for--a Navy. From this introspective inquiry
emerged the definition of four "Navy Mission Areas" -
.---
strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of power, and
presence - which contained all the elements of why and how
naval forces are vital to the United States today and
tomorrow.
Historically, broad concepts of seapower and control of
the sea have led to the creation of navies. The unique
character of the newly defined naval mission areas, however,
permits explicit and knowledgeable formulation of specific
naval plans and programs in support of strategies.
Essentially, the four naval mission areas are perfor-
mance functions--the end products which the nation can and
should expect its Navy to accomplish. Assessment of present
and future Navy programs in terms of end products - sea
control, projection, etc., - has proved to be a vastly more
objective process than concentrating on input categories--
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
manpower, aircraft carriers, destroyers, amphibious ships,
and submarines. Thinking in. platform input parameters is
simply not very useful to a naval officer, a Congressman,
a Defense official or a taxpayer when considering-why we
want a Navy, how much of a Navy, and what a Navy should 'do.
In planning strategy, generating procurement programs,
and developing tactics, it is absolutely vital that the
U.S. Navy closely understand its missions and objectives.
With the exception of strategic deterrence forces, most
Navy units are broadly multi-purpose in character. Air-
craft carriers contribute to the sea control and presence
missions as well as the projection mission, and destroyers
are useful to the projection mission as well as the sea
control and presence missions. This interrelationship
becomes even more clear if one breaks down each mission
area into its components. Included in the sea control
mission, for example, are the counter roles of sea control
assertion and sea control denial. Each of these roles can
be further reduced to tasks such as sortie denial, choke
point attrition, open area search and attack, and local
defense.
Accordingly, the aggregate naval forces of a nation
says something--or should say something--about that
nation's naval strategies, objectives, and capabilities.
Naval mission area planning simplifies the choices that
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
a nation must make in developing naval programs in the
proper balance to match its national objective priorities.
Perhaps more significantly, thinking in terms of'the
four naval mission areas is the most. promising approach
to the issues which lie ahead. What level of assertive,
sea control, and what kinds of forces, will be required
to safeguard U.S. interests in the most likely conflict
scenarios? How much sea control capability is essential
to maintain a credible projection potential? What is
the-Optimum-trade-off-balance.Lbetwcon. larger numbers of..
moderately capable forces and smaller numbers of very
capable forces--the "Hi-Lo Mix?" Which strategies,
employment concepts, and tactics will maximize perfor-
mance of the naval forces selected? How should the
presence mission be accomplished in the light of varying
perceptions by different nations, in different tension/
conflict circumstances.
In short, the introduction of naval mission area
planning has made it possible to apply all the tools of
intellect, reason, and analysis to the resolution of the
most difficult problems confronting the Navy--today and
tomorrow. Comprehensive understanding of the four naval
mission areas is a fundamental sector of the professional
knowledge of every naval officer.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
1
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island
02840
Dear Dr. Krogh,
s ?
Bk FEB 1974
It certainly was good to hear that you have managed
to pin down a speaker for the Nash Lecture after all
the trouble you have had. Mr. Bundy should provide us
with some exciting and provocative ideas.
Your schedule of events for that evening - from the
"academic sherry" to the reception and dinner - are
very enticing. I shall plan to attend and look forward
to a pleasant and stimulating evening. Further, I am
fairly certain that some of my staff will be interested
in attending. Your assistant can get in touch either
directly with me or with my aide, Lieutenant Commander
Dave Clark, to make specific arrangements.
Again thanks for ?the good news. Warm regards.
Dean Peter F. Krogh
Georgetown University
Washington, DC 20007
Yours,, .-
V
..
- --,\
/
STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
?
hECTU"
WoT ICE
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Mr. David Aaron
Deputy Director, Program Analysis
National Security Council
Dr. John D. Christie
Office of the Assistant
Analysis)
The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C. 20301
Secretary of Defense (Systems
g- -
Rear AdmiralWilliam J Crowe, Jr., USN
Office for Micronesian Status Negotiation
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The Brookings Institution
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The Brookings Institution
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VADM Thomas B. Hayward, USN
OP-090
Navy Department *
Washington', D. C. 20350
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Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare ProgiAams
Office of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering
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Director for Naval History and Curator for the Nay. Dept.
Navy Department
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Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Air Warfare)
Navy Department :
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Air Transport Association of America
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American Broadcasting Company
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Director, The National Law Center
George Washington University
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.
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Counselor on International Law
Department of State
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? Senior Fellow
, The Brookings Institution
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?
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
02840
11 April 1974
MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL TURNER
SUBJ: Visit to LTG Rogers
1. (O'Brien). Reminder: Father Peterson, PC, never sent the letter
I requested and, consequently, O'Brien was assigned to the Army C&GSC,
Ft. Leavenworth.
Comment: In all candor, this is an internal Army problem. If you
consider it an obligation to bring it up because of O'Brien's telephone
call, please be advised that this will cause a fair amount of "flap"
and could decrement your leverage vis-a-vis the Robinson case (par 2).
2. (Robinson). Facts: LTC(P) Richard T. Robinson, Corps of Engineers,
had been assigned to head up a computer systems office in San Francisco.
For that plus a strong personal desire to be stationed there (wife is
Japanese) I omitted (with ADM Williams' concurrence) his name on your
original list called in to BG Forrest three weeks ago. You will recall
that we got McLain as a result. Robinson is now scheduled to be the
Plans and Training Officer for the Engineer Training Center, Ft. Leonard
Wood, Mo. I tried to break this loose on 9 April through the Colonels'
Branch, but without success. We are authorized five Army officers,
three colonels and two LTC's. We will have for next year:
COL. McLain (CNW)
COL. Guertin (departs Jan 75)
LTC Whalen (CNW)
MAJ(P) Hogan
LTC Gallup (.99 probable retirement this year. Also our
only engineer)
NB LTC Pietsch will be reassigned in July to HQ FORSCOM
3. (Hutton, Cuthbert P.). Facts: He attended the NC&S course of 1971.
He was an alternate selectee for a war college this year. The assign-
ment officer added him to the Naval War College list without checking
his C&S schooling. Upon re-checking, he deleted Hutton. There is a
standing rule that an officer who attends a C&S course at another service
will not return to that service's senior service college.
Comment: I'm sure an exception could be made. Hutton would really
be in his element with this curriculum.
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4. (LTG Rogers). Per_Amst7ctions from Dave Clark, a CSF invitational?,
letter will be sent'-(blind)to General Rogers.
-
Comment: Presume you will discuss this with him.
Very respectfully,
. W. JACKS
COL
COL INF
Senior y Advisor
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DRAFT CNO Letterhead
Dear Duke,
On the 4th of December I indicated in a letter to
you my support for your efforts to foster a broader
association with the Washington area academic community.
Since then I have had an opportunity to give your program
more thought and, quite frankly, have developed some
0 reservations. Although your PROTAP Program has many
attractive features, it also presents problems worthy
of further consideration.
First, upon review of the ten disciplines identified
as PROTAP areas of study, I notice only Political Science
relates to validated Navy billet requirements. There are
only 80 P-coded billets in the Navy in Political Science
and, of those, only 58 are identified for 05/06 officers.
Second, the cost of detailing officers for an extra
four months to a Senior Service College to participate
in PROTAP appears to me to not be a very effective way of
spending money, especially in view of the limited,Navy
need for officers with graduate work or degrees in the ten
disciplines of PROTAP.
Third, your successor's hands may be tied by having
to maintain the National War College curriculum in
consonance with the participating consortium of Washington
area universities. It seems to me that it would be
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DRAFT
difficult to expand or modify the National War College
curriculum while involved in PROTAP, since, presumably,
the participating consortium universities would have to
base a considerable amount of their degree credit upon the
National War College course.
Finally, I worry a bit about the subtle pressures
that the PROTAP Program may exert on our officers to pursue
advanced degrees as points for promotion rather than because
they want or need education for professional reasons.
- _
No doubt you have weighed these, and other, arguments
and may be able to persuade me that my doubts are not well
founded. Accordingly, I will look forward to hearing from
you on this matter.
Warm regards,
E.R. ZUMWALT, JR.
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Vice Admiral M.G. Bayne, U.S. Navy
Commandant, The National War College
Washington, DC 20319
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MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
by
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
A
E? D
GE
Jr
CE
INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS
USEFULNESS OF CATEGORIZING NAVY MISSIONS
Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed
naval lexicon over the past several years. To those
accustomed to phrases such as "sea power," "command of the
seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the
new terms, "Strategic Deterrence," "Sea Control," "Presence,"
may seem to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there
has been a re-definition of traditional U.S. Navel roles and
missions to force the Navy to think in terms of output rather
than input.
Why must we emphasize output? First, because a nation
of concerned free citizens and skeptical taxpayers is natu-
rally more interested in what is harvested than in what is
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sown. By measuring the value of output in terms of national
objectives the country can rationally decide what resources
it should allocate to the Navy. Input categories such as
manpower, ships, aircraft, and training are of little help
in trying to determine why we need a Navy or, if we do need
one, how big it should be and what it should be prepared to
do.
Second, focusing on missions helps tactical commanders
to keep objectives in mind. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
tacticians often overconcentrate on killing submarines when
their ultimate objective is to ensure safe maritime operations.
Third, an amorphous mass of men, ships, and weapons is
difficult to manage because it is difficult for an individual
to visualize. By subdividing these masses into their ex-
pected output, or missions, we are able to establish prior-
ities for allocating resources - to know how much we are
spending for different objectives, and to judge their conso-
nance with national strategy.
Mission categorization is useful in less abstract decision-
making also. For instance, we shall propose that?the Sea Con-
trol mission is executed by tactics of
operations), choke point control, open
local engagement. Different platforms
sortie control (barrier
area
have
operations, and
different utility
in each of these tactics. Generally speaking, VP aircraft are
best for open area operations; surface escorts best for local
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engagement, and submarines best for choke point operations.
Although each of these forces has secondary applications,
resource distribution among them will be dictated by-our
evaluation of which tactics are going to be most important
to us.
Categorization of mission tactics can also be used at
even more detailed levels of resource allocation. A sub-
marine designed for choke point operations should .emphasize
quietness at the expense of speed; a submarine for local
engagement or escort defense needs speed even at the expense
of quietness. If we understand this, we will trade off speed
versus quietness according to our evaluation of probable
employment:
Fourth, an understanding of missions assists in selecting
the best among several competing systems. A research program
may develop five new air-launched munitions, but we may not
be able to afford production of more than three. We shall
divide tactical air projection tactics into deep interdiction,
battlefield support, close air support, and counter air/anti-
air warfare. Each of these makes slightly different demands
for weapons. While precision is mandatory for deep interdic-
tion, it is critical in close air support. Surely in our mix
of three new weapons we will want at least one that stresses
accuracy. If this seems obvious, an examination of history
will show that the military has sometimes become hypnotized
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by the weapons needed or used in one particular tactic or
mission to the neglect of newly emerging .requirements.
Finally, stressing missions helps to ensure that members
of the organization focus on the whole rather than on one
of its parts. This Can help keep vested interests in proper
perspective. Even the:most- professional, well-motivated
individual can become so committed to a particular missile
system, type of ship or aircraft, or special personnel pro-
grant that he loses sight of what is best for the whole
organization.
? EVOLUTION OF NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS
How did the Navy come to define the four mission areas
as Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power
Ashore, and Naval Presence? It was evolutionary. Navies
have not always had each of these missions nor is this
likely to be the definitive list of naval missions.
The first and only missionof the earliest navies was
Sea Control. A classic example of the importance of being
able to move military forces by sea is the Battle of Salamis
in 480 BC. The Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the
wall. The Athenian Admiral, Themistocles, turned the tables
by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut off
from reinforcement and resupply, the Persians left Athens and
Attica.
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A few decades later, in the Peloponnesian Wars, Athenian
Sea Control repeatedly permitted outflanking the land-based
Spartan campaign. In the Punic Wars, Rome's exercise of Sea.
Control prevented the Carthaginians from being able to sup-
port Hannibal. And so it went. There were many technological
milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initiatives,
but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the save move-
ment of ground forces and their supplies across the sea.
In time, trade routes flourished, exploration became more
far ranging, the horizons of imperialism widened, commerce
grew, and with it, piracy. Nations began to demand security
for their endeavors. Broad command of the sea became the
sine qua non of economic growth and wellbeing. The nature
of Sea Control, evolved to include the protection of shipping'
for the nation's economy as well as its overseas military
expeditions. By the same token, denial of an enemy's use of
the seas for commerce as well as military purooses became 'an
important element of warfare-blockade hurt economies and
warmaking potential.,
By the early 19th century, another importantnaval mission
had evolved-the projection of ground forces from the sea onto
the land. Amphibious warfare in the modern sense began during
the Wars of the French Revolution. Ground troops traditionally
transported by sea to some staging area began to use sea plat-
forms as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was
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given to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through
amphibious assault. This also extended the traditional Sea
Control mission. In addition to protecting supply reinforce-
ment and economic shipping, navies now had to protect the
amphibious assault force.
Also during the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplomacy"
came into the naval vocabulary. In the quest for colonies,
nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate and serve
0 warning on one another. In time the range of this activity
extended to demonstrations of good will. It has come to be
known as the Naval Presence mission.. Sea Control, Projection
of Power Ashore by amphibious means and Naval Presence were
the missions of navies through the end of World War II.
During-that war, naval tactical air was used primarily in
the Sea Control mission (e.g., Midway, Coral Sea; and Battle
of the Atlantic) and secondarily in direct support-of the am-
phibious assault mission.. When the war ended, however, there
was no potential challenger to U.S. Sea Control.. In essence,
the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a con-
tinuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in. quest of new
missions. Two arose.
The innovation in missions came from the final stages of
World War II, when naval tactical air pewer played a role in
the bombing of the Japanese home islands. Post-war improve-
ments in aircraft and munitions made it logical to extend this
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pprove or e ease
use of naval air power. The Navy staked out its claim to the
use of air power in support of land campaigns; strategic air
attack on enemy.industry, transportation, and cities; air
superiority over the battlefield; and close air support of
ground forces. Its value was demonstrated early in the Korean
campaign where there were few alternative means of providing
air support ashore.
The second innovation in naval missions came with the in-
troduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national military re-
quirement. The combination of improved aircraft performance
and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft
carrier capable of contributing to .this new mission. With the
Navy -struggling to readjust its missions to peacetime needs
and the U.S. Air Force establishing its own place in the mili-
tary family, it is understandable that there was a sense of
competition for this new role. However, by the mid-1960's
the development of the Polaris submarine concept eliminated
any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy.
At. about the same time, the dramatic and determined growth
of the Soviet naval challenge caused mission pribrities to
begin to shift and brought about a resurgence of traditional
Sea Control requirements. Today, the balance...of naval resour-
ces and attention devoted to each of these four missions,
Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore,
and Naval Presence, is especially difficult because of their
complex interdependence and ?because almost all naval forces
have multi-mission capabilities.
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The distinction between the four missions is primarily one
of purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and interde-
pendence, we can understand the Navy far better if we care-
fully examine each mission individually. We must know what
each mission's objectives are so that we do not overlook ,
some useful new tactic or weapon and, so that we can strike
the proper balance whenever these missions compete for re-
sources.
DEFINITION OF NAVAL MISSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THEIR
FORCES AND TACTICS
Strategic Deterrence Mission
Our strategic deterrence objectives are:
? To deter all-out attack on the United States or its
allies;
? to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than
all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and -
? to maintain a stable political environment within which
? the threat of agression or coersion against the United
States or its allies is minimized.
In support of national objectives, we have three principal
military "tactics" or force preparedness objectives. The
first is to maintain an assured second strike capability in
the hope of deterring an all-out strategic-nuclear attack on
the United States. Today that means dissuading the Soviets
from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by
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maintaining a strategic attack force capable of inflicting
unacceptable damage on any enemy even after he has attacked
us. The Navy's Polaris/Poseidon/Trident forces are funda-
mental to this deterrence because of their high nuclear sur-
vival probability.
A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that
the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position
by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only
a portion of our strategic forces, would it. then make sense
for the United States to retaliate by striking Soviet cities,
knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to
strike our cities? In these circumstances do we need an
alternative of controlled response? This means making our
strategic strike forces quickly responsive to changes in
targeting and capable of accurate delivery.
can
SSBN forces
be well tailored to these requirements.
A third objective is to deter third powers
from attack-
ing the United States with nuclear weapons. Because of the
great disparity between any third country's nuclear arsenal
and ours, the same forces deterring the Soviet Uilion should
deter others.
Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic
forces which will not let us appear to be at a disadvantage
to the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to allow
the opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is
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markedly superior to ours, we would find that political
decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must
always keep in mind the balance of power image that our
forces portray to the non-Soviet world. In part, this image
affects what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence:
In part, it affects how we talk about our comparative strength
and how we criticize ourselves.
In summary, the strategic deterrence mission is sub-divided
into four tactics.
TD
RE
AT
TE
E R
GR
I E
C N
Assured Second Strike
Controlled Response
Deter Third Powers
-Balance of Power Image
There is very little overlap between strategic deter-
rence and *other Navy missibn areas at present. However,
significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could re-
duce the ability of SSEN's to survive without assistance
from friendly Sea Control forces. With this exception and
the fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential
for nuclear strikes,-naval forces for strategic nuclear de-
terrence are almost exclusively devoted to that mission.
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Sea-Control Mission
The term "Sea Control," derives from the traditional
phrase "control of the sea." This change in terminology
may seem Minor, but it is a deliberate attempt to acknow-
ledge the limitations on ocean control brought about by, the
development of the submarine and the airplane.:
In the 18th and 19th centuries, we passed through
.period of maritime history in Which full regulation of the
.seas in wartime was the ambition of Great Britain._ Initially;
this could be accomplished through possession of a superior
sailing fleet. The enemy's harbors were closely watched by
patrolling cutters and frigates. Ships of the line were
called forth to defeat the enemy or at least to force him
back into port whenever-he dared to sortie. Later, when
steam propulsion afforded ships greater mobility, the British
found that they needed both coaling stations and control of
vital' chokepoints around the world. The intention was still
to be able to move a superior fleet into position for. a show-
down engagement before an enemy had the opportunity, to use
the seas for his advantage. The term "control qf the sea,"
as used by Mahan, meant both denying use of the seas to the
enemy and asserting one's own use.
British and German naval strategies in World War I re-
flect this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive
encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of
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the seas. Hence caution dominated the tactics of Jutland.
Germany challenged British reliance on a superior battle
fleet by first employing surface ship commerce raiders, then
by attempting to blockade the GerMan U-boat with mines layed
across the exit to the North Sea. It failed. Few naval
strategists understood how radically the concept of "control
of the seas" was altered by the advent of the submarines.
British, German,
Japanese,
II all concentrated: on potential-battle fleet,
and American preparations for
-
actions. Only a.few voice S pointed out that an additiona
-
Submarine might be more: useful than another battleship or
-Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that
control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However,
in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engage-
ment of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that
it was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that allowed
an otherwise weaker force to prevail. By the end of World War
II the idea of totally denying the seas to one's enemy while
asserting one's own exclusive use had been overtaken by tech-
nology. On the one hand it was nearly impossible to deny an
enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other, there
were likely to be areas of the Sea where enemy air power would
make the assertion of one's presence prohibitively costly.
Yet, for the first several decades after the second World War,
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the U.S. Navy had such a monopoly on sea power that the term
"control of the seas" understandably continued to carry its
long established connotation.
The new term "Sea Control" is intended to connote more
realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods
of time. It is conceivable today to temporarily exert air,
surface, and subsurface control in an area while moving ships
project power ashore or to resupply over-
into position to
seas forces.--Tt_is no Ionget_cOnceivable, except:in.the?
- -
?
most limited _sense, to totally control the seas for. one's
'own use--; orto:Lotaiiy-deny. them-to an enemy.
____ __. . .? _______ . _ __ _
_
Thi mays change with evolving technology and tactics, but
. .,..
:i. _ . _
Control,
from two directions:
' denying an enemy the right to
use some seas at_some times; and, asserting our own right to
use some seas at some times. Any sea power may assert its
own right to use the seas and deny that right to the enemy
at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided bet-
ween the two objectives. For instance, in Figure 1, if the
U.S. were attempting in wartime to use the Nort4, Atlantic to
reinforce Europe, it would be operating near the left side
of the diagram with the greater percentage of its effort on
asserting sea control. In a situation like the Vietnam War,
we operated on the right extreme, since our use of the seas
was not challenged, but we did make a substantial effort to
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deny the other side access to Haiphong. An opponent, of
course, will usually respond with countering objectives and
tactics as in the lower half of the figure.
United States
Opponent
FOurU.S- hatiOnaLobjeotives.which-calI for asserting
opponent are:
To ensure industrial supplies.
To reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas.
? To provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies.
? To provide safety for naval forces in th2 Projection of
Power Ashore role.
There are four different tactical approaches for achieving
these Sea Control objectives:
Sortie Control:
Bottling up an opponent in his por-ts
or on his bases can still be attempted. As opposed to the
18th and 19th century tactic of forcing a major fleet engage-
ment at sea, today's blockade seeks destruction of individual
units as they sortie. If we assume an opponent will be in
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.?? .1-? ?
" I "B":1:1 AI'11 .11 IIIA
control of the air near his ports, sortie control tactics
must primarily depend on submarines and mines.
If successful, sortie control is a most economical means
of cutting off a nation's use of the seas or ability to in-
terfere. Nevertheless, such established techniques have
their disadvantages. No blockade is 100% successful. Some
units may be beyond the blockade when hostilities
and will remain to haunt opposition forces.
?
enett-li'S airczcLft._ there,
is-no_ static.' defense.
be bombed at their bases. Thus
- .
-blockades _a
commence
Against the
Planes: must-
e weapons of
_ -
attrition requiting time-to be. effective. But the lesson
_
- .
. ._
of history-i..iS perhaps the most i:nStructive,.of: all - ingenious
.., -
man.._has:Usually.:fond ways to circumvent blackades.
Choke point control: Sometimes the best place to
s-in a geographical bottleneak through whiCh-.
engage the enemy
he must pass. In _so doing, platfor?lis like- ASW aircraft that
probably could not survive in the area of the enemy's sortie
point can be used. This also requires patience.
For those enemy forces that have cleared sortie and choke
point operations, there are two remaining tactics-.
Open area operations: Once the enemy is loose at sea
or in the air, surveillance and search systems can assist in
locating and putting him at bay: Aircraft are perhaps the
most appropriate platform because of high search rates. Here
again, though, time and patience are required.
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Local Engagement: In contrast to searching out a
large area, we can let the enemy come to us. If we are
asserting our use of the seas, his attacking forces must
Close ours to within weapon release range. This enables us
to concentrate our defensive forces around the units to be
protected. These forces may attempt to destroy the enemy's
launching platform prior to weapon release or may attempt to
eflect, or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. If we
_
are denying...:use :of -the- seas. to someone- else,* local engagement
_ ? .
amounts to positioning forces in .aflimited region and waiting--
_
?in pr.ey..
_
The: weapons &tap Toy ed In these four tactics are numerous
their selection_ depending- :on ,timing and the situation. - The
same weapon may be-used to assert our control or to deny- con-
trol to anopponent. This multimisSion character of many
weapons systems. Often causes misunderstanding of the boundary
_ -
between Sea Control and the other naval missions. Figure 2
shows the weapons systems applicable to specific Sea Control
tactics.
WEAPONS SYSTEMS APPLICABLE TO SEA CONTROL TACTICS
Weapons Systems
Tactics
Sortie Chokepoint Open Area Local
Control Control Operations Defense
Submarines
ASW Aircraft
Fighter Aircraft
Surveillance Systems
Attack Aircraft
Mines
Escort Ships
X
,Figure 2
X
?
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- ? ? ? T - ? ?
I, IP II ? .11 WA
In executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques
deserve particular mention:
Deception: Assertive Sea Control objectives do not
necessarily demand destruction of the enemy's force. If the
enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability
to press an attack we will have achieved our Sea Control
objective.
Force routing, deceptive/imitative devices,-and
- :
,Other anti-search-techniques can, be employed, often in corn--
,
bination with other: tactiCS:-.-
_
The perceptions of other nations. of ..our
Sea" Control capability relative to that of other major powers
can influence political. and. military decisions. What any
_
'natidn 'says about its capabilities_ influences the challenges
-
that are offered or accepted.
In summary,
a" Control, tactics include
SEA CONTROL
? Sortie Control
? Chokepoint Control
? Open Area Operations
? Local Engagement
? Deception
? intimidation
??4
Projection of Power Ashore Missions
Sea Control is concerned with what happens on under, and,
over, the ocean surface._ Projection of Power Ashore is concerned
with the impact of naval forces on land forces and can be divided
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into three categories: amphibious assault, naval bombardment,
and tactical air.
Amphibious Assault Projection: Ships have long been used
to transport military power to
conflict areas. As noted
earlier, assault from the sea in the face of opposition b
gan to
develop
as a naval mission in the early 19th _century.
- The calamitous assault at Gallipoli in 1915
and subsequent
failure to distinguish...poor execution from good strategy
lowered_ enthusiasm- for this mission. However, World War II
and the Korean conflict testified to its continuing importance.
? 'Amphibious assaults are-,opposed landings on, hostile tern-
tory - and. have four objectives:-
? o- secure territory for land campaign.
is used when there is no other practical approach,
_
from the sea
a
Assault
?
_ _
that :is ? the, enemy_.etrritory is, a geographical or political'..
island, or when we want to outflank and surprise the
enemy.
. The Okinawa and the NOrmandY .landings. in World War II are
examples. The purpose of the assault 'on Okinawa was to secure .
a base from which to launch the invas4.6n, of Japan. The Nor-
mandy assault launched the attack into heartlanthGermany.
* To secure land area for an air operation. One of the
costliest amphibious assaults during World War II was launched
against Iwo Jima to gain a site from which the Air Force could
strike Japan.
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? To secure territory or facilities to prevent enemy
use of them. The first offensive action of World War 11 'in
the Pacific was the capture of Guadalcanal to deny the Japan-
ese the airfield facilities.frpm which they could interdict
U .s.. supply routes between Pearl Harbor and Australia.
? To destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communi-
cations, divert his effort, etc., by means of amphibious
- _
raids with planned withdrawal.
Amphibious tactics are
classified by the size of the
operation. as indicated_in Figure--
- 'COMPARIS614 OFAMPKIBIOLM TASK ORGANIZATIOMS?
-
_MAP'
TMAB
'MAU. *7
Raid
Troops._
To 33,000-
800042,000
1800-4000 -
50-250
Ships,
43-52-
15-17
4-6-
1-2
Helos
- 250-300
75-120
30-36
10-14
Attack Aircraft
50-60 _
18-20
6-8**
2-4**
Boats
320-350
80-100 -
30-40
2-10
Gunfire Support
8-108".
These
There are
22-30.5"/54,--?
1214.-5"i54
2-4 5"/54-
Marine-Amphibious Force-
MAB ? Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAU -- MarineAmphibious Unit
"VTOL
Figure 3
0-3 5754-
-
rough force compositions are by no means rigid.
many specific ways in which amphibious assault
forces can be tailored to the particular requirement at
hand. Obviously the landing force must be adequate in size
to handle the tasks assigned ashore. As the size of an
assault increases, there are two factors that scale upward
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more than proportionally to the number of troops to be landed.
One is the number of specialized units that are required such,
as command, control, and communications ships or facilities;
minesweeping capability; aircraft and gunfire support. The
other factor is the time to assemble, sail, prepare the ]ind-
ing area, and assault. The larger the operation, in short,
the more complex it becomes with attendent delays and risks
enemy advance defensive preparations.
Finally when little or no opposition is encountered, such.
in Lebanon-in 1958, amphibious forces can be
ministratively." They can then-be employed as regular ground
forces if supported. Administrative landings are considered
amphibious operations only when the unique over-the-beach
capability of amphibious force is an essential element.
Naval Bombardment: Although most commonly associated
with amphibious assault, bombardment can have three separate
objectives
along a coast or in coastal areas:
To provide direct support to troops
To interdict movements
To harass military or civil operations
Bombardment is presently available from naval guns in des-
troyers and cruisers utilizing the two tactics of either direct
or indirect fire control depending on the distance of the ship
and target from shore. Targets can be prearranged geographi-
cally, called by observers on the beach, or selected visually
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from a ship or aircraft: The accuracy of fire can be spotted
from on board ship, from ashore, or may also be employed in
this role.
Tactical Air Projection: Tactical air power is used to.
achieve three objectives;
* Destroy portions of the enemy's warmaking potential.
Provide support to a- groUnd campaign directly or by
-interdicting enemy 'support. to the engaged areaS.
* Deny an enemy_ these-
- ? ?
same options against us.
--.The- four basic tactics bv_which these objectives are abhieved.
are: deeo-interdiction; battlefield interdiction; close air
support; and counterair/anti-air warfare.
Deep Interdiction: Attacks conducted to destroy,
neutralize, or impair the enemy's military potential before
it can be directed against friendly forces are deep interdic-
tion. Targets may be military or civilian, remote from the
battle area and perhaps mo-re strategic than tactical.
prevent the enemy from moving forces and material under
protective cover of darkness or adverse weather, an all weather
attack capability is important.
Battlefield Interdiction: Sometimes referred to as
Direct Air Support (DAS), battlefield interdiction differs :
from deep interdiction in two ways:. targets are usually mili-
tary and of immediate tactical importance, and air space con-
trol must be closely coordinated with front line support
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operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict
- the enemy's capability to move supplies/reinforcements or
maneuver his forces.
.Close Air Support:- Providing direct support to front .
line ground forces, close 'air support is generally exercised
in a similar manner
_ -
-Therefore- V
as call-fire support from field artillery.
ry close coordination with -gunfire, support
ments is necessary.
e-
COuriterair/Anf-+-'-air Warfare: In Order to conduct the
-three types of air strike operations, counterair forces are
employed,to neutralize. the .enemy's. air capabi,liti?Minimiz-
.
_
-ing threat over enemy expected attrition of Our fbrces. The th
. _
territory may be surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), anti-aircraft
guns qiA10 and/or-fighterinterceptor
aircraft. Counters
-,these range from:attack on enemy air bases or weapons sites.
to direct protection with our fighters counter-
measures.- :When
When
_
the situation is
or electronic
reversed, and an opponent,
_ -
is projecting his air power over our territory, antiair war-
:fare operations employing fighters, SANS, and AAA exact
attrition on enemy aircraft.
All of these tactical air projection tactics are carried
out by attack aircraft supported by fighter-interceptor air
superiority forces. One of the values of categorizing air
projection missions is to identify the aircraft and weapon
Characteristics and tactics best suited to each mission as
in Figure 4.
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AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR
TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION MISSIONS
(H-high; M-medium; 1-low)
Battlefield Close Air
Deep Interdiction Support Support Counterair
Aircraft
Speed
Maneuverability
Range
Endurance
All Weather
Sophisticated Weapons
Delivery System
ECM Capability
Weapons Payload
Weapons
Long. Range-
Large Warhead
- Antipersonnel
Antirnaterial -
Sophisticated (Smart)
There will be specificscenarios where some of the judg-
mental evaluations in Figure 4 will be incorrect. It would
be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have maximum
characteristics in all aircraft and weapOnS. Unfortunately,
the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence,
some evaluation of probable use and likely need can be valuable.
Before leaving the projection mission, we would note that
only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the Sea
ra?
Control and Projection of Power. Ashore missions. Many weapons
and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults
on choke points or tactical air strikes on enemy air bases
can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission. Sea
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based tactical aircraft are used in Bea Control missions for
anti-air warfare and against enemy surface combatants. The
distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces nor
the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the
operation. Is the objective to secure/deny use of the sehs
or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance,
much of the layman's confusion over aircraft carrier use stems
from the impressipn that they are employed exclusively in the
Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the Battle
of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were
used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean's
surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to play in
both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.
In summary, Projection of Power Ashore tactics are:
PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE
? Amphibious Assault
? Marine Amphibious Force
? Marine Amphibious Brigade
O Marine Amphibious Unit
? ? Raid
? Naval Bombardment
* Direct-
? * Indirect
* Tactical Air
? Deep Interdiction
? Battlefield Interdiction
* Close Air Support
? Counterair/Antiair
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Naval Presence Mission
Simply stated, the Naval Presence mission is the use of
naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives.
Presence forces are used for two broad objectives:
? To deter adtions inimical to the interests of the
U.S. or its allies
e To encourage actions that are in the interests of
the U.S. ,or its allies
We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two
tactics: preventive deployments and reactive deployments.
The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence
in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a
crisis (reactive). In a preventive deployment our force
capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems which
might arise, clearly cannot be markedly inferior to some other
naval force in the neighborhood, but can rely to some extent
on the implication that reinforcements can be made available
if necessary. On the other hand, in a reactive deployment
any force deployed needs to possess an immediately credible
threat and be prepared to have its bluff called. If another
sea power, such as the Soviet Union, is in the area, a com?
parison of forces will be inevitable.
In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider
what size and composition of force is appropriate to the situa-
tion. There are basically five actions with which a Naval
Presence force can threaten another nation:
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0 Amphibious Assault
e Air Attack
6 Bombardment
to Blockade
? Exposure through reconnaissance
In addition, almost any size and type of presence force
can imply that the United States is concerned with the .situa-
tion and may decide to bring other military forces to bear.
All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we
tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can
move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be
appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the
threat of major air attack on a small oil sheikdom would
not be credible but the.threat of an amphibious assault on
the capital might be; or, sailing a major fleet to show sup-
port for a small government threatened with insurrection
might be more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps prompting
overaction.
When selecting a Naval Presence force, we must also take
into account how the countries that we want to influence will
perceive the situation. There are three distinctly different
categories of national perceivers:
The Soviet Union: When contemplating a U.S. presence
force, the Soviets must assess their comparative naval strength
available over time, and the expected degree of U.S. resolve.
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Their principal strength comparison would probably be on
which country can exercise sea control in the area in
question since the United States is not likely to pose a
threat of projecting power directly against the USSR, except
in a worldwide crisis of the most serious proportions.
Nations Allied to the Soviets: Nations with close
ties to the Soviets must assess relative US-USSR capabilities
in the particular circumstances. These powers will be asking
the question, "Can the United States project its assembled
power onto my shores?" and "Can the USSR deny them that
capability?" Thus third nation appraisal of relative sea
control strengths may be the most critical factor. We should
note, however, that third power assessments may not correspond
to either U.S. or Soviet assessments of identical military
factors.
Unaligned Third Nations: 'There will be cases where
a nation is not ab1 to invoke major power support in a dis-
pute with the United States. The perceptions of such a
country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to
project its power ashore to influence events in "-dlat country
itself.
Thus, the naval presence mission is simultaneously as
sophisticated and sensitive as any, but also probably the
least understood of all Navy missions. A well orchestrated
Naval Presence Can be enormously useful in complementing
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diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied
'deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Pre-
sence can be a persuasive. deterrent to war. If used ineptly,
it can be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence objec-
tives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, there
will never be a weapons system as important as the human
intellect.
are:
In summary, the tactics of the Naval Presence mission
NAVAL PRESENCE
? Preventive Deployments
a Reactive Deployments
CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES INVOLVING NAVAL MISSIONS AREAS
The United States, as we have seen, has perforMed the
four basic naval missions for many years. Yet the dynamic
nature of world conditions demands a continuing reassessment
of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative
emphasis on their individual tactics. National priorities
change. The nature of the threat changes. Only by under-
standing the complex interdependence between naval missions
and their elements can we expect to be able to allocate re-
sources wisely and prepare for the future rather than the
past.
Some of the key issues which must be addressed are:
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TAtra Mission Issues.
Strategic Deterrence
* Can we maintain our balance of power image and accent
controlled response without appearing to be developing.
a first strike capability?
Sea Control.
0-Should future SSN's be designed for employment in
barriers (attrition) or as escorts (local engagement)?
? Projection of Power Ashore
Amphibious Assault -
GI Should we design lift forces and tactics differently
for different size assault?
Naval Bombardment -
to Should the vanishing 6 inch and 8 inch guns be re-
placed? If so, by what?
Tactical Air -
O How much high performance capability is needed (or
can we afford) for deep interdiction?
? What tactical application could VSTOL aircraft best
fulfill?
Naval Presence
e Are there different operating policies that would yield
a greater presence capability?
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Inter Mission Issues
Strategic Deterrence vs General Purpose Forces
o Should sea based missiles be favored over the other
elements of the TRIAD and assume a greater role in,
Strategic Deterrence?
Sea Control vs Projection of Power
o Does the increased size of the Soviet Navy signal the
? end of our freedom to project power from sea sanctuaries
and justify shifting more resources into Sea Control?
O Are "Lo-mix"* Sea Control forces incompatible with the
? Projection of Power?
Presence vs Combative Missions
O Is the Presence mission becoming sufficiently important
? to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?
Force Mix
Some say the Navy should move toward more sophisticated,
multi-purpose units. . Others advocate cheaper, single mission
units, but more of them. What mix of high cost, multi-mission
and low cost, less sophisticated forces does the Navy need to
carry out the three non-strategic missions?
*When we think in the accustomed terms of projection of
power from sea sanctuaries, we incline toward larger, more
cost-effective, and more efficient platforms (the "hi" of the
"hi-lo mix"). Sea Control favors numbers of units because
operations will likely spread to numerous areas; the "Lo" of
the mix.
30
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I invite you to be CNO for a few minutes. In the followT.
ing chart, Figure 5, using
H (high) to mean expensive, sophisticated, multi-mission
L (low) to mean cheap, simple technology, single mission
indicate under each mission whether high (H) or low (L) sophis-
tication characteristics need to be built into aircraft, ships,
submarines, weapons, and sensors to carry out the specific
tactic.
FORCE
SEA
-
SEA CONTROL PROJECTION OF POWER PRESENCE
AIRCRAFT -
SHIPS
SUBMARINES
SENSORS
WEAPONS
FIG. 5
Obviously we cannot resolve these issues in a vacuum. We
must consider both what our national political objectives are
, 31
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;
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and what any potential opponent is doing. Our principal mili-
tary concern, of course, is the growing Soviet Navy. The
evolution of their post World War II navy would indicate that
they started with a sea denial orientation as evidenced by
their emphasis on submarines. There are those who argue that
this was intended only to deny us access to waters from which
we could Project Power into the Soviet Union. -There are others
who contend that their sea denial capability now includes being
able to interdict our resupply operations over a wide span of
oceans. It also seems clear that the Soviet Navy has chosen
to exercise its Naval Presence capabilities aggressively.
Whether they look'bh:this as a fall-Out of their other-capabil-
ities or have done so deliberately is difficultto assess
With the advent of Soviet aircraft carriers.and the continuing
expansion of their amphibious forces, there is a growing ques-
tion of whether they have ambitions for Projection'of Power
Ashore capability. If so, it would logically be accompanied
by assertive Sea Control capabilities to. defend their pro-
jection forces. Even smaller non-allied navies, such as the
Chinese, must be taken into account. They, as the Soviets,
are starting with a sea denial orientation. With relatively
simple sea denial weapons such as anti-ship missiles and mines
proliferating and extending in teach, the threat of sea denial
in restricted waters from even the smallest navies may well
increase in the future.
32
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There will always be this constant flow and counter flow
of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation. Perhaps it is
even more accentuated today than in the past. On the. one
hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this7
On theother, the changing nature of world political rela-
tionships demands a continual updating of naval capabilities
to support national policy. Naval officers, as,professionals,
must understand the Navy's missions, continually question
their rationale, and provide the .intellectual basis for keep-.
-ing-them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs. .Un-,
less we do, we will be left behind attempting ,to use yester-
day's tools to achieve today's objectives.
33
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Approved For Release 2001/
WASHINGTON1
RADM Read
RADM Staring
VADM Bagley
CNO
RADM Crowe
LGEN Jaskilka
LGEN Rogers
RADM Train
Bob Murray
Andy' Marshall
VADM Ed Hooper
Chief Carpenter
Qtrs P-1
Dean Krogh
-RDP80601554R003600170004-5
66Y1' 7-46
Office -
Foreign Service School
Georgetown University
Room
BuPers 2711
ARLEX 2042
BuPers 2072
4E660
4E566
Rm 2036- AA
Rm 2E736
Rm 4E566
Rm 3E869
Rm 3A930
Phone Numbers
OX-41291
OX-45021
OX-41101
OX-56007
OX-54402
OX-48003
OX-56003
OX-70831
OX-77234
OX-51822
Bldg 220, WNY 433-2210
Rm 4E658
Home -
2 Wynkoop Ct, Bethesda, MD
RADII 7om L. sows,
ovsum. coptsfum ICA MIMS
Rol SW718
(Pt Al
It Ruh ARA POS44-1 gel 30 46 2.
OOP ASs7. Setatic (eaucirmmj
OX 54412
433-2287
625-2518
229-6753
OX S72911
Olt 10611
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601554R0 600170004-5
ro
WASHINGTON SCHEDULE
17 - 18 APRIL 1974
Wednesday, 17 April 1974
1130 - Leave Retreat
1230 - Allegheny Flight #892
1340 - Arrive National Airport - Met by CNO car
(At disposal for entire visit
1400 - Meet RADM Hanson in RADM Read's Office
- YNCS Duplicate Original of Evaluation
(President Selection Board - Room G734)
1430 - Call on RADM Read
Personnel status
TAB
aCg444,
1500 -
1530 -
1630 -
Call on
Draft letter
Wilsoni
VADM Bagley
FT04
to Bayne
sars
C4I 4/1A/4
Call on LTGEN Samuel Jaskilka,
Keever letter
USMC,
Pm 2034
Academic Sherry, Dean Krogh's
Office
36th and N Streets
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
1700 - Nash Lecture by Mr. William Bundy
List of VADM Turner's personal guests
Reception IHO Mr. Bundy following in
Copley Lounge
2000 - Dinner at Dean Krogh's home
2 Wynkoop Court, Bethesda, Maryland
2100 -
Quarters P-1
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?
?
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,3
Thursd
, 18 April 1974
25
45 - CNO
,41/3
C?i. (NAB
cd&L
Bates Professorship
Draft letter to VADM Bayne
Missions
Letter to CNO
Precis (3)
Single Page Precis (6)
Letter from USS OWENS
Letter from Proceedings
0
Status of Colbert Dedication
Herrington: Co-Author book on
Naval Policy
CNET Command Relationship
Mr. Robert Murray
1100 - Appointment
Flag List
1200 - RADM Train (Lunch)
DO_
CDR Nepier V. Smith
Net Assessment Missions
RADM Crowe
Draft Letter
General Bernie Rogers 00E-736,,
Jackly Point Paper
Honorable M. Richard Rose 3))192---
1440 - Allegheny Flight #945
1545 - Arrive T. F. Green
1630 - Arrive NAVWARCOL
%
Ao
0
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'
?
COMMANDING OFFICER
U.S.S. ROBERT A. OWENS (DD-827)
2 ApAie 1.974
Dealt Vice Admitat Tunnet:
? Juzt Ct zhatt not to tett you hour much 1 appteciated
put attic& on nava mizzion4 .i.M! the tecent i44ue o4 the
Navat Waft Cottege Review. Fair. the 6i/ot time in my eateet,
/ 4eee that I iutty undetstand and Aetate to the Navy'4
? At,tki..40 time AdmiAat, 1 woad tike to 4uggat that
you considet the 4ea4ibitity o4 making you& attic& into a
shoitt, nat over. 30 minute's, 4tide phesentation iat u4e by '
evety command in the USN. 1 betieve that thete L4 a. gteat
need 40/E met USN petzonnet .Co have the mimions o4 the
Navy and theit pto4e44ion in 6ocu6. 1 think the otd te-
ctuiting 4togan, "Join the Navy and zee the woAtd",
countetpADductive and haz given them a di42otted view.
Again Admitat, 1 appteciate yout attic& and ?Het
this consttuctive idea Lox passibte toe in ?Advt. to en-
tighten att membets o6 out Navy.
Sineetety,
?R. J. HART
CDR, USN
?Commanding (Week.
Vice Admikat Stansgetd Tutnet, U. S. Navy.
Pitesident, Navat Watt Cottege
Newpott, RI 02840
(
,
ho
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e
COMMANDING OFFICER
U.S.S. ROBERT A. OWENS (DD-827)
-? 2 Awrie .1.974
Deair. Vice Admilta Tultnet:
Juzt a. 4holzt note to tett you how much. I appxeciated
youx air-tic-2e on kuwat mazionz --En .the ir.e.c.e.nt q the.
Nava Wax Cottege Review. Rm. the. 6,1A,st Vire in my e.axeex,
ee..e. that I iuLey undeitztand and teate .to the. Navy'z
1714,6420n.
At this time Admixat, I woad Vim ,to zuggeAt that
you consideit. the. 6e.a6ibie,Lty (IS mak-Eng you/E. ant-Lae into a.
zhoxt, not ovex 30 minute's, 4LLd pte.sentation 4ox-cvse by
evvuy command in the USN. I befieve that theiz.e -bs a. gn.eat
need 4olt. au t USN peitoonne2. to have the. tritszion/s o6 the.
Navy and thax jolt.o0.,64ion 4ocuz. I think the otd xe-
e.lud.ting .6togan, "Join ..the. Navy and