NOTE TO MR. WALT ROSTOW FROM RICHARD HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100060011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 10, 1966
• Content Type: NOTES

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Here is the study you requested.
Copies have been forwarded to
General Taylor, "Messrs. Rusk, NcNaxnara,
and Komer.
Attachment: 1
SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT
POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS.
10 May 1966
General Maxwell Taylor
The Honorable Dean Rusk The Honorable Robert McNamara
Mr. Robert Komer
This study responds to an inquiry from
Mr. Rostow. He has asked that a copy be
given you in preparation for the NSC meeting
at 5:30 P.M., today.
Attachment - 1
SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT
POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS.
10 May 1966
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SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT POLITICAL
DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS
Sumrnary
Under goading political pressures by the Buddhist leadership,
dominated by Tri Quang, the military government in South Vietnam has
been forced unwillingly into commitments and actions which, at this
reading, seem destined to produce a new constitution and civilian
government, certainly within a year's time. These political pressures,
spawned in an environment of heightened armed conflict and effective
Viet Lang political agitation, have created new tensions and fragilities
litany establishment. The clear Communist content
of the propaganda lines used by the Struggle Groups in the I Corps area
symptomine the continuing gravity of the turmoil there,
in spite of a
seeming easing of tensions there in recent weeks. General Dinh's
command and leadership have brought about this superficial easing, but
have not yet dominated the more fundamentally divisive forces at work
in the area. His own objectives and motivations remain unclear as well.
Odds would seem to favor the military establishment's observing
their present political commitments and going along with the constituent
assembly and the subsequent formation of a civil government. Real
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risk remains, however, that military elements, not yet coalesced,
may unite in action against suspect Buddhist motives. This risk is
increased if a civil government begins to move toward a neutralist
position of disengagement.
The other religious sects and groupings appear at this time to
have no decisive political impact. The contest is essentially one
between the military establishment and the Tri Quang hierarchy. It
appears that the U. S. does not have any significant leverage at its
disposal in this contest. The imperative factors now at work in the
social structure of Vietnam are deeply indigenous in their character and
If a Buddhist-dominated civil government emerges, and does not
provoke military reaction by moving to the left we may indeed witness
the forging of a new and intrinsically more natural Vietnamese national
character, a development which could strengthen the national fabric in
our joint endeavor. If a new government does move to the left, additional
and greater political convulsions can be expected.
. The Problem
South Vietnam is in the midst of a period of political ferment
and institutional transition. The outcome of this ferment and the
institutional forms that will emerge from the transitional process cannot
be predicted with any degree of assurance. Both will depend in large
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measure an the actions and interactions of the various groups in
South Vietnam - regional, military, religious and others -- which
presently possess some measure of political strength or influence.
This paper will endeavor to assess the strength, cohesiveness and
political intentions or aspirations of each of the major groups in order
to provide the best possible basis for an overall political appraisal.
U. The Political Complexion of I Corps
The political complexion of I Corps (and the First Division)
involves an amalgam of religious, regional and personal loyalties. The
Buddhists (or, more precisely, Tri Quang's supporters) have the
predominant political voice. They exercise their influence by manipulating
student groups, have the support of some local government officials
(including police officials), and are attempting to control or subvert the
military through Buddhist chaplains and military commanders amenable
to Buddhist guidance.
General Chuan's appointment as acting I Corps commander to
replace General Thi and General Nhuan's appointment as First Division
commander (vice Chuan) greatly increased Buddhist influence, since
both Chum= and Nhuan were chosen primarily because of their acceptability
to the Buddhists.
"-Struggle elements predominate
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in the First Division, but this is strongly resented by some loyalist
officers and, probably, troops. The First Division, in short, is badly
rent over political issues.
When General Dinh succeeded Chuan as I Corps commander
chose to act with extreme caution in reasserting central government
control over I Corps. Virtually all Struggle leaders such as Danang
Mayor Maya and the Struggle Movement's principal military leader,
Colonel You (who commands the special military sector surrounding
Danang) have been permitted to retain their positions. General Dinh is
moving with considerable political skill, but his own personal objectives
and loyalties are far from clear.
Demonstrations and violence in I Corps have diminished since
Dinh's arrival about four weeks ago. The government has resumed control
of radio stations, and some military units associated with the Struggle
have complied with orders to move out of the Danang area. Tensions
remain high, however, not only between Struggle Forces and the
government but between Struggle Forces and local anti-Struggle groups,
particularly various factions of the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD).
Military and paramilitary forces are involved on both sides and there
is a constant threat of violence.
Tri, Quang has returned to Hue and though he appears to be trying
to clamp down the more violent tactics he encouraged in the immediate
aftermath of General Thits ouster, there is no evidence to suggest he
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has abandoned his objective of broadening and strengthening the
"Struggle force" organization as a political Instrument which he can use
over the ensuing months to further his political aspirations.
The scope and intensity of disturbances in I Corps apparently
caught the Viet Cong unprepared, though the VC have moved swiftly to
take advantage of the situation as beat they can. We have evidence of
VC instructions to student groups to participate in demonstrations and
prepare banners and slogans. Struggle Force broadcasts, especially
by the Hue Radio, frequently use themes and terminology of obvious VC
inspiration. It seems clear that the VC have also infiltrated the Struggle
Force leadership to at least some significant extent.
Though on the surface the situation in I Carps has improved, in
fact little if any substantial progress has been made in returning it to
GVN (i. e., Saigon) control. Furthermore, the extent to which persons
of leftist or neutralist persuasion, including almost certainly some
actual VC agents, have succeeded in acquiring positions of influence
within the I Corps Struggle Movement raises some serious questions.
It is possible that -- whatever be his personal intentions -- Tri Quang
may find he can no longer dictate the themes or actions of the Struggle
Movement. Should this prove to be the case, Tri Luang may consider
himself forced to go to the head of the anti-war parade to conceal the
fact that he can no longer control the movement he started. This has not
necessarily happened yet. But it is a real danger.
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IIT. The Military Leader ship
The unity and cohesion of the GVN military establishment have
suffered as a result of the unrest following the dismissal of General
Thi as I Corps commander. The latent strains created by Ky's
original tactic of including in the government all military leaders who
could post a serious throat to the regime have become more evident
under current political pressures.
Chief of State and Directorate Chairman General Thisu and
Deputy Prime Minister General Co have tended to become isolated
from their Directorate colleagues. The four Corps commanders have
been devoting themselves to their regional duties while doing little to
bolster the authority of the central government or assist it in solving its
difficulties. Prime Minister Ky retains the loyalty and support of
moat of the principal military figures, but this loyalty derives largely
from friendship, personal association, and expediency rather than from
any high regard for Ky as a statesman or military leader. This support
could rapidly dissipate, particularly since senior Vietnamese military
figures have rarely let personal considerations interfere With political
expediency.
Failure of the central government to take decisive positive action
against military insubordination in I Corps and Buddhist agitation
throughout the country has resulted in some dissatisfaction among senior
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field grade officers in the Marines, Rangers, airborne, and armored
forces as well as other elements of the ground and air forces. Although
no clear organisation or leadership of these so-called "baby tucks" has
become evident, it appears likely that General Le Nguyen Khang,
commander of the capital military region, and Colonel Nguyen Ngoc
Loan, Director-General of National Police and chief of the Military
Security Service, are in sympathy with them and could probably assume
leadership of the group should they deem it advisable or desirable to
do so.
In general, the military establishment has shown no great
enthusiasrn for elections or an early transition to civilian government.
The goal of drafting a constitution and holding elections was first publicly
announced in November 1965, but measures to implement it have been
repeatedly, changed and postponed. The current program for transition
to civilian rule was promulgated on 14 April under pressure of widespread
demonstrations and the breakdown of government authority in the I Corps
area. The government has done little to resolve or clarify ambiguous
aspects of the present program. The electoral-law drafting committee
that met on 5 May, for example, complained that the government had
not followed the recommendation of a preliminary committee that met on
23 April and the chairman of this drafting group is currently trying
to clarify its mandate. General Ky's various public utterances have
done little to clarify matters. Instead, at various times he has made
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have been interpreted and publicized in ways working against the
government's position.
They reluctance of the leadership to propose and carry out a
clear-cut, definite transitional program is probably based on an ingrained
distrust of civilian politicians and a conviction that the time is not yet
ripe for elections and a civilian government. The military leadership
is probably resigned to some sort of elected civilian government, but
will attempt to provide safeguards to ensure that Communist influence
excluded, that the war effort is not weakened, and that the military
retain substantial influence. Formation of a military political party
such as that of Korean President Park Chung Hoe has been considered
by Prime Minister Ky and his advisors in the past, and Ky probably
continues to favor this idea. (He has suggested that military officers
resign their commissions and run for election to the National Assembly
with military support.) In any event, there will be a continuing
possibility throughout the coming months that a military officer or
group of officers will attempt to seize control of the government and
prevent the creation of a civilian regime.
There is probably no organized military group now actively
planning a coup. There are probably a number of individuals and small
groups, however, who would like to take control of the government under
certain ciarcumstances, and would attempt to do so if they thought
conditions were favorable (e. g., the "baby Lurks" mentioned above).
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Continuing tensions in I Corps provide continuing opportunities
for potential coup makers. Former I Corps commander General Thi
has not been conspicuous in recent events in the area, but there is a
considerable reservoir of loyalty to hinA and deterioration in the
political situation in Saigon might encourage Thi to believe he could
utilise his remaining support in I Corps to reassert himself on the
national scene. There is still some sympathy for Thi among top leaders
in Saigon, and Thi may feel he can count on some support from within
the present leadership. It stems unlikely that the present I Corps
commander, General Dinh, would be in a position to challenge the
central government in the near future. Dinh has been described as
universally disliked by everyone who has been associated with him and
he probably lacks any significant following that could support a power
play although there are reports that he has some private arrangement
with Tri Chiang. There have been widespread and persistent rumors in
Saigon that Chief of State General Thieu and Deputy Prime Minister Co
have been plotting to remove Ky. General Quang, IV Corps commander,
has been:rumored to be in league with Co, and the commanders of II and
III Corps are also linked with Thieu and Co in rumored 'coup plots.
If there io any fire behind the smoke, it may be that Thieu and Co have
been feeling out the possibilities of a palace coup, in which Ky and some
other leaders would be removed while the general framework of the
government would remain. i ET.
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In short, the military establishment is restless and incipient
factions are beginning to emerge. Though there may be little concrete
coup plotting presently in train there is obviously considerable talking
and maneuvering. At the moment the odds are probably a shade better
than even that no significant military group will move to disrupt the
process of transition to elected civilian government if there is no fresh
outbreak of serious disorder and unrest and if the new government does
not appear in military eyes to be neutralist or Communist influenced.
Should either of these conditions materialize, however, the odds an
military intervention would almost certainly tip the other way.
1V. The Buddhists
The Buddhists are the most important single factor in the current
political turmoil in South Vietnam. They precipitated the crisis and they
pressure on the government until they achieve a considerable
portion of their aims or until they are forcefully repressed. The
Buddhists cannot be said to have any precise tactical plans for achieving
their goals. Their intermediate aim, however, appears to be a government
which will, be susceptible to substantial Buddhist influence without being
overtly dominated by the Buddhist clerical hierarchy. In working toward
this goal, they have shown considerable political skill in exploiting
opportunities as they arose. The outstanding example is their prompt
utilization of General Thi's dismissal as a springboard for their current
campaign. Within two days, they had enunciated the "four points" that
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became the guidelines for the Struggle Movement in I Corps and
elsewhere? They have also exhibited an ability to control military
personnel through the Buddhist chaplains and to plan and carry out
demonstrations efficiently.
One of the Buddhists' major assets is their existing organization
which includes a national headquarters and subsidiary organs which are
particularly effective in the I Corps area and the coastal provinces.
Although weakened to some extent by internal disputes, this structure
provides the Buddhists with a means for initiating political action
simultaneously in many places. Aside from the armed forces, no other
non-Communist political force in the country can eomm*nd such an
effective political machine. Though the Buddhist hierarchy's involvement
in politics has cost them some support, especially among middle- and
upper-class Buddhists who feel the clergy should devote themselves
solely to religious matters, rank-and-file Buddhists probably remain
large responsive to guidance by the bonzes.
Recent events have probably tended to increase Buddhist
solidarity, at least for the time being. The more moderate elements
generally associated with Thick Tam Chau and the Saigon Buddhists
have tended to lose influence while the activists associated with Thick
Tri Luang and the Buddhists of the central provinces have gained. While
long-standing divisions based on regional and personal loyalties persist,
Tri Quang and his followers have somewhat extended their control of
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The domination of the Tri Quang faction is likely to persist
through any period of tension or anti-government struggle, but after
"victory" -- i.e.. the establishment of a civilian government in which
the Buddhists have a strong or predominant voice -- the fissures and
internal stresses within the Buddhist movement will certainly show
themselves.
V. The Catholics
In contrast to the Buddhists, the Catholics now appear to present
a less united front than they did before the current crisis began. One
reason is that certain Catholic leaders who indicated some willingness
to cooperate with the Buddhist campaign for elections and a civilian
government have met with opposition from other members of the Catholic
hierarchy. A division in Catholic ranks has thus appeared and the
Catholic bloc is currently undergoing a reorganization to restrict the
influence of those Catholics who might advocate cooperation with the
Buddhists.
The majority of Catholics remain opposed to the Buddhist
campaign. Many would prefer to see elections and a civilian government
postponed rather than run the risk of Buddhist domination. A real
threat of imminent Buddhist domination of t' e government would almost
certainly result in Catholic counter-action and probably violence. For
this reason, it is possible that a potential military coup-maker could
successfully appeal to the Catholics for support on the ground that he
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VI. Other Political Forces
The military, the Buddhists, and the Catholics are the only
political ellements capable of independent political activity throughout
South Vietaan, though the capabilities of even these groups are severely
limited by factional divisions. Other political parties and groups are
so identified with certain regions, and so highly fictionalized as to be
incapable of coordinated national action. In the I Corps area, the Vietnam
Nationalist Party (VNQDD) and the Dai Viet party are more active than
elsewhere in the country. They have been consistently opposed to
the Struggle Movement, although individual members have occasionally
been Struggle sympathizers. There is now a move afoot to fora--, a
coalition of VNCI)D, Dai Viet, and Catholic elements in. the Hue area
to oppose the influence of Struggle Forces and assure that Buddhists led
by Tri uang do not dominate the forthcoming constituent assembly.
In the southern part of South Vietnam, the Cao Dai and Hot Iiao
sects are more or less independ political elements in certain areas.
In the past they have been willing to cooperate with the Catholics in
opposition to the Buddhists. In the face of a threat of Buddhist domination,
a coalition of Catholics, Cao Dai, and Hot Hao could constitute an
effective opposition in parts of the Mekong Delta area.
The other significant political element consists of prominent
natives of the southern part of South Vietnam (i.e., what the French
called Cochin Clint). The major organization of this group is the
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French schools of the area. The membership of this Association includes
former government officials, professors, lawyers, businessnion, and
retired military officers. Because these southerners oppose the Ky
government on the grounds that it is dominated by people born in the
north, they are looked upon as a source of support for possible moves
to replace the present regime. The principal leader of the southerners,
retired General Tran Van Don, is frequently mentioned as a possible
interim Prime Minister, or as Prime Minister of an eventual elected
government. Don is a nominal Buddhist but is acceptable to many
Catholics and probably retains some personal popularity among the
military. He probably does not command enough real support to play
an independent political role, but it is possible that he could serge as
a compromise candidate for a high office at some point in the transition
to a civilian government.
VII. The Outlook
For the next few months South Vietnamese political life -- at
least urban political life -- will be in a process of active ferment as
South Vietnam transits a rough and rocky patch along the road to nationhood.
The processes of political transition, balance-striking and institution
building will obviously be complicated by the pressures and tensions of
war and by the fact and sheer size of the U. S. presence in Vietnam.
Pitfalls and possible sources of disaster abound and the immediate dangers
of chaos or anarchy will be ver Were vertheless, the type of political
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evolution now in train is probably inevitable and something no
interested group or party could stop, even if it wanted to. Furthermore,
despite the obvious hazards and uncertainties, the process of political
evolution ..- even forced draft evolution -- is not unhealthy and could
still produce a political structure with a broader popular base and
stronger x xandate than any South Vietnamese government has heretofore
enjoyed.
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