PRESS CONTACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN CRISIS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 15, 2002
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 26, 1962
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8.pdf219.92 KB
Body: 
Approved `For Release 2001A1 jNjff RjM6- ?1676R00 0011001 EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS) DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE) DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH) DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT) COMPTROLLER INSPECTOR GENERAL GENERAL COUNSEL ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES Distribution: TO ALL ADDRESSEES 1 - Col. Grogan 1 - ER via DCI, DDCI NOTE: Copies to DD/I and Col. Grogan were fwd'd 26 Oct. This memorandum contains information for the addressees. Ad- dressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request. CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY, Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8 - Approved Fo`rwRelease 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01 WR000100110012-8 October 24, 1%2 MZMQR AMD UM TOM: 0snsral Castes *U$JXGT: Prose Cestacts La C.assctios with the Cuban Crisis I sets a growing amount of pros s cssaaasst indicating that the Cuban situation developed precipitis.ty for one or two renews: (a) iaforssatisa was witbbsid from the public. or (a) intelligence was fatty or inadequate. Oen Use therefor* sh&WA be abeat as follows: The MR$U and ZKibi areas were surveyed on August 89th and ptsstios kb sad lb.n. was as syldasss Si army cesetrnsdes activity or un ne al Si awMartot, its. S oogom t wawa-- of& cs same" is Into ispissNbor and party Octsbsv woes insdfsettws because ad bad wander and do flights that wars suesoss- fat concentrated as dswis~-ls$ essential istssaastiss as known, isssatjstlass nab as SAM sites. cruise scissile sites. etc. ft- --- was obtained is a ald-diptssabsr as the arrival o[ tams crates saepsctod of containing fas 1a ss ad LL-26* but the planes themselves son" set be detected as no crates wore opened. The first affective fUgbt rovoaUsg significant iatsrawtiaa occurred is October 14th after several days' delay bscasss of woatber and this night revealed the fuselage of ass IL-22 which bad bass ancratod, the lscatisa ad the rsswaising crates, asd the ovidsiacs sit some IiRRM sibs. The most advascod apparently had d.os under construction for a few days. Subsejt flights rovoalsd progtasstvo assets ties ad tin. Mau sites. additional MAIM sites being c omm nos t od and initial construction as the first Si the IR f ld sites, aces a substantial somber of YL Us (crates of which bad been previously noted and roper" is being on the runway and ass crate unleaded and the plane being plated is operational states. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BOl676R000100110012-8 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01 WR000100110012-8 One can only conclude that what we observed had been care- fully planned for execution in a very minimum time in the interests of avoiding detection. I am told there are a number of articles in preparation. soma of which wish to deal with the role of intelligence in the findings and subssguent decision. .some writers have expressed a desire to do a profits on m o personally. I would like both any personal role and the role of intelligence played down. 'he might confine ourselves to the followiatg: On the evening of M achy, October 15th, analysis of photographs taken on ;unday, October 14th. revealed the probable evidacs of medium range missiles in Cuba. This probability was reported to the White Howe Tuesday morsiag and btcCone. who was on that day in ,oattle to attend the funeral of his stepson who had been killed on the 14th in an accident, was advised and returned to Washington on the first available plane. The 'Central Intelligence 1;.geucy and the entire Intelligence Community worked continuously on analysing the photographic product and preparing the necessary appraisals and estimates needed for proper policy consideration and decisions. The United :.tares Intelligence Board made up of senior intelligence officers from ;sate, befense. rnvy, Navy, =sir Force and Atomic Energy Cornm-is- nion met every day and somnetimes more often to consider current intelligence and estimates as they evolved. Jubcommittees of the Soard were in continuous session. a result the President and his policy advisors were currently supplied with a coordinated send considered judgrrent of the criticest situation. 1rdcCons personally attended all meetings of the senior Govern=sat officials and with the National security . a'xn,: it and with the President in considering the alternative courses of action & ad reaching final decision as to the coarse we have f3l:..wyd. as a principal intelligence officer of the Government. continue o meet daily as a memoer of the '.'reside sal appointive L'xeeativ-e _C:MZA ittee of the N. ;,L. JU17S~ .aa: ..:.root Approved For Release 2002/10/30 CIA-RDP80BOl676R000100110012-8 Executive Registry Approved,For?Release 2002/10/30: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400110012-8 - MW DD/R 691-62 29 October 1962 FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Press Contacts in Connection with the tubas Crisis I randuat for General Carter from , dated 94 October 191 , subject Sow as Above noted your re feed *e aorazWkm relative to att. t to follow the line Indicated. I s tld lfkee, however, to Est change in the second sentence of the first bra of the proposed lime, which I believe is owe in acrd with the facts and also makes a bettor case for our aativitioa. I believe that our successful flights in September and early October concentrated on developing Information on not piously covered by photography since the August bul'ld-4p, rather than obtaining recd rerrage of the areas which bad shown no evidence of unusual activity or in which known sites existed. This coverage of now areas was aimed at obtaining tatornation on additional sites, cruise missile sites and any other military installations which night exist. MUMM SCaTILt9 JR. qty Director March) co: VDCI !I motive Director Colonel GrO9116a Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BOl676R000100110012-8 Appr wed F DATE /30 : CI~;,~BP 76 n ROOM NO. BUILDING REMARKS: FROM: ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION I FFEB ORM NO G4 I REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. 000100110012-8 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8 rii4Z- C11- Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BOl676R000100110012-8 Appr ve s r20Af1/34+ss(IA-RQP?091w UNCLASSIFIED COIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 O/DCI 2 O/DDCI ' 2 G 3 ER. 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE ExDir 29 Oct UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40) 2-[~ 237 ? U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 0-587282 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BOl676R000100110012-8