LEVYING OF REQUIREMENTS IN THE NOSSENKO CASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 11, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE Executive Registxv
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
R 1 1 6 4
W4
SECRET
F NORA%. Uri TO: Lt. General Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
,L*gJECT Levying of Requirements in the Nossenko Case
The attached copy of a letter from Mr. Foster with
enclosure sets forth questions of particular significance to
AGDA for development during the debriefing of Yuri Nossenko.
Officials in State also have inquired about the levying
of requirements.
We would find it helpful to be informed of the subjects
on which Nossenko appears knowledgeable and the time when
;State's requirements might be levied.
Your advice in these matters will be appreciated.
Thomas L. Hughes
Letter from Mr. Foster
w/enclosures
State Department review completed
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 OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
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The availability for questioning of a former member
of the Soviet delegation to the ENDC offers an unprece-
dented opportunity for developing an understanding of
Soviet attitudes towards arms control proposals and
negotiations. I realize that intensive interrogation
has been going on now for some days ar-i that, in due
course, reports will be made available. Nevertheless,
I thought it might be useful to pass on to you some of
the questions which we in ACDA feel are of particular
significance at this time. These questions break down
into four areas: general tactics and composition of the
Soviet and Bloc delegations; Soviet policy positions;
likely Soviet attitudes with respect to the general
policies of other countries; and Soviet attitudes to-
wards specific proposals currently under consideration
at Geneva. Our questions are not intended to be compre-
hensive but, rather, indicate some areas of particular
interest. If the source is particularly knowledgeable.
on specific subjects, more detailed questions can be
provided.
Sincerely,
William C. Foster
List of Questions.
".rite sr a ?e+ f' rn it'17`,m~rJ, haiilli this
a_ 1i of ; t1Ce and Research,
,.Approved For Release 280 4 QJ~ e 4-RQP?@lilO-t676R000400070008-5
'.llamas L. Hughes,
Di_rec t.or , But c?au of
The Honorable
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 3..
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ACDA Proposed questions
I. Soviet Tactics and Delegation Composition
1. Elicit information on the way in which arms control and
disarmament policies are formulated both in the Foreign
Ministry and the other levels at which decisions are taken.
Include the roles of the party and the military.
2. What individuals or departments prepare the disarmament
position papers? Who finally approves them?
3. Seek information on internal operations of the USSR's
Geneva delegation, including biographic information, types
of expertise represented thereon, degree of flexibility
granted the delegation. What are the functional reponsi-
bilities of the members of the Soviet Delegation?
4. How are tactics, strategy and proposals on disarmament
developed, coordinated and approved by the Soviets?
5. With respect to disarmament, can hard and soft line groups
be identified?
6. How do the Soviets coordinate with the Satellites with
respect to disarmament measures?
7. What is the relationship of the Satellites with the Soviets
on disarmament? Do the Satellites always clear their proposals
with the Soviets before they are proposed?
8. What do the Soviets'know about the US disarmament pro-
posals? Are they informed in advance of o~_,.r texture actions?
9. What are the various actions, internal or external, which
place the greatest pressure on the Soviets disarmament proposals?
10. What is the morale of Soviet delegation at Geneva?
II. Soviet Arms Control and Disarmament Policy
1. What ~:re the basic and overall objectives of the Soviets
with respect to disarmament?
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2. Are the Soviets developing any new disarmament measures?
When will these be proposed? What are the details of these
proposals?
,. Are the Soviets cu:,:iidering any unilateral disarmament
measures?
4. How do the Soviets view the question of verification of
retained levels of armaments?
5. Will the Soviets permit adversary inspection? Aerial?
Ground?
6. How serious are the Soviets about disarmament and in what
fields do they look for concrete progress? Are they just
playing for time?
7. Do demands on Soviet economic resources make arms limita-
tions or disarmament attractive to the government? If so, what
sorts of measures are most interesting from that viewpoint?
8. What disarmament measures do the Soviets currently favor?
III. Soviet Attitudes Towards Current Proposals
1. To what extent was the Polish nuclear freeze proposal
coordinated with the Soviets? If so, do the Soviets mean
this proposal or is it a propaganda move?
2. What is Soviet attitude toward ChiCom participation in
the ENDC? What is the Soviet estimate on whether the Chinese
would accept? Does the source know about Soviet attitudes
toward UN ChiCom participation?
3. Does the source think they will "break off" the Conference
if it doesn't seem to be making progress, or go along for an
indefinite period?
4. Do the ChiComs seem a threat to the Soviet Union in the
short or long term, resulting in modified Soviet view on
disarmament?
TV. Soviet Attitudes.with Respect to Specific Proposals
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1. Are the Soviets adamant in their opposition to on-site
inspections or will they go back to an allowance of three or so?
2. Does the USSR intend to abrogate or abide by present version?
Do they seriously entertain a verified all-elements ban?
3. How seriously does the USSR treat the problem of minor
venting?
4. What is the significance of absence, to date, of underground
testing by USSR?
B. Ban on Production of Fissionable Material
1 Has there been serious consideration of an agreement with
the West on placing limits on production of fissionable material?
2. Will the USSR entertain inspection of any nuclear production
facilities.
3. Wi7.1 there be an attempt to conceal production facilities?
C. Ban on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1. What is the possibility of Soviets signing agreement on
non-dissemination without the West abandoning the multi-lateral
nuclear force?
D. Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (NDV) Freeze
1. Does the NDV freeze hold potential interest for the Soviets??
E. Observation Posts
1. Are the Soviets interested in the observation post concept
or is this a propaganda move?
2. With respect to observation posts, are the Soviets rigid
on fixed posts or will they accept roving posts?
F. Separable Measures
to Are the Soviets interested in making agreements on
;r -S .:age I ?casur` s?
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/02: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070008-5
ER 64-1844/e
March 1964
The Hirable Thomas L. H bes
Director, bureau of Intelligence
and Research
Department of ate
waskington, D. C.
Dear Tom:
I have your rnerorandum of 11 March with the
questions from Mr. roster pertaining to Noseako.
So assured that the queries will be handled as
rapidly as possible. I am leaving town today for a period
of about three weeks and will ask Dick Helens to keep you
advised on this matter.
raithfutly yours.
/a/ Pat
Marsh S. Carte r
Uout.uant Ceneral, USA
ti k,. 4,C-
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - DDC1
&.- ER (via Ex Dir)
I - DD/P
1 - CISR (via DD/P)
ry (~y~i b1
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