LETTER TO MR. JOHN MCCONE FROM THOMAS L. HUGHES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080026-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 17, 2003
Sequence Number:
26
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 23, 1964
Content Type:
LETTER
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080026-4.pdf | 85.11 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0004000800 se*--
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON
SECRET
APR 7 3 1964
Dear John,
In late June of last year USIB approved NIE 4-63, The
Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Systems. Since that time we have obtained new
information on the nuclear programs of two countries,
25X1
-Gnat wouJxt change somewhat the conclusions of 4-63
.
There may also be significant new data on the programs of
other-countries treated in the estimate,)
being one
25X1
We would like, therefore, to see a new Nth country
estimate scheduled for the third quarter of 1964, perhaps in
late summer after the annual Soviet AE estimate is finished.
We suggest that the estimate concentrate on capabilities and
intentions of non-communist countries to develop and produce
nuclear weapons, since the implications and consequences section
that appeared last year remains generally valid. Our suggested
terms of reference are attached.
Sincerely,
Thomas L. Hughes
Enclosure:
Suggested Terms of Reference
HHr. John McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence,
CIA Headquarters,
I ngley, Virginia.
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2004/01/15: iMP80B01676R000400080026-4
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080026-4
3ECRET
Draft Terms of Reference: Likelihood of a Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Before 1970
The Problem
To assess the capabilities and intentions of non-communist
countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons over about the
next five years.
Questions Bearing on the Problem
1. What countries now have an adequate technological and
scientific base for the development before 1970 of a nuclear
weapon and what are their intentions in this regard?
2. To what extent are these countries deficient in materials,
equipment or scientific talent that might require or make desirable
outside assistance?
3. If outside assistance were necessary for specific countries,
what would be the problems -- or lack of them -- in their obtaining
it?
What inhibiting effect, if any, might the test ban have
on weapon development by Nth country signatories?
~. Is clandestine weapon development a realistic possibility
over the next five years?
6. What technological developments are in sight that might
make weapon development easier?
7. What would be the cost of a token weapons program,
excluding delivery systems, i.e., a few fission weapons a year?
Of a more ambitious program?
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080026-4
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080026-4
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080026-4