HIGHLIGHT CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAR EAST MISSION CHIEFS' CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400100009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 23, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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i > i~. A HA l (V1 t i\ I OF STATE,
ASSISTANT SEATETARY
h'}';
TOP S1_1.C ': T'
MI, MORA NDUM
March 23, 1965
TO: 'The Secretary of Defense
Special Assistant t - the President for National Security
Director, CIA
Director, USIA
Under. Secretary of State
Administrator, AID
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
-Ambassador-at-Large Harriman
G - Mr. Thompson
DOD/ISA - Mr. McNau.ghton
Cl.hairrrman, JCS - General Wheeler (via Mr. McNaughton)
AlD - Mr. Gaud
All-) - Mr. Pouts
White 1 louse - Mr. Cooper
USIA - Mr. Bunco
CIA - Mr. Colby
"ROM: :fF E - William P. Bundy /"7
SUBJECT: Highlight Conclusions of the Far East Mission Chiefs'
Conference
Attached, for your personal use and for information only, are the
highlight conclusions of the Far East Mission Chiefs' Conference which
took place. at liacl'alo in the Philippines, March 9-11, 1965. These con-
clusion:, wore di >cwlsed in draft with the Mission Chiefs, but no effort
was made to (,lo over thorn line by line. They thus reflect the conoensus
uli a croup of. rce.,i,onsiblc individuals, and do not attempt to form a corn-
pr?olwn,,,uV(! or 1'u.ll.y authoritative ;=.,tate,rrt_nt of policy.
Atlacfh.rnc:nl.: 'l'op Secrc t -- highlight Conclusions
of Conference.
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FAR EAST MISSION CHIEFS' CONFERENCE
BAGUIO, MARCH 9-11, 1965
HIGHLIGHT CONCLUSIONS
General
1. The basic elements of our current Far Eastern policy are sound.
2. U.S. conduct in the Viet-Nam conflict is not only crucial in
itself, but is regarded as a touchstone of the U.S commitment in the
rest of the area. Initiation of air action against North Viet-Nam has
been generally regarded as demonstrating a previously questionable U.S.
determination. Many countries believe, however, that the pace of U.S.
actions must be further stepped up and our goals further spelled out if
our policy is to be clearly understood by both our enemies and our
friends.
;. While clear evidence of U.S. determination and power is perhaps
the foremost current need, there is an almost equal need to make clear
that the U.S. is acting; in support of the interests and desires of the
countries of the area themselves. Asian nationalism is growing and often
intemperate, and there are as yet scattered indications of anti-Americanism
and of a tendency to think of American actions in "imperialist" or, in
a few countries, in racial terms. To meet these factors, the U.S. must
on every occasion identify its actions with the interests of the local
governments and must weigh the effectiveness of specific U.S. action,
particularly in the military field, against any possible appearance that
the U.S. is acting solely for its own interest and is taking over the
situation beyond the desires of the local Asian government. *
h. There is a dangerous shortfall in military assistance funds for
the Far East, producing seriously adverse effects in both the security
and political fields. Viet-Nam needs must be met without regard to cost,
but the policy of doing this, on the military assistance side, out of
existing MAP totals has produced serious and continuing inadequacy in
military assistance funds particularly for Korea and Thailand, and to a
-* While this paragraph was generally endorsed, it was considered to
apply with extra force to reactions in Indonesia and Cambodia, but con-
versely to reflect a concern not significantly felt in Thailand and
Malaysia. The .L'orce of the attitudes stated clearly varies substantially
within the area.
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lesser extent for the GRC. Military assistance for these countries
should be funded at a level which will maintain the effectiveness of
their forces, particularly now that the threat from Communist China
is increasing. The additional appropriations required for this purpose
are very small compared with the perhaps $15 billion used to support
our own forces in the Far East.
5. No major changes in the alliance structure for the area now
appear desirable. A knitting together of the bilateral security arrange-
ments with Japan, Korea and the GRC into a Northern Security framework
is not now feasible. Although UEATO is not operative as such, except
for purposes of military planning, it is still useful politically. Fur-
ther consideration should be given to possible expansion of ANZUS as a
consultative mechanism or (perhaps alternatively) to whether SEATO might
be tightened by the withdrawal of France and/or Pakistan.
6. On the economic side, the Asian Development Bank should be
supported. A U.S. initiative for a Southeast Asian development organi-
zation would serve a highly useful purpose in defining "peace aims" for
the area, but there are a number of difficulties that must be faced
before this is advanced beyond the point of a very general statement.
7. I1.' the Viet-Nam situation should go badly, major additional
actions would-be required at high cost. Thailand would be the first
focal point, but there would be a need for substantial strengthening
action, both for practical and psychological effect, in many other
nations. This would specifically include M P and might include a new
and hard. look at revisions of the alliance structure.
SPECIFIC COUNTRIES AND AREAS
1. Third-country assistance to Viet-Nam continues to be important
both in showing widespread international support for the South Viet-Nam
Government in its struggle and in sharing the burden being carried by
the U.S. However, the Philippine political situation is so confused it
is doubtful we can get much help from them.
2. Thailand deserves a priority second only to Viet-Nam. Major
increases in U.S. personnel, or military deployments, are not now indi-
25X6
STATE
3. As to Laos we should try to hold the situation roughly as it is.
Li . There
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4. There is little we can do but hang on in Cambodia and attempt
to retain the best position we can in Burma. Sihanouk's anti-American
policy can be expected to return to a truer neutralism if our efforts
in Viet-Nam bear fruit.
1. An ROK-Japan settlement is more nearly in sight than ever and
needs every U.S. support we can usefully give.
2. Japan's external role both in economics and in defense will be
a crucial factor as it evolves over the next 3-5 years. We should en-
courage Japan to move forward to a full alliance with the United States.
This major objective should be given full consideration in our state-
ments and actions concerning the rest of the Far East, in our economic
relations with Japan, and in our handling of the Ryukyuan problem.
3. The Korean situation is marked by an underlying lack of self-
confidence and particularly requires the assurance, and the fact, of
adequate military assistance levels. This is not the time to consider
any reduction of U.S. forces except for the gravest reasons of use else-
where in the area.
4. In the GRC, there is a significant problem of confidence in the
outcome of the situation in Southeast Asia as well as in the future of
its on international position. On ChiRep in the UN, any U.S. shift to
a two-Chinas position would require careful handling with the GRC, but
the latter might now accept such a position if it were clear that this
would in fact mean its continued presence in the UN and the exclusion
of Peiping. It is not likely that Chiang will forfeit his claim for
eventual control of Mainland China. GRC combat forces should not be
considered for Viet-Nam, but additional military technicians might be
acceptable without serious Chinese Communist reaction.
1. Present U.S. policies are generally sound, although we should
continue to look at such possibilities as trade in medicines and broadened
travel regulations, with the expectation that Communist China would re-
ject these measures and thus expose its own basic hostility.
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2. Recognition of Outer Mongolia might have advantages, including
the tendency to widen the Sino-Soviet split. However, the GRC would
have to be carefully handled to avoid a sharp impact on its presently
shaky confidence.
1. We should try to keep a presence in Indonesia to the extent
Indonesian actions permit. We must play for the long term even though
our present influence will be extremely limited. We should remain alert
and retain the utmost flexibility in our capacity to respond to sudden
changes in this fast-moving situation.
2. Our present policies in Malaysia and the Philippines are generally
sound, leaving Malaysia largely to the British. In handling the stagnant
Philippine situation, we should try to minimize friction points and per-
haps pursue some limited initiatives in terms of assisting in the re-
structuring of the Philippine defense posture and also in Food for Peace
and other programs in rural development.
3. Our relations with Australia and New Zealand are sound, but will
require continuing very close consultation, as well as efforts to find
mutually acceptable formulae on the meat, wool and dairy products trade.
We should continue to further the increasingly responsible policy of both
countries toward the area as a whole, stressing particularly our growing
defense relationships.
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