PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES ON PANAMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400170004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 27, 1966
• Content Type: MF

25X1
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THE WHITE HOUSE
? WA SHING TO N
SECRET - SENSITIVE July 27, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
Administrator Gaud
Director Helms'
Secretary Resor
Assistant Secretary Gordon
Ambassador Anderson
SUBJECT: Presidential Directives on Panama
In order that we all have a clear understanding of the directives given
by the President at the conclusion of our Panama review meeting on
Tuesday, July 26, I have thought it useful to recapitulate them as
follows:
1.
2. Assistant Secretary Gordon is to establish a Contingency
Planning Group and immediately to proceed to develop
alternative courses of action should the treaty negotia-
tions reach an impasse. Ambassador Irwin will give
special attention to determining maximum concessions
which we might make to the Panamanians, taking into
consideration the requirement to retain United States
control of operation and defense of the Canal and what
the Congress is likely to accept. Assistant Secretary
Gordon and Ambassador Irwin will work closely together
in carrying out their respective assignments and both
keep Ambassador Anderson fully informed.
3. Assistant Secretary Gordon, in consultation with Admin-
istrator Gaud, is to:
NSC review completed
MORI/CDF Pages
a. establish a group to review actual and planned 1/2, 4-41.
assistance to Panama with a view to developing
SECRET - SENSITIVE
State Dept. review completed
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SECRET - SENSITIVE -2-
and putting into effect as rapidly as feasible
sound projects fax economic and social de-
velopment, with special emphasis on those
.having more immediate human impact.
b. develop a plan for a Panama Development
Authority, which Mr. Gordon will try to
persuade the Panamanians to accept.
c. assist United States businessmen interested
in private investment in Panama.
4. Secretary Gordon is to proceed with arrangements for
further grant assistance to strengthen the National Guard.
5. In order to assure full coordination within the government,
Secretary Gordon is to pass on all public statements and
new initiatives relating to Panama. He is to coordinate
these closely with Ambassador Anderson for their possible
effect pn the canal negotiations.
(,)
W. W. Rostow
SECRET - SENSITIVE
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STAT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt "A. R.ostow'
_
,pecial Assistant to the President
National Security Affair
SUBJECT : Security Reviews
Pursuant to your request there are transmitted herewith
L;ecurity Reviews on the following areas:
..:Jananta
Colombia (Bogota)
1.)eru (Lima and Tarapoto)
Chile (Arica)
bulivia (Santo Cruz)
brazil (Brasilia and Grata)
Venezuela (Caracas).
Attachments
SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:
Deputy Director for Plans
H
3151: ichard H, Lits
. irectur
3"..?^'^''"'''''3?3 3.70 3.. Ir
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1. The general political and security climate in Panama
now is one of a somewhat uneasy calm. Normality has returned
to Colon. Panama's second largest city, at least on the surface,
after the riots and demonstrations of early June which cost the
lives of two and the burning of several public buildings. In Panama
City and Colon, where almost 1/3 of the population residea, there
pervades a general feeling of restlessness, due to the high unemploy-
ment and very poor living conditions which exist for the bulk of the
populace. Nonetheless, it appears that, barring some unexpected
precipitating factor, no new manifestations should occur in the
near future which would cause a breakdown in public order.
2. There are three organisations which must be considered
as threats to the security of the Government of Panama:
a. The Peoples Party of Panama (PDF') is the
orthodox Communist Party of Panama. It is Moscow-
orientated and generally soft-lined. It hae a member-
ship of perhaps 500. with some 250 party activists.
Although small. the PDP does control the important
student organizations in the country. including those at
the University of Panama, and through these it has the
capability of causing a disproportionate amount of
trouble for the government.
b. The Panamanian Revolutionary Union (URP) is
a pro-Peking nurvexnent with some 60-100 members,
most of them students. Although more aggressive and
violent than the POP, the party is hampered by internal
divisions, lack of funds, and by rivalry with the ADP,
and does not in itself pose a serious threat to stability.
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c. The Panamenista Party, although not pro-
Communist, poses a threat to Panamanian stability
due to the demagogic and uncertain nature of its
Leader. Arnulfo Arias. Twice president and twice
deposed from that office, Arias has by far the greatest
popular following of any Panamanian politician, and his
greatest strength lies in the sectors of the Panamanian
economy most stifled by poverty and want, the urban
slum dwellers.
. Friendly Forces:
a. Panama's only uniformed security force is the
National Guard (ON). It currently numbers approximately
4,300 men and is a disciplined and fairly competent
organization, loyal to its longtime commander, Brigadier
General Bolivar Vallarino.
b. The only other security organization is the 250 man
Department of National investigations (DENO, a plainclothes
investigative unit responsible to the Ministry of the
Presidency and concentrated mostly in Panama City and
Colon.
c. The U. S. forces in the Canal Zone must also be
considered since in the event of extreme disorders that
got out of the control of the Panamanian security forces,
they could be employed. Their actual strength at any given
time is about 10,000.
4. Panama has been wracked by civil disorders twice in recent
times. In January 1964 riots broke out in Panama City in a dispute
over whether a Panamanian or U. S. flag should fly over a school in
the Canal Zone. In this instance the Panamanian Government of
President Roberto Chiari failed for several days to commit the
National Guard to quell the rioters, whose venom was directed
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primarily at U. S. personnel and property. As a result, over 20
persons were killed before the riots ended, and property damages
ran into the millions. Panamanians have never really forgiven the
U. S. for the killing of Panamanians by U. S. troops (even though
most of the Panamanian deaths were suffered by looters caught in
burning buildings, and the like), and the memory of this occasion
continues to provide an emotional issue which is used to eitr up
anti-U. S. feelings.
5. In June of this year disorders once again broke out, this
time over the unexplained death of a Communist student who had
recently returned from the USSR. Thie time, however, the demon-
strations were targetted against the security forces of Panama. In
contrast to 1964, President Marco A. Robles immediately put the
ON into action, and the demonstrators were aggressively battled and
scattered. Of importance during these disturbances was the fact
that dlandestine reporting showed that the PDP leadership quickly
backed away from calling for a confrontation with Government forces
after efforts to incite a general alike had failed, and retreated into
the background. However, younger, more militant party members,
local thugs, and other youths continued to incite disorders and battle
with the ON before being brought under control. In several instances
during these riots the situation nearly got out of the control of the
ON. This has prompted the Ooverzunent of Panazna to request U. S.
financial assistance for the addition of 1,000 more men to the ON.
6. Currently the situation in Panama is quiet. However,
the basic socio-economic weaknesses which undermine stability
Tell-Hafts President Robles' shaky coalition government of oligarchial
parties has been unable satisfactorily to cope with Panama's serious
problems. The disparity in Panamanian living standards, wide-
spread unemployment and growing poverty, particularly in.the urban
areas, make the outlook for political stability bleak. The over-
crowded, outdated facility inhabited by the University of Panama
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gives the PDP a ready issue with which to rally the volatile students
against the government. Added to this is the Robles' government's
handling of the current Canal negotiations. which has been seized
upon by all shades of opposition as a lever for attacking the govern-
m,ent.
7. Thus, there are several areas in which sorn s incident
could arise to touch off new disorders. However, the National Guard
should be able to put down any new strife. unless Assault* Arias
chose to call his followers into the streets. Thus far Arias, the
one man who appears to have the ability, given the right situation,
to bring down the Robles government, has contented himself with
biding his time, apparently hoping to be legally called on by the
people in the next elections (1968) to save Panama. Therefore, it
is felt that the National Guard will be able to contain disorders
which could be triggered by a variety of issues in this volatile
climate.
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COLOMBIA
1. The political and security climate of Colombia is more
stable now than at any time during the past year and is expected to
remain substantially unchanged through the inauguration of President
Lleras on 7 August. Bogota has experienced a few isolated terrorist
acts, student demonstrations and a "land invasion" (politically inspired
squatting), but there have been no major or uncontrolled disturbances
in Colombia this year. ,yhile the Colombian security forces cannot
guarantee foreknowledge of plans or protection against isolated acts
of terrorism, it is believed they can control practically all organized
disturbances and can detect any major plans for disruptive or
terrorist actions by organized groups. Organizations capable of
mounting acts of violence in selected areas are the following:
a, The Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), the
orthodox, Soviet-line party, with about 7,000.8,000
active members.
b. Communist Party of Colombia/Mandst-Leninist
(PCC/ML), the Chinese-line party, with about 2.500
active members.
c. Army of National Liberation (ELN), a pro-Castro
revolutionary guerrilla group with about 100 men in the
hinterland.
d. 'giorker.Student.Peasant Ivl.ovement (h4OLC), a
pro.Chinese revolutionary group, with about 500 active
members.
e. National Federation of University Students (FUN),
which is controlled principally by pro-Chinese Communists
but is made up of many kind, of leftist and extremist
students. (Students, and especially the FUN, have been
the most successful of all Colombian groups in creating
disturbances in urban areas, especially Bogota.)
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f.Although non-Communist the National Popular
Alliance (ANP) of former dictator Rojas Pinilla, which
polled almost 30 percent of the vote in the presidential
election in May, also has the capability of mounting
disorders.
2. Colombia has a background of politically inspired violence
which, since 1947, has claimed the lives of perhaps as many as a
quarter of a million people. Gangsterism and banditry, principally
in highland rural areas, carried on by those who have known no other
existence for 15 years, still flourished in 1961 despite efforts at
suppression by the police and army. The problem was further
compounded by Communist efforts to influence or establish control
over bandit groups. Persistent efforts by the military, aided by
the police, since 1961 have neutralized the threat to the stability
of the government and to the economy of the country posed by the
bandits and guerrillas. As indicated above, however, several
organizations have the capability of mounting campaigns of violence.
3. There is currently no indication that extremist groups
have formulated plans of action for the inauguration, nor have unusual
movements or actions by subversive individuals been noted. However,
25X1 thiS oxpects symbolic attacks,
demonstrations, "land invasions," and other similar protest actions
aimed at the inauguration of I.Ibras aa president. If a high-level
official is a member of the U. S. delegation to the inauguration, the
principal Communist and extremist organisations could be expected
to step up piano for disturbances and terrorist activities. This
assessment is based an patterns of activities of these groups in the
past,
4. As of midJuly the security services were just initiating
preparations for the inauguration and were awaiting firm indications
from the presidential palace concerning plans and schedule. Colonel
Jorge Rol:A.0d? Pulido, Chief of Staff of the Militery.Inatitutes_Brigade
(BIM Army unit, responsible for security in Bogota under the present
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state of ge decree) and former chief of Army Intelligence
will be the coordinator for all security matters concerning the
inauguration. The Administrative Department of Security (DAB) and
and the E.2 will be responsible for providing intelligence support.
The National Police, the BIM troops, and to some extent the DAB
agents, are responsible for crowd control.
5. In terms of planning, we may expect the following security
measures by the Colombian security forces. The Public Order Division
of DAS plans to set up a briefing room for daily meetings with security
representatives of the visiting delegations. DAB is also preparing a
preventive arrest list such as the one used before the visit of General
De Gaulle to Colombia in 1944, when about 300 undesirables were
placed under preventive arrest. The security services will probably
set up road blocks for controlling travel and possible transport of
arms. The Army will place sharpshooters in strategic buildings
along the routes used. In addition to Army troop., about 3,000
policemen, plus the traffic police, are available to maintain order
in Bogota. An additional 27, 000 policemen are located throughout
the country. DAB has a total of about 2,000 men, located in key
cities and towns.
mr,
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PERU
1. The political and security climate of Peru has remained
stable ince the conclusion in early 1966 of the Government's success-
ful campaign against the guerrilla uprising, which began in Sum. 1965.
President Belaunde has been in office since 1963 and his term runs
until 1969. Although municipal elections are scheduled for November
1966, there is no indication that these will be the occasion for any
abnormal outbreaks of violence. There are isolated famine areas
in the eastern portions of Peru which may see some peasant unrest;
however, the Government is taking measures to relieve the food
situation. The leaders of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR). Which conducted the guerrilla activity in 1965, have either
been killed, are imprisoned or are in other countries. Organizations
capable of mounting acts of violence in selected areas are the
following:
a. The Communist Party of Peru (PCP), with
about 5000-6000 active members, is split into a
Soviet-line faction and a Chinese-line faction. The
Chinese faction is the larger group but is itself
fragmented by internal power struggles.
b. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left,
(MIR), with a nationwide membership over 1,000,
initiated guerrilla action in the summer of 1965.
Only 125-150 members were actively engaged in the
fighting and by early 1966 they had been decimated.
The top field leaders are dead and almost all the
Lima-based urban leaders in prison.
c. Minor Leftist Parties with a total maximum
strength of 2000 attract the socially maladjusted, the
criminals and the anarchists. They have no ideological
cohesion and although they are capable of sporadic,
uncoordinated activities, they concentrate most of their
energies on bank robberies.
d. The Revolutionary Student Front (FER) controls
most of the Peruvian universities. They occasionally
have engaged in violent actions but are more likely to
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limit their activities to mass protest demonstrations.
However, the oldest and best known Lima University,
San Marcos, is controlled by the Chinese faction of
the Communist youth which represents the activist
arm of the Communist Party.
2. Communist oriented and trained groups in Peru continue
to pursue their objectives of subverting labor, student, peasant and
other organizations with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the present
constitutional government. However, for the present. given the
effective security measures of the government against the MIR, the
leaders and membership of all the revolutionary left parties are off
balance and fearful and not capable of effective action.
3. The Minister of Government and Police is responsible
for maintaining public law and order. He fulfills this responsibility
through the Civil Guard, the Peruvian Investigation Police and the
Republican Guard. The Peruvian police forces are capable of
controllirtg most urk- an disturbances. Primary responsibility for
crowd control and security in Lima rests with the 20, 000 man
Civil Guard which is equipped with both motorized and horse patrol
facilities. It is supported by the Republic Guard with 3,800 personnel
and the investigative facilities of the 3, 500 man Peruvian Investiga-
tions Police. The latter has the responsibility of keeping track of
subversives and has demonstrated considerable ability in this area.
They maintain good records on subversives and have been quite
successful in identifying, locating and detaining subversive elements
during time. of crisis. The rural capabilities of the security forces
are limited, largely due to the lack of PIP coverage in these areas,
lack of effective communications and poor coordination.
4. Cooperation between the three civilian police agencies of
Peru is not good, nor do the civilian and military forces coordinate
effectively.
5. The Armed Forces are funoamentally apolitical in action
and outlook. They are strongly anti-Communist arid western-oriented
and the officer corps is of high caliber. Current strength of the
Armed Forces is as follows:
IFCRET
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Officers
r.nlisted Men
Army
4.000
31,000
Air Force
950
5,150
Navy
675
8,850
6. The town of Tarapoto, with a population of approximately
20, 000, is located in the Department of San Martin. The area is
fertile farm region with principal crops of cotton, tobacco, sugar
cane and coffee. The airfield, located just outside the town, is
serviced by the Peruvian Mr Force commercial line, SATCO, and
the private Faucett airline. It can handle up to C-I18 aircraft
during daylight only. Although details are not immediately avail-
able, there apparently are both military and civil air communications
facilities at the airport. During the guerrilla activity in 1965, there
were no major clashes between government forces and the MIK in
the Northern Zone which would include Tarapoto. However, there
were reliable reports of guerrilla camps in the area and, as recently
as February 1966, an armed band ambushed a Guardia Civil patrol
within 200 miles of Tarapoto.
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CHILE
1. Chile's northernmost port city of Arica was acquited
in 1929 following territorial disputes among Peru, Bolivia, and
Chile resulting from the IA ar of the Pacific (1879-1883), which
Chile had won. Acquisition of Arica. left a residue of controversy
between Chile and Bolivia which is manifested in Bolivian aspira-
tions to regain Arica and access to the sea. These aspirations
are frequently exploited by extremist Communist or nationalist
groups in both Peru and Bolivia. Diplomatic relations between
Chile and Bolivia were broken in 1962 as a result of a dispute
over water rights of the Lauca River, which originates in Chile
and flows into Bolivia. After 23 years of unsuccessful negotia-
tions, Chile began an irrigation project to divert water. Bolivia
promptly suspended relations and appealed to the Q.A.S. Bolivia
proposed mediation, but Chile insisted on arbitration by the Inter-
national Court of .Tuatice. The impasse continues. For both
countries the dispute has strong nationalistic overtones which
overshadow the immediate issue of Lauca.
2, Although the port of Arica is serviced by rail connec-
tions, the Pan American highway and two small airports, it hag
failed to develop into a major shipping center. Its pro4mity to
the Peruvian and Bolivian borders and the looseness of border
control procedures has made Arica a center for smugglers. The
Agency also has had reports that in the past Arica was used by
Castroite and Communist extremists for entry into Bolivia and
Peru, This activity, however, was not of great magnitude due to
Arica's isolation from the mainstreams of Latin American and
international subversive political activity.
3. Arica. has a population of 42,452. In the 1964 national
elections the Communist-Socialist presidential candidate obtained
26,048 votes in Arica and adjoining areas, in comparison with
24,793 for Frei s.nd the Christian Democrats. There is no university
or strong student activity in Arica. The labor unions in Aim Arica
area, predominantly mining, are well organized and are controlled
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by the Communists and Socialists. The slum dwellers in the area
also are organized and controlled largely by the Communists and
Socialists. Although there are extremist, pro-Peking political
movements in Chile, these are minimal in strength and influence
and not aggressively active in Arica.
4. Despite the strong Communist-Socialist influence in
the area, political disorder in the form of riots and demonstrations
in Arica has been minimal and parochial in view of its isolation
from the political and geographic centers of Chile. Police and
security forces in Arica consist of 26 officers from Investigaciones,
the Chilean security and criminal investigative service, some
350 Carabineros (police), and some 300 to 500 military personnel.
The overall strength of Investigaciones is 2, 152 officers who are
deployed throughout urban centers in Chile. It is considered as
a highly professional and effective service by Latin American
standards, with modern equipment. Apart from criminal matters
the service monitors political and labor activities. Its chief ie
Director General Emilio Oelch.kers, a career officer. The strength
of the Carabineros is 23, 000, headed by General Vicente Fluerta
Cells. The principal functions of the Carabineros are to maintain
public order, help safeguard borders and coastal regions, traffic
and other normal police matters. The Carabineros is one of the
most efficient police forces in South America; many of ite officers
have been trained by the U.S. and AID has a relatively large
assistance program with the Carabineros involving training, equip-
ment and advisors.
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BOL1 VIA
I. The political and security climate of Bolivia has been
uncertain under the Military Junt., Government, which came to
power in 1964. Two major outbreaks of violence in 1965 were pat
down by the army at a conaiderable cost in lives. Presidential and
congressional elections were held on 3 July 1966 without major
incidents of a security nature, and the outlook for the inauguration
of President-elect Rene Barrientos on 6 August and the period
immediately thereafter now appears to be favorable.
2. Government forces have the capability to detect major
for disruptive or terrorist actions by organized groups and
normally control organized disturbances in the main cities.
ever, Bolivian security forces cannot guarantee foreknowledge
ens or protection against isolated acts of terrorism and are
not well geared to counter such acts. Organizations capable of
mounting acts of violence are the following:
a. The Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB, pro-
Moscow), the orthodox, Soviet.line party with about
3,000 - 4.000 active members.
b. The Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB, pro-
Peking), the Chinese-line party with about 500 - 1,000
active members.
c. The Revolutionary Workers Party (POR), a
Trotskyist party which is divided into two groups with
a total membership of about 1,500 of which approximately
250 are hard core members.
d, The National Liberation Front (FUN), a Communist
front organisation responsive to PCB, pre-Moscow, which
has few members itself but can influence leftist extremist
students, workers, and others in significant numbers
under favorable conditions.
SECRET
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0. The National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN),
a leftist party which frequently collaborates with Communists,
with perhaps as many as 20,000 n2embers throughout the
country.
f. The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), a
leftist political force, now divided into several factions.
which ruled the country until it was overthrown by the
revolution of November 1964. Although the effective
strength of the MNR under present conditions is difficult
to measure, one indication of influence, if not actual
membership, of the MNR is the combined 142,000 votes
(about 14% of the total) that it received in the 3 July
elections. It has a capability for violence in the Santa
Cruz area.
g. The Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB), a strongly
nationalistic party with fascisttendencies which has a
long history of plotting and acts of violence, Including
an attempted coup d'etat in 1959 and guerrilla action in
eastern Bolivia in mid-1964 in opposition to the MNR
government then in power. Although not now overtly
hostile toward the government, the FSB, with about
10,800 members throughout the country, secured over
138,000 votes in the elections and has a capability for
violence that cannot be discounted, particularly in the
Santa Cruz area.
3. Bolivia has witnessed much politically inspired violence
since the revolution of 1952 which swept the MNR to power. Centers
of violence have been the principal cities and ths mining region
southeast of Oruro. In May 1965 a fire fight between armed workers
and the army in the capital city resulted in about 100 dead, a number
which was equaled the following September when the army put down
attacks by workers at the tin mining center of Siglo Veinte. This
girPIT
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was accompanied by an operation that was only partially successful
in rounding up the thousands of arms that have been in the hands of
workers and peasants since the 1952 revolution. Students under
certain conditions pose perhaps an even greater security threat than
do workers because the government is most reluctant to use force
against them. Thus, the provocation potential of the student element
is very strong, and student plans for violence are often difficult to
detect much in advance.
4. There are currently no indications that extremist groups
plan acts of violence during the period surrounding the presidential
inauguration on 6 August. However, on the basis of past performance,
some protest demonstrations, propaganda rallies and perhaps symbolic
sabotage actions by opposition groups can be expected, at least on a
small and isolated scale. While such demonstrations probably would
be designed primarily for propaganda purposes, the possibility of an
incident touching off acts of violence would be ever present and difficult
to foretell. The provincial cities of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, which
are often visited by United States officials, have the same basic security
hazards as La Paz, except for the flat terrain which permits some
alternate routes through the cities to be used. A further security
consideration is the sizeable following of the mutually antagonistic
MNR and FSB in Santa Cruz.
5. Since the overthrow of the MNR government in Bolivia in
November 1964 by a military coup d'etat, the Armed Forces numbering
18,000 men have had the primary responsibility for internal security.
The Bolivian Armed Forces are among the least effective in the
hemisphere. Most army units devote a major portion of their military
duty time to agriculture, road construction, and other 11CO210MiC
activities.
6. The Bolivian public order force is composed of: the National
Police (Guardia Nacional) responsible for maintaining law and order;
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the traffic police (Transito); and the Criminal Investigation Division
(DNIC. Departamento Nacional de Investigacion Criminal). These
throe groups, with a combined strength of approximately 5, 000 are
responsible to the Minister of Government. While the police force
has the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, the
military can of necessity be expected to take over in any serious
situation. There has been a traditional rivalry in Bolivia between
the police and the Armed Forces stemming from the partial decimation
of the Armed Forces after the 1952 MNR revolution, with the latter
in the ascendency since the 4 November 1964 military coup.
7. Although the Armed Forces and the civilian security
elements have the capability of containing most local security
problems on a short-term beide, the GOB would have difficulty in
handling a serious security situation over a prolonged period of
time given the overall inefficiency of the Armed Forces, plus the
downgraded status of the civilian police and security units.
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STAT
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BRAZIL
1. The political and security climate of Brazil in mid-1966
is considered stable and it is expected to remain substantially
unchanged during the second half of 1966.
Z. Brazil has experienced several recent acts ,)f terrorism
which were directed against United States property in the country.
A bomb exploded in the corridor of the American Consulate in Belo
Horizonte on 20 September 1965. A small explosive device was set
off at the U515 Information Center in Brasilia on 29 June 1966. An
arson attempt was directed against the Belo Horizonte Bi-National
Center on 14 June 1966. On 26 July 1966 a bomb of undetermined
size was exploded at the US1S theater in Recife. Although no
American injuries were sustained in the above terrorist acts and
damage in most instances was minor, there exiets no guarantee
that advance notice and adequate protection of United States property
can be obtained against isolated terrorist acts. On the other hand,
the Security Forces of Brazil are considered capable of controlling
all organized disturbances and can detect any major plans for
disruptive or terrorist actions by organized groups. The most
serious act of terrorism which coincided with the bombing of the
USW theater in Recife on 26 July 1966, was an airport explosion in
Recife. Two Brazilians died as a result of this explosion which
occurred within 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival of Marshal
Costa e Silva, the Government candidate for the Presidency in the
October elections.
3. Subversive organizations with limited capabilities of
mounting acts of violence in selected areas of Brazil are the
following:
a. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the orthodox,
Soviet-line party with approximately 20, 000 hard-core
members and an estimated strength of 100, 000 sympathizers.
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b. The Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), the pro-
Chinese Communist-line party with an estimated hard-core
numerical strength of 500. Some of its younger elements
have undergone guerrilla warfare training in Communist
China and have returned to Brazil.
c. The Peasant Leagues were an effective force in
Brazil only from roughly 1961-1963. They were capable of
rural agitation, mostly squatting, occasionally a small
peasant strike, even more occasionally a small fire-fight
against local owners. While its leaders claimed the Leagues
had up to 20, 000 members (or more) in fact, the Leagues had
only a small core of full time workers, very loosely organized
peasant groups on the farms and little real political power.
It also attempted to set up a clandestine guerrilla arm of about
30-100 members but quickly ran afoul of the law in this effort.
Since the revolution of March 31, 1964, with its prominent
leaders either in exile, in jail, or in hiding, the Leagues have
collapsed.
4. The following political and institutionalized categories for
diverse reasons have varied potential to upset the heretofore described
stability found in Brazil:
a. Because the label hard-line has been indiscriminately
applied to all manner of groups in Brazil, there is widespread
confusion both in and outside of Brazil about what the label
signifies. In its broadest meaning, when used as an adjective,
it means any group in favor of rooting out corruption and
Communism from Brazilian political life. In a narrow sense,
when used as a noun, it refers to a small, predominately
military group which played an important role in the 31 March
1964 Revolution and which now insists that the Brazilian
Government not be returned to any of the groups which ran it
prior to the Revolution, i.e., the Vargas inspired forces.
b. There are a smattering of extreme right wing groups
in Brazil, none of which carry much political weight. The
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3
well-known right wing leaders such as retired Admiral
Sylvio Heck, and retired Admiral Penna Botta are capable
of occasionally rating a headline in a Brazilian newspaper;
however, they have little following and almost no political
power. These extremists consider themselves members of
hard-line groups but they are not members of Hard-line.
c. Student discontent in Brazil is presently at a high
level because (1) the Brazilian Government has largely
ignored the students and their demands (2) many student
politicians recall with longing the Goulart era when they
participated actively in national politics and (3) the most
dynamic student organizations in Brazil are under the
leadership of far left wing students.
d. Labor Union discontent matches student discontent
largely for the same reasons -- their demands are ignored,
they have lost their position of political importance, many
of their leaders are far left wingers. Union discontent has
been flamed by the general unhappiness with the rising cost
of living which has accompanied the Government's stabiliza-
tion program.
e. The organization which best represents the student
and labor unrest is Popular Action, a student dominated,
clandestine, radical left wing group. Most of its members
are sincerely dedicated to ridding Brazil of what they consider
its present repressive government. While the group claims
to be, and probably largely is, non-Communist, many of
their plans and activities are virtually identical to those of
Brazil's Communist Party. There are other small non-
Communist extremist left wing groups in Brasil possibly
capable of isolated incidents of harassment but of small
political importance.
5. The overall strength of the Security Forces (not including
Air Force and Navy) is approximately 310, 000. A breakdown shows
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150, 000 in the Brazilian Army, 105, 000 in the militarized police
force, and 50, 000 in the civil police force.
A. Situation report on Brasilia, Federal District:
(1) Airfields
The Brasilia Airfield and the Brasilia Military
Airfield, which are located side by side, handle
commercial jet aircraft on a daily basis. The strip
is of sufficient size to handle 707s.
(2) Hospital
There is one hospital in Brasilia, a government-
operated one, which is, according to the Brasilia post
report, believed adequate only for out-patient treatment
and in-patient treatment for emergencies. There are
50 to 60 doctors on the staff, approximately 40 nurses
and 150 nurses aides. The hospital now has 500 beds
crowded into a space designated for 260 beds because
it continues to be the only medical facility of any
substance in the Federal District.
(3) The subversive presence in Brasilia is:
(a) The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) evidently
small (perhaps 100 members) and apparently largely
inactive.
(b) The Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) probably
even smaller than the PCB. However, it should be
noted that the CPB has been reported ofl various
occasions to be carrying out some military type
training in the state of Goias, which surrounds
Brasilia, and the CPB follows the violent Chinese
line of Communism.
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(c) POLO? (Workers Politics) -- a student
organization evidently quite similar to the CPB
in its thinking. It was overtly active in Brasilia
prior to the 31 March 1964 Revolution but has
become a clandestine organization since that time.
(d) AP (Ace() Popular) -- another clandestine
student organization with some strength at the
University of Brasilia.
(4) Security Forces
Military. The Eleventh Military Region is head-
quartered in Brasilia. The Battalion of Presidential
Guards is stationed in Brasilia. A regiment of infantry
is stationed in Goiania, Goias, roughly 90 miles away.
Police. The DFSP is headquartered in Brasilia.
Most of the DFSP facilities in Brasilia are used for
national police training, support and administration.
The DFSP does have an investigating section; however,
this section, while maintaining a number of employees,
carries out few operations. Also located in Brasilia is
a Police of the Federal District which is under the control
of the Secretary of Public Safety of the Federal District.
The DFSP and Federal District police have cooperated
In the past to provide security for chiefs of state visiting
Brasilia such as Charles de Gaulle, the Shah of Iran
and others.
(5) Local Officials
The entire upper echelon of the Brazilian Government
is headquartered in Brasilia. It is the location of the
President, the Supreme Court and the Congress. The
Mayor is Engineer Plinio Catanhede. The Commander
of the Eleventh Military Region is Brigadier General
Jose Nogueira Pass, The Commander of the Presidential
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Guard Battalion in Colonel Oswald? Carvalho. The
head of the DFSP is General Riograndino Kruel. The
Chief of the Police of the Federal District is Colonel
Cabral.
B. Situation report on Crato, Ceara, 13razil.
(1) Airfield
(a) One (1) in Crato which handles Varig DC 6B,
DC 3, and C-46's in regularly scheduled weekly flights.
(b) One (I) outside of Juazeiro de Norte about 7
to 11 miles east of Crato which appears to be a large
facility. No data in available on actual size of strip.
Latter field handles scheduled Varig DC-3 flights.
(2) Population
About 15, 000 to 20, 000 on Northern slope of Serra
de Araripe, 250 miles SSW of Fortaleza. It is a rail
terminus and important commercial center for
agricultural produce of the interior (cattle, hides skins,
cotton, sugar, rubber, tobacco and sugar milling). It
has an experimental livestock institute, corn storage
plant, and electrical equipment factory.
(3) Terrain
The area of the airport is from 0 to 100 meters in
altitude and appears relatively flat. There are hills of
100 to 200 meters high, 3 to 8 miles west and south of
airstrip.
(4) Security Forces
The Headquarters of the Fourth Army is located in
Recife. The Army complement totals 17, 000. Sonic of
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this force could be made available as a security guard
in Crato. There is a small state police force of
probably 5 to 10 men in Crato. The main army units
in Fortaleza consist of one (1) undersized infantry
battalion and one (1) undersized regiment in Recife with
support troop. The unpaved road complex to the interior
of Ceara is so bad that troop movement to the area to
meet a 24-hour requirement is only possible by airlift.
Forteleza and Recife are about 1:40 from Crato by
DC 6B.
(5) Communications
State police, Yang and the Department of Civil
Aviation of Brazilian Government and Brazilian Air
Force (FAB) and, possibly, the Department of Telegraphic
Communication (DCT) of the Brazilian Government should
have radio or cable links with Crato. Messages would
take 6 to 8 hours to transmit. Crato has at least two (2)
commercial radio stations (Radio Araripe and Radio
Educadora).
(6) Subversive Potential
There is very little evidence of PCB, CPB, or
Peasant League activity in area. In April 1965, however,
there were signs of "Yankee Go Home" painted on
building walls located near new, large industrial
developments.
(7) Hospital Facilities
The medical facilities in Crato are probably limited
to one or two competent doctors and an aid station. The
closest hospital is probably located in Forteleza or
Recife.
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(8) It should be noted that there is a dearth of
information concerning the Crate area because of
its relatively isolated geographic position. However,
it is a part of the Northeast s.rea which is one of the
major depressed areas in the hemisphere, and thus
has been in the past fertile grounds for agitation and
dissension.
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STAT
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SLCRET
VENE ZUELA
1. The political and security situation in Venezuela is more
tense at the present time than it has been during the past two years.
This is due to the fact that political and economic groups of both
the extreme left and the extreme right see opportunities for advancing
their own causes at the expense of the current left of center govern-
ment of President Leant.
2. The extreme left split recently over the policy imposed
by Moscow to abandon armed insurgency and carry out only "political
action", consisting of attempting to make alliances with non-Communist
parties. The principal leftist groups are:
a. PCV - The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV)
with approximately 20,000 adherents.
b. MIR - The Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR) with approximately 3,000 men.
c. FALN The Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) controlled by the above two parties, consisting
Of approximately 1,200 men.
Recently leaders of the "hard line" of these parties (those advocating
the continuance of terrorist tactics) broke away from the parent
parties and formed a new group, the General Command of the FALN,
which is threatening to resume terrorist actions in order to win
national and international Communist recognition and support. The
FALN controlled approximately 1200. guerrilla fighters prior to
the split and it is estimated that approximately 20% of these adhere
to the dissident General Command. They are tough, trained and
experienced fighters and terrorists who are anxious to renew their
terrorist activities.
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regard:
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The following incidents have taken place recently in this
a. Reports received on 14 and 21 July indicated
that Venezuelan Communists were becoming convinced
that economic and political conditions may be ripe for
them to stimulate a military uprising. On 23 July four
junior army officers stationed in Maturin were arrested
for conspiring against the government. According to
the government they planned to seize control of the army
garrison in Maturin and turn it and its arms over to
other officers who had been recruited by Communists.
The government learned of the plot and arrested the
principals.
b. Approximately 75 guerrillas from the General
Command moved from the interior of Venezuela into
Caracas during the last week of July. Some 20 of these
have been arrested. An additional 20 hard line guerrillas
not belonging to the General Command have taken up
residence in the dormitories of the Central University
of Caracas. These groups are armed and recently committed
at least four robberies to acquire funds and provisions.
c. On 24 July citizens of the western state of Falcon
reported that between 20 and 40 armed and bearded men
disembarked from launches on the coast and moved into
the nearby hills. The Venezuelan government is attempting
to apprehend this group.
d. During the last week of July leaders of the General
Command made plans to carry out terrorist activities in
the form of small but spectacular acts of violence in the
Caracas area.
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4
3. Plotting from the extreme right stems mainly from
conservative political and economic groups who oppose the present
regime's legislative program Their opposition is heightened
by the example of the recent successful military coup in Argentina.
None of this dissatisfaction is serious enough in itself to threaten
the stability of the government, but when viewed against the back-
drop of current leftist activity, they constitute a situation of definite
unrest and uneasiness.
a. Two laws recently proposed by the administration
aroused strong feelings within the business community and
within conservative and Catholic Church circles. One law
calls for an increased income tax and a stiff tax on the
extractive industries (petroleum). The other law goes
further than have past laws in separating Church and State
and was proposed without the Church's approval. As
isolated incidents these proposed laws and the resulting
strong feelings would be relatively unimportant but in the
context of the present situation they assume added impor-
tance.
b. Military officers have expressed dissatisfaction
with the proposed taxes and with the Venezuelan govern-
ment's so-called tendency toward socialism. These
officers cite the government's recent release from prison
of several Communists and the government's apparent
slowdown in the military action against the rural guerrillas
as further evidence of its softness on Communism. A
recent report indicated-that some high echelon leaders of
the army have considered the possibility of attempting a
"preventive coup" to crush any attempt of leftist officers
to seize power.
c. The recent coup in Argentina provoked an emotional
reaction in the Venezuelan army that adds to the pro-coup
feeling.
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4. Venezuela has experienced the largest concentration of
Cuban-inspired guerrilla activity of any country in Latin America
in recent years. However, by mid - to late 1965 the Venezuela
Government had effecitvely contained guerrilla and terrorist
activities of the FALN but had not succeeded in completely elimi-
nating ouch groups. In addition to the recent resurgence of leftist
activity and the increasing dissatisfaction among rightist elements,
there has been a decrease in the effectiveness of the Venezuela
security forces, which are:
a. DIGEPOL (Political Police) composed mainly of
AD supporters. It is a 1200 man civilian security force
primarily responsible for the internal security of Venezuela.
It is organized on a regional basis. DIGEPOL is not
considered to be a highly efficient police service, although
its effectiveness in countering subversive activities
showed definite improvement during early 1966 and it
was able to arrest many Communist leaders. However,
in may 1966 a shakeup in the leadership took place which
resulted in the removal of key officials of the organization.
Consequently, DIGEPOL as an effective counterinsurgency.
anti-Communist arm of the Government has been reduced
drastically in effectiveness, although the organization of
the DIGEPOL state zones in the interior of the country has
been left more or less intact. The biggest changeover,
which is continuing, has affected the approximately 600-
man force in Caracas which is virtually leaderless and
reportedly demoralized and uncertain of its future.
b. PT.1 (Criminal Police). This organization resembles
the F13l in purpose and has primary responsibility for
criminal investigation and carrying out scientific police
investigations. The PTJ, basically a plain clothes investi-
gative agency, acts after a crime has been committed and
handles all crimes except those specifically involving
national security. Total PTS personnel number approximately
1500 with the majority located in the Caracas area.
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5
c. National Guard (FAC). The National Guard is a
military force of approximately 17,000 men. It has the
following responsibilities: to counter rural guerrilla
activities throughout Venezuela; guard frontiers, ports
and airports, and protect oil zones and other resources.
The National Guard maintains good morale among its
members and is the most depenable security force in
Venezuela. Manpower and equipment shortages hamper
its ability to handle emergency operations, especially in
the interior. The Government's assignment of the
primary counterinsurgency responsibilities to the Army has
adversely affected National Guard morale to some extent.
d. SIFA. The main functions of SIFA are: detection
of subversion in the Armed Forces; collection and use of
intelligence on counterguerrilla activities throughout
Venezuela. It has a limited responsibility in public law
enforcement. SIFA also conducts covert operations against
subversive civilian circles. It is a relatively small
force composed primarily of military personnel but does
have a small civilian section. SIFA cannot be considered a
very effective counter-subversion/terrorism arm of ;the
Venezuelan Government.
5. It is estimated that the current capabilities of the leftist
forces, particularly the FALN General Command, would be sufficient
to plan terrorist activities against prominent figures in Venezuela
without these plans lei ng detected by the local security forces. The
General Command is in desperate straits and would undoubtedly use
any opportunity to carry out a spectacular act which would enhance
its prestige in leftist circles. It should be recalled that in 1964
an American Army Colonel stationed in Venezuela was kidnapped
by the FALN and held as a hostage in an effort to prevent the
execution of a Viet Cong terrorist in Saigon.
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6. It is expected that the Venezuela Government would
make all efforts to set up strict security precaution for any foreign
visitor and that a great deal of reliance would be placed upon not
only the civilian security officers but the Venezuelan Army. As
an example, a large number of Army troops were broutto Caracas
for the visit of President Kennedy in 1961. However, since that
time the capabilities of the FALN for well planned and audacious
terrorist actions has improved considerably, while the ability of
the Venezuelan Government to detect and frustrate such plans has
probably remained at about the same level.
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STAT