CONVERSATION WITH (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400170008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 8, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

NIT:MORARprMd For Release 2005/06/14: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400170008=.it-'
CONFIDENTIAL November 8, 1966
K 11
25X1
1. I talked with or almost two hours yesterday, mostly
in Chinese. His Mandarin is better than reported and his English,
ch he is now studying full time, has improved remarkably. Con-
versation with him is more worthwhile than his former rank would
indicate because of his high intelligence, his perceptivity, his evident
intellectual honesty, and his retentive memory.
2. emphasized that Communist China must be contained
as in Vietnam. He further said we should never "give up" Taiwan to
the Communists in any attempt to buy good relations. It was true that
Taiwan was the major stumbling block to relations, but by no means
tae only one. The Chinese needed, for both ideological and practical
domestic reasons, to throw us into the role of "bad people. " Giving up
Taiwan would be interpreted by the Chinese as weakness and nothing
else. (I assured him there was no thought of this. )
3. thought we should keep two considerations constantly
In mind in trying to interpret Chicom policies: (1) the Chinese thirst
for equality among the world powers, and (2) Chinese preoccupation with
domestic considerations. He thought we sometimes interpreted Chinese
actions in an international context at times when they were fashioned
almost entirely from domestic concerns, which we were not likely to
affect very much in any event.
4. Nevertheless, Thought that our bridge-building efforts
were right; the Chinese must be given an option if they are to alter their
pathological hostility to the United States. Since the Chinese only under-
stand reciprocity, however, we should not push too far without response.
It was good to try to arrange an exchange of people and ideas, although
the Chinese would not reciprocate until the post-Mao era. He doubted
,.at trade offers would affect the political situation at all. We should
pr::,ceed with steps concerning trade which are in our own economic long-
term interest, quite apart from political considerations. The Chinese
would understand this because that is just what they themselves are
doing, despite advertisement to the contrary.
NSC review(s) completed.
,G2NFIDENTIAL`1 'w
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CONFIDENTIAL - 2 -
5. thought that entry into the United Nations would not
alter Chinese policies for the foreseeable future. Domestic change must
come first. China is very sick but it is not likely to be cured from the
outside.
6. After Mao, thought China would be able gradually to
improve its relations with both the Soviets and us. A clear choice between
the two would not have to be made because there was not that much
difference between the Soviet revisionists and the American capitalists.
Among the major nations today, in social organization China was in one
camp and all the rest in comparison could pretty well be lumped in the
other, so great was their difference from China.
7. Thinks most Chinese believe most of what the regime
tells them concerning international affairs. Mainland Chinese who have
radios not only fear to listen to foreign broadcasts but actually have little
desire to, since they are unable to relate to the world which those broad-
casts describe and have no hope of joining that world. Hence the broad-
cas;,s fill no realistic or felt need except for the rare individual. He
listened to foreign broadcasts mostly for Arabic language practice. II
Alfred Jenkins
cc: Mr. Davis
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Jorden
Mr. Redmon
Mr. Ropa
State EA/ACA - for China Working Group
25X1
25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
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SIGNATURE
Walt Rostow gave me this memorandum to-
day. He thought it was most interesting.
pass it to you for whatever it may be worth.
V
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.. Richard ::elms, Director