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December 14, 2016
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March 6, 2003
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Approved For Release 2003/05/05 :CIA-R1 l 80B01676R00060001q -3 G BaSERO'iTNi `T'HE DISA MENT PROBLEM 1. Prior to World War I no real progress was suds toward the limitation of armaments. The Hague @nferences tried to "humanise" war by attempting to ban the use of certain types of vesponsq dumdum bullets, poison gas, projectiles thrown from balloons, etc., etc. Such agreements proved to be unenforceable and a more trap for the trusting. 2. After World :gar I conditions seemed ideal for a renewed effort to limit armaments. The victorious Allied coalition was supreme. Germany was disarmed in fact, and limited by Treaty. Russia was as yet no menace and was preaching total disarmsiasn't? Yet, even under these conditions the attempt to reach international agreement on the limitation of armaments was a failure, except in the very limited field--limited both as to time and types--of Naval armaments. Even friendly former allies could not agree on satisfactory definitions of military manpower or of various types of weapons as a basis for limitation. The United States and Britain had profound disagreements in their attempts to equate a 100000 ton, 8 inch gun cruiser against a 6,000 ton, 6 inch gun cruiser. In the field of aircraft there was no clear common denominator* Thousands of man hours were spent in arguing how to evaluate trained reserved against standing armies and paramilitary units against regular soldiers. Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDR81B01676R000600010013-3 I 1- The argument as to what arms were distinctly defensive an hence peretssable as against those arms which were offen and subject to limitation were totally inconclusive over the decade prooseding 1933 and Hitler's accession to power. While Masi maneuvers were the ostensible cause for the failure of the disarmament conferences of this decade, the real reasons were deeper. We were trying to force into the pattern of an international agreement, elements too complicated to be the subject of such agreements. To be effective international aree- ments must not be so complicated that their enforcement breeds controversy and suspicion. Most of the agreements attempted dwring the pro-Hitler decade failed to met this test. 3. Since World War II the technical side of disarmament has become vastly more complicated than it was even after World War I. Weapons have assumed new intricacy, new elements of secrecy,, and vastly increased power. At the same time the political s ituatie has worsened to a point where little, if any, trust can be placed in the good faith of the Communists to carry out written agreem eats. As a result, we now demand complete inspection of performance or the type of agreements which provide for mutual and simultaneous perform- ance. The latter type is well nigh excluded by the very nature of the disarmament problem and control and inspection, as we mean it, is excluded by Soviet objection. Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA- 80B01676R000600010013-3 For some five years no international agreements of even the most simple character have bow reached between the U. S. and the soviet. Those reached with then during the period 1945 - 1917 are today largely dead letters. In the present political situation it is unthinkable that we could now negotiate an understanding of broad scope in this most intricate field of negotiation, namely arms limitation, a field where, in the past, even dose international friends have failed of agreement. At best political agreements must proceed disarmament agreements and the latter, even if the proper political atmosphere is established, want be kept simple and, as far as possible, self-executory and self-policing. 5. From the above it is fair to conclude that any disarmament agreements of the conventional type - i.e., as discussed in the World War II period are not within the realm of practicaal.ity. Sven proposals like the Baruch Plan or along the lines recently suggested in the UN for the limitation of armed forces are not attainable. 6. In view of the popular yearning in the free countries--probably reflected also by the peoples even in Soviet Russia and the Satellites-- it may be necessary, as a measure of psychological warfare, to adopt a posture of willingness - and possibly even of inventiveness - in proposing new schemes for disarmament. It is possible, howwor, that in what we have already done in the UN we have pushed psycho- logical warfare in this field as far as it can go. Further public - 3- Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RD,,~8a0,~01676R000600010013-3 debat" asy lead to the corsion that our proposals are propaganda aotiv4W. It may be therefore that the time has omens, in the tilt debates, to smmmarise our efforts, to endeavor to fix responsittl tlr' for failure to make progress, and to bring to an end a wholly tide and almost stultifying argument that no longer fools agfb . This however is a psyaehological warfare matter. The Panel was not chosen for expert advice in this field and has no particular comretonee to give such advice. We can only express our own opinion that further public debate of the disarmament problem in the UN is likely to be mere propaganda and that those who are coupetsnt to deal with the international effect of propaganda should advise on the proceedures. 7. The fact that the somewhat formalized, publicised and conventional approach to the disarmament problem has proved futile and should be left to the psychological warfare experts does not necessarily lase! and should not lead, to the abandonment of all efforts in this field. The issues are far too grave and the stakes too high to leave any avenues unexplored.' This review of the past, however, fairly justifies the conclusion that the old approaches are shopworn; that now ones are necessary. 8. If we are to attack the armaments problem with any hope of making real progress, the focal point to attack is of course atomic weapons. It would be relatively futile, as indicated above, to Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 CIA-B01 676R000600010013-3 D4a, r+~i`fo7l resume the debate on limiting conventional, armaments even if the unreality of this approach were rot highli;hted by the fact that if war breaks out atomic and possibly thermonuclear weapons are likely to be the most important weapons in the arsenal of each opposing came Theoretically of course one eowmU concentrate a disarm lest study on the means of deli atomic and therm clear weapons. This however seems a roundabout and ineffective method of approach. Obviously no one is going to spend billions on atomic and therms- nuclear weapons and not attempt to deliver them vhatever restrictions are placed on the instruments of delivery. Furthermore, those instruments are varied and numerous and not in all cases necessarily military instruments, vie cargo ships. Another important reason for concentrating our attention on the atonic-thermonuclear field is the fast that these weapons present a peculiar threat to the free world. This reality has possibly been obscured by the present public obsession with the view, real but transitory, that our atomic superiority is the best insurance of peace. Finally, the atomic field introduces certain new factors which were not considered by the disarmers of the post World War I era and it may be that there are fresh elements, despite the study by the Baruch Committee, which present a new handle to the dis- armament problem. ,.5. Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/0 80BO1676R000600010013-3 '. y 1r1c rroatiOO In connection with the above the following seen to be reasonable assn ptions to makes a. Today the U.S. has a substantial numerical superiority in atomic weapons over the 'oviet and a superior ability over the Soviet to deliver these bombs, leaving. aside for the moment the question of the respective air defense of the two areas* b. We have the ability to keep a numerical superiority over the Soviet in A. and if bombs for a considerable period but the practical value of this superiority will decrease and approach the vanishing point as the numbers of Soviet bombs and means of conveyance reaches adequacy in terms of their appropriate targets* c. In the light of our present progress and the limited number of appropriate Soviet A & g bomb targets we will reach the adequacy point well before the Soviet and until the Soviet reaches that point we nay have a period of relative immmodty from the danger of atomic war. Of course the determination of the adequacy point is a very finite determination open to error as neither can accurately assess the stockpiles or defenses of the other party. Neither can either side compute to what extent a surprise all-out attack by one side if directed against the other's bases of atomic, as well as against industrial gets, might cripple the retort of the other. -6- Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010013-3 .~ :t,.,RE T v 11 ormafiofl d. Once each side has reached the adequacy point there may be a period of uneasy stability - of uncertain duration buy if political and other agreements are not reached in the moantiaae then a spark might set off a war of mutual suieidt. e. It is in our interest to prolong as far as possible the period during which we are closer to adequacy than the Soviet in the hope that in the intervening period political changes in the Soviet will load to the political agreements necessary to real disarmament discussions* f. This period of free world supremacy will be prolonged substantially if the race could be limited to atomic bombs and the Soviet do not acquire thermonuclear weapons. With the latter the Soviet W uld more quickly reach the goal of adequacy and would then enjoy a relative advantage since thagr would have at their disposal many more thermonuclear targets in the free world than we would have of such targets in the Soviet world. 9. GENMAL CONCLUSIONS What has been said above both with regard to the field of conventional and atomicsnuclear weapons leads to the following conclusions a. Both past history and recent performance show that public discussion and public negotiation for agreements on -7- Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010013-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010013-3 .;t ,kI aonvention&1 disarmament will lead nowhere in the present political climate and if pursued at all should be pursued from the point of view of psychological warfare and world public opinion. be Our lead in the atomic race is a temporary advantage to be prolonged in any way possible but is an advantage which will be wiped out at soes future date, probably not too far distant, when the Soviet have "enough" bombs* c. An B bomb race will be stiil more to our disadvantage than the A bomb race as it will narrow the tima before the Soviet has "enough" weapons of mass destruction* d. Accordingly, all efforts should be bent to preventing an H bomb race if there is any way of doing it. SO 8 - Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010013-3