QUESTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND FOURTH COUNTRIES (DATED 26 MARCH 1957)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010017-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 3, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
3 April 1957
DOE review
SUBJECT: Questions on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fourth Countries
(dated 26 March 1957)
I. Is testing necessary to the development of atomic or hydrogen
weapons by fourth countries?
1. The question posed requires a distinction between the desir-
ability for testing atomic or fission weapons on the one hand and the
necessity for testing hydrogen and advanced types of fission weapons
on the other. A country possessing kilogram quantities of weapon-grade
fissionable material, technical know-how and the motivation could
produce and stockpile, without testing, limited numbers of low-yield,
inefficient atomic weapons (i.e. weapons comparable to the Heroshima
bomb). Such a procedure would result in extremely inefficient use of
fissionable materials and would be achieved at considerable cost to
the potential of the weapon stockpile. Testing in any event would be
considered highly desirable by both scientific and military components
of the government. For the development of hydrogen weapons and atomic
weapons of advanced design testing is a necessity.
SECRET
State Dept. review
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II. Given the scientific capability, industrial capability, and the
nuclear knowledge now available to the world, can any fourth
country clandestinely develop a nuclear weapon? How sophisticated
would the weapon be?
2. A nation could clandestinely develop a fission weapon. Without
testing this would be inefficient and of low yield. Thermo-
nuclear weapons would require more elaborate and extensive experimentation
and therefore could not be developed clandestinely. Note: The assumed
capabilities would have to include the possession of quantities of fission-
able materials above and beyond that which must be accounted for under
bilateral agreements requiring strict accountability of materials.
III. Would it be possible for fourth countries to produce and stockpile
weapons as the result of design and weapons specifications passed
to them by a country currently possessing nuclear know-how? If
technical assistance were provided?
3. (a) The fourth country could produce and stockpile advanced
atomic or hydrogen weapons under the first assumption if the country
had a supply.of weapons-grade critical material and the scientific and
technical capacity to utilize the information given.
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3. (b) There are two possible definitions of "technical
(1) Technical assistance meaning completely equipping
the fourth country with plants for fabrication as well as super-
visory and technical personnel, in which case the fourth country
could produce and stockpile weapons, assuming the availability of
weapons-grade critical material.
(2) Technical assistance meaning the provision of
knowledgeable technical and scientific pens^nnel only, in which
case the fourth country could only accomplish weapons production
and stockpiling if it had a supply of weapons-grade critical
material and the scientific and technical capacity to utilize the
assistance given.
IV. What countries other than the USSR UK and US Piave tie capabilities
and motivation to develop nuclear weapons program and the stockpiles
within the next decade.
4. With respect to capabilities, a country should possess adequate
quantities of fissionable materials under its own control, competent
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scientific and. technical personnel, an advanced industrial establishment,
and substantial public financial resources, in order to develop a nuclear
weapons program and stockpile of sufficient size to be militarily effec-
tive. No fourth country except Canada possesses all of these. There
are countries, however, which possess one or more of these ingredients
and which could, if they wore prepared to make the necessary adjustments
in their economy or in their relations with other countries, engage in a
nuclear weapons program.
5. With respect to motivation, there are government leaders,
public officials, or private citizens almost everywhere who see advan-
tages in the possession of nuclear weapons. There are also people almost
everywhere who oppose inauguration of a nuclear weapons program. In
some countries the leaders would almost certainly initiate a program
if they possessed the capability; in other countries considerable
capability exists, but there is no agreement that the sacrifices and
risks should be undertaken. In all cases, the motivation to initiate a
nuclear weapons program would be greatly reduced -- if not elimicated
by an effective system of international control,
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6. The fourth country possessing the greatest capability is France.
The only substantial limitation on French capability is the lack of the
rublic financial resources necessary to undertake a major weapons pro-
gram without further endangering an already strained economy. The
French reactor program is already in operation; there are strong pressures
in France for undertaking a weapons program; some weapons research may
already have been accomplished. It is ar !ued. th`ot defense costs in the
longer run would. even be reduced by shifting from conventional to nuclear
arms. These pressures will probably lead France to adopt some kind of
a weapons program over the next decade unless it receives an adequate
supply of weapons from other countries (i.e., the US or UK).
7. West Germany presents a special case. Its uranium resources
are inadequate, but it possesses all the other ingredients necessary to
the development of a major nuclear weapons program. It is currently
barred by treaty from producing nuclear weapons, The Vest German Chancellor
is now in the forefront of those in West Germany and NATO who favor a
comprehensive review of NATO strategy, weapons, and forces. He evidently
feels that a shift toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons as against
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conventional armaments is taking place without being planned or co-
ordinated on a NATO wide basis. He appears to oppose this trend,
particularly if it would leave no alternative to nuclear warfare, but
he and his countrymen also appear to recognize that some nuclear forces
are necessary. Judging by the West German desire for a review and
Judging by their views on the need for some atomic ieapons in any
defensive system, it appears likely that the West G rmans will press
strongly for some change in the present restrictions upon them espe-
cially if it is affirmed that NATO strategy will involve extensive
reliance upon nuclear weapons. It seems most unlikely that the present
situation can continue, and West Germany must be counted as a fourth
country likely to have some form of atomic weapons progran within the
next decade. If Germany should be reunified, it would, of course,
possess adequate uranium resources; presumably the use of these re-
sources would be a major question in any final peace treaty.
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8 Sweden has a sufficiently developed reactor program to enable
it to produce some nuclear weapons within the next five years. It
possesses the required raw materials and the qualified personnel. How-
ever, to carry out the necessary research, development, aid production
program would impose a severe strain on the Swedish economy. There is
strong military pressure in Sweden to acquire a nuclear capability,
either by developing a program in Sweden or by au' Arirg the )weapons
from other countries. There is also strcng cppcs_?ticn, and the govern-
ment has not reached a decision. We believe that discussion and
agitation will probably ecntinue for some time, and there is a good
chance that at some point in the next decade Sweden will initiate a
limited program.
9. Because of its concern over North American defense, Canada
must also be considered as one which might engage in an atomic weapons
progran if it does not receive weapons from the US or UK which it can
use in an emergency situation. Canada has the capability to develop
such a program, and we believe it will do so, probably with British
assistance, unless it receives defensive atomic weapons from the US.
10. There are states which, if they were now prepared to make
the necessary sacrifices, could have, a small number cf low-.geld
weapons within the next ten years. We do not know of any which are
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now attempting this or appear likely to do so within the next few years.
Such a limited program almost certainly would not permit the development
of a nuclear weapons capability which would be militarily effective in
a major war either for offensive or defensive purposes. Possession of
atomic weapons by a substantial number of countries based on domestic
production seems likely to occur, if at all, in some period of time
beyond ten years.
11. Within the Soviet Bloc, the only country which appears likely
to develop a capability to produce atomic weapons is Communist Ohina.
It does not now possess a sufficient number of qualified personnel or
the capacity to produce the needed equipment for development. A research
reactor, built with Soviet assistance, is scheduled for completion in
1958. The USSR is assisting in the training of Chinese scientists in
basic nuclear physics and in the adaptation of atomic energy to peaceful
purposes. Chinese uranium resources would be sufficient to support a
weapons program. We believe that, in view of the extremely limited
progress so far made, Communist China will be unable independently to
develop an atomic weapons program within the next five years. In the
course of the next decade, however, they may get enough technical and
material assistance from the USSR to make possible a.substantial nuclear
weapons production and stockpiling program.
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what time period would they
be expected to develop nuclear weapons? Commencing when?
12. It is possible to give a specific estimate only for those
countries -- France and Sweden -- which have reactor programs under way.
a. France: If the French have been carrying out theoretical
weapons research for the last three years, France could test
a' ],oar-?to mediw -yie' d weapon in early 1958. Assuming no theoretical
studies have been conducted by the military as of this date, 1960-61
could be forecast for development and proof of the first French
nuclear weapon. If the French reactor program is carried out as now
outlined, and all the attendant plutonium produced were allocated
for a weapons program, France could produce about 45 medium-yield
or 75 small-yield nuclear weapons by 1960, and a cumulative total
of 350 medium yield or 600 small yield nuclear weapons by 1965.
b. Sweden: Sweden will begin to have the minimum quantity
of plutonium required for one low-?yield weapon per year by 1960.
This one low-yield weapon per year figure could be doubled in 1963
and a total of 12 low-yield weapons could be produced commencing
in 19614 if Swedents present reactor construction plans are carried
through as now scheduled.
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VI. What inducements would dissuade potential fourth countries from
developing a nuclear weapons program?
13. The most obvious, and probably the only effective, induce-
ments would be either (a) implementation of an effective international
control system, or (b) provision of nuclear weapons to fourth countries
under conditions permitting their emergency use. It should be noted,
with respect to (b), that the condition which most nations would seek
'would so limit the control exercised by the supplier as to increase
the opportunities for uncontrolled and irresponsible use of these
weapons, with its attendant danger for world peace.
ossible US-U K-USSR agreements
have on fourth country weapons development:
a* test limitation on allowable contribution to world-wide fall-out;
b. test limitation on number of tests;
c. test limitation on total yield;
d. test limitation on yield of individual detonations; and
e, test limitation combining some or all of the above?
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hi. We assume that fourth countries would abide by the conditions
of such a trilateral agreement. However, test limitations of the type
described would have little effect upon the fourth country problem.
Presumably the testing requirements of many of these countries would
not be substantial, since they would not be involved in the development
of advanced atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Unless the maximum'allow-
able yield were extremely low, most countries would be permitted to make
such tests as were within their capability to attempt.
effect on fourth countries of an agreement to
cease testing entirely?
14. See paragraph 1.
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FORM N 7 Replaces Form 30-4 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 19551-0-342531
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