PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS SUMMARY MINUTES

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CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3
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September 26, 1955
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Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 I This document consists of $ pages No, _o,f 50 copies, Series A. TOP SECRET DPC/RA-6 Presid.en:t " s Specials.. Committee on Disarmament Problems SUMMARY MINUTES Meeting of the President 2 s Special Committee on Disarmament -Problems Chart Room, Executive Office Building September 26, 1955 - 10030 a.m. ATTENDEES Harold. E. Stassen9 Chairman. Ge_~era. Herbert B. Loper Colonel William B. Bailey Mr. David Wainhouse Mr, Charles C. Stelle Mr, Ronald I. Spiers Mr, Andrew Berding Mr, Dowsley Clark Mr, Frederick- W, Ford Mr, Nathan Siegel Mr, Herbert Miller Dr, Paul Co Fine Mro James E. Goodby Mro Robert E. Matteson Captain Donald W, Gladney Mr, Joseph So Toner To discuss (a) the revised position paper on. the U.S. Geneva Proposals (DCS/3~ Rev. #3)a (b) the preliminary progress reports of the Task Forcesy (c) Mr. Bulganin s letter date 199 1955 to the Presidents, and (d) developments in the UN Sud ! -ommmttr discussions during the week of September 19. o ttee ACTION ASSIGNMNNTSo 1, To reproduce the Moch paper dated September 22 and circulate copies to the Committee members. (Toner) NOTE.- See DPC Note No, L. dated September 27. State Dept., NSC, JCS reviews completed TOP SECRET 4283-/i Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 DPC/RAm6 2. State to study (a) the Moch paper,, and (b) the Nutting proposal to determine whether the U.S. should agree to the tabling of those papers in the UN Subcommittee,, with the stipulation that the U.S. does not agree with but will study these positions, 3. Assign Special Staff members to prepare working papers on possible U.S. positions on (a) the Moch paper and (b) the Nutting proposal, (Matteson) 1. Revised Position f1 per on US Geneva Proposals (DCS/39 Revision #31 Mr, Stassen said that since there were no additional comments on the revised position paper on the U.S. Geneva pro- posals (DCS/3 Revision #3) the paper would be approved subject to later modification by the Departments should they desire to initiate a reevaluation. 2. Preliminary Progress Reports on the Task Forces Mr. Stassen said the task forces are working diligently and in cooperation with the Department of Defense. The prelimi- nary progress reports submitted by the Communications Task Force and the Army Inspection Task Force are now being studied by the Disarmament Staff. 3. Time Schedule for a Comprehensive Report to the President Mr. Stassen said the November 1 time schedule for a comprehensive report., as outlined in previous Committee meetings,, will still be adhered to even though the President may not be able to personally review the policy in early December as pre- viously anticipated. He said., the overall paper,, after the thirty day review period in the Departments., will reflect the most com- prehensive study that any government has made on the total problem of disarmament, It will not constitute a rigid U.S. position; rather., the policy will be studied and reviewed on a continuing basis. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA..6 14o Report on the UN Subcommittee Sessions Mr. Stassen said the sessions of the UN Subcommittee were in recess and would reconvene at 3 p,m. on Wednesday., September 28. (a) Moch Proposal, Mr. Stassen said Mr. Moch pre- sented a paper for consideration at a conference of the Western delegates held on Friday, September 23. In general, the approach outlined in his paper is a more or less predisarmament phase along the lines of the Eisenhower proposal followed by stages of disarma- ment. At the end of those stages, Mr. Moch suggests that a con- ference of atomic scientists be called to study and report on whether it is possible to eliminate nuclear weapons, Mr, Stassen said. Mr. Moch is apparently thinking of getting off the hook of a previous position on the elimination of nuclear weapons by a scien- tific study at the end of the conventional reductions and is giving some thought to limiting the expansion of nuclear weapons capability. Mr. Moch stated that he has the approval of his Government to dis- cuss this position with the Western Powers, ACTION: To reproduce the Moch paper and circulate copies to the Committee members, (Toner) Note: See DPC Note No, 4, dated September 27, 1955, Mr. Stassen said it might be desirable for the U.S. to agree to the tabling of Mr, Moch's paper in the UN Subcommittee even though we would not concur with it at this time. The U.S. cannot agree to such a proposal until the total NSC review is com- plete., Mr, Stassen said, but if it proves to be a better position than the old Anglo-French proposals it would have the advantage of indicating a movement away from former rigid positions and would become a part of the movement of world understanding. ACTION: State to study the Moch paper to determine whether the U.S. should consent to its being tabled in the UN Subcommittee with the under- standing that the U.S. does not agree to but will study the proposal. (Wainhouse) TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 DPC/RA. 6 sLo b. Scientific Committee. Mr. Stassen said the U.K. has not yet reported on Mr. Nutting's suggestion for a Scientific Committee. Mr. Wainhouse said that the Nutting proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Committee to study the problem of elimination of nuclear weapons., in a way., indicates some change in the British position. Mr. Stassen said it might be desirable for the U.S. to consent to the tabling of that proposal as well as the Moch paper with the same understanding beforehand; i.e.., we will not agree to it but we will study it. Both of these papers he said would serve to move world policy in the direction the U.S. wants it to move. ACTION: State to study the Nutting proposal for a Scientific Committee to determine whether the U.S. should consent to its being tabled in the UN Sub- committee, (Wainhouse) ACTION: Assign members of the Special Staff to prepare working papers on possible U.S. positions on (a) the Hoch proposal and (b) the Nutting proposal, (Matteson) 5. Mr. Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower dated September.19, 19 Mr. Stassen said he noted with interest that in the Bulganin letter to the President there was little reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons., whereas in the Molotov UN speech that point was stressed. He suggested the reason for the difference of emphasis on this subject could reflect; (a) the propaganda aspect of the speech versus the realism expressed in the letter., or (b) a difference of opinion within the governing circles of the USSR. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA=6 Mr. Wainhouse said with respect to the possibility of a difference of view with the Soviet Government, it had recently come to his attention that perhaps Molotov was following a fairly hard line. For examples, a Russian delegate to the UN informed a U.S. delegate that the original text of the Molotov speech did not con- tain any reference to the difficulty of elimination of armaments. General Loper said possibly the difference in approach between the letter and the speech indicates a moving away from elimination, thus reenforcing prohibition on nuclear weapons as the solution to the problem. Mr. Berding suggested that since copies of the Bulganin letter were sent to the British and the French, it would be proper and perhaps desirable if they were to comment on the letter and therein inject their views on American bases on foreign soil for examples, or thoughts such as those advanced by Mr. Moch. Mr. Stassen urged that both Defense and State give fur- ther thought to possible modification of their views on the Technical Panel proposal now that the Soviet reaction to the President's pro- posal has been received. He asked that all Departments now consider in the light of the Soviet response, the advisability of the U.S. or another Western power putting that proposal forward or something along the lines of the USIA proposal for an aerial test inspection in an effort to keep things moving in the Subcommittee discussions. General Loper raised a question as to the time schedule on the analysis of the Bulganin letter. Whether the Defense position on the Technical Panel Exchange will be modified in view of the Soviet reply,,, he said would involve another study for them to under- take. He said a meeting with State to discuss a reply to Mr. Bulganin's letter is expected to take place this week. Mr. Wainhouse said it _ is hoped that a first draft of a comprehensive reply would be ready sometime this week. It is planned, he said, to prepare an analysis of the Bulganin letter, paragraph by paragraphs, as abasis for that reply. Mr. Stassen said the time schedule for a reply to the Bulganin letter was a matter for State's consideration, but he did not think a comprehensive substantive reply could be prepared until after the total U.S. disarmament policy has been reviewed. For in- stance, comments could not be made on force goal levels nor on nuclear weapons other than to restate our position until the sub- stantive policy is completed. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-6 In his discussion with Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Lodge, he said., the preliminary thinking was to pre- pare a sort of holding reply somewhat more than just an acknow- ledgement of the letter--on the basis that no substantive reply could be made until after the review of the total study. However, he said, he had not talked with Secretary Dulles on this matter since the Presidentts illness, Mr. Stassen read a suggested draft reply which he had submitted to the Secretary of State. His thinking, he said., was to keep all channels open and not have negotiating entirely on the Presidential level and., on the other hand., not to rebuff them too sharply from using that channel at any time if they should so desire. Mr. Wainhouse said the Soviet response presents a pro- blem on how we now proceed to further the President's proposal. He said his preliminary view is that we should attempt in the best way possible to put the Eisenhower proposal forward. He would not like to see the work of two or three months lost by virtue of the fact that we cannot get a Presidential response to the Bulganin letter. Mr. Stassen said it is still possible that if the Russians find that this is the only way they can move on the disarmament problem., they may still accept the President's pro- posal; indications are that they are moderately respectful and cautious in their approach. On the other hand., he said., they may want to stall further progress or they may be attempting to get the West to reduce armaments. He said he did not believe world appeal for the Eisenhower proposal was minimized by the Bulganin letter, He asked that USIA follow the trend of Soviet propaganda with respect to the Russian's reply and also with respect to the Molotov speech as it unfolds in the next several days. Mr, Stassen said the next two months can be well spent if we consider letting the Moch and Nutting proposals come for- ward and if we decide to submit a proposal along the lines of the Berding proposal, Also., he pointed out., the Foreign Ministers Meeting in October and following that the UN debate in December will require study and detailed preparations. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 6. Subcommittee Report for the Foreign Ministers' Meeting Mr, Wainhouse asked Mr. Stassen whether he had received any guidance from Secretary Dulles with regard to an interim or progress report from the Subcommittee for the October meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Mr. Stassen said the Secretary indicated that he wanted him to be present when the disarmament subject was discussed, but he did not state his views on the Subcommittee re- ports, He said it is his impression that each of the four powers would report to their foreign minister rather than have a formal Subcommittee report. An attempt might be made, he said, to get an agreed report of the four representatives,, for submission to their respective foreign ministers, setting forth the issues, which would not prohibit individual supplementary comments as desired, Mr. Stassen asked Mr. Wainhouse to discuss this matter further with the Secretary of State. Also, he said, either Mr. Wainhouse or he might ask the Secretary if this is a matter he would like to discuss with the other foreign ministers. 7. Exchange of Nuclear Weapons Information Mr. Stassen said his feeling in postponing an answer to the Soviet question on the exchange of nuclear weapons information was that by spelling out that we will not exchange numbers, charac- teristics and design at this time would raise the presumption that we will exchange all other information. He said that endeavoring to be too inclusive in detail at this time might be bad psychologically and also bad for negotiations, He said he had an extensive discussion with Dr, von Neumann on this problem and he asked that AEC and Defense review this point in an effort to include language in our reply that will make it clear that we are not now agreeing to exchange any infor- mation.; that everything has to be agreed to later in order to imple- ment an effective inspection system, In other words, he said, our answer to their question should merely restate the principle of the President's Geneva statement and that specific information to be exchanged-is a matter for later negotiation and agreement. The answer might include illustrative items, both negative and positive. 8, Justice Report on Legal Aspects of Technical Exchange Panel Mr. Stassen asked for a report on the legal analysis of the problems involved in the Technical Exchange Panel proposal. Mr. Ford said further progress is pending a reply from some of the Departments to Mr. Rogers letter of September 16. Dr, Fine said AEC has prepared an answer which is being circulated in the agency for clearance. General Loper said the Defense reply is ready for the Secretary's signature. DPC/RA-6 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-6 Mr. Stassen asked Mr. Berding if USIA had an overall report on the trend of public stories world-wide on the total problem of armament and disarmament. Mr. Berding said thus far there have only been spasmodic reports but he believed that a full reading should be undertaken at this point. The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m. Helen Nelson Committee Officer Distribution.- Committee Members List II TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 This document consists of__pages No._,_of :S- Copies, Series A. TOP SECRET DPC/RAo5 President's Special. Committee on Disarmament Problems Meeting of the Presidentts Special Committee on Disarmament Problems Chart Room, Executive Office Building September 19, 1955 -- 10:30 a.m. 3 Harold E. Stassen, Chairman General Herbert B. Loper Mr. Charles C. Stelle Mr. Ronald 0. Spiers Mr. Andrew Berding Mr. John Z. Williams Mr. Frederick W. Ford Mr. Nathan Siegel Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Dr. Paul C, Fine Mr. James E. Goodby Mr. Robert Matteson Colonel Raymond B. Firehock Mr-. Joseph S. Toner To discuss (a) progress report on the analysis of legal problems relating to the Technical Panel Exchange, and (b) Mr. Berding's proposal for an aerial test inspection within the framework of the - President's Geneva proposal. 1. To further review the proposal for aerial inspection s,tfumitted by Mr. Berding after Mr. Molotov's opening speech at the UNGA 2. To review the outline of the - Pre sident t s plan as tabled in the Subcommittee to determine if an addendum is required. 1, v 42 9-;3k' 7 c- /1/ 2 2 9o Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/BRA-5 1. Progress report on he analysis of legal problems relating to the Technical Panel Exchange. Mr. Ford reported that a meeting of legal representatives from State, Defense., AEC and Mr. Turlington from Mr. Stassents staff was held in the Department of Justice on September lL, to study the various legal problems posed by the Technical Panel Exchange proposalo He said William P. Rogers., the Acting Attorney General, wrote to the heads of the agencies represented at the meeting on September 16, 1955 requesting that they furnish the Attorney General with an opinion from their legal staff on the problems that might arise in their respective agencies in connection with such a proposal. A letter.was also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury since Coast Guard facilities would also be involved in the inspection of ports. At the meeting, he said, it was urged that the highest priority be attached to this study. Mr. Stassen, replying to Dr. Finets question, said there are really three interrelated sets of legal questions involved in the total plan; those related to (a) the President's proposal for an ex- change of blueprints and aerial verification, (b) the Technical. Panel Exchange,, and (c) the final inspection system. The questions related to the Presidentts blueprint proposal and those connected with the permament inspection system would come under a treaty arrangement; therefore, the study now is concentrated on the extent to which the Technical. Panel Exchange proposal could be implemented under an Execu- tive Agreement. Mr. Ford said there may be some problems involved ever under a treaty arrangement, For example, revealing information and trade secrets to a foreign government which the U.S. Government obtains in confidence from a private firm may pose a problem. Mr. Stassen said when the current study is completed the next step may be to determine the limits of a treaty in this field, 2. Report on Mr. Stassen's discussion with the President. Mr. Stassen said he reviewed for the President the antici- pated time schedule of the work of the task forces; the personnel on the task groups; and the endeavor to prepare a comprehensive report for him on or about December 7, The President., he said., was satisfied with the time schedule and he was extremely pleased with the caliber of the personnel working on the task forces; at the same time the President urged that all phases of the work continue to be carried forward in the departments and agencies. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-5 for roposal an aerial test inspection within the framework of the President's Geneva Proposal. Mr. Berding said he had nothing to add to the written proposal he had submitted (circulated on September !4) for an aerial test inspection within the framework of the President's Geneva proposal, He noted that recent conversations with. USSR delegates to the U.N. Subcommittee indicate that the Soviets have regarded the President's reference to an exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance as a propaganda move. It may be, he said... that they till entertain that view to some extent and this proposal may help to overcome that idea. .Also, the proposal would serve to demonstrate to the Soviets just what aerial reconnaissance will reveal. Mr. Stelle said the Department of State has not prepared a final position on this paper. Discussions thus far., he said,, indicate a divided opinion within the Department. Some see con- siderable propaganda advantages in such a proposal and view it also as a means of moving forward; others are concerned about possible competition between this plan and the President's proposal. General Loper said the Department of Defense has no firmm, position to offer at this time. He pointed out that past Defense positions indicate that they do not look with favor upon any kind of implementation prior to acceptance of the principles of the President's proposal. The study currently under way by Defense, he said, is directed first toward the implementation of the President's proposal from the standpoint of exchange of blueprints and the sub- sequent aerial reconnaissance; second, toward. something along the lines of this proposal as a trial. run,- and third, if the trial run. proves to be effective and agreeable, the detailed arrangements for the total plan. Dr. Fine asked whether the blueprints of a major atomic energy installation would merely outline the exterior of the buildings or whether they would include such details as processes. Mr. Stassen said the concept of the exchange of blueprints has always been in relation to an exterior examination, which at a certain point could involve checking the input and output of the plant. He pointed out that at no time would we contemplate an exchange of technical infor- mation such as methods of weapons design. In the first stage the concept is to determine what -kind of information can be reciprocally Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RAmS exchanged to prevent the possibility of surprise attack. He said that information could be negative or affirmative., but in his view no detailed answers would be provided which would give the Russians an excuse to reject the President's proposal. Mr. Stelle pointed out that., since the U.S. has taken the position that the major problem is the impossibility of account- ing for nuclear material, to table an outline of the proposal for a Technical Panel Exchange confined to external examination of one nuclear plant would present a difficult political problem. General Loper said., as a trial run the JCS had in mind something specifically directed to surprise attack and from that point of view the objectives outlined in Mr. Berding's proposal appear to be broader than necessary. If the idea for a trial run were accepted, he said, he could see no point in including a major atomic energy center, Mr. Stassen agreed., and said that the objec- tive of a trial run could be limited to include only one port and one air field. With respect to the timing of such a proposal., Mr. Stelle said depending upon the circumstances it might be desirable to pre- sent it before the Russians indicate what their reaction to the President's proposal will be since it may serve as a means of bringing their attention back to that position, Mr. Stassen said that was a good point and he noted that Soviet reaction: to the Eisenhower proposal might be presented: (a) in Molotov's speech at the opening of the U.N., (b) at the Geneva Foreign-Ministers' Meeting on October 27., or (c) during the UN debate on December lover the UN resolution to accept the President's proposal.. Mr. Stassen said this proposal would be kept under review and considered further after Molotov's U.N. speech, lt. Proposed Scientific Cow. Mr. Stassen said the British Government has not yet replied to Mr. Nutting's suggestion for the establishment of the scientific committee discussed f t e mee 'fig oia ueptembL--r-12. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-S m5- Dr. Fine said Dr. von Neumann feels that the probability of such a group of scientists coming up with a solution for detection methods or for a means of accounting for past production of fission- able materials is so slim that the establishment of a scientific com- mittee to study these problems would only raise false hopes. Mr. Stassen explained that the basic concept of the suggestion is to convince the world that we are leaving no stone unturned in the search for a solution. The U.K. now agrees with us that you cannot eliminate nuclear weapons and they are trying to find a way to present that position to their public and to their parliament. In other words, until the scientists report back, we will proceed on the basis that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated and then the President's proposal will be brought back into focus. In addition, this group of scientists from the five nations represented in the Subcommittee could, from time to time, invite the comments of scientists from other nations such as India and Egypt, thus including and encouraging other countries to join in the effort to find an answer to this problem. Mr. Stelle said State's view with respect to internal exami- nation of a nuclear installation is also based somewhat on the public relations aspect. For instance, the internal examination of a research reactor would reveal the difficulties involved and would assist in con- vincing the public at large of the scientific basis of that policy. Replying to Mr. Berding's inquiry about the scientific study currently under way, Mr. Stassen said that is the Ernest Lawrence task group. With respect to the task forces, as a whole, Mr. Stassen said the tentative thinking is not to publicize their studies until such time as the report to the President is made and acted upon and the President or the Secretary of State ennunciate the various aspects of our policy. 5. Proposed briefing on aerial photographic capabilities, Mr. Stassen said Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson in a letter dated September 16 approved the suggestion in his letter of September 13 for a briefing and short brochure on the capabilities of aerial photography for dissemination among the British, French and Canadian disarmament delegations, and that later, if appropriate, such a presentation might be circulated to the USSR. Mr. Robertson has requested the Secretary of the Air Force to appoint a project officer to prepare this brochure and presentation, within security limits. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 ? TOP SECRET DPC/RA-5 =ba (Copies of Mr. Stassen's letter and Mr, Robertsonts repay were circulated by EXSEC to-Committee members on September 19). Mr. Stassen said the purpose of these briefings is two-fold, One, to educate the public domestically as well as abroad as to the significance of aerial reconnaissance--,within classification limits; and second to maintain the initiative from the public relations aspect on the part of the U.S. and the Eisenhower proposal, Mr. Stassen noted that comments from State approving the dissemination of information to the U.K., France and Canada are con- tained in Cable 168 (dated September l5), In view of State's feeling that the Soviets should not be included in the original briefing because others may raise questions in their presence which might indicate a division of opinion on efficacy of aerial reconnaissance., Mr. Stassen said we could make it clear in the briefing that any questions they wished to raise must be submitted in writing at a later time for our further consideration. He asked that the Departments continue to review the possibility of including the Soviets on the basis of no questions being asked or answered at the briefing session, ? 6. Agenda items. Mr. Stassen asked if there were any subjects the Committee would like to submit for future discussion. He noted that the revision of the position papers is under way., and Colonel Firehock said the revised papers will be ready early in the week of September 26, Mr. Stelle said it might be well to review Mr. Hoover's suggestion of putting forward some expansion and clarification of the outline of the President's plan which has been tabled in the Subcommittee. Mr, Stassen said that outline plan would be further considered to determine whether an addendum is required, (Mr. Stassen left the meeting at 11015 a,m, and turned the meeting over to Mr. Matteson,) Mr, Matteson asked if there were any further suggestions for subjects to be discussed,., or any new matters to 'be brought up. Mr. Stelle asked if a list of the task forces and their operations could be made available to the Departments. It would be useful, he said, to know generally what developments have occurred in their studies, Mr. Matteson said he had sent a note to each of the Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-5 liaison officers on Mr. Stassen's Special Staff to prepare a progress report on each of the task forces by the end of this week. He said some of the task forces have submitted progress reports but others have indicated that their studies will take longer than the present time schedule indicates. Mr. Bissell asked if there was any written material available with respect to the general terms of reference of the task forces. He said such information would be extremely helpful in conducting briefing sessions for the task groups. Mr. Matteson said the Department of Defense had received that information. In general., their studies are related to the feasibility of inspection and beyond that at their own discretion to the total out- line of the plan. (NOTE: Terms of reference for each task force and other personnel data are being prepared in EXSEC for circulation to the Committee members.) The meeting adjourned at 11:25 a.m. Helen E. Nelson Committee Officer Distribution: Committee Members Ambassador Lodge List II EXSEC/9-20.55 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 This document consists of pages No. -11, of 1 Copies, Series !L ? TOP SECRET DPC/RA-4 President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems Meeting of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems Chart Room,, Executive Office Building September 12d 1955 m 10030 a.m. Harold E. Stassen, Chairman General Herbert B. Loper Colonel William B. Bailey Mr. David Wainhouse Mr. Charles C. Stelle Mr. Ronald 0. Spiers Mr. Andrew Berding Mr. John Z. Williams Mr. Frederick W. Ford Mr. Nathan Siegel Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Dr. John von Neumann Dr. Paul C. Fine Mr. James E._Goodby Mr. Robert Matteson Mr. Joseph S. Toner Mr. Edmund Gullion Mr. John Lippmann 1. To discusso (a) JCS comments on the Technical Exchange Panel; (b) Department of State comments on U. S. Geneva Proposal, and (c) Dr. von Neumannts comments dated September 7, 1955. _ TOP SECRET ? 7s 4?6I-- 3n Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 DPC/RA-b 1. To amend the position papers in accordance with the comments of: (a) the JCS (DCS/5B)9 (b) Dr. von Neumann (letter dated September 7, 1955), and (c) the Department of State (DCS/3 Revision #2A). 2. That the Committee would meet regularly each Monday at 10030 a.m. 1. Report on the UN Subcommittee Sessions Mr. Stassen said the Western delegations are presently awaiting comments from the Soviet Union on the significant parts of the Presidents proposal and on other questions relating to the inadequacies-of previous USSR positions on inspection. In view of the relatively short period of time the meeting has been underway, he said,, the situation could not be described as "deadlocked" but neither has any significant progress been made. There is further evidence that the Soviet Union is analyzing the basic problem just as we are. ACTION: To reproduce and circulate to Committee members the September 7 statement by the Russian delegate,, Mr. Sobolev, to the UN Subcommittee. (Toner - see memorandum dated 9/12/55) 2. JCS Comments on the Technical Exchange Panel Proposal DCS 5B Mr. Stassen asked for comments around the table on the JCS comments on the Technical Exchange Panel proposal. Mr. Wainhouse said the State Department agrees with the JCS position that a panel should be established which would be composed of technically and scientifically qualified individuals from each of the countries represented in the Subcommittee; that this group would study the methods of inspection and report back to the Subcommittee at an agreed time. In view of its terms of reference this group might be called a Study Group on Inspection and Reporting Techniques. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET -3 DPC/RAeh Mr, Wainhouse said State will be in a better position to comment on the detailed comments of the Joint Chiefs (DCS/SB) after there has been a Soviet reaction to the President?s Geneva proposal, Generally speaking., he said., the Department of State agrees with Defense on reducing the number of installations from two to one in each category which might be visited, State does not share the Defense view that the atomic installation should be examined only externally; rather, it is believed that little would be gained by such an examination, Mr. Wainhouse said it would be helpful to the Department of State if Defense and AEC would provide them with a more detailed exposition of their concept of external inspection of atomic installations. Dr, von Neumann said a great deal can be exposed by external operations; for example., if the amount of raw material going into a reactor is known much can be told of the interior activities, Mr. Stassen noted-that this would also tie in with Dr. Lawrence's work, Mr. Stassen replied that it is not known when the Russians will respond to the Eisenhower Proposal., but when they dog the U.S. position on how to proceed after that should be as thoroughly prepared as possible. He urged that the studies on this. problem continue to go forward in the Departments. Dr, von Neumann said he had no comments other than those contained in his letter to Mr. Stassen dated September 7, Mr, Bissell said in general he agreed with the detailed comments of Defense but he preferred to reserve opinion on the point raised by Mr. Wainhouse respecting external examination or a more comprehensive plan in connection with atomic energy pro- duction facilities. Dr, von Neumann said this is a twofold problem and the question involves the amount of information we extract from the USSR by this means as against the information we would be furnishing them. It is the feeling in AEC., he said., that the way it is now defined., the time allowed is very short; in some cases., such as budget,, it is a matter of the extent that it adds to the information furnished and from that point of view the external examination is a good first step? It should be judged more from the standpoint of negotiation tactics, Mr. Bissell said he may wish to submit written comments on this point before the next meeting of the Committee, Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 DPC/RA-4 4 Mr. Berding said he had no comments on the detailed revision of the JCS on this proposal. As a matter for possible consideration., he suggested that the test inspection idea might be transferred to the President's aerial reconnaissance proposal. This would have certain advantages such as keeping the President's proposal alive and supplying tremendous publicity to it. Mr. Stassen said that when the panel tested objects of control,., they were also going to test methods which would include aerial inspection. The first impact of the Eisenhower proposal concentrated on aerial photography and the exchange of blueprints- the second impact was to put in the JCS plan on ground posts. Replying to Mr. Stassen's question, Mr. Berding said he meant that the aerial proposal would include some testing, and in the begin- ning it would be limited to aerial reconnaissance. Mr. Stassen said that is sort of an offshoot of the matter we are presently concerned with,, and referred to a letter on this subject submitted by the Department of Justice on September 9 (DCS/5C). Mr. Ford said the first indication was that the legal problems involved were not too difficult but upon further study it was found there were not sufficient fact known to prepare a definitive statement. He said if the attorneys at AEC, State and Defense could meet with the legal persons concerned in Justice to discuss the problems involved it would greatly facilitate the Department of Justice in preparing a comprehensive legal opinion. Mr. Stassen said he believed the best way to proceed would be to have the lawyers from AEC, Defense and State get to- gether with Mr. Ford's group either by departmental or multi- departmental informal conferences and then to get a written state- ment which would outline the problem and state what information is required from the individual Departments. Through such informal conferences an outline can be prepared of what can be done and what cannot be done under Executive agreement. He said we may have to approach this matter by 'treaty or we may decide to do as much as is possible under Executive agreement and no more. The lawyers should define the problem and outline the alternatives as well. ACTION.- To follow through with the Department of Justice on setting up meetings during the week of September 12 with AEC., State and Defense re an analysis of the legal problems stemming from the Technical Exchange Panel proposal. (Matteson) Note: This meeting was held on 9/l4. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 . _ Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA- -5- Mr. Stassen said the revisions on the Technical Exchange Panel Proposal submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be accepted. He emphasized that this proposal could not be used in any way as an ultimatum requiring the USSR to accept the Presidents proposal before we proceed with this kind of study. He said this proposal would not be advanced until we get the Soviet reaction to the President's proposal. Also, on State's position, he said he believed it would be a mistake to advance a proposal for a study group that in effect would meet in the same city as the Subcommittee and discuss the same matters as the Subcommittee. He said his feeling now and it will have to be evaluated further is to concentrate entirely on the President's proposal and think in terms of either working this out with the Eden proposal or working it out as suggested by Mr. Berding as a third stage. Replying to Mre Wainhouse's question, Mr. Stassen said if the Soviet Union should accept the President's proposal the exchange concept might then be advanced and it would mean that the-other countries could participate in-it which would be an advantage since'the Eisenhower proposal refers only to the US and USSR. 3. Comments b Dr. von Neumann dated September 7, 1955 Replying to Dr. von Neumann's question, Mr. Stassen said it is contemplated that inspection would be carried on simultaneously in the various countries rather than one at a time in a specified order. It is believed that the simultaneous approach would be advantageous from the psychological as well as the negotiating standpoint. General. Loper said some of the questions raised by Dr. von Neumann would require further detailed study by the Department of Defense. Referring to Dr. von Neumann's comment on paragraph E-4 on page 6 of the position paper on-the USSR Geneva Proposal (DCS/2, Revision #2) Mr. Wainhouse recommended the following wording for the quoted passage, "the US position on this must await the determination on whether the development of an adequate inspection system is possible." Mr. Stassen said it is only possible to determine whether it is possible at this time, and times keep changing. Mr. Wainhouse said State would agree to Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-4 the phrase,, "at this time," Mr. Stassen said he believed there was general agreement on State's implication, Mr. Stassen said the position papers should be amended in accordance with Dr, von Neumann's comments,, as modified by State. 1., State comments on the U.S. Geneva Proposal (DCS/3, Revision #2) a. Para ra h 1 (a). There was general agreement on paragraph 1 a revised by the Department of State. b. Paragraph 1 (h),. General Loper said the modifications submitted by State are acceptable to Defense' particularly with reference to paragraph 1 (h). Mr. Stassen said this raises the point of waiting for the later date rather than dissipate the move at the present time,, and that further study would be given to that point. Mr. Berding suggested that the attention on the President's proposal would be heightened if the proposal were made to institute a test inspection of aerial reconnaissance on a limited basis now. Mr. Stassen said that is an interesting thought to segregate the aerial reconnaissance testing and visiting of a sample object from the other categories to be tested and visited. He noted that though it would increase attention on the Eisenhower proposal,, it could in effect,, from a public opinion standpoint,, let the Soviet off the hook if they agreed to permit a small area to be photographed. It is a matter of evaluating the complex world psychology and pressure aspects. Mr. Wainhouse said his initial reaction to Mr. Berdingvs suggestion is that actually it means carving the sector on aerial photography out of the President's proposal--the other sector being the exchange of bluepr3nts~,band reducing. our attention to one small sector might supply the coup de grace to the President's proposal. Mr. Stassen said it would not be a matter of reducing; rather Mr. Berding's suggestion would serve as a spearhead of the implementation of the plan. Mr, Wainhouse pointed out that the Russians conceivably might come forth with a reduced aerial inspection area; for example, a hundred square miles of antic waste,, to see how it works out. Mr. Berding said it would mean selecting comparable points such as New York and Leningrad but it would be on a reduced basis. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 ? Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RAm4 ? ? Mr. Stassen asked Mr. Wainhouse for an appraisal of what the Soviet reaction will 'be to the Presidents proposal. Mr. Wainhouse said it is expected that they will sub- mit a conteroffer., which will revolve primarily on their May 10 position and they may include aerial reconnaissance over the ports., airdromes and so on thr-t are contained in their proposal. It is possible that we will not get a Soviet response before October 27 since they may prefer to use the Geneva forum rather than the Subcommittee meeting for their reply. Dr. von Neumann pointed out that if the aerial recon- naissance aspect is separated from the exchange of blueprints in the President's proposal., there is danger giving away certain intelligence informatior_n9 whereas if a complete set of blueprints were available the operation would be on the basis of information furnished by the other nation. Mr. Stassen said that problem, could be met by requiring each side to offer the site they will permit to be photographed and on which they will submit blueprints rather than have or tell the other what they want to see. It might mean that each would give a blueprint of say Leningrad or Norfolk for example., to start with and then have the aerial photo- graphy and the ensuing studies of that. He said Mr. Berdinggs suggestion would be given further consideration. c. Paragraph. 2 (b)o Mr. Stassen said he fully concurred in the revised language of this paragraph., particularly since a Soviet counterattack may be that the PresidentIIs proposal is simply a stalling device and that the U.S. does not favor a reduction of armaments under any circumstances. He said a certain amount of world opinion shows a trend along that line and articles have been written on the basis of Secretary QuarlesQ speech to advance that argument. He said his initial reaction to Secretary QuarlesII speech was that it contained no specific ;inaccuracies but it ommitted what should be aiimportant feature of any address by government officials and that is to emphasize the desire of the United States and the President for peace and a sound agreement. Mr. Stassen said not only have the British and French asked whether that speech represented U.S. poky but the Russians have asked for an interpretation of it. He said he had sent a preliminary informal memorandum to the State Department and to the USIA setting forth a possible public relations outline. Mr. Wainhouse said State would have a reply to that memorandum within a day or two. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 0 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-i. Mr. Ford suggested that the word "might" in line 2 of paragraph 2 (b) be changed to "should". Mr. Stassen said it could read., "",,,and it is U.S. policy that this would be followed ? ."" or some such wording which could be chosen from the Presidents awn language. Mr. Stassen asked whether there were any further questions on the comments submitted by the State Department or whether there were any new matters to be discussed. 5, UN Exhibit to illustrate the Presidents proposal. Mr. Berding said a special committee has been established to work on an exhibit to illustrate the PresidentQs idea of an inspection system., particularly with respect to the aerial inspection. The committee has concluded that such an exhibit during the General Assembly sessions is both possible and desirable and is thinking in terms of installing the exhibit in the United Nations lobby or., if that is not desirable., in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, Mr. Berding said it might be premature at this time to approach the Secretary General of the United Nations on this matter. Mr. Wainhouse pointed out that placing such an exhibit in the United Nations building could be construed as forcing -the issue. It would be quite within reason9 he said9 to ask the Secretary General to permit an exhibit of this kind if the Russians give an indication of an affirmative response to the Presidents proposal., 'but if their reply is negative or if it is not submitted during the course of the General Assembly, he could see no objection to having the exhibit in the Waldrof Astoria, Mr. Stassen said he believed such an exhibit would have merit and that the preparation of it should go forward. He asked that Mr. Berding9 with the assistance of the Air Force., proceed on the preparation of an exhibit. 6. Aerial Reconnaissance, Mr. Stassen asked General Loper if it would be possible to work out some briefing sessions within limitations for the British., French and Canadians on the subject of aerial reconnaissance. Colonel Bailey said Colonel Firehock had given him a list of questions submitted by the British. but it was for informational purposes rather than action responsibility. Mr. Stassen said he would submit that list of questions to the Secretary of Defense and ask for the JCS comments on it. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-4 General Loper said that in addition to the questions submitted on the list there would be a great many other questions on the details of the President9s proposal and it, therefore would be well to indicate to the Joint Chiefs what priority this should have in connection with their study of the overall job of the technical aspects of a comprehensive limitation of armaments plan. Mr. Stassen said he believed the British, French and Canadians would want this information by the middle of November but the sooner the better. Some of the questions might 'be answered promptly he said, and answers to others could be postponed on the basis that they require further study. 7. Scientific Committee. Mr. Stassen said Mr. Nutting, in an effort to get a public declaration of the impossibility to inspect and control the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, suggested-subject to approval by his Government-that a scientific committee composed of scientists from the five nations in the Subcommittee be established for the purpose of furnishing a scientific basis to government leaders of the U.K., Canada and. France and other western powers to present this position to their public and to their parliaments. Mr. Wainhouse said there is a cable dated September 9, 1955, No. 251 from US-UN New York to the Secretary of State relating to this suggestion of a Committee of Scientists. (The Department of State sent copies of this cable to the Departments and Agencies concerned on September 12, 1955). Mr. Stassen said it is important to convince the public that our position that we cannot eliminate nuclear weapons is based on a scientific analysis. If there is a favorable response from London this week, he said, this matter could be further reviewed at the next Committee meeting. It was agreed that the Committee would meet regularly each Monday at 1Ox3O a.m. The meeting adjourned at 12xO5 p.m. Helen E. Nelson Committee Officer Distribution-. Committee Members Ambassador Lodge List II EXSEC/9-15-55 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 This document consists of pages No..a9 _ of f Copies, Series DPC/RA-3 President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems Meeting of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems Chart Room, Executive Office Building September 1, 1955 -- 3030 p.m. Harold E. Stassen, Chairman Colonel William B. Bailey Mr. David Wainhouse Mr. Howard Meyers Mr. Charles C. Steile Mr. Andrew Berding Mr. Abbott Washburn Mr. John Z. Williams Mr. Frederick W. Ford Mr. Benjamin. Freidson Mr. Richard M. Bissell Dr, John von Neumann Dr. Paul C. Fine Mr. James E. Goodby Colonel Raymond B. Firehock Mr. Joseph S. Toner 1. To discuss comments of the Department of Defense on: (a) the Technical Exchange Panel, (b) the USSR Geneva Proposal, and (c) the U.S. Geneva Proposal. 2. To discuss the legal aspects of the Technical Exchange 3, To discuss the revised draft position paper on Previous United States. Positions. T,S 4243 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 ? TAP SECRET ATTACHMENT A (Changes to DCS/2, Revision 1, recommended by the Department of Defense). Page 2, Par, 2, Line 3: Insert the words, "among others" after the word, "that", Reason: It must be emphasized that the United States cannot accept the provisions of the Soviet proposal on inspection as restrictive. Page , Par, 2, Line 12: Delete word, "an" and change word, "example" to the plural. Page 2, Par, 2, Line 13: Delete the word, "minimum" and the phrase tff o be included", Reason: It must not be inferred-that the United States would regard the listing which follows as an actual statement of our minimum position. Page 2, Par. 2(b), Line 14: Delete the word, "limited" and substi- tue Tnited". Capitalize the word., ""states"o Page 2, Par, 2(c): Add to the sentence, "and other appropriate rights and privileges", Reason: To provide for other than diplo- matic privileges and immunities, Fage , Line 2: Add the phrase, "on a continuing basis" after the word, "area"o Page 3: Suggest the addition of the following subparagraph before the existing subparagraph (e). The addition then would become (e) and the existing (e) would be renumbered (f). Language as follows: "(e) The Control Organ would have the power to decide that a violation of the agreement had occurred. The administrative pro- cedure by which such a decision would be made must be provided for in the agreement, as well as a delineation of the action to be taken by the Control Organ in the event that such a decision were made," Reason: The question of how the inspecting mechanism would arrive at the conclusion that a violation had occurred is an extremely important one. Witness recent experience in Korea. It is felt that a reference to this point is desirable in this paper, Page 3s Subpar. (!t): Add to the sentence the words, "for mili- tary purposes". Reason: To emphasize the military aspects of the inspection. Page 3, Subpar, (5): Add the following sentence to this sub- paragraph: "The term, "replacement? to be fully defined in the ? disarmament agreement," TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Pie 49 Par, D62,: Delete the last sentence of this paragraph and substitute 'the following: "The position of the United States on the question of force levels is such that the setting of arbitrary ceilings for nations large or small is unrealistic at the present times The United States position on this portion of the July 21 Soviet proposal should be the same as that contained in Par, E.3, on Page 5o$' Page 5, Par, E,3: It is suggested that this paragraph read as 011` aws: "3. Force Levels: The United States recognizes that numerical limitations on armed forces will constitute one of the components of any compre- hensive system for the reduction and control of armaments and armed forces, However, the United States considers that the figures for numerical ceilings on armed forces introduced in the most recent Soviet proposals are., like those of the United States and other nations, suggested for the purposes of illustration and do not bear an actual relationship to strategic considerations or to the specific security requirements of any state. The United States intends to regard these proposals as a line of departure in developing and reaching an understanding on realistic force levels in the context of whatever may be achieved on the other substantive features of an arms limitation arrangement, In discussions toward this end a number of factors '_icluding demographic., geographic, political and economic must be taken into account," (Note: This language is in consonance with Pars, 3 and 4 of Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of August 19, 1955.) Page 10, last paragraph, 2nd line: Delete the words,, "the greatest" and substitute the word., "adequate", Page 109 last paragraph, ?nth line: Delete the phrases "the greatest amount of procurable" and substitute the words "ac m ceptablO , Reason: The "greatest" is subject to interpretation and in any case may not be what the United States would consider a sufficient reduction in risk to satisfy its national security requirements. By the same token what others may consider to be "the greatest amount procurable" may prove to the United States inadequate,, Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET (Changes to DCS/3s Revision 1,9 recce mended by the Department of Defense). Page 19 2nd Paro of ":Conclusions" =Add the word. "subsequently" ter the word., "expanded". Reasono To bring this paragraph in consonance with Paragraph III(a). Page 2, Paragraph II. Assume words "purpose" should read., "proposal". ubparagraph II(a): Add the words, and ground" between the words "aerial" and "inspection" in the last line on the page. Reason: To bring in the thought contained in subparagraph (g) below. Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA_3 1, To revise, in accordance with Defense comments, and circulate draft position papers on the USSR Geneva Proposal (See DCS/2 Revision #2), and the U.S. Geneva Proposal (See DCS/3 Revision '#2), 29 To circulate the preliminary and detailed comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Technical Exchange Panel (See DCS/5A and DCS/5B), 3, To circulate comments on Previous United States Positions (See DCS/6A), 4, To circulate comments by the Department of Justice on the legal aspects of the Technical Exchange Panel, 5. To circulate draft position paper on the Technical Exchange Panel, as revised by a member of Mr. Stassents Special Staff, _ 6, The Department of State to draft a suggested revision of Paragraph I, subparagraph (a) of the draft position paper on U.S. Geneva Proposals (DCS/39 Revision 1), TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA-3 1, Report on the Subcommittee Sessions Mr. Stassen reported that the outline plan on the implementation of the Presidentis Geneva proposal has been tabled along the lines of the JCS memorandum., and that the sessions were progressing much as was anticipated. Among the questions asked by the Soviet delegate Mr. Sobolev, which are under advisement by the U.S. delegation, are: (a) whether the U.S. agrees that the objective continues to be the abolition of nuclear weapons, and (b) whether the U. S. still agrees to the.force goals previously submitted. Mr. Stassen said Mr. Sobolev told him that the Soviet still holds to its May 10 language with respect to the unaccountability of nuclear materials and the possibility of clandestine production. Mr. Stassen said he believed the U.S. would have to place its old positions in a reserved and inactive status very soon. The Canadians have expressed the hope that progress on the previous positions would not be lost and it is expected that there will be active discussion of that matter before long. He said there is general agreement to take the outline plan of the Presidents proposal under advisement, and a Soviet response is anticipated during the week of September 5. 2. JCS Preliminary Comments on a Technical Exchange Panel Referring to the September 1 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Technical Exchange Panel (circulated at the meeting), Mr. Stassen said we plan to first present the PresidentIs proposal and the resolution that it be referred to the General Assembly. We had not, however, anticipated that "prior acceptance" of that proposal would be a condition precedent to any other study. He said he did not understand the basis for the JCS "prior acceptance" position nor for the statement., "It should be recalled that one of the principal purposes of this proposal was to insure against sur- prise attack by either side and thereby create a suitable climate for further progress in the field of international limitation of~ arms. The proposed exchange of a Technical Panel would not provide this insurance." He asked Colonel Bailey for a copy of the August 26, 1955 memorandum referred to in the JCS September 1 memorandum which may have served as the basis of this position. TOP SECRET -3- Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010040-3 TOP SECRET DPC/RA?3 Colonel Bailey said he believed that foremost in the minds of the Joint Chiefs was the fact that the existence of .the Technical Exchange,Panel proposal in the Subcommittee prior to a commitment by the USSR would afford the Soviets an oppor- tunity to evade a commitment on the Eisenhower Geneva proposal. The JCS feel strongly:that it would be extremely advantageous .to the U.S. if the Soviet Union would agree on the President's proposal as a first step, Mr. Wainhouse asked whether the JCS position means that the United States should not go on with anything in the way of inspection until there has been prior acceptance by the USSR of the President's proposal,, or whether it is just a matter of timing. Colonel Bailey said he believed it is primarily a matter of timing. Mr. Wainhouse replied that if that were true he believed the Department of State would go along with that position. Mr. Stassen said. he felt that the JCS paper is contrary to the President's statement and contrary to the directive at Geneva because it implies reserving previous Presidential and NSC decisions by in effect saying that nothing should be done unless the Soviets first accept the Eisenhower proposal. The final directive on which the four heads of government agreed in Geneva states that the Subcommittee is to proceed to develop a sound inspection system and does not refer to any prior step of accepting the President's proposal as a.condition to developing such a system. 'Mr. Wainhouse suggested that a position paper be prepared which would relate the Technical Exchange Panel proposal in terms of time and tactics to the President's proposal as a means of clarifying this matter. . Colonel Bailey said that if Mr. Stassen feels the U.S. should proceed with the technical panel proposal,, the Department of Defense would urge that the panel be limited in scope., if possible to a study of objects of control, and that the traveling aspects of that study be omitted. Mr, Stassen said .we are more or less faced with three problems: (a) how to proceed in the.study we were directed to conduct by the heads of government., the President, and the NSC; .(b) how to get off the hook., as directed,, on the old force levels and the abolition of nuclear weapons and at the same time maintain