NEW PROPOSALS FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

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CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8
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RIFPUB
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K
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11
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December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 15, 2007
Sequence Number: 
54
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Publication Date: 
July 2, 1952
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 t/.~ _ NEW PROPOSALS F'OR CONTR?L~ OF' AT?MIC WEAPONS ~UL ?~ This paper is bntended to be c~ont~?ove~?sial~ It is therefore one sided, opinionated aaAd er~?oneo~asa Noted by D/DGI ~ ~ ,~{: SUMMAR'K The weste~?~s nations have several natu~?al disadvantages in atomic warfare, these x~~eo 1) greate~~ vaall~eraY~ils~.ry bc~~:ause of more centralization and speciali- zation, greatea? dependence on powe~? and transliort, ~) possibility of sneal~ attacl~~ and 3) dependeaace o~n o~rerseas transport and possibly beach-head land- ings in warf~.ree When the Russian stockp~.le ~?eaches a00, we cannot compensate for these disadvantages even by aaa uaaflimited supply of bombs as a saturation effect occursa Consequently9 military cyefense plaaaning should not be based on atomic weapons which we may not tiara to use9 we should attempt to minimize our natural disadvantages an atomic warfare aid we should seek to eliminate stockpiles of atomic weapor~sa The previous plan fo~? control of atomic energy presented by the United :hates was not accepted9 it left us in an unce~?tain mo~?al position and it is now +~bsolete, Anew effort is needed to eliminate stockpiles which are now to our disadvantageo A new pleas is presented based ono 1) Accepting the Russiaa~ p~??posal fir inte~?national iabspectaon and destruction of stockpilese DBE re~ie~s~ completed. state Dept. revievr completed Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 2~ 2) Specifying the inspecti?n re~llired, sand 3) Progressive elimination of stockpiles during a period of 30 weeks This plan is to our advaant~e if accepted or rejected It should be negotiated in private to permit coancessioans~ No plan can more than postpone the use of atomic weapons, so de~;es~trali~ation is still urgently neededa IN~'Fi.?L~IJ~TI?N Almost seven years hate passed since the 49~4greed Declaration?? of November 15, 1945, was gssued by the President of the United States and the l?rime Ministers of the United I~na~gdom sand Canadao Th1S declaratioan Which committed tine United States to ?Aseek by all reasonable means to bring about international arrangements to prevernt the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes99 was based on three major consideratiommsa These wereo 1) The development of atomic energy has placed at the disposal of maailciand means of destruction hitherto unlcrnown, 2) There can be no adequate military defense against atomic weapons, and 3) These are weapons 94in the employment of which no single nation Dean in fact have a monopoly??~ Shortly thereafter ~aanp 339 1946) a board of consultants begaan its work on the formulation of a plan for the international control of atomic energy This report, issued March l6, 19469 coapfirms the three points of the '?l~greed l~eclaratiornP9 sand adds a fourtho 09Our p?BStACa1 ganstJStutIl?naS9 and the historically established reluctance of the United States to take the initiative in agressive warfare, both would wean to put us at a clisadvaantage with regard to surprise use of atomic weapons This suggests that although our present position, in Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 3~ which we have a monopoly of tk~ese weapons9 ma,y appear st~?ong, this advantage will disappear and. the situation may be reversed in a world in which atomic armamexat is general?~o Another point which was recognized. at an early date was that the United States and the western mowers are more ~rulm~erable to atomic warfare than Russia because of their higtaer deg~?ee of concentration in citx~s and higher dependence on the pz:~pea2 fu~~ctioning of a complex tech~aology~ Accordingly9 the need. for a gradual decentralization. to reduce our vulnera- x-ility was apparento The developments of se~~en years have only confirmed these major premises Present day think~;ing ~~s based on the utilizatio~a of hundreds or thousands of bombs i~r.stead of tens or hua~d~?eds9 furthe~? emphasizing point c-ne, General Vande~aberg estimated that even a conventioa~al attack by World War II type bombea?s would be ~5 percent successful Sato Evea Post)o The Russians have demonstrated the truth of point ~9 which was considered to be the most controve~?sial ixa 1946 Unfortunately9 the ~?e~arkable foresight of 1946 did not lead to action c-f equal merito Today9 ~ 195~D there is no decentralizatione no improvement in international relations no adequate defe~nsey no control of atomic energy a,nd the time has al~?eady a~?rived wJnen the Russia,~a stocl~pile could cause a major catastrophe in this country het at this time the public appears satisfied because the United States ha.s bu~,lt given more bombs and made some feeble e>fforts toward organizing a Ci?ilian Oefe~ase group to clean up the debriso On this basis a man would be pleased at the prospect of a duel because he had the Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 4~ foresight to buy ten pistols and the arrangements with his undertai~er~ It is apparent that the time is here whe~a the ea~istence of atomic weapons is a decided milita~?y d~.sadvantage to the iJnited Stateso Consecluentlyy we should direct our efforts towards formulating a new pro~sal for the control of atomic weaponso Whatever the rnerz.t oi? the original proposals it is damned b;y the simple fact that it was usoft a,ccepted~ 1VIII.~~''AI`t~ D~SADiIA1mTTA0ES OF' ATOMIC WEAPONS 1.. American. use of atomp~c; weaf?ons~ a) Destruction, of I~uss~~.an cities Apart from considerations of whether this method of war"~a~e ~s too evgl to be used the amount of damage is limited not only by the number of mbs available but also by the number of targets and the means of transp~~?ting the bombs Where is a point of diminishing returns and it seems hbgh.~y doubtful. wtl~etber it would be worth transporting the 1000th ~ bomb to Itussiao b.) "Tactical use for defense of Eu~?opeo Targets which would merit use ofc atomic weapons are ra~?e and would become even. more so if bombs were used, consecluently9 1000 would appea~? more than ampleo c) Submarines and submarine bases Submarines are more difficult tc- detect than to dest~,Poy after detection., Consecguently atomic bombs would only be useful in cases where a verbed ~?oxntac:t was made and losto Submarine bases are limited ia~ ~~.nxmbex;, so o~ae thousand more bombs should surely be ample for tactical use by the ivavy~ d) Hydrogen bombs ??nl~~ a few l~ussian, targets are large enough to merit larger bombs Gonse~uentlys the hydrogen b?mb is a completely wasted Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 5~ effort. Worse still it will a~~.cele.~?ate the Russian development of a hydrogen bomb. Conclusion, Borgabs beyor^~d IoTo, 3000 are completely worthless and can?t even be sold. as surplus 1/ Even worse, if several ~~~s and k~ombs are used there may be some widlespt ~~d ta~~ic effectsa 2. Russian uses Consider? the n~xmb~;~. ~{ ~i~.ssian bombs required to overcompensate even an unlimited Ame~~;:cs.:~ s~~.~pa~~ a) American aid Eu~~?o,~ean. cities 300 bori~bs deliverable to American and European cities should lre su~fic~ient to deter the United States from starting city bombing b) Shipping and harbors Amy war with Russia :will require an enormous overseas transport 200 bornbs reserved for shipping and harbors would more than compensate for tactical ~,d,~, amtages of the United States side (anti-submarine weapon). c) Break through X00 bombs reserved fo~~ use in breaking through strong positions should elnmF~,?uate the need of massed divisions d) Beach =heads 50 bombs reserved for beach-heads should make landing operations even wo~~se tfi~ax~ usualo Conclusions 650 Russian. bombs are sufficient to put us at a military disadvantage ever if we had an unlimited supply. We 1/ If intercontinental guided, mussiles are used, several thousand bombs may -- be needed to hat a parti~?~1~.~? tar?get~ Approved Far Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 ca~~,~vt w~~n ~~~ hav~~~,~g bigge~? stockpiles. Air defense must be p~?ep~,~~~~~~ ~'~~~~ ail types of attack at all times and duickly ~~ea~~:he~ a ~~~%^~t of ~+.na~g~5~shn.~.g retu~?ns. As the Russian st?~k}~ile is }r~,r~w ~aaot~;d i~ ties pape~?s at 150 we should lose ~~o 'tt.iim~~: ~~F~ malz~~g eve~?~ effort to eliminate these sto~~-kpll~~~~~ PR~~~tO?,~5 A~~ ~ ~~?~~ PTS ~.~ OO1?ITRO L 1a. Laliemthal-Ache~c~?s F~ilti.{,~~:,, Thas plate ~v~~.Q~ ;~~.~,, ~` ~~~~~ lie ~.s a~f~r tsght as ~ssible to prevent small leaks which mAght ~.~~~~~.~,~~~?'~ ~;,~; ::r~;r~"..~~~i~~-L~" .at~~?ial to t'~,bri.cate a few bombs. It overemphasized the ~?1~"f:u.c~.~~{~~1~ ~~' ref"tr~~'~ ~tellagent ~aspectors. This was fallacious for the A~~ ha~~~ ~~;~~~~~~:~`~~?~ted thai$ people wrath physics training can be hia?ed to do dull ~o~P~s? ~"fc a~~~~' ~~~~~ ~re~;ognize that a maaor attack utilizing mbs is d: ~?~;~:~,~~:;~~? ~~~e.~ation and detectableo It demanded a lot from the Russb~ a~~~~ ~>~t,;~,,,,~~,d, ~,_~ ba~lt flee n?1ow-how?? of atomic ear~ergy which we now reaAize vva?i~ ~~~~ G.~ ~,tt~~?.r?~~nve to them as we thoughto Perhaps it was a good offe~? at the tn~~e ~>>tt ~~ wars not a~?ceptable these and is even less acceptable at presea~t wh~~s s~~:e ~~~~~e ~s pe~?haps ~.a00?100 instead of 20-0. 2. Russian Proposa~.~ Wester~a ot?~e~t~io~ss t~.~ t~~~e ~tussl.~n p~opos~,ls were a) Outlaw bombs ~'l}gip y , ~.; ~~f~;~..~1 ~~e~or.d, b) ~Teto in se~u7rIlf~~ ~?c~~~sx?f~.l.~ c) hio details on l~,spr~~??~a~r~~.r~ p~r~~~~;edu~e~s? The fi~?st two ~fl~esti~z._~~ R~.~"~, me~,~^,~,~nglc~~~s ~R we~~?e f~all~ eox~ceded b~ the Russians an Y99k~~ The ~?~s:~~.~~s,~i~a~n~~ ~~e~re~? p~~?~ided ar~~ detabled mechanisms for inspection9 beat ?r~ ?ua~ s~ca~ey ,~,~, 7~~ ~pe~;tioan p~?ocedures were proposed based on the gene~?a.l. p~?r~~(~'~~~:~.~6'. ?, ~r~ ~~~.e .Russian pla~na Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 ~o It seems clea~? that we had no ~?eal intention of giving up our only n:iilitary advantage and, t~n?~ ~Fssians were willing to wait until they caught up with their productiono ~urt~e~mo~?eU in the open forum debate neither side was willing to comp~?omise "~o,~ ,~T~a.~ of appearing to "back down49~ DASIC A~~~T~v'i~`~Tl?liiS ~~' ~dE~ PIaAN 1) Any deg~?ee o'~ ~~~~;A;~~~~~. c~r~ given warning system which can be obtained is better than the p~~es~~~~~ ~~;r,.~~~? 2) As recognised i~7~ t~~e fl.9~5 ?"Agreed Declaration" no control plan can eliminate the use of ato~~~~~ v~~apons in a mayor wa~?o A country could start f7rom scratch at the e~utb~?e~,.T~: ~~.d produc'e bombs in two years The best possible plan can only e~~~Y~h~.~~,~~~-~ s~.~acl~:piles and postpo~ae for a while the use of atomic weaponso 3) It is highly dout*ttf~~.~~ that the l~ussia~.s will accept any form of control or elimination of stocl~piles as it would be to thei~? disadvantages Consequently tlhe plan should be designed tee do 'gas g?od even if it is not accepted or if it is accepted but broken later ono 4) Discussion of the plan should not be held in open sessions as this prevents concessions and ~;ompromisee 'The plan should only be published after i~t has been accepted or re~ected~ 5) Even a plan that wo~atd only gn.ve one day? s warning would be valuables Populations c?o~~ld~. m~~~r~ and the ai~? defe~ase would not be caught with a Sunday morning hangove x?~ Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 6~ ~'he ~.~~'.,~r~,ri t~~ c i~,:~~i~ate l~~~e stockpileso A few X10) ]zidden bombs a~~ ~~r~~~~~T_,,.;.;~ ~-~~;~, :~~?~~~~,-~. ~ pr~adu~tioan facility operatiang at a capacity of 30~~0 peg ;~,,,:~:,~:~~, ~~ .~~~.h~~7;5,~ leis da~~e~?ous than aaa accumulated stock- pileo Such a plat ~:~~4~'s~;l ~~~~;~--;~~~ ~s.~ `~~~;~ ~o~~~ed auto ~ wa~? broke out when we had ~~io stockpile brut ~~~, ~,~~~ ~~_~_ ~~~~,~ ~~~?~~~~~,t~ara~, the ? I~id~e sand snot our cities would be the l~c~~ ~. ~~~ { ~;;< 7~ Atomic: ~r~,,~~~..~ ~~:.:, ~;_~ ,;,~;~? ~~~i{ ~~,t value ~.nd coin easily be sacrificed if ~.iecessary to elimi~~~~~.c~- 2; ~w, ;,:,':, ,:; ~~~,;~,~?s~ 3~ b'nte~?r~lato~~= ~~ ~~.~1~ ~,~~.~: ?z~ G~~st ?f atomic eaner~y~, whether desirable or riot, is clearly a~ot ~:c~a?e~~~~.'~~ ~__" sc?> ~~'~~~~~~i~, aan~~ ~hou~~~ ~.?t be cornsideredo 9~ A ana~o~? ~to$?.~,~.~: ~`~4~.~~:~ ~~ ~~~?ol~es thous~.~ds of people aaad could be ..: c etected by tine sipa.eL;:~tt a.,.;~,;~~ 4 , :l ,:;~~i.~~,~, 10~ The pu?a~;ti~ e ~~~~~ ;~~~.?>> ;_:,~.~ :~~ ;~a?ts ~,~n~~ ~~oepian~ ~?ecox?ds is such adeep- ],rained humaan h~l~~L'~ f~~,ac: st?^, ;-~,. , ,-: uy ~~:c.~k~ile~ aid the locatioan of production i:acilities can be ~~'~~E~,:C`;~Clt~.tr~ic~ "r;~~~1 `i~~~.~ ,~ c~~o~~~7s~ 11~ A oanemd~.~r ~~,~_ ,vy ~ ;~~~~~~~ ~~~ a~ztnie~ed by simply locking up the stockpile of fissia~n~i~:~ie ~,~z?~,,K. ~ln~,~cF~~ i~te~an~tioaaa.l coantrol~ 1~~ A? ?ne?w~c~7'~s ~~~~~r~_>>~~~~ c~;~~~;~~~ be a~;in~e~e~, if tine same material was alloyed with some ~t~~~7~ ;,;~,?:~;:~ ~I. 13~ Stockp~.l~e~ E,~~~~~.?~~I ;n.,, =; ~~~,~~irx~a~ted by de~~a:~u~? the fissionable material with won-fissg?n~,bb~ i~~~~f~~~;~~~~~~, `~h~~~~ ~~,~ould rr~ot ~t~~fe~e with ~epeacefuh? uses and is st~?esse~ ~.~~.~; tth~L:~ ~.~: ~~~,>-~~a~ ~ep~~?t~ ~~' i;_/ It is not possible to ~~.~.~.~~;_?~?l~~~ ~~Y~?om aan~?lass~~ned data whether Plutoa~ium can be a denatured If got ~t ~,t~f,~i1t?~;, "~.;;~~ to e duaanped. , the oeeaan~ ~ the Russians use Plutoani~n e~ch~~~~+;~~ely ~~~~ ~~,~~.il~,~ t~?ade an e~ui~aleant ~uaaatity of denatured Uraniumo Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 9a 14) A further delay of ?~leT tc-two ~ea~?s could be introduced b~ destruction of all piles and separ~atioa~ facilbtieso This would be nice but not essentialo 15) We have more to ga~~.~ tl~,,~ lose ~ exchange of information except about details of bombs From the consideratlcizs a~ov~~ ~, plan r,atu~?all~r followso 1) Accept the Itussi~. ~ro~sal to outlaw ar~d destroy bombs and simultaneously to est~,blist~ ~,o~trolso 2) Define the co~.trols aid lnspectiog~ ~~?e~ui~?edo For examplea a) Access to all reco~?cls of production etco during phase 1 and the~?eafter at n~onth.ly ~~~te~?vals plus three unscheduled visits per year b) Access to all ~,rodu~ti?~ facilities9 assembly facilities and stockpiles d~~~~gng phase ~ and thereafter at weekly iz~.tervals, plus teas ur~sch~d~~nle~, visits pe~? year c) Continuous surve~.llaa~ce of stockpiles wader ianternatioa~al co~.trol~ d) Inspection of eaatbre cou~atry by air beginning at stage 2 and thereaftero e) Outlawiaag aaaci dest~?uction of stockpiles by stageso Stage to Deliver. ~.uclear anaterial of bombs to international coaatr?.l l?catec~ wntha~rn coum~tr~ at rate of 10 percent per we~k~ Also curre~at p~?oduction)e Approved For Release 2007/05115 :CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010054-8 Stage ~? Aif~,~? r ~~~.T.s ~a~~~~~~i~al is del~l~re~ea to satisfaction of ho~h ~~~~!~~~~ alloy l~ per~;~nt per weep with another et~,~~ t . Stage ~~. ~~~~.~s~ ~;:~t? ~~ ~.1. ;~at~~~i~,i ~.s allo~~ed9 denature 19 percent Stage ~0 1~~~~:~~;;~.~?~'~;,-, ~~~~~~_u~,tio~ plantso This plan would ~-~z~%~~r_;~~.:,tf. s~o~~~,~5~les zn ~~ weeds afte~? adoption It could hardly ~e a,c~epte~~, ~ ~~~. ~,e, ,";, ?~.~~.a~s s months so ?ux~ stockpile would remain intact duria~g the short t~~e :. ;ill k.~~;~.~; ~ that ~?eYna,ins wheys we have an advantage in atomic weapor~s~ 'his ~la~~. L,~ ~~~:is;~z~ed, as a~ ea~ample oa~ly~ The details of any actual plane would ~e ~~~z ~~:~~~~ e4~~ f~ra~c~ load, ~~. W. yllas~kr~t>~n ~5, D. C.