A DRAFT SUMMARY OF THE LINE OF ARGUMENT AGREED ON NOVEMBER 15TH AT A PARTIAL MEETING OF THE PANEL IN NEW YORK CITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010058-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 58
• Content Type: MEMO

AlI
: A PAR TI
r THE LINE CF As'ZI3U tE ' AGREED ON. NOYEMBE.I l Dth AT
L MEETING OF `I': IE PANEL IN NEW YORK CI` 'i .
A ? Asa nation- we have' into , a su,.:h : that it is hardly
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MEMORANDUM
thin?.au a 10x* u
Ue.ALO undertake
a rious effort to l %lt the arms
_o defena the continent of Europe, we are dependent upon our prowess
unilateral decision in all, of these matters of atomic energy. More
-anc iuore,.both in our grand strategy and in our specific effort
ly federal taw, we are committed to-.a policy of noncooperation and
-s iuch weapons where necessary in the event of hostile aggression.
our own present public national position commit us to the use
of the largest ossihle weapons. We are conraitted to the develop-
,...,..
ment of, ever more powerful weapons;. got r the dare.:event of 1945 *nd
in the field of weapons of mass destruction. And finally, it seems
at least possible that military considerations will require us, in
the event of. war, to launch our Massive attack with a rapidity an
violence that
polo and incomplete.
11 previous examples of "total war" seem
The contest in producing weapons of-mass destruction is pro_
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State Dept. review completed
itself, is a weapon of a new order of destructive power. 'What is
ceeding grimly a an a er more rrapia pacer The atomic oo:nc , in
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*pa well understood is that it 4
a weapon of such a character
at once. any nation knows how to make an atomic bomb,
sect the total destructive force of its stockpile, to multiply at
a quite extraordinary rate of speed. The rate of growth of the
American stockpile has been startling, and there is no reason to
e that a similar development is not occurring in the Soviet
&M e. A
we consider simply the rate of expansion
U6tion. If this is true
of the supplies of fissionable material; the point becomes still
sharper if in addition we bear in mind. the possibilities of weapons
with a thermonuclear, or a biochemical, component. In the end it
even becomes necessary to consider the unmeasured but real possi-
bility of a contamination of the atmosphere. The destructive power
of atomic stockpiles.is of a wholly new order, and in this sense it
creates a new and fearful connection between the United States and
the U.S.S.A. We seem to be moving toward a situation in which each
of the two great powers may have the capacity to wreck the society
.evitably shadowed by fear and anguish, compare to which our present
of the other. Without venturing to predict whether or not, in such
a world, catastrophe might be averted by the fear of retaliation,
the Panel is persuaded that life in such conditions would be in-
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 scheme for safety--or even to decide whether it
Yet the Panel has not tr ,ed Vd sketch a full and wo
van l ? tic nal
of . to work for the adoption of a such scheme. mere it may
be necessary' to explain briefly how we distinguish a "full and
workable" s eme from the sort of
Nations thus far--and to remark that we have tried to sketch for" ,
G*r `own use some
utl.ine of the balance. of consideratiot as it now
stands,) ail; are persuaded that these questions can have no fixed
answer, for .`the outlines
and not simply upon a study of the contest in armaments. So a
judgment on this matter would in reality take t-*me beyond its
sketched above--must depend on a full estimate of national policy
scheme for arms control--even in the light of the grim prospect
change ra"idly as time passes. Moreover, the proper sbap* of a
assignment.
D, This Panel does not think that either the Soviet danger or the
great effort to establish a collective defense in the free world
unimportant. Qn the contrary,
it believes that there is pressing
urgency in guarding against the one by doing all we.can to develop
and strengthen the other.
Much of the strength of the United States
and her allies must currently come from weapons of mass destruction.
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ENT AL
Nor is 11' re anything remote or trifling in the problems suggested
by such words as Berlin, Korea, Iran, and Indo-China--to say nothing
of the Saar, Trieste, Suez, and Kashmir.
S tom, the Panel has not been able to persuade itself that
this double goal is sufficient; in its view the character of the
arms race is such that pop licy should be based on three.opoints and
not two; the meaning of-armaments should be placed fully on a level
with the menace of the Soviet Union and the urgency of the defense
of the free world. This is exceedingly difficult, for there are
many kinds of activity which serve :one concern while damaging
another--and in-some cases it is quite impossible to give full
weight to all. three. On the other hand,,we believe that there are
several important steps which can be of real, and general value in
such a three-point policy and our only firm conclusions relate to
six steps of this kind. These conclusions are firm enough to make
up for our hesitation in other matters.
F. In the light of these considerations, we reach the following
conclusions:
1. There is need for candor about the. arms race. The Govern-
ment should adopt a policy of candor about the character of
major -weapons, their expanding rate of production, ano the
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ous and important,, ct that they are po#seesed by both
sides. There is need for candor both within -t.he-~'Goverameut
and outside it--to our people in general and to all respon-
the arms race, think about.it,an6 talk ai)out it.
There is need for a focusing of responsibility in the Govern-
that a very mu 1 viccer circle of officials shoulc :now about
Bible officers of the Government in particular,
ment for both thought and action. All major decisions anQ
plans for the development and use of armaments, and all
deliberations about their regulation, should have the same
care and consideration which are now given to the largest
aspects of our resistance to Soviet expansionism and our
efforts to organize the free world. Neither plans for
strategic bombardment, at one extreme, nor-details of dis-
armament proposals, at the other, should be left to agencies
.of limited and specialized responsibility. Nor should large
decisions in other fields be taken without a full awareness
of their meaning with respect to armaments.
There is need for a wholl new order of effort in defending
the North American continent against weapons of mass destruc-
tion. The arms race, in our vie
carried enormous dangers
to the whole of American policy through the fact that the
V .i I]
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le to stxikea crippling VUM against
in advancing now proposals for disarmament through the United
Nations. We find with regret that the policy of advancing
proposals for disarmament through the United Nations is los-
ing its usefulness. These proposals seem almost inevitably
unr*-t, famed as'they arew.without any real hope that the
Russians will accept them. They seem to suggest that there
is available as a real possioility a world of full safety
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the United States.
Suh a devslapnent would have the gravest
kind of adverse effect on all our policies, and we believe
that there is-urgent need for a major effort to strengthen
our continental' defense. We would emphasize tbat,.064 great
way to reduce the danger of all weapons is to 7duce their
effectiveness. There is probably no complete safety in
continental defense, but the more that we Can get, the better.
This is something that can be done even while real arms regu-
la.tion seems unattainable--and the Panel also bolt" 09 that
each improvement in continental defense may make it less
necessary to insist on totally ironclad-schemes of arms
regulation.
4. There is need for a gradual abandonment of the initiative
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CO rYi 6 F AL
and peace--and this is not really the case.at the present.
Chile recognizing that it will JWI
dz
be possible to change oir
_tacek suddenly or without; preparation, the Panel believes
that precisely because the. pN blem of arms regulation is so
important it should not now be handled by public discussion
in commissions of the United Nations. Of course the United
States cannot prevent others from advancing their proposals,
but the Panel believes that it can use its right to analyze
and comment on any such proposals to clarify the fact that
these discussions do not at present really serve the common
cause,
5. There is need for a new level of understanding with our major
allies on the meaning of atomic armaments. The Panel is
persuaded that it is important to get a better understanding
with our allies on atomic problems. (This view is
generally
shared in the Department of State, and so it will probably
not be useful to press our reasoning here. Our view of
course is that there is need for a common approach to such
problems as using atomic weapons in Europe and planning for
a possible scheme of adjustment in which the danger of these
weapons might be reduced; we are also concerned with the broad
objective of holding the free world together.)
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 .--a
There is need for increased attention to the Possibilities
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that ME be found in serious communication with the Q.S.S.F1.
The Panel believes that one of the central difficulties in
all our policy is a fearful ignorance of Russian t apabilities
and intentions--and that some of our gravest dangers lie to
the possibility that Soviet leaders may misread the realities
of the arms race and of our own determination. We think
that the United States him_ the skills to open
serious and significant conversations bearing on such prob-
lema, and we believe that even if such conversations should
not develop at present into any real negotiations (which
.may well be impossible), they would bring us such important
information and perhaps decrease the likelihood of a disas-
trous miscalculation on either side.
G. The Panel is uncomfortably aware that its firm conclusions
are none of then ens to execute--and that in the view of many they
are highly debatable. While the Panel is In no position to assess
the strength of any opposition to the views It has expressed, it
seems important to observe that it may be better that proposals of
this kind should be ignored than that they should be raised at a
time and in a manner such that they could only be rejected with a
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 4,. t~4i,w
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f4 K
4iffit:UIt' AYao
: ewr of the Pa e" the true "test o : any
-we inux;t ? r: ecognize ha L
whu
L. But we ae .. L pans - of
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