Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 21, 2003
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010058-4.pdf741.33 KB
AlI : A PAR TI r THE LINE CF As'ZI3U tE ' AGREED ON. NOYEMBE.I l Dth AT L MEETING OF `I': IE PANEL IN NEW YORK CI` 'i . A ? Asa nation- we have' into , a su,.:h : that it is hardly Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 MEMORANDUM thin?.au a 10x* u Ue.ALO undertake a rious effort to l %lt the arms _o defena the continent of Europe, we are dependent upon our prowess unilateral decision in all, of these matters of atomic energy. More -anc iuore,.both in our grand strategy and in our specific effort ly federal taw, we are committed to-.a policy of noncooperation and -s iuch weapons where necessary in the event of hostile aggression. our own present public national position commit us to the use of the largest ossihle weapons. We are conraitted to the develop- ,...,.. ment of, ever more powerful weapons;. got r the dare.:event of 1945 *nd in the field of weapons of mass destruction. And finally, it seems at least possible that military considerations will require us, in the event of. war, to launch our Massive attack with a rapidity an violence that polo and incomplete. 11 previous examples of "total war" seem The contest in producing weapons of-mass destruction is pro_ Approved For Release 2003/06/16 CIA- bP8 01 State Dept. review completed itself, is a weapon of a new order of destructive power. 'What is ceeding grimly a an a er more rrapia pacer The atomic oo:nc , in Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 *pa well understood is that it 4 a weapon of such a character at once. any nation knows how to make an atomic bomb, sect the total destructive force of its stockpile, to multiply at a quite extraordinary rate of speed. The rate of growth of the American stockpile has been startling, and there is no reason to e that a similar development is not occurring in the Soviet &M e. A we consider simply the rate of expansion U6tion. If this is true of the supplies of fissionable material; the point becomes still sharper if in addition we bear in mind. the possibilities of weapons with a thermonuclear, or a biochemical, component. In the end it even becomes necessary to consider the unmeasured but real possi- bility of a contamination of the atmosphere. The destructive power of atomic stockpiles.is of a wholly new order, and in this sense it creates a new and fearful connection between the United States and the U.S.S.A. We seem to be moving toward a situation in which each of the two great powers may have the capacity to wreck the society .evitably shadowed by fear and anguish, compare to which our present of the other. Without venturing to predict whether or not, in such a world, catastrophe might be averted by the fear of retaliation, the Panel is persuaded that life in such conditions would be in- Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676.R000600010058-4 scheme for safety--or even to decide whether it Yet the Panel has not tr ,ed Vd sketch a full and wo van l ? tic nal of . to work for the adoption of a such scheme. mere it may be necessary' to explain briefly how we distinguish a "full and workable" s eme from the sort of Nations thus far--and to remark that we have tried to sketch for" , G*r `own use some utl.ine of the balance. of consideratiot as it now stands,) ail; are persuaded that these questions can have no fixed answer, for .`the outlines and not simply upon a study of the contest in armaments. So a judgment on this matter would in reality take t-*me beyond its sketched above--must depend on a full estimate of national policy scheme for arms control--even in the light of the grim prospect change ra"idly as time passes. Moreover, the proper sbap* of a assignment. D, This Panel does not think that either the Soviet danger or the great effort to establish a collective defense in the free world unimportant. Qn the contrary, it believes that there is pressing urgency in guarding against the one by doing all we.can to develop and strengthen the other. Much of the strength of the United States and her allies must currently come from weapons of mass destruction. Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010058-4 Approved For. Release 2003/06/16.: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010058-4 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 ENT AL Nor is 11' re anything remote or trifling in the problems suggested by such words as Berlin, Korea, Iran, and Indo-China--to say nothing of the Saar, Trieste, Suez, and Kashmir. S tom, the Panel has not been able to persuade itself that this double goal is sufficient; in its view the character of the arms race is such that pop licy should be based on three.opoints and not two; the meaning of-armaments should be placed fully on a level with the menace of the Soviet Union and the urgency of the defense of the free world. This is exceedingly difficult, for there are many kinds of activity which serve :one concern while damaging another--and in-some cases it is quite impossible to give full weight to all. three. On the other hand,,we believe that there are several important steps which can be of real, and general value in such a three-point policy and our only firm conclusions relate to six steps of this kind. These conclusions are firm enough to make up for our hesitation in other matters. F. In the light of these considerations, we reach the following conclusions: 1. There is need for candor about the. arms race. The Govern- ment should adopt a policy of candor about the character of major -weapons, their expanding rate of production, ano the Approved For Releai6 A 63/06M : lAA-tDP8QBOi676R000600010058-4 I Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 ous and important,, ct that they are po#seesed by both sides. There is need for candor both within -t.he-~'Goverameut and outside it--to our people in general and to all respon- the arms race, think about.it,an6 talk ai)out it. There is need for a focusing of responsibility in the Govern- that a very mu 1 viccer circle of officials shoulc :now about Bible officers of the Government in particular, ment for both thought and action. All major decisions anQ plans for the development and use of armaments, and all deliberations about their regulation, should have the same care and consideration which are now given to the largest aspects of our resistance to Soviet expansionism and our efforts to organize the free world. Neither plans for strategic bombardment, at one extreme, nor-details of dis- armament proposals, at the other, should be left to agencies .of limited and specialized responsibility. Nor should large decisions in other fields be taken without a full awareness of their meaning with respect to armaments. There is need for a wholl new order of effort in defending the North American continent against weapons of mass destruc- tion. The arms race, in our vie carried enormous dangers to the whole of American policy through the fact that the V .i I] Approved for Release 2003/06/11: CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010058-4 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 le to stxikea crippling VUM against in advancing now proposals for disarmament through the United Nations. We find with regret that the policy of advancing proposals for disarmament through the United Nations is los- ing its usefulness. These proposals seem almost inevitably unr*-t, famed as'they arew.without any real hope that the Russians will accept them. They seem to suggest that there is available as a real possioility a world of full safety Approved For Release 2003/06/16 CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 the United States. Suh a devslapnent would have the gravest kind of adverse effect on all our policies, and we believe that there is-urgent need for a major effort to strengthen our continental' defense. We would emphasize tbat,.064 great way to reduce the danger of all weapons is to 7duce their effectiveness. There is probably no complete safety in continental defense, but the more that we Can get, the better. This is something that can be done even while real arms regu- la.tion seems unattainable--and the Panel also bolt" 09 that each improvement in continental defense may make it less necessary to insist on totally ironclad-schemes of arms regulation. 4. There is need for a gradual abandonment of the initiative Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 CO rYi 6 F AL and peace--and this is not really the case.at the present. Chile recognizing that it will JWI dz be possible to change oir _tacek suddenly or without; preparation, the Panel believes that precisely because the. pN blem of arms regulation is so important it should not now be handled by public discussion in commissions of the United Nations. Of course the United States cannot prevent others from advancing their proposals, but the Panel believes that it can use its right to analyze and comment on any such proposals to clarify the fact that these discussions do not at present really serve the common cause, 5. There is need for a new level of understanding with our major allies on the meaning of atomic armaments. The Panel is persuaded that it is important to get a better understanding with our allies on atomic problems. (This view is generally shared in the Department of State, and so it will probably not be useful to press our reasoning here. Our view of course is that there is need for a common approach to such problems as using atomic weapons in Europe and planning for a possible scheme of adjustment in which the danger of these weapons might be reduced; we are also concerned with the broad objective of holding the free world together.) Approved For Release. 2003/061M':t'i4RDP8OE301,676IQ.00600010058-4 .--a There is need for increased attention to the Possibilities Approved For Release 2003/06/1 ' RP B01676R000600010058-4 . ~ ~ IAL that ME be found in serious communication with the Q.S.S.F1. The Panel believes that one of the central difficulties in all our policy is a fearful ignorance of Russian t apabilities and intentions--and that some of our gravest dangers lie to the possibility that Soviet leaders may misread the realities of the arms race and of our own determination. We think that the United States him_ the skills to open serious and significant conversations bearing on such prob- lema, and we believe that even if such conversations should not develop at present into any real negotiations (which .may well be impossible), they would bring us such important information and perhaps decrease the likelihood of a disas- trous miscalculation on either side. G. The Panel is uncomfortably aware that its firm conclusions are none of then ens to execute--and that in the view of many they are highly debatable. While the Panel is In no position to assess the strength of any opposition to the views It has expressed, it seems important to observe that it may be better that proposals of this kind should be ignored than that they should be raised at a time and in a manner such that they could only be rejected with a Approved For Release 2003/Q6 i 4,. t~4i,w Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4 f4 K 4iffit:UIt' AYao : ewr of the Pa e" the true "test o : any -we inux;t ? r: ecognize ha L whu L. But we ae .. L pans - of Approved for Release 2003/06/16':'CIA-RDP80BO1476ROQQ600010058-4 proved-Far Release 2003/06/16: CIA-RDP80BO Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010058-4