DISARMAMENT STUDY TASK FORCES STUDY OF INSPECTION AND CONTROL METHODS REPORTS BY TASK FORCES OCTOBER 1955 -- JANUARY 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 492
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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[JCS review completed.
DISARMAMENT STUDY
TASK FORCES STUDY OF INSPECTION AND
CONTROL METHODS
DOE review completed.
DHS Review
Completed.
USAF review
completed.
REPORTS BY TASK FORCES
OCTOBER 1955-JANUARY 1956
(APPENDIX J TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN)
Report on Army Inspection
Report on Navy Inspection
Report on Air Inspection
Report on Industrial and Power Inspection
Report on Steel Inspection
Report on Budgetary and Financial Inspection
Report on Communications
DIA review
completed.
NSC review completed.
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T.S. Control No.195
Copy N. _ 7:3
Army Review
Completed
NAVY
review
completed.
THE WHITE HOUSE
-Office of the Special Assistant
/a the President for Disarmament
'TOP SECRET
Special Staff Study
for the President
NSC Action No.1328
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C O N T E N T S
PRELIMINARY PLAN ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM
ARMY PLAN op Secret No. 30
General Walter B. Smith, Task Force Chairman
INSPECTION AND CONTROL PLAN NAVY (Top Secret No. )305)
Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, Task Force Chairman
FINAL REPORT TASK FORCE ON AIR INSPECTION (Top Secret No. 119)
General James H. Doolittle, Task Force Chairman
REPORT ON GENERAL INDUSTRIAL AND POWER INSPECTION (Unclassified)
Walker IL. Cisler, Task Force Chairman
STEEL INSPECTION FORCE FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION (Unclassified)
Benjamin J. Fairless, Task Force Chairman
REPORT ON BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL INSPECTION (Secret)
Dr. Harold G. Moulton, Task Force Chairman
PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS (Secret)
Dr. James B. Fisk, Task Force Chairman
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TOP SECRET This doc gnt consists of
80 pages; copy LL of 100
copies, Series B.,.
THE ARMY SECTION PLAN
for the
ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM
I. Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Facts Bearing on the, Problem . . . . . . 1
III. Discussion 2
IV. Concept - Joint Inspection System. . . 7
OUTLINE
Page
V. Concept - Army Section of Inspection System
1. Organization . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Communications . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Personnel. . . 17
4. Adminis trative_ and Logistical Suppor_t_1
5. Cost Analysis.
6. Rights, Powers and Privileges. . . . 19
7. Supplementary Information. . . . . . 19
VI. Conclusions. 19
VII. Recommendations. 24
Inclosure: List of Appendices . . . . . . . ii
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APPENDICES
Page
A. Outline Plan for Implementation of the
President's Geneva Proposal. 25
B. The Organization to Support the Mission
Incl. 1 -- US(Western Powers) Inspection System. . . 29
Inca. 2 -- International Armaments Commission . . . 30
Incl. 3'-- US (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters 31
Incl. 4 -- US (Western Powers) Inspection Mission . . 32
Incl. 5 -- US (Western Powers) Area Headquarters. . . 33
Incl. 6 -- Military District Inspection Groups. . 34
Inca. 7 -- Verification Teams 35
Incl. 8 -- Observer Teams'. 36
C. Major Functions of Organization Sub-divisionsl'.' . . . 37
D. Station Lists: Joint and Army Headquarters of
the Inspection System 41
Stages of Disclosure and Verification. . . . . . 43
F. -A Plan for the___Administratire_ and Logistical Sup~r-t 48
G. Communications. . . . 58
H. Army Personnel Requirements 59
I. Initial Requirements for Major Items of Equipment. . 60
J. Cost Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
K. Rights, Powers, and Privileges of the Inspection
Organization and Its Personnel . . . . . . . . . . 71
L. Supplementary Information 74
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THE 41.ru ' SECTION] PRELIPJINARY PLAN
for the.
ARP tli' ENT AND A ,1EU. FORCE INSPECTION SYSTFi-4
I. PROBLE1
1. To design in specific tme countries should be established.
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i. Logistical support for the inspection system and
its personnel should be provided on.-a national. basis insofar
as practicable. Support for the American elements should be
by A designated a1'med service on a reiinburseable basis.
7.' Test of the Inspection System. In the formulation of this
plan the adoption initially of some limited forth of inspection
for test purposes has been considered. The British have made
a concrete proposal in this regard. 'Another proposal much
more restricted in its aspects has been under study by Ameri-
can elements. While such,a test would
be valuable in that it
would afford a dress rehearsal of a. crass-section of a possible
final type system, it has the following obvious inherent dis-
advantages:
a. The basic purpose of the system (i.e. warning of
surprise attack) could not be accomplished, and
b. Cooperation by'USSP during the test would.not necess-
arily assure cooperation during a later full implementation of
the system.
Further, it would delay for a considerable period, possibly
for several years, the installation of a fully.desirable system.
All the benefits to be derived from such a test inspection
could be achieved better. during the initial stage of a fully
implemented system. Furtheri.iore, under these circumstances,
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procedural defects could be determined more readily and timely
on-the-spot corrective action facilitated.
8. Participation of Other Powers. It is difficult. to conceive
that any inspection system could be ' imi ted to the U. S. and
USSR even in the beginning. Many J. S. bases are on foreign
soil. The USSR could neither be `expected to exclude these
bases of potential surprise attack, neither could the U. S.
agree to inspection of such bass without consulting the countries
in which they ar il-. locat ;d.. Li?.ce.
the USSR could not be expect-
ed to excluder the arena ents and forces of other Western
Pow c.- especially the major powers. While the U. S. and USSR
conceivably might be the principals in an original inspection
agreement, any subsequent agreements to be fully effective,
would have to be i_ntern^tional in scope, involving as a minimum,
the Western States on the one side, and Soviet, satellite countries
on the othe.;r. Acco dingly, this plan assumes that Western Power
countries and the USSR satellite countries will participate in
the inspection system from its inception. If,,, .for Any reason,
participation in the system is i_Zi+,_f_allr limited to the U. S.
and the USSR, the plan described heroin could be placed into
effect with minor modifications.. However, any such limited
system would betot,lly incapable of assuring early warning
against a surprise attack which could be mounted or. supported
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from within satellite countries.
9. Reciprocal Provisions of the System. It is important to
bear in mind that the provisions of any armaments convention
and inspection system ensuing therefrom are to be reciprocal
in all aspects. This applies to such things as internal organi-
zation of the, system, number and locations of on-the-spot ob-
servers, stages of disclosure and verification, and the rights,
powers and privileges of the inspection organization and its
personnel. For example, if the U. S'. plan provides for six
intermediate (area) heaaquart::rs within USSR, we should expect
the Russians to insist on a like number of the same type head-
quarters in the U. S. If insistence is placed upon the inclu-
sion of the a vinments and armed forces of the Russian satellite
states, then in the most litor^1 manner must we expect that
the Russians will insist that the system;.4 cover our allied
countries. It is of primary i portanc ., t'.herefore, in nego-
tiating any agreement for an, inspection system,that constant
consideration be given to the impact of reciprocal arrangements
upon the American people and the kncrican milit xy establishment.
IV. CONCEPT - JOINT INSPECTION O GANIZATION
10. Czezneral. The over-all inspection organization should be
joint and incorporate the requirements of all its component
elements. There follows an oiitline of such an organization
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which insures accomplishment of the inspection mission at mini-
murcr cost in personnel, time, and funds, and should be accept-
able on a reciprocal basis as "betw ;en the U. S. (', ostorn Powers)
and the USSR? (Soviet satellites).
11. Basic -Principles of the Organization. The concept of the
Joint Inspection Organization is based on the following principles.
a. An inspection organization including integrated military
ground, sea and air, as well as specialized civilian elements
is necessary.
b. The over-all inspection system should b a single com-
posite organization, insofar as its incorporated missions permit,
and consist jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers
personnel, both uniformed and civilian.
c. The personnel of the various headquarters, and inspect-
ion and observer teams of the inspection s;;st %M should be pre-
dominately American because of the high stake: of the U. S. in
the undertaking,.
d. All Echelons and units of the inspection organization,
both within thl IT. S. and USSR and its s ~.~ lli es should be
staffed and operated on a joint basis with appropriate, and pro-
portionate representation from military and specialized civilian
elements.
c;. The inspection organization should be controlled central-
ly with over-all direction exercised by the U.S. from Washington.
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f. A communications system which will insure full and
free exchange of information among the field elements and with
all higher headquarters and home countries should be established.
g. Logistical-support of the inspection organization and
its personnel should be provided on a national basis insofar as
practicable. Support of the American element should be by a
designated armed. service on a reimburseable basis.
12. The Organization to Support the Objective. (See Appendix B,
Inciosure 1, Chart - "U. S..(Western Powers) Inspection System)."
a. The inspection organization schematically charted in
the above-mentioned annex is in line with the principles stated
in paragraph 6, above.. Detailed organizations of the various
headquarters and teams along with a statement, of major functions
are listed as follows:
Appendix B,
Appendix B,
Appendix B,
Appendix 13,
Appendix B,
Appendix B,
Appendix 3,
Appendix C
Incl. 2 . International Armaments Commission
Incl. 3 U.S. (Western Powers Inspection Headquarters
Incl. It U.S. ('=Jestern Powers) Inspection Nission
Incl. 15 U.S. (W(-.stern Powers) Area Headquarters
Incl. 6 r:i14.tary Dietrict Inspection Groups
Incl. -7 Verific^.tion 'Teams
incl. 8 Observer . Teams
:ejor Functions of Organization Subdivision
b. It is contemplated, on the basis of best information
available, Vint headquarters of the above-listed subdivisions
will be located as follows:
International Armaments Commission--Switzerland.
U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters--Washington, D. C.
U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection'Mission--?Moscow (USSR).
U.S. (Western .Powers) Area Headquarters (See Appendix D for
Station Lists of Joint and Army Headquarters).
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U.S. Military District Inspection Groups. (See Appendix D, for
Station Lists of Joint and Army Headquarters).
c. It is emphasized that the above-described organization,
including on-the-spot observers, must be in place and ready to
function.on the date agreed upon for commencement of the inspect-
ion system.
13. Extent of Disclosure and Verif ication:
a. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a
continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one-
time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would
not meet the requirements and hence would require a continuing
program. Therefore, it is contemplated that the machinery which
will be set up should be permanent, or at least on a long terra
basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and
armaments will be on a continuing basis.
b. The disclosure, verification and on-the-spot surveillance
must cover all armed forces and armament of every kind including
para-:military, security and police forces, and all armaments in-
eluding nuclear. It is.obvious that disclosure of such informa-
tion to a foreign power is contrary to U. S. laws and no doubt
the same fact applies to Russia ara(. other foreign powers. Since
we would have to secure Congressional approval, we may encounter
difficulties on the politic: f r:,'r?t. it is likely that
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necessary legal approval would present fewer obstructions to the
authoritarian Communist Governient. Other parliamentary systems
may be confronted with problems approaching those of the U. S. in
difficulty.
14. Stages of Disclosure and Verification.
a. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by
step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step
when and only when Tp ovi..ous steps have been completed satisfact-
orily by the signatory nations. A definite time limit should be
established for the completion of each stage.
b. Appendix E, sets forth in outline the extent of forces
and armaments to be disclosed 'in the respective: stages and the
mariner of verification of the information required to be disclosed.
c. In considering the appropriate number of stags, the fig-
ure five was determined to represent the minimum number consistent
with the following conside.'ati ons :
(1) Disclosure and verification should proceed from the
less secret areas in the earl;; stages to the More secret areas.
(2) A phasing of this nature, in addition to furnishing
the best test of the good faith of all states, would cause the
minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country.
d. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification
processes with respect to all adhering states should begin si_mul-
ta_neously, go forward at approximately the same tempo, and be con-
cluded with the utmost dispatch.
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Z Coe Tunic bons. A conm~unicaticns system which will -insure
full and free,. oxchange. of informatioh among all field elements
and with all higher headquarters and home'countries is an absolute
ne:ceessity.
16. Administrative and Logistical Support. Appendix F, contains
a plan for the Ac inistrotive and Logistical Support to the In-
spection System. In arriving at this plan, consideration was
given to the following principles:
a. Administrative and logistical support will be provided
b,,; a designated Ar, cd Service on riaation submitted by the USSR
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in the "blueprint" exchange. In add tion, these teams should
be permitted by the signatory nation and requirod by the in-
specting nation to inspect areas which, by virtue of aerial
reconnaissance, are suspected of including installations
either undisclosed in the military blueprint or of such size
as to indicate inaccuracy or inadequacy in disclosed infor-
mation.
Sector headquarters will serve as the distribution
point OIT the disclosed information which will be passed to
the appropriate team for verification. It is expected that
the verification teams will promptly verify the disclosed
"blueprint" inforaation and report back immediately to their
naval sector headquarters. reports will be handled in ac-
cordance with the T:'T,NI Communications :lad, Appendix E. ..!rom
the beginning, at all stages and phases, provision must be
made by the Sector Commander for detection and reporting of
any indicators of surprise attack.
In the development of the verification organiza-
tion, one of our most important considerations has been to
devise a system which will require a minimum of change in
order to convert it for immediate use to the Inspection-
Surprise Attack phase, in this connection we think it
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desirable to incluae as iaany me:abers of the proposed inspec-
t.,:on tea is on the verification teas as practicable. This
will operate to the advantage o.L the inspection tea:,i person-
nel, in that they will have an opportunity to become familiar
with the various Soviet _taw; installations and operating pro-
cedures with reference t which they will have to maintain
continuing surveillance.
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0. Inspection Teams
1. I yS~'i~CTI0T 3?GA:dl:Z ?TIOmr
Described in Part 3. j, B-1 above.
2. POSITIO ;Iid > 0,2 T . -~ - L)C-IT-04S
Refer to Part IV, Section B-2 above.
3. CO:It'OSITI N OF T ,11 S: STILJLRY
Refer to Part IN, Section B-3 above
Refer to: Appendix F for a detailed personnel
listin5 of specific inspection tears.
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4. CO, i:wIjTS
Initially the same procedure suggested in Part IV
(B-ct) above for determining the coirposition of verification
teams has. been applied to the task of asse:.o ing the appro-
priate personnel -:or the various inspection teams. ..-'or the
inspection teams, however, the information items selected
by the procedure outlined in Part III (C) (items to be con-
tinaously observes or per.odlcaliy inspected) are the basis
for making personnel choices.
Inspection teams, in some instances, may. require
a greater number of personnel than initially envisaged for
verification teams since the continuous surveillance which
will be found necessary in so:pie situations (radar watch on
major Sorts and air stations) will require a 2'; hour watch
with consequent increase in personnel. :}Anther, if we do
set up our own radar stations for continuous observation we
may decide to provide our own power supply (mobile generators)
where feasible, so as to guard against the possibility of the
Soviets cutting off the supply at critical moments. Facil-
ities of this soA will require additional operators and
repairman.
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On the other hand, the eventual size, personnel
qualifications, and p)ositionin of inspection teams will
depend upon the information disclosed and verified during
the verification phase. or should? we lose sight of the
possibility that some activities may be combined or some
teams might be dissolved, and a few specialized personnel
placed with an flrr r team. To the extent this may be fea-
sible, there can be a corresponding reduction in the ini-
tially estimated number of personnel. ,/e may find that a
team can cover a greater or lesser area or scope of activ-
ity than herein assumed; and the number of personnel may
vary in relation to the type and amount of electronic
observing equipment that can be utilized within the USSR.
or e:ca;rple, we have stationed a single teal: at .Turinansk
to cover naval activities in several locations. Because
of difficult climatic and terrain conditions and resultant
difficulty of rapid and easy movement of corronents oft-he
team, it may become necessary to set up permanent sub teams
at each naval establishment wit.i a consequent increase in
personnel. Our present estimates are adjusted to the activ-
ities to be inspected on the basis of the information now
available to the MI,
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During the inspection phase the Navy organization
is not envisaged as needing permanently constituted mobile
teams. As stated above, when inspection is. required at
secondary installations to which no resident inspection
team is assigned, a ten.porary mobile team can be made up
of members of one of the resident inspection teams. If it
is eventually decided, however, to place U.S. inspection
,personnel on a continuous basis at the various US)"-"R naval
air stations and seaplane bases, it may be necessary to
arrange additional messin , berthing and transportation
services to su?pott these inspection units.
In both the verification. and inspection phases
such mobile teams will require coiununications equipment
with which to re)ort to the nearest permanent cormiunications
facility (resident team location). or certal.n highly,sig-
ni ficant observations during, the. inspection p e sc. t, .T2 11
be necessary for the mobile teai.x to have coiii:-.iu.n c:at-Jicn~s
equipment sufficiently powerful to reach the neatest rival
sector headquarters or peripheral naval co:x=ications facil-
ity. The type of transportation and servicing required by
the various specially constituted mobile teams will, of
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course, depend upon the conditions of the particular locality.
Ordinary vehicles, trailer trucks, small observation aircraft,
hel:_copters, transport aircraft, patrol boats, etc. may be
required depeading upon the circi:unstances.
The procedures for the inspection phase (functions
of the inspection/observation tea,zs) are directed to the pri-
i,iary purpose of providing adequate advance warning of an im2-
peudin,; surprise attack. Composition 01' the tea::is as set
forth in the T..:i11I report show only sli,ht variance between
the verification and inspection phases. Hence, there should
be no interruption in continuity in passing from the verifi-
cation to the inspection (surprise attack) phase. :Host of
the verification personnel will continue as members of the
various inspection teams. The types of significant indica-
tors of hostile intent are elaborated upon in Part III of
the T_,-11I deport and the means of reporting are set forth in
the T2141 Coii rLunications Plan.
It is emphasized that the detailed analysis ard
presentation of verification and inspection teaias for the
Navy portion of the inspection system is not 'lieant to serve
as the final composition of the verification and inspection
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teams which will eventually be positioned in the
i.iust continuously remind ourselves of the difference in the
level of intelli;ence o: the Soviets and ourselves. This
detailed work has been done on the basis of the best infor-
iaation available in order to present a careful analysis of
the types o skills that will be required and to enable the
T:~':iI to cone t*z) a reasonably accurate est.rnate of the number
of personnel r eqzired.
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D. COMMENTS ON EXPENSE, PERSONNEL POLICIES, ADMINISTRATIVE
AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
1. COSTING OUT.
The cost estimates of the personnel and material require-
ments for the verification and inspection teams of the Navy
portion of the inspection and reporting system are calculated
on the basis of the verification phase lasting three months,
after which the inspection teams will take over. The cost of
the inspection teams is calculated for a twelve-month period.
Equipment assigned to the verification teams is included
in the inspection team cost, as it is assumed that it will
remain for their primary use.
Furnishing and repair costs are included in the verifi-
cation team cost, which would initially be in the area. It
is assumed that 90%.of verification personnel will remain as
part of the inspection teams. For the additional personnel
brought in for the inspection teams, additional funds are
added for furnishings and repairs.
For the second year, the estimated inspection team cost
of $90,161,088. may be reduced by $9,750,000. This represents
the initial cost of furnishings which does not become an annual
expense.
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For second and subsequent years the estimated team cost may
be further reduced by about one-third of the total aircraft and
vehicle cost, or about $12,000,000. This is based on the assump-
tion of replacement of one-third of the aircraft and vehicles
annually. Cost of Naval Air Reconnaissance aircraft should like-
wise be reduced by one-third or $48,000,000 for second and sub-
sequent years.
A cost summary is shown at the'bottomof the second succeed-
ing page.
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VERIFICATION TEAMS
Personnel 309 officers, 1973 enlisted -- Total 2282
Pay and Allowances (3 months)-'- - - - - $ 6,003,393
Maintenance and Operation
3 months' rent and utilities- - - - - - 1,900,000
12 months' repairs and furnishings - - - 9,500,000
Transportation (1 way)
(2282 at $500) - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,141,000
TOTAL COST $ 18,544,393
NAVAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUAD_? RONS
2 Long-range Photographic Squadrons
2 Observation-type Photographic Squadrons
6 VP Squadrons (9 aircraft each)
It is assumed that the above planes require 2,000 men.
3 FASRONS are required for support for the above air-
craft and those used by the "Inspection Teams."
Total personnel for the above squadrons and "FASRONS"
is 2,640.
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INSPECTION TEAMS
Personnel 332 Officers, 2589 enlisted -- Total 2921 personnel
Pa and Allowances (Incl. Station)- - - - $ 30,201,888
months)
Maintenance & Operation - - - - - - - - - 12,437,500
12 months' rent and utilities - plus
additional furnishings for: increased
personnel.
Transportation-Personnel
(2021 - 2054 - 867 x 500) 433,500
Equipment Procurement
Aircraft 48 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 35,900,000
Vehicles (111) - - - - - - - - 277,000
Equipment Transportation- - - - - - - - - - 129,300
Equipment Maintenance and Operation 11.084.900
(Including garage and hangar rent)
$ 90,464,088
(a)
Naval Air Reconnaissance E4ttiadrons - -
$220,555,200
(b)
Verification Teams (3 months)- - - - - -
18,544,393
(c)
Inspection Teams (12 months) - - - - - -
90,464,088
GRAND TOTAL COST $329,563,681
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PERSONNEL PAY &ALLOWANCEES
CONNECTED WITH AIR RECONNAISSANCE S U,'1DRONS & FASRONS
FASRONS 64o)
FASRON Personnel Pay. 15 officers x-3 - 45
15 x 7550 - - - - - - - $ 113,250
30 x 9710 - - - - - - - 291,300
175 men x595
395 x 4350- - - - - - - 1,718,250
200 x 5550 - - - - - - - 1,110,000
$ 3,232,800
10 Squadrons (2,000)
Personnel Pay .350 officers
50 x 7550 - - - - - - - - 377,500
300 x 9710.- - - - -. - -2,913,000
16 50 men
1000 x.4350 -- - - - - - - 4,350,000
650 x 5550 - - - - - - - 3,607,500
11,2 8
PAY AND ALLOWANCES $ 14,480,800
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M&O 54 P2V- - 11,100,000 (Includes overhaul & fuel)
24 AV - - - - - 7,500,000 it it -r
24 OE - - - - -- 500, 000 it
19,100,000
Procurement 54 P2V- - - - - - 86,400,000
24 AJ - - - - - - 57,200,000
24 OE -. - - - - - 2,160,000
1 ,7~+ 60000
Base Support 3 Locations
Photo Equipment & Film -
- 6,000,000
- - 1,000,000
171,860,000
Personnel Pay & Allowances
14,480,800
(a)
Total- - - - - - - - $186,340,800
(b)
Living Quarters - - - - 19,800,000
Station Allowance - - - 14,414,400
(For 2640 Personnel)
Total Cost- - $ 220,555,200
(c) Total Personnel - 2640
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(Includes aircraft
procurement and
basic pay including
flight pay)
(1st year only; Deduct
$8,800,000 for 2nd year.)
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2. PERSONNEL POLICIES (Including Support).
The task'of maintaining minimum acceptable standards of
living for the teams will probably be one of the most difficult
problems in the implementation of an effective inspection system.
It could be found desirable to establish small, practically self-
sufficient communities for American and allied personnel (and
families, if included), particularly at the more important shore
installations. It would seem elementary that the'inspection
system, however well designed, will not function satisfactorily
unless competent people can be attracted to'this type of duty.
Living standards should at least provide for a minimum of those
peace-time comforts and conveniences to which our service person-
nel have become accustomed. The'more services provided, the
larger and more expensive the inspection operation. Therefore,
while setting up those services necessary, we must keep them
to the minimum acceptable. Furthermore, with respect to assign-
ing or selecting personnel for inspection duty, it will be
advisable to choose those people with i) relatively "even" dis-
positions who will be able to take petty and continuing annoy-
ances in stride, and with 2) sufficiently stable personal
qualities to fortify them against over-susceptibility to Soviet
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inducements toward laxity. or irresponsibility on the-job.
Clearly the logistics which must be provided the U.S. teams
present a real problem.
The TFNI accepts the Army Task Force plan on Administration
and Logistical Support Requirements with such modification as
is noted in Appendix G herein. The TFNI wishes to suggest,
however, an alternative means of logistical support which may
prove highly satisfactory for ,servicing many of its teams and
possibly Army and Air Force teams positioned at the same loca-
tionsas the Navy teams (or in close proximity thereto).. If
feasible, a U.S..Navy unarmed ship might be moored at those.
USSR naval bass where verification and inspection teams are
to be located As to thetype,of ship to be used, it is be-
lieved that communication ships (AGC)t small transports (AP) and
ice breakers (AGB) would be suitable, depending on the contem-
plated location. Regardless of the type, it. is important that
the subject ship have suitable communication and radar equip-
ment and a helicopter landing platform.
If such an alternative means of logistical support were
used, it. would have many. advantages over basing teams ashore.
The ship would provide a compact operating base with:
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facilities for rapid and secure communications, early warning
radar observation of USSR naval fleet and air movements, boats
and helicopters for routine and emergency observations, good
security for equipment and publications, shops and technicians
for the maintenance of equipment, ready means for collecting
hydrographic and meterological data on the USSR, fully accepta-
ble living quarters, medical services, and entertainment and
leisure activities such as libraries and motion pictures. It
would provide all these immediately without delay for instal-
lation. Of course there would be some disadvantages. In many
locations there may not be wholly adequate mooring facilities.
And in some ports, the ship might be icebound during the winter
months which would render immediate recall impracticable. Such
disadvantages, however, are believed minor in'comparison with
the advantages gained.
;Should such a ship be provided, we would of course want to
provide for periodic thorough inspection of the ship by the host
country, in the likely event the Soviets should also base person-
nel on ships. The inspection proviso would thus provide some in-
surance against the introduction and storage of nuclear weapons
in ships.
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3. RIGHTS, PGJERS AND PRIVILEGES.
Careful consideration must be given to the rights, powers
and privileges of the inspection organization, to be negotiated
as part of the agreement.
Satisfactory completion of the verification phase will re-
quire that our teams be accorded the rights m .privileges of
substantially complete "freedom of movement" within defined land
and sea areas, and in specified air spaces, in addition to recon-
naissance rights. They must also be granted immediate access to
the agreed "blueprint" materials, such as pertinent reports and
records kept by various installations and operating commands of
the Soviet Navy.
The "freedom of movement" and access problem in the inspec-
tion phase will differ in some respects from the verification
stage. Perhaps the real difficulty will arise in connection with
continuous or periodic inspections. Interpretative and personal
conflicts are bound to arise in situations when the U. S. teams,
feeling that a critical' indicator may be involved, demands to
make an immediate, unannounced inspection of a certain facility
and is refused on the grounds that it is contrary to the
"agreement", or is not within the defined areas of "freedom of
movement", or for the reason that it is simply late at night
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and the inspection could have as easily been made during work-
ing hours, or some other specious excuse.
The following rights, powers and privileges are submitted
for consideration:
(a) The host government shall have the right to examine
personal baggage, supplies, equipment, ships, vehicles and air-
craft upon entry into its country to preclude the introduction
of arms, weapons, and propaganda. There should be similar
examinations prior to departures of ships and aircraft to detect
clandestine activities of inspection personnel.
(b) In order to insure that the personnel of each inspec-
tion organization are continuously in a position to fulfill
their responsibilities, they'must be granted the following rights,
powers and rivileges, except as provided in '(a) above:
(1) Rights of duly accredited representatives to the
facilities of ingress and egress into and from the territory of
the other nation including rights of transit for persons and
equipment across and through such territory.
(2) The right to use designated communication facili-
ties of the host country to the extent necessary for the dis-
charge of inspection responsibilities.
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(3) Such exemptions from customs and . administrative
regulations as may be necessary to effective operations.
,(4) Inviolability. of premises, (except for periodic
inspection as provided in the agreement) property, and archives,
including protection of classified equipment on downed aircraft.
(5) Unimpeded access to.records pertaining to exchanged
data ("blueprint") as specified. in the agreement.
(6) The right to import,. possess and use suitable
transportation, communications, and logistical support to properly
discharge inspection responsibilities.
(7) The right to.:observe and.inspect on a continuing
basis, (including the right to use photographic and.scientific
equipment) all armaments, armed forces and geographic areas in
accordance with the terms of the. agreement and to communicate
resulting observations to respective governments without inter-
feronces
(c) The. Host Government will:
(1) Provide full protection and all necessary. assist-
ance and cooperation to the Inspection organization located with-
in its national boundaries in the carrying out of its functions
and responsibilities.
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(2) Provide such logistic support, including com-
munications~and transportation facilities, as.may be mutually
agreed by the participating governments.
(3) Permit the inspection organization to establish
communication facilities, logistical facilities, base .facili
ties, inspection posts, and on-the-spot observers wherever re-
quired to properly discharge its responsibilities.
(d) In the event of a serious violation of the inspection
agreement, the agreement must provide for.:
(1) Reversion to. an earlier stage of the inspection
procedure, or to
(2) Immediate abrogation of the agreement in its
entirety, with cessation of inspection activities and with-
drawal of inspection organization.
Regardless of the foregoing provision, our
inspection organization will keep our government fully in-
formed of all incidents so that it will be.in a position to
adjust the rights, powers and privileges accorded the USSR
inspection organization as necessary..
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4. AIDS TO OBSERVATION AND REPORTING.
The following list is suggestive of means whichmay be
employed in accomplishing"verification and'inspection tasks.
Means of Access, Transportation and Reporting
Transportation: Plane
Train
Ships-and boats
Auto
Instrument assistance in access and reporting:
Aerial survey: interpretative photography
Radar
Sonar
Radiation detection
Closed circuit TV
Channels for reporting information:
Plane
Radio'
Land Wire
Regular mail
Guard mail
Messenger
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In the inspection phase the transportation, instrument
assistance and communications channel problems will have to be
adjusted for continuous operation. Transportation pools -
automobiles, planes, etc. - must be established. In those
situations where continuous surveillance is required the most
effective procedure may be to install our own radar or closed
circuit television systems.
Naval Air Reconnaissance
The Naval Task Group adopts in substance for its Air
Reconnaissance Plan the provisions of the Plan heretofore agreed
upon by the Navy Department and the Air Force.
The U.S. Navy will participate with the U.S. Air Force in
the Reconnaissance of targets of naval interest within the USSR.
The Navy's initial contribution should be:
(a) Two long-range photographic squadrons which can be
operated from land and sea bases as required.
(b) Two observation-type photographic squadrons which can
be operated from land and sea bases as required.
(c) A total of 2,000 officers and men.
(d) Air-Sea Rescue aircraft and personnel as required.
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There will also be a need for continuous naval air recon-
naissance to seaward of naval operating bases. This will re-
quire the use of suitable bases on the periphery of the USSR.
The following material and personnel will be required:
(a) 1 Patrol Squadron (VP ron) (9 aircraft) - based in
Jorway to cover the Northern Fleet area particularly the White
Sea and approaches thereto - 120 officers and men.
(b) 1 VP ron - Based in Germarjy to cover Baltic Fleet area.
(c) 1 VP ron - Based in Turkey to cover the Black Sea area.
(d) 1 VP ron - Based in Alaska to cover Bering Sea area.
(e) 1 VP ron - Based in Japan to cover Sea of Okhotsk.
(f) 1 VP ron - Based in ..Japan to cover. Sea of Japan.
ACCESS TO FACILITIES, OP&U9TONS A"00. REPORTS
Access has two important aspects that must be kept in mind:
(a) First., it must be directed above all to the goal of
getting information early enough to prevent surprise attack.
(or to reduce the possibility to an acceptable d;3gr ee).
(b) Second,, our own request for access to facilities., opera-
tions reports and records should weigh the general intelligence
gains that may thereby be achieved for the United States against
the benefits the Soviets mi ht gain from reciprocal provisions.
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Our first requirement is. to gain early warning of surprise
attack. This requirement has been fully treated in the basic
plan and in-appendices. We need merely reiterate here that this
is a difficult task that depends primarily upon a wide-spread
ground inspection system tied in with aerial inspection' tuned .to
detect. changes in the day to day tempo of Soviet naval activity.
Provision for access to facilities; and reports must emphasize
efforts to gain information on movements of nuclear weapons and
carriers. For the Navy this includes mine and torpedo depots,
guided missile, bomb and other ammunition depots. It includes
especially submarine bases, medium range aircraft bases, medium
range aircraft-guided missile bases and amphibious bases in such
areas as the Black Sea,. Baltic Sea and the Sea oSf,Japan. It in-
cludes to a lesser degree key anti-aircraft and technical guided
missile units.. Lastly, it includes careful attention to all
means of getting information concerning the operation of 'Soviet
naval air, surface, and undersea draft which comprises not only
visual and radar observation but access to and study of USSR
naval employment schedules, ship disposition, records, upkeep
and overhaul plan, ship and aircraft movement reports and plot-
ting boards in fleet and force operation centers.
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Changes in.-tempo of Soviet naval*activity will be
observed.(if..they are observed) from a combination of informs
mation obtained'from.operation plans and schedules-and from
persormel.observations in those. localities that will give the
foregoing -.information. Some of ."these locations are isubmarine
operating bases, naval air and guided missile bases, supply
and ammunition depots-(especially those related to.nuclear
weapons where this can bedetermined), naval arsenals (especial-
ly those where nuclear weapons. might be assembled)., and naval
training, stations (in particular those with 'nuclear training
and,operation centers).
The second factor, general.. intelligence, to be gained'
from access to facilities and repos has likewise been treated
at some length in .other ,parts-of this study, especiallg Part ill.
In considering this factor we should take into account the
higher level,of:-existing Soviet Intelligence compared:to ours.
They now, have and daily obtain a? tremendous amount of -infor-
mation with respect to our military posture whereas we have
little..certain..information.concerning theirs. It-might well be
that we would be willing to accept. . certain: otherwise undesirable
provisions of reci.procal.access,..in order to gain information
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which the Soviets no doubt already have of the U.S.
In this connection exterior observation of such Soviet
facilities as oil depots, shipyards, guided missile bases, sub-
marine bases, waterways and roadsteads, dry docks and overhaul
facilities, air bases, radar and radio transmitting stations, and
the like, would provide us with a great deal of useful information
that it may be expected the Soviets already have.
Likewise, we may consider that access to a multiplicity of
reports and records would be merely confusing. For example,
mutual access to most of the paper work generated in our correspond-
ing Navy Departments would be of doubtful value. On the other hand,
it would be useful to interchange such information as annual and
quarterly reports of materialdand personnel bureaus, with adequate
provision for checking. It would also be useful to have such
information as blueprints on facilities (for example, a submarine
base or a naval arsenal that might assemble nuclear weapons),
reports that identify an activity as to proper strength of person-
nel, control structure and disposition of personnel and equipment.
It would also be useful to have records of strategic materials
used at a facility or base, especially where these are indispensa-
ble to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or launchers or carriers
such as rockets.
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The greatest value would be. derived from a combination
of a review of periodic reports and on-the-spot, day-to-day
inspections in-such locations as training. stations, munition
depots, operating bases and fleet operations control rooms.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A
USSR NAVAL INSTALLATIONS AND ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO REPORTING
In many situations one naval installation or complex
1. Naval operating bases for forces afloat
2. Shipbuilding yards
3. Ship repair yards
4. Ship equipment factories (electronic and fire-control
gear, generators, propulsion machinery, etc.)
Ship equipment repair shops
6. Naval air stations
i. Naval aircraft factories
8. Naval aircraft overhaul facilities
9. Naval gun factories
10. Naval guided missile factories
11. Naval munitions and weapons plants (shells, rockets,
bombs, depth charges, chemical and biological
weapons, etc.)
12. Naval supply depots
13. Naval arms and ammunition depots
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1L, Naval fueling stations
15. Naval communications stations
16. Personnel training centers and technical schools
17. Personnel receiving stations
18. Naval test centers ;model basins, equipment, etc.)
19. ITaval proving grounds {guns, ammunition, guided
missiles, etc.)
20. inland canal system
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APP; NDIX A
List 1
SHOP; INSTA?1LATIOIS
IN OIJ IATIOI; C3 1CCR rI 'G C!a' EGJRI S TO DE R,EPORTED
Designation
Location
Principal functions(s)
Secondary function(s)
General Description (area layout of installation,
showing all associated facilities and their location;
installation blueprints, construction and production
charts, management organizational chart, etc. should
be requested in the 'Iblueprint1' exchange phase.)
1. Number and annual construction capacity of building
ways (note more significant characteristics such as
crane capacity, type power available, etc). :Dote
number of vessels that can be accommodated by type
and class.
2. Number, annual repair and fitting out capacity of
drydocks (note more significant characteristics such
as crane capacity, type power available, time to
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flood dock, etc.). Include floating drydocks.
3. :Number and length of piers and docks (also note the
depth of water and facilitie 3 aiailable )
4. Number, arrangement and dept.'.i of anchorages
5. Ship repair and overhaul facilities (in addition to
drydocks and vharves listed above)
6. Equipment repair and overhaul facilities - ships
7. Ship construction and repairs underway
8. Nu nfoer and length of plane runways
9. Number and capacity of aircraft hangars
10. Aircraft overhaul facilities - capacity - class
and type of planes
11. Equipment repair and overhaul facilities - planes
12. Aircraft construction or repairs underway
13. Major input materials and amount - manufacturing
and production facilities
14. Source and amount used of scarce strategic raw
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AP.~r;i'JDIX A
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15. Source of critical spare parts and component parts
used in facilities or,in equipment
16. Output capacity - manufacturing and production facili-
0
17. Type personnel training and processing provided
(schools for Officer and Enlisted Personnel; describe
specialty of each school: submarines,. gunnery, com-
munications, etc.)
18. Capacity of personnel tr'a.ning and processing
facilities (length of courses, number of student
trainees in each school)
19. ,;arehouse capacity
20. Hardstanding area
21. Refineries and storage capacity - aviation gasoline,
fuel oil
22. Power source and supply capacity - steam, electricity
23. Sewage and waste disposal facilities
2L.. Communications facilities
25. Fueling facilities
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26. Charging (submarine) facilities
27. Barracks and housing accommodations
28. Hospitals and other medical facilities
29. Recreation facilities
30. Current level of production, construct-.on, repair,.
training, etc. activity.. (Compare current level with
estimated normal level).
31. Current stocks: Critical materials
general stores
ammunition
torpedoes
bombs
depth charges
rockets
missiles
fuel oil
av. gasoline
replacement equipment heavy
spare part stores
(Compare current level with estimated normal level)
32. Type management control organization
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33. Personnel employed - civilian. Number of workmen
required to operate facility on a full capacity,
three shift basis
34. Personnel: Types of skills represented. Critical
shortages, if any
35. Military personnel on station performing military
duties or standing by for military operations.
Designate types.
36. Harbor/base/port defense: torpedo nets
mined areas
gun emplacements
rocket launchers
ground to air missile
launchers
ground to sea missile
launchers
special devices:
accoustic, etc.
37. Layout of surrounding mined coastal areas
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38. Layout of surrounding coastal defense installations
(armament, location of fortifications, personnel
assigned, etc.)
39. Layout of Inland Canal System - size of vessels
that can be accommodated in the various sections
of the canal system
40. Test centers -.type of testing: ship model basin,
equipment testing, etc.
L1. Proving grounds type guns, rocket and'missile
launchers, missiles, projectiles and explosives.
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TABLE B
USSR NAVAL CO~NANDS SUBJECT TO REPORTING
1. Combatant - Surface Forces - Large
2. Combatant - Surface Forces - Small:
(patrol craft, motor torpedo boats, mine
layers/sweepers, etc.)
3. Submarine Forces
L. Amphibious Forces
5.
Service Forces (tankers, cargo, transports, etc.)
6.
Training Forces
7.
Miscellaneous Au iliary Forces:
(Icebreakers, etc.)
8.
State Operated Merchant Marine
9.
Naval Air Groups
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f. l i~zx A
LIST 2
Ii'TFJii.IiATIO ! CJiiC:2RNNNI 1G CAT GJiU S
TO B ; 1,PO tTL'D
flesi nation of command
:formal Base
Normal operating area
ilission (indicate functions such as security patrol,
training squadrons, etc.)
General description - Composition and capabilities
/Request Co,nand Or,;anizational Chart7
1. Organization - administrative
2. Organization - tactical by task forces and groups
3. Ships attached by number and type
t. Characteristics of ships attached by types
(Armament, speed, cruising range, draft,
complement, special equipment, etc.)
5. Ships under construction and expected to join
comaand - types and characteristics
6. Ships, if any, in reduced or inactive status
7. ;formal operating ?rocedures: Forces, groups,
and units.
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8. Air groups attached. to command
;. ilumber of planes by types
10. Characteristics of plaaes by types (range,
speed, etc.)
U. :: ;ormal operating procedures - Air groups
129 Notice of scheduled movements of task forces,
groups, units or naval air groups
13. Purpose of movement; security patrol, convoy
escort, routine training, special training
exercises, etc.
14. Si ni_ficant deviations from normal operating
procedures
15. Indications of impending significant deviations
from normal operating procedures
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TABLE C
NAVAL P.J100iFrEL CLASS !!.AID OlICT-1,11 _ATI3iJS
P,UBJSCT TO REPORTIWG
1. Personnel in active duty status currently assigned
to all naval establishment activity-units (fleet
units.,-naval air, and shore installations)
(This information will be obtained in completing
List 1 and List 2)
2. Units of the naval infantry (marines).
3. i6-:ii is of the constituted reserve
ii.. iational forces required primarily for internal
security to include regularly active organizations
and militia type. organizations operating under the
authority of the state or nation, but not to include
municipal police or other forces not susceptible
to national mobilization
5. Naval academies and naval units of schools, the
primary purpose of which is to furnish officer
personnel to the regular establishment or of
reserve components. (This information will be
obtained in completing List 1)
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6. Reservoir of available trained but unassigned
personnel including the unorganized reserve
7. National political organizations which can be
activated or naval personnel
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APPL;?DIX A
T,IST 3
UF RHATIOIT COLTCER nN?G CA"EG3RIES
TO B;, R:.;PORTFD
Name
Location
Function(s)
General description of organization and status
(level of activity)
1. Size-numbers/organizational units
2. Annual increase or decrease/rate
3. Aptitudes-general qualifications of personnel
4. Specialized trainin of members (ranks and rates)
5. Physical condition/health level/medical preparation
6. ~iorale
7. quiaament assigned to organizational units
8. Time to mobilize-process into regular duty
assignments
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APPENDIX B
STAGES OF. DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION
Mr. Stassen, in his memorandum, subject: "U. S. Policy
on Control of Armaments", dated 1 November 1955, stated that the
comprehensive inspection organization "would be installed by
stages".
Ile are convinced that the USSR would enter into any
agreement of disclosure and verification in bad faith and would
carry it out in bad faith.
Since the USSR has far more information on the U.S.
than vice versa, it is probable that a disclosure and verifi-
cation system could be so devised that in the initial phases the
U. S. would secure more valuable information than would the
Soviet Union. This would require that the USSR be prevented
from securing in those initial phases information intended to be
withheld until a later phase, or not to be disclosed at all.
Beyond the initial stages, phasing of such a disclosure
and verification system will become increasingly difficult and
there will be a correspondingly greater likelihood that the USSR
will secure information of commensurate value to that obtained
by the United States.
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Any satisfactory disclosure and verification procedure
should meet four critei'ia?, It should pro4de for: (a) com-
prehensive and detailed, specifications for disclosure within
agreed phases, thus reducing the possible scope of Soviet bad
faith; (b) clear documentation of Soviet bad faith at any stage,
thus providing the best possible case for termination; (c) prompt
termination, self-executing if possible, at any stage in event of
such bad faith; and (d) protection of the U, S. insofar as it is
possible, from disclosure of highly sensitive information, in-
cluding premature disclosure in earlier phases of information re-
served for later phases.
Formulation. of such a program involves the following
considerations:
.a. Disclosure must cover all armed forces of every,
kind including para-military, security and police forces, and all
armaments including atomic,
b. Disclosure and verification must be carried out
stage by stage with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the
next stage when and only when. the current stage has been completed
satisfactorily by the signatory nations. A definite time limit
should be established for the completion of each stage.
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c. Disclosure and verification should proceed from the
less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in the
early stages to the more secret areas. Sensitive aspects of re-
search and development in all, fields, manufacturing processes and
.details of new weapons (the measure of U. S. technological superi-
ority) should be excluded altogether. The freedom of movement and
access of inspection teams should in general be carefully limited
to quantitative verification of numbers, types, sizes, etc.,
although within these limits inspection should be as full and free
as possible. Detailed inspection of technical specifications,
performance data, etc., should be avoided. Although this limi-
tation on the freedom of inspection would reduce the amount of in-
telligence the U. S.. would acquire, it would be necessary in order
to guard against premature disclosure of information which we
would like reserved until substantial co-operation and good faith
has been demonstrated. A phasing of this nature, in.addition to
furnLshing the best indication of a lack of Soviet good faith,
would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal
life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in
fact be.'more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences
or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information.
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Aside from phasing, the types' of disclosure and veri-
fication procedures employed in each phase would be of vital
importance in minimizing the risks to the U. S. and compelling
maximum disclosure by the. USSR. It is apparent that these two
objectives are largely contradictory. The'more frequent, thorough,
and unrestricted the inspection the'less would be the possibility
of Soviet concealment,, but the greater Would be the risks of
sensitive disclosures by the U. S. This contradiction is further
apparent when we examine two basic problems implicit in any veri-
fication system. While it is probably feasible to verify such
Vquantitative data as had previously been--'disclosed, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether all relevant
data had actually been disclosed. It would bb impossible to de-
termine whether there had been full disclosure unless the in-
spectors were allowed to travel anywhere to look for,anything:
included in the particular phase. On the other hand, only by
careful restrictions on the movement of inspectors could the USSR
be prevented from acquiring in the earlier phases information re-
served for later phases, or not to be disclosed in any phase.
Although full Soviet disclosure could only be assured
by completely free and unrestricted inspection in each phase,
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such a procedure would entail serious risks for the U. S. of
prematurely revealing at earlier phases information which the
U. S. planned to disclose only in later phases or not at all.
Consequently it is doubtful whether in any phase the U. S.
should allow Soviet inspectors freedom to travel anywhere and
inspect everything. The problem, therefore, is to devise an
inspection system which, while less than complete, would still
increase the relative gains to the U. S. while minimizing the
risks of premature U. S. disclosure.
In considering the appropriate number of stages, con-
sideration was given'-to the objective that full implementation
of the program of disclosure and verification should proceed as
rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of inter-
national tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which
must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage
would unduly delay the program. t-Yith this in mind, it is con-
cluded that the number of stages of disclosure and verification
should be five -- a figure which represents the minimum number
consistent with the preceding considerations. In each stage,
the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simul-
taneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the
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successful completion of 'the program.
Proposals for disclosures are divided into those for
(a) armed forces and non-nuclear armaments and (b) nuclear arma-
ments solely in the interests of clarity of. presentation. The
problems involved rith the appropriate terminology irith.respect
to nuclear weapons differ so greatly from the problems and termi-
nology with respect to other weapons that a single proposal com-
prehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that.all
stages of disclosure and verification cover both nuclear and non-
nuclear weapons; in other words the first stage and verification
in that stage, and the same in all succeeding-stages. The stages
are:
STAGE 1
Disclose:
a. Overall manpower strength; composition; disposition of
regular and reserve military forces to include para-
military, security and police forces*
b. Employment schedules sufficient to cover the period of time
necessary to. complete the first five stages of verification.
Inasmuch as the time necessary to complete the first five
stages cannot be anticipated at this time, it is proposed
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that each side present in advance employment schedules
covering a six months period.
co Location of military installations and mobilization centers,
with a general description of the facilities at each instal-
lation except proving grounds and research and development
activities (posts, camps, stations, naval bases, training
establishments, depots, ports, airdromes, guided missile
launching sites, rail and road centers),
d. Details of those parts of the bud,:-,et which pertain to armed
forces less allocations for Research and Developi.ient and for
nuclear purposes.
Verify by:
a. Analysis and evaluation of disclosed data supplemented by
aerial reconnaissance and by actual physical checks of tac-
tical units and installations by ground inspection teams.
To complete the check and at the same time ascertain the
basic military pattern -- but primarily to give early warn-
ing of pending attack -- observers will be in place at
critical points, i.eo mobilization centers, military depots,
road and rail centers, telecommunications centers, airdromes,
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naval bases, ports, guided missile launching sites, training
areas, on the date the agreement becomes effective.
be, Inspection of the various installations (type of activity,
physical layout, description of facilities) by ground in-
spection teams.
co Examination and comparison of previous, present and proposed
national budget and reconciliation of authorization with
actual expenditures.
NOTE: a., b., and c. -- Inspectors and observers to have
access to the entire national territory to the extent
necessary to determine that all facilities and instal-
lations of type listed have been declared. They will
be provided with facilities for uninterrupted com-
munications. Aerial surveys will be permitted for
same purpose and to same extent.
STAGE 2
Disclose:
a. Detailed organization and composition of units comprising
the over-all strength disclosed in Stage 1 including
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mobilization procedures.
b. Details of each of the military installations, posts, centers,
stations, naval bases, etc., listed in Stage 1.
c. Equipment armament and facilities for overhaul . and, repair
thereto (including reserve equipment of units making up
ovrer-all strength disclosed in Stage 1, except units equip-
ped with novel weapons).
:1O`1E: fovel weapons include biological warfare, chemical
warfare, radiological warfare and nuclear weapons.
d. Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to arma-
ments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.
Verify by:
a. -2uantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel,
movement of units, supplemented by access to and inspection
of units and installations.
b. inspection by ground inspection teams.
c. Analysis of disclosed data in comparison with tables of
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organization and equipment supplemented by physical checks
of units and installations. Also compare with aerial photos.
d. Cross-checks of pertinent statistics and employment records,
access to output of plants, and analysis of operations with
respect to materials used.
:10TE: a. and b. to include aerial survey.
STf_GE 3
Disclose:
a. Production facilities (military arsenals, civilian plants)
for the manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units
making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage 1 (excluding
novel weapons) including location, type and quantity of arma-
ment produced, and maximum annual capacity.
Verify by:
a. Physical inspection of exterior of plant to include obser-
vation of plantts physical dimensions, raw material on hand,
end product, and labor force employed. Analyze these ob-
servations against available production records, input of
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raw material, power consumption, employment statistics and
finalcial reports.
NOTE: Utilize aerial survey as feasible.
STAGE L
Disclose:
a. Research and Development program (except nuclear).
b. Equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include
biological warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological war-
fare weapons (except nuclear).
c. Location of installations and facilities devoted to manu-
facture of novel weapons including production rates (except
nuclear).
Verify by:
a. Analysis of the present and past production records.
b. Examination of pertinent plans and records.
c. Cross-checks of information contained in present disclosures
with units denied access to in Stage 1. Supplement these
checks by physical checks of these units as well as those in
reserve at other locations.
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d. Inspection of exterior physical dimension of plants, and
conformation of records pertaining to input of raw materials,
type and disposition of finished product, rate of production,
labor employed, power consumption, and financial records.
(Internal inspection of industrial production plants would
in general not be included, but material intake, power use
and product output would be reported and be subject to exter-
nal check).
NOTE: Utilize by aerial survey as feasible.
STAGE 5
Disclose:
a. Quantities and types of novel weapons and delivery systems
on hand (less nuclear)
b. Testing programs (less nuclear)
by:
Verify
a. Examination and analysis of quantitative reports (showing
quantity, type, date of manufacture, location and physical
condition) of novel weapons supplemented by (1) actual
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physical count of stockpiles and examination of delivery
systems and (2) constant observation to disclose wlth-
drat-rals from or additions to the stockpile, displacement
of delivery systems.
be Check testing program.
NOTZ:Aerial survey to disclose additional stockpiles and
delivery sites.
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ADVANCE REPORTING - PROJECUD MOVEMENTS,
Governor Stassen's memorandum, "The Follow-up on the
Quantico Session," dated October 31, 1955, at paragraph L.
directs the Task Force on Navy Inspection to "make a special
study of the requirement for reporting in advance on pro-
jected movements of carriers with a nuclear weapons capability
in connection with an inspection plan."
The types of nuclear weapons which the USSR possesses,
or has the capability of developing, are bombs, torpedoes,
mines, torpedo mines ("creepers") and guided missiles.
There are two classes of nuclear weapons carriers which
must be considered in such a study by the TFNI; namely, naval
vessels and naval aircraft (medium range). In addition, it
must be recognized that merchant ships can be used as car-
riers. For the purposes of this study, i.e., advance re-
porting of projected movements, merchant ships need not be
dealt with, for their movements are subject to report in
accordance with world-wide shipping practices. A note of
warning in this connection should be recorded, however, that
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the distinction between' naval vessel and a merchant ship
is very fine in Russia where all ships are state-owned. For
example, during the last war-an incident occurred in which a
naval tanker was temporarily denied entrance to a United States
port, under the rule -6f clearance through diplcmatic channels,
to furnish us with a quid pro quo in negotiations on a visa
problem and aMurmansk ship repair request. The next visit
of the same tanker to the Jest Coast found it registered as
a merchant ship.
The capabilities of naval vessels as nuclear weapons
carriers stems from the guided missile with an atomic warhead,
in addition to the traditional torpedoes and mines. It must
be assumed that Russia-has developed the missile, the launcher,
and the control system for ship-board firing. That we are
able-to-fire such missiles, both from surface' ships and sub-
marines, is well-known to all the world. It is now eight
years since our submarine capability was publicized.
It is customary among naval powers to plan the movements
of ships well in advance. For example, we develop yearly
operating plans which define the general employment and loca-
tion of ships for that'year. This is nebessary in order to
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plan adequately for upkeep and maintenance periods, ship-
yard overhauls, and for the extensive supply system needed
to support operations. These yearly schedules are then
broken down into shorter periods, quarterly for example, in
more detail, and finally into weekly or bi-weekly operating
schedules.
The inspection plan should provide, therefore, for
exchange of operating plans and schedules of the several
fleets and subdivisions thereof, down to the individual
ship. This information will serve, not as a complete safe-
guard of course, but rather to establish contemplated oper-
ating patterns. Professional judgment applied thereto can
establish, to a degree, the changes in the patterns, if
any, which would be required to initiate war through a
surprise attack. It will also furnish a basis for judging
indications to be derived from the activities of naval
shore establishments which support the ships, naval bases,
naval shipyards, ammunition and supply depots, training
facilities and the like.
As will be readily recognized, the interchange of such
information will not in and of itself justify reliance at
any given time upon the employment of Russian naval vessels
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as being that which they. have declared. And furthermore,
while verification of the announced movements can be had
to a degree through aerial search and observation, it can-
not be relied upon as adequate for an effective inspection
plan. In the case of submarine operations, if they are
cleverly operated, they will not be observed at all, while
low visibility will at times protect surface ships from
observation.
It is because of these and other considerations that
the TFNI again concludes that ground inspection of naval
activities is a necessary part of the plan. In order to
complete this study, therefore, there has been prepared a
supplementary study, "Detection of Movements of Nuclear
Weapons Carriers," Appendix D.
Turning next to advance reporting of naval aircraft,
the TFNI recommends, as part of the inspection plan, inter-
change of operating plans and schedules, which., although
not necessarily projected as far into the future as in the
case of naval vessels, nonetheless do have to provide
periods for routine checks, major overhauls, and supply.
To that extent this information will be helpful in furnish-
ing indications of strategic, if not tactical, intentions.
123 ..
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Verification of adherence to advance plans and schedules
for aircraft would seem to require, to an appreciable de-
gree, ground inspection of naval air bases, stations,
overhaul and supply activities.
In addition to operating plans and schedules, there
should be an interchange of detailed flight plans. Veri-
fication of such information is more questionable, although
departures and arrivals predicted in flight plans can be
checked on the ground. In addition, radar check points
can follow within limits the flight route itself.
For the reasons heretofore stated, in the case of
ships, however, the TFNI concludes that advance reporting
of nuclear weapons carriers must be supplemented by a
thoroughly realistic detection system -- hence Appendix D.
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APPENDIX D
INSP UTION PROC DUh"S AND TL;C{ NI4UES
1. The primary purpose of the inspection system is. to provide
adequate early warning by which the United States can be
reasonably confident that the Soviets will not be able to
launch surprise massive nuclear attack. As stated in the
basic directive,.the inspection system must be "practical,
effective, and cca.prehensive."
2. Before we put, our faith in an inspection system, we must
be reasonably certain of what kind of surprise attack we
prepare against, of what type of warning indicators we
can depend on,, and what data we need to provide such indi-
cators. le must avoid accepting a bare minimal or a
single type of inspection, because of the certainty that
human fallability and Soviet guile will defeat a, plan
based on this narrow foundation. It is better to have
no plan than to-be enmeshed in one that lulls the West
into a sense of false security -- which is a .fundamental
danger in the inspection concept..
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3. In developing inspection plans, we must consider both of
the following general possibilities of Soviet initiation
of war:
1) supporting massive nuclear attack with large scale
conventional attack
2) to increase possibility'of surprise and resulting
disastrous damage to the iestern powers, making the
initial attack principally with nuclear weapons and
employing conventional forces to follow up as soon
as possible.
!t. Because of the overwhelming advantage to be gained-from-
surprise.,. the Soviet leaders will do everything possible
to cover up preparations for initiating war. They'will
realize that inspection cannot eliminate surprise, so
that-even with an apparently adequate system-of mutual
reporting, verification and-inspection, it might never-
theless be possible to start World War III with sudden
and unexpected nuclear attack. This might, in fact, be
delivered with only a portion of their forces because of
the great destructiveness that can be achieved with nu-
clear weapons. For example, the Soviets might launch
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widespread and damaging attacks with submarines and air-
craft normally absent from their bases in day to day
operations.
However, since the damage they could inflict on us in
these circumstances might be less than sufficient to
break our power to retaliate and ultimately win the war,
the Soviets may go beyond these more easily hidden prep-
arations. They may well get ready for operations of suf-
ficient magnitude that changes in their day to day
activities will become 'apparent to inspection teams that
have unrestricted freedom of movement and alertly carry
out their duties.
PROBABLE NATURE OF T.U,u SURPRISE ATTACK
6, What kind of surprise attack must we prepare against? We
must, of course, expect attack by long-range aircraft
including those capable of only one-way flight to the
United States. In addition, we must also expect the
following simultaneous operations designed to destroy as
much U.S. and allied strength as possible. Together they
could have devastating effect on our capacity to fight a
war.
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a) 'Nuclear attack against the United States from the
sea including:
1. Delay action mines laid long in advance of D-fray
in our principal ports and waterways, and set to
actuate on D-Day. These can be laid on certain
areas by submarines -- in others by merchant
ships.
2. "Creeper" torpedo-mines fired into harbors from
submarines on or before D-Day.
3. Guided missiles fired on D-Day from offshore by
submarines and possibly merchant ships,
b) Nuclear attack against United States land and sea bases
overseas to reduce our potentiality for nuclear re-
taliation. This attach would be made by sea'forces,
including those in a) above, by mediun range aircraft
and by shore based guided missiles.
c) 'Sabotage, subversion and biological warfare within
the United States and allied nations.
.Operations against our vital sea lines of communi-
cations
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e) Immediate follow-up of massive nuclear attack by the
employment of at least part of the USSR's conventional
forces in all types of'operations, including short-
range amphibious landings, as~in Turkey and Iran.
f) Heightened preparations in the USSR and its strategic
sea areas to protect against our massive retaliation
from land and sea bases.
?. We may furthermore expect, if we emphasize inspection of
only part of the USSR's potentiality that the Soviets will
devise means both to reduce the effectiveness of that
particular inspection, and to increase the relative ratio
of other means of surprise attack. They seek "peace" and
will accept an inspection system simply as a "truce" during
which they will hope to steadily gain advantage over the
United States in comparative strength.
WARNING INDICATIONS
8. In looking for warning indications, we must take into
account
a) the generally accepted conclusion that nuclear weapons
themselves are readily concealed - hence, for an in-
spection system to be effective it must be directed
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at means of delivery; and
the certainty that, should the Soviets start World
War III, they will go ""all out" to damage us as much
as possible on D-Day. Although for purposes of sur-
prise they might accept essential reduction in num-
bers of attacking forces, including long-range
aircraft, they will undoubtedly employ every means
of attack possible within the limitations of the
desired degree of concealment.
We must therefore look for indications, not only in opera-
tion of long-range aircraft, but in the several other
critical areas, a number of which also involve delivery
of nuclear weapons.
9. Aerial photography and periodic ground inspection wi11 of
themselves contribute to detection of Soviet preparations,
especially if the Soviets intend to combine massive nuclear
attack with a large scale conventional attack on D-Day.:
However, these methods alone may be grossly inadequate to
detect, in timely fashion, changes in the tempo of Soviet
activity should the Soviets decide to initiate war with
only nuclear attack delivered by normal operating forces.
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10. Likewise ineffective would be inspection limited to
movements of long-range aircraft from normal operating
fields. To outwit this limited inspection system, the
Soviets may be expected to use many stratagems, such as
ruses. to confuse rada, lulling alertness of inspectors
through warlike training missions, including long, un-
explained absences of units from their home fields, and
through operation from smaller fields made possible by
rocket assisted take-offs.
11. To have a reasonable chance of obtaining warning indica-
tions of impending "surprise" nuclear attack, we must
direct our inspection system at all means of nuclear
delivery. It must thus include long- and medium-range
aircraft, long- and medium-range guided missiles, surface
ships, submarines, and key anti-aircraft and ground tac-
tical guided missile units.
12. In all of these areas, our inspection will have to be
geared to detect variations that in and of themselves
might in many cases not seem significant; but together
would have ominous meaning.
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13. We can be sure that in all inspected locations the
Soviets will prepare for war under the disguise of
normal operations, This disguise will not be easy
to penetrate. For example, consider a submarine base.
Submarines come and go all the time. We may expect
that the Soviets will keep approximately 1/3 of their
submarines at sea, training with training munitions
that closely resemble the nuclear ones they will use
in war. Aerial photography, periodical ground inspec-
tion, or even daily count of submarines will be of
limited value in detecting preparations to use nuclear
weapons. After the inspection team has departed or the
photography plane has gone on its way, it should be an
easy matter to equip submarines for war and to send them
on what is apparently a normal training operation, es-
pecially if the Soviets have operated far in advance
under a routine schedule of extended cruises.
14. A similar situation exists in most of the other critical
areas. In nuclear war a limited quantity of munitions
and a limited number of ships, planes and missiles may
be able to deliver almost a crippling blow. Significant
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changes in pattern of preparation and in movement of
forces can be detected only by day-to-day inspection
on the spot by experienced men who know what they are
doing.
15. In order to have a reasonable chance of detecting prep-
arations by the Soviet i'avy for surprise nuclear war,
therefore, we must have tl'ained naval inspectors con-
tinuously on hand in the more important locations. They
should be supplemented by aerial photography and trav-
eling inspection teams in the less critical localities.
16. Indications of preparations for surprise attack with
nuclear weapons may appear through increased activity in
such locations as the following:
a) nuclear munition depots and assembly plants and
other key arsenals where nuclear munitions might
be concealed.
b) submarine bases and other naval bases to a lesser
degree
c) long- and medium-range aircraft bases -- especially
those within a reasonable range of the coast and
frontiers.
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Id) long- and medium range guided missile bases near
frontiers and the coast; and tactical guided missile
units at key frontier locations.
e) air defense activities including AA guided missile
units equipped with nuclear weapons,
major training stations and technical schools that
train teams for nuclear operations.
17. To have adequate protection against surprise nuclear
attack we should therefore have inspection teams at all
these critical locations. It is not easy to determine
what are the detailed indications they may be able to
note in each type of critical location. The following
paragraphs will attempt to estimate some of these.
18. The Soviets can no doubt disguise many preparations.
Thus the best means to develop a useful syllabus of
indicators for inspection tears will be by actual test
and war gaming them at similar locations in the U.S.
The general indicators that follow are offered as only
a tentative guide from rich test and experience will
develop more valid ones, and in more detail.
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19. Warning Indications at Nuclear Munition Depots and Assembly
Plants, and at Other Key Arsenals Where Nuclear Munitions
can be Concealed.
a) These locations are among the first places we would
hope to find indication of nuclear attack. If we
could adequately police these, much of our problem
would be solved. That we cannot is obvious; but our
plan should provide for as complete inspection as
possible, which would be certain to give some warning
indications that could be among the most important
any of our inspecting teams would obtain.
b) One of the last places we will be able to put inspec-
tion tea-..,,,s will be at nuclear manufacturing centers
and to a lesser degree at nuclear munition depots.
We can probably have them stationed somewhat earlier
at naval arsenals; and in some respects this will be
more beneficial, since nuclear weapon assembly for
naval use will be carried out at least in part at
these arsenals. Furthermore, experience at these
will soon indicate other arsenals where naval inspec-
tors should be stationed.
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c) Some of the possible warning indications the inspec-
tors may note,-Soviet efforts to disguise them, and
what incidents may give the Soviets away are covered
in the following tabulation:
1. Indicator: Increase in issue rate of nuclear weapons
Probable Efforts to Disguise Factors That Should Aid in Detecting
Soviet Preparations
Issue of dummy and test muni- U.S.',.?personnel specially trained
tions over long periods from in nuclear weapons who visit issue
the same depot that issues points daily and check on loca-
live ammunition tion of explosives may be able to
note significant increases in
handling of live ammunition
2. Indicator: Restationing of teams trained in assembly
and operational use of nuclear weapons
Periodical and frequent Familiarity of inspection teams
alerts of all teams as part with the personnel and Soviet
of normal training system may permit them to pick
up changes certain to occur when
the Soviets prepare for the real
thing
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3. Indicator: Increased precautions necessary when live
ammunition is being handled in quantity
These precautions will be Whatever system of training is
simulated in routine drills adopted, large issues of live
ammunition will so affect Soviet
personnel reactions that the
change should become apparent
to alert inspectors on the spot
4. Indicator: Increased efforts at security and to block
information from the inspecting team
The Soviets will make strong Inspectors on the spot should
efforts to simulate this become quickly conscious that
activity, but they will not something momentous is develop-
be able to match the real
thing.
20. Warning Indications in Surface Ship and Submarine operations
a) One of the critical factors in nuclear surprise attack
against the United States will be the submarine and to
a lesser degree the surface ship. Probably more than
any other major carrier, the submarine will be able to
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conduct its operations with a high probability of
achieving complete surprise. This applies both to
the secret laying of static and creeper nuclear mines
over a period.of months prior to the war, and to the
attack with--guided missiles and other nuclear weapons
on D-Day.
b) Furthermore, if warning indications can be gained
from submarine operations, some of these at least
will have the advantage of giving greater advanced
notice. Since the Soviets cannot afford to sacrifice
the clear advantage of utilizing their vast number of
submarines in surprise nuclear attack, we may hope to
find in their submarine preparations some of the best
early warning indications,
c) The laying of static and "creeper" mines over a period
of months preliminary to the Soviet planned date for
war will be a difficult operation to detect. It is
quite possible that merchant ships and submarines can
conduct this laying without our having any knowledge
of what is going.on. on the other hand, if we have
inspection teai.:s at each main submarine base and at
other naval bases where submarines may take aboard
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munitions, there is a chance that we might gain
some knowledge of developments. This might be
in variation in load; it might be in repeated long
absences from base of certain submarines; it might
be in the fact that the same submarines would on
each voyage call ata certain munitions depot for
special loading.
There will be better opportunity for inspection teams
to note warning indications during the final prepa-
rations for D-Day. The attitude and activity on a
submarine base during these final weeks may reveal
tell-tale indications.
e) These indications will be of vital value whether or
not we can obtain agreement that will effectively
limit the number of Soviet submarines at sea at any
one time and therefore reduce the nuclear attack
hazard, It is not certain that this desirable measure
can be achieved; even if the Soviets agreed to it they
would develop means to negate it. For example, should
they agree to having no more than 1/4 of their long
range submarines at sea for prolonged training
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exercise, they might well equip this 1/4 (more than
50 vessels:) with nuclear weapons for attacking the
continental ,United States. Then in ample time for
concerted operations they could send another large
portion of their submarine force to sea for "short-
range" operations, These could also be armed with
nuclear weapons for use against our carrier task
forces and overseas bases and ports, as well as the
sea.lines of communication.'
f) Only. by having trained inspection teams in adequate
numbers could we have any hope of getting-m rthwhile
warning indications from these operations. Some of
the indications our inspectors might note are given
below:
.1. -Indicator: -Change in type of-munitions loaded
Probable Efforts.to Disguise Factors That Should Aid in
Detecting Soviet Preparations
Not only will the Soviets The Soviets will naturally limit
make training munitions to a very small number those who
similar in appearance to war will be informed of plans for
munitions, but they may load the initiation of war. However,
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submarines for trainingmis- a considerably larger number
sions at night or holidays -- will of necessity know when
as they may be expected to live nuclear muntions are being
load them when preparing for handled. There will thus be
war, greater concern and seriousness
among officers and technicians
and greater attempts to conceal
handling of the nuclear weapon.
This change in attitude may be-
come apparent to inspection teams.
2. Indicator: Accelerated installation of guided missile
launchers on additional submarines; or large scale re-
placements with late model launchers.
The Soviets will attempt to As the date for D-Day approaches
make installations appear and as the usual delays put them
routine, behind schedule, we may expect
that a note of urgency will ap-
pear in the preparations.
3. Indicator: Capacity fueling
Long in advance of war, If the Soviets make capacity
capacity fueling will prob- fueling routine, there will be
ably be made routine for little indication from fueling
training operations as to their intentions
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However, it is possible that fuel
shortages and inertia may cause
them to slack off'in capacity
fueling. Therefore, if they seem
to revert to this at a number of
bases it will be a warning.
Indicator: Increasing readiness of submarines - repairs,
drydocking, spare parts and so forth
The Soviets will endeavor to Routine peacetime operations will
maintain a constant pattern inevitably cause neglect in vari-
of keeping their submarines ous fields of readiness. Imminence
fully ready of war will.bring with it increased
effort to eliminate deficiencies.
This increase in effort will be of
such a widespread character that
inspection teases reporting from
widely scattered bases may develop
a significant pattern of change in
attitude and action by the Soviets.
5. Indicator: Provisioning
Same as in 4. above Same as in 4, above
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6. 'Indicator: Building up war complements
Same as in 14, above Same as in !a. above. There will
be such tell-tale indications as
cancellation of leave and arrival
of trained nuclear- teams
7. Indicator: Additional security measures
Measures will be tightened Inevitably on the I approach of
from time to time as a drill war the Soviets will increase
efforts to block access to im-
portant information teams have
been getting
21. Warning-Indications at'Medium-Range Aircraft Bases --
Especially Those Within a Reasonable Range of the Coast
and Frontiers -Such as' the Balkans ana.-T,fie'siern Europe
1. Indicator: Increased attentiori 'to readiness of
Probable Efforts to Disguise Factors That Should Aid in
Detecting Soviet Preparations
The Soviets will endeavor to It will be difficult to maintain
make a high degree of readi- a constant high degree of readi-
ness routine ness. Hence, we may expect that
the Soviets will slack off in
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many bases until they bed to
prepare for sudden attack. Than
the tenseness and urgency of
preparations should become ap-
parent to inspection teams
2. Indicator: Arming planes with live nuclear munitions
In their training operations
the Soviets will simulate
carrying live ammo and will
occasionally load it in the
planes
Each time that live ammo is
carried, the facts should be
reported immediately by the
inspection team. Increase in
number of planes so armed and
reports from a number of fields
simultaneously may give adequate
3. Indicator: Capacity 'fueling ' of planes on the same date
in many fields and planes for air refueling
Such operations will be made In training operations the
routine periodically Soviets will probably not be
able to carry out simultaneous
capacity fueling and air re-
fueling in all important bases.
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Therefore, reports of va despread
accomplishment of this prepara-
tion should likewise be signifi-
cant
!t. Indicator: Increased attention to navigational equipment
The standard operating pro- Since the standard operation pro-
cedure will undoubtedly be cedure will undoubtedly be.ne-
to maintain in the planes glected in a.number of localities,
charts and equipment ready increased attention to.naviga-
for distant operations tional preparations may be ob-
against specific targets served by an alert team
5 Indicators-,' ..Personnel. changes :!and:reaction
The Soviets will endeavor by." Arrangements for.. distant attacks
continuous training inissions' with nuclear weapons will not
to closely simtiate the"war only require additions of skilled
mission and therefore to pre- technicians in some localities,
pare personnel for the real but the movement of- live ammo
thing'. , will become known. Some of the
Soviet personnel will give away
the seriousness of the situation
by their action and emotions.
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6. Indicator : Large number of planes on training flights
Periodically the Soviets will
dispatch large numbers of
planes from bases on prolonged
training flights
These training flights will be
difficult to coordinate. The
urgency attending imminent at-
tack will be apparent in many
bases.
22. Air Defense Activities including AA Guided Missile. Units
Equipped with Nuclear Weapons
Indicators to be obtained from Task Force on Army Inspec-
tion
23. Major Training Stations and Technical Schools that Train
Teams for Nuclear Oper.ations
1. Indicator: Slow but study .iriarease in nuclear and
and allied technical training 'over a period of many
months
Probable Efforts to Disguise Factors. That Should-Aid in
Detecting Soviet Preparations
'.This increase will be gradu- As naval training experts be-
ally superimposed on normal come conversant with Soviet needs
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technical training to appear and methods they may be able
to be merely the usual Pro- to put their finger on critical
gressive development to be increases that denote prepara-
expected in this scientific tion for certain activity
2. Indicator: A sudden jump in the rate of increase as
the planned date for war approaches
Dry runs in training variation Both the urgency and quantity
will be made from time to time of change would probably be-
to disguise the real thing come apparent to trained
when it comes observers in the situation
3. Indicator: Greater emphasis not only in nuclear
weapon training, but also submarines, guided
missiles and air defense (radar fence, AA guided
missiles, jet interceptors).
This activity would be dis-
guised under normal technical
advances and periodic special
training
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APP3iIDIX E
NAVY-'S COMMUNICATION PLAN
Reports from Naval Verification and Inspection Teams should
flow from the field to Naval Sector Headquarters, then to
the National Armament Inspection Headquarters in INdscow,
and from there to the JCS or specific'inspection command in
I1ashington?
.2. The plan must provide adequate safeguards for "flash warn-
ings", for rapid movement of other than routine messages,
for interchange of information in Russia, for separate
channels in case of jamming, and for transmission over an
entirely separate system to information addresees in
Washington.
3r' A typical plan might function as follows:
a.- The field team, equipped with powerful mobile radios,
reports to its Naval Sector Headquarters. Important
messages will also be sent information to the nearest
U. S. communication station on the periphery of the
USSR (this should preferably be a naval communication
unit. For the most part these units already exist at
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Yokosuka, Dhahrein, and so forth. Naval vessels can
fill in gaps).
b) The Naval Sector Headquarters will consolidate and
analyze all reports and transmit the summary to the
National Armaments Inspection Headquarters in iloscow,
and information to adjacent Army Area Headquarters.
I iortant reports appropriately desi ynated by the field
tears will be transmitted ir:uaediately without delay for
decoding and evaluation; this will follow later. Like-
wise the peripheral cornnunication station will immedi-
ately retransmit important maessa: es to , tashin ton.
NOTE.: It is desirable that equipment at Naval
Sector Headquarters be powerful enough to permit com-
munication with Area Headquarters of the United States
Array and Air ?orce., and other Navy sectors, and if pos-
sible with the United States direct. This will help
reduce the possibility of jaaraing, will provide several
means for sending flash warnings direct to the United
States, and be a psychological deterrent to the Soviets
against initiating World 'Jar III.
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c) Aircraft. reconnaissance reports of targets within the
USSR will follow the same channel of corm unications
as above, the aircraft in a sense operating like a
field team. Patrol aircraft conducting, reconnaissance
to seaward of naval operatin`; bases will transmit to
the peripheral communication station, thence to ;Ioscow,
Important? aessa; es will be sent in.'orzaation through
the usual naval chain of command to the Navy Depart-
ment. If there are indications of immediate surprise
attack, the m:iessaes will be sent with an Urgent
Priority.
d) reports from Naval Sectors will be sent action to
Department of Defense (Western Powers Inspection HQ,
dashin ton), information to National Arznazzent Inspec-
tion Headquarters, ::oscow. The latter will not delay
the transmission of these reports but can accompany
or follow up such reports with additional information
or interpretation available to the ? :oscow Headquarters
which will aid evaluation at the Department of Defense.
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e) The Navy Department will make a separate digest and
evaluation from the important inforriation messages
it receives, and will ;give this to the JCS. If the
other services adopt a similar plan for their corn-
munications, this would provide a separate, rapid
check of cevelopments in the U332, This multiple
report ?rocedure would be especially valuable in the
event of concerted jamming or other action against
our teams in Russia.
f) hen observer or inspection teams of the three serv-
ices are in the sane location, their communications
should be consolidated under the service having pri-
mary responsibility.
g) The communication plan should provide for the usual
procedures such as change of code, transmission of
dump messages at random varied times, and similar
precautions.
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t
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SENIOR NAVAL INSPECTOR
PACIFIC FLEET SECTOR
Location: Vladivostok
INSPECTION SUPPORT PERSONNEL
No. - Officer Designator No. Officer Designator
1 Senior Officer
1 Chief of Staff
1 Flag Secretary (sub)
1 Flag Lieutenant
1 Operations Officer
1 Naval Aviator
1 Intelligence Officer
1 EDO
1 AEDO
1 Nuclear Tech.
1 Petroleum Spec.
1 Marine Officer
12 Officers
2 Interpreters
2 Yeomen
4 Enlisted
1100/0
1
Supply Officer
3100/3
1310/1
1100/2
1
Officer
1100/4+
1100/3
1
Machinist Mate
MM
1310/2
2
Seamen (Drivers)
SN
1630/2'
1
Steward
SD
1+00/2-
t
Stewardsmates
TN
1510/2
2
Marines
Colonel
10
'Enlisted
11..
Total Support Personnel
16 Total Inspection 'Personnel
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VLADIVOSTOK NAVAL BASE
Vladivostok (Pacific dector)
Principal Function(s):
two major shipyards and three small yards; all types of major repairs
and drydocking of vessels up to cruiser size (635 ft.); Principal
naval fitting out and repair and supply base in'the Far East.
Secondary Function(s):
Headquarters Pacific Fleet and Headquarters CinC e-th Fleet; Marine
Headquarters; Submarine base;-4otor Torpedo Boat Base.
General Description:
Icebreakers required from December to Mid-April but open all year.
The Dals-troiNaval Shipyard effects repairs to both merchant
and naval vessels, and fits out those built in the Amur Ship-
yard in Komsomolsk., This yard is actually three yards', all yards
under the same administration; the number 202 Naval Yard, the
Number 202 Repair Yard, and the E14IT Submarine Plant. Facilities
available in the Yard in addition to shop facilities, are three
graving docks,, each approximately 635 feet long, that can drydock
vessels up tb and `including cruisers in size..- Largest,.most_.
important Soviet repair yard for cruisers and other ships in. the
Far East; no'shipbuilding facilities; primarily afitting out and
repair yard for cruisers, destroyers, submarines,' minesweepers,
and merchant ships; fits out naval vessels constructed, at Amur.
No. 2 Ship-Repair Yard; engaged in above and below waterline
repairs to merchant vessels and- is -equipped with a floating
drydock of approximately 6,000 tons lifting capacity. No national
ranking as producer of new construction; important as repair
yard and ranks third most important yard in this area. Production
consists almost entirely of hull, engine, and electrical repairs
to merchant vessels and passenger ships. Underwater repairs are
carried out in the floating drydock and floating repairs are done
at the Quay.
Additional facilities located in or in the vicinity of the afore-
mentioned shipyards:
Munition, torpedo and mine' shop"s;-'torpedo assembly plant. Munition,
torpedo, mine depot.
Major storage and supply base.
151
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600070001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600070001-0
VLADIVOSTOK, CON'D
General Description:
Machine shops; steel mills
Numerous naval airfields in vicinity (approximately 20).
Schools: naval academy; radio; submarine school; anti-sub
;school; engineering, school; gunnery; Red Banner Coastal Patrol
.School; communications; naval preparatory school.
Amphibious training base.
1000 bed hospital
Receiving station.-
VERIFICATION:
-..
Officer Designator
No
No. Officer Designator
_
.
1
Commanding officer 1100/1
1
Commanding officer . 1100/1
1
Executive Officer (sub)1100/2
1
Executive officer 1100/2
1
Submarine Officer
1100/3
1
Intelligence officer
1630/3
1
Regular Line is Jith
1100
1
Supply officer
3100/3
Amphibious Quali-
fications
1
Marine Officer
1
Intelligence Officer
1630/3
5
Officers
1
Supply. Officer
3100/3
1
Medical officer
2100/2
3
Interpreters
1
Medical officer
2100/3
3
Yeomen
1
Training & Adm.
Officer
1720/3
18
Photographers or.
.Aviation Rates
PH
1
EDO
1400/2
1
Torpedoman
TM
1
EDO Civil Engineer
5100/3
1
Gunner's Mate
1
EDO Communications
1420/3
.1
Hinman
1
EDO Ordnance
1450/3
1
Quartermaster
1
Marine Officer
Lt. Col.
1
Radarman
RD
lL
Officers
16
E isted
Total Fs=-..E on Personnel
'. 155
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600070001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/23: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600070001-0
4 Interpreters
4 Yeomen
4 Photographers or
Aviation Rates
VLADIVOSTOK, CONT'D
1 Fire.Control Tech. FT-
1 Torpedoman TM
1 Gunner's, Mate CK
1 Mineman. MN
1 Quartermaster
1 Radarman RD
1 nlisted
32 Total Verification Personnel
Support Personnel
1
Naval Aviator
1310/2
1
Naval Aviator
1310/3
1
Naval Aviator
1310/4
3 -
Officers
12
Radiomen
RVf
2
Communications Tech.CT
..1
' Storekeeper
.SK
Hospital Corpsmen-
H4'-
2
Machinist Mates
MM
2
Av. Mach Mates
AD
2
Airmen
AN
4
Seamen (Er ' ive r s):
SN
6
Mess Cooks
SN
2
Commissarymen?
CS
1
Steward
SC
6
Stewardsmates