COUNTER-INSURGENCY CRITICAL LIST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600090002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 25, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
25 July 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
SUBJECT: Counter-Insurgency Critical List
1, As agreed at last week's meeting, I asked the
Board of National Estimates to consider each of the eleven
countries now carried on the Counter-Insurgency critical list.
2. Attached are eleven assessments, one for each
country, which I believe are responsive to this requirement.
In each case, the study seeks to:
(a) identify the nature of the internal threat,
including the extent of Communist influence,
(b) assess the strength and orientation of the
present government and its capabilities for dealing
with insurgency, and
(c) suggest the likely course of events with
particular reference to possible active insurgency.
J,bhn A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
MORIXCIDIF ages 2-31
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GROUP I
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SECRET NOFORN
OCI NO.
2693/62
DATE
COPY
25 JULY X62
COUNTER INSURGENCY CRITICAL LIST
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
GROUP i
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AND DECLASSIFICATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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25 July 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Board Review of Countries on the
Counter -Insurgency Critical List
1. In accordance with your request, the Board of Na-
tional Estimates considered each of the eleven countries
on the counter-insurgency critical list. Board considera-
tion was based on draft statements prepared initially by
appropriate branches of the Office of Current Intelligence,
in consultation with ONE regional staffs.
2. Attached are eleven assessments, one for each
country, which have been approved by the Board and which
are submitted for your use with the Special Group.
SECRET
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
GROUP I
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COUNTER-INSURGENCY CRITICAL LIST
Page
Burma
1
Cambodia
4
Laos
6
South Vietnam
8
Thailand
11
Africa
Cameroons
Middle East
Iran
Latin America
Colombia
18
Ecuador
20
Guatemala
22
Venezuela
24
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GROUP 1
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in Burma
1. Insurgency in Burma has been a problem
for the government since independence in 1948.
Originally the chief threat to Rangoon's con-
trol came from two separate Communist forces
--the Red Flag (extremist) Communists and the
White Flag (orthodox or moderate) Communists
whose base of operations was in central Burma.
Both groups drew their personnel from the
Burman ethnic majority. The Red Flag and
White Flag Communists gained relatively lit-
tle support from the peasant population and
were largely eliminated from their strong-
holds by the end of 1950. They maintain the
ability to launch sporadic raids and ambushes
on the main lines of communications in the
Irrawaddy valley and in the Irrawaddy delta
area, but are based in the sparsely popu-
lated hills. These two Communist insurgent
forces are estimated at 500 for the Red Flags
and 1,500 for the White Flags. There is no
evidence of significant assistance or direc-
tion of either of these forces by outside
Communist authorities.
2: The insurgency of ethnic minorities
is a more serious matter. There are insur-
gent movements in each of the three largest
of the ethnic minority communities-.the
Karens, Shans and Kachins--and similar move-
ments threaten among other ethnic elements.
The basic cause for the ethnic insurgency
is the historical antipathy of the minori-
ties to the dominance of the Burman majority.
This has been augmented by the arrogance of
Burman officers and men stationed among the
minorities and by the government's effort
to "Burmanize" the country--to develop a
single linguistic and cultural base.
3. The largest and most serious of the
minority forces is the Karen National Defense
Organization, which went into revolt in De-
cember 1948. It numbers about 6,000 and the
core of its fighting force is made up of
former army personnel trained under the Brit-
ish. Driven out of the Burman-dominated Ir-
rawaddy basin, it has fallen back on positions
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of strength among its fellow-Karens in the
hills of eastern Burma along the Thai border.
The Karen antagonism for Burmans is so deep-
seated that military conquest appears to be
the only hope for the elimination of the
KNDO. Of the various ethnic insurgent forces
in Burma, only the KNDO appears to have been
infiltrated to any degree by the Communists
--and then only in the isolated delta area
below Rangoon. There appears to be no con-
nection with alien Communist groups.
4. The Shan State Independence Army and
the Kachin Independence Army, operating in
the eastern Shan State and in the Kachin
State, oppose the Rangoon Government for the
same reasons as the Karens do. Their revolt
started later, in 1959 and 1960, and has been
centered in the ethnic states where Burmans
are few. The two forces are estimated at
3,000 and 2,000 respectively, and are still
in the early stages of organization. Through
a Nationalities Liberation Alliance, they are
associated with the Karens, and thus, indi-
rectly, with the Burmese Communists but have
no known connection with foreign Communist
organizations. Other ethnic minority in-
surgent bands, the Mons, Kayahs and Moslem
Mujahids, have remained too small to be of
much significance.
5. The government of Burma, currently
under the domination of General Ne Win and
the army, is intolerant of opposition and
is expected to demand discipline and effi-
ciency. Despite this, it is probably con-
siderably less stable than were the previous
civilian administrations of U Nu. It is also
reportedly divided on policy. Thus, its sta-
bility depends largely upon the continued
unity and loyalty of the army to General Ne
Win. The orientation of the government is
essentially one of narrow nationalism, sus-
picious and fearful of foreign intervention.
Its program is one of developing a purely
Burmese, and largely undefined socialist
state.
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6. The government's program for dealing
with its current and potential insurgents
has been a combination of long-range educa-
tion and reorientation of the ethnic minori-
ties toward a Burman cultural pattern and an
extended war of attrition against the exist-
ing insurgent forces. While the government
should be able to contain the insurgents
militarily, over the coming months the proba-
bility is that the insurgency will continue
at its present costly but not dangerous level.
7. The principal, danger is that the govern-
ment's policy toward the minorities will be
so heavy-handed as to increase rather than
reduce disaffection. US ability to influence
this situation is not great. The Burmese
are suspicious of Western advice, and are
particularly sensitive in the case of the
US, which because of its previous involve-
ment with the Chinese Nationalist irregulars
in Northern Burma, is suspected of favoring
minorities against the Burmese government.
Hence US counsels of moderation run the risk
of being counter-productive.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in Cambodia
1. Cambodia has no serious internal se-
curity problem at the present time. Prince
Sihanouk enjoys broad popular support, and
he has identified himself closely with the
people's interest. His all-inclusive Sangkum
political movement has absorbed potentially
dissident elements and he has suppressed any
semblance of an effective political opposi-
tion. The local Pracheachon (Communist)
party is small in number (1,000?3,000) and
influence. External Communist subversion
is minimal due to the bloc's tactics of
avoiding offense to Sihanouk. The Chinese
and Vietnamese minorities, although oriented
toward the left, are mainly interested in
maintaining their preeminent commercial po-
sitions.
2. Sihanouk has been the dominant figure
in Cambodian politics since 1941. The 30,000?
man national army is loyal to the government
and is not active in politics. The peasants,
for the most part, own the land they till,
and food is abundant. The younger intellec-
tuals in Phnom Penh make up the one group of
malcontents. They were educated in France
after World War II and received considerable
aid and political guidance from French Commu-
nists. Sihanouk is aware of their attitudes
but has done little to satisfy their demands
for reform.
3. Sihanouk has stated that Communism is
"the wave of the future" in Southeast Asia.
He does not hesitate to look to Communist
China for diplomatic support and he threatens
to seek military aid from that quarter when-
ever relations with Thailand, South Vietnam,
and the United States become seriously strained.
However, he has taken steps to suppress Com-
munism within Cambodia, and he is increasingly
concerned with the growing Communist presence
in neighboring countries. He fears the crea-
tion of a united Vietnam under Communist rule
and is concerned over the future direction of
Laotian neutrality.
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4. Cambodia has had an effective civic
action program for several years. The Cam-
bodian army has been active in construction
projects, village health, provincial admin-
istration and settlement particularly in the
northeast, a region Sihanouk recognizes as
a likely center of disaffection and subver-
sion. He has received indications of US sup-
port for three additional infantry battalions
and one engineer battalion to protect this
border, aid the local minorities, and en-
courage "homesteading" by Cambodian refugees
from South Vietnam. The armed forces and
the para-military Provincial Guard (11,000
strong) are capable of assuring internal se-
curity. Cambodian forces, however, have not
been very effective, or very diligent, in
patrolling border areas against Viet Cong
infringements.
5. Recurring rumors that Bangkok and
Saigon are plotting against Sihanouk jeop-
ardize the standing of the United States in
Cambodia.. Sihanouk takes the view that Wash-
ington condones such plotting.
6. The internal situation is likely to
remain stable under Sihanouk's leadership.
He has not provided for a successor, however,
and should he die a period of political in-
stability might follow until senior advisers
and the royal family could agree upon a leader.
During this period leftist elements might
create unrest. If Sihanouk's death were to
occur by assassination, and South Vietnam or
Thailand appeared involved, Cambodia would
react sharply against the United States.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in Laos
1. For a decade the Pathet Lao has been
exerting military and political pressure
upon the constituted government. The Pathet
Lao insurgents now exercise de facto control
over almost half of Laos, ancU_P_athet Lao
representatives hold key positions in the
recently formed coalition government.
2. The Pathet Lao is an arm of the North
Vietnamese Communist apparatus. Its impetus
and backing come from Hanoi. While the move-
ment is headed by Laotians, the key leaders
--Nouhak, Kaysone and Souphannouvong.-all
received their indoctrination under Ho Chi
Minh, and returned to Laos at the time of
the Indochina War. Nouhak and Kaysone are
completely responsive to Hanoi. Pathet Lao
operations over the years reflect Hanoi's
programs and policies which are designed to
bring the former Indochina states under North
Vietnamese hegemony.
3. The Pathet Lao draws much of its sup-
port from non-Lao ethnic minorities. Consti-
tuting almost half the Laotian population,
these groups have for centuries been treated
as inferiors, and have been isolated from
the Lao of the Mekong River valley.
4. In recent years, students returning
from France have been increasingly attracted
toward the movement, no doubt in reaction
to the conservatism and corruption of the
Vientiane government and in sympathy with
the "anti-colonialist struggle" in neighbor-
ing Vietnam.
5. The Pathet Lao has developed signifi-
cant support in the areas which it has con-
trolled. Its "grass-roots" appeal was strongly
evidenced when candidates of its political
arm, the Neo Lao Hak Sat, made a strong show-
ing in the 1958 elections. Other factors,
such as the existence of protected base areas
contiguous, to North Vietnam, major re-supply
routes from North Vietnam, airlift support,
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and the augmentation of the Pathet Lao mili-
tary capability by North Vietnamese technical
and military personnel, have played an impor-
tant role in past Pathet Lao operations and
presumably would in the future should the
Pathet Lao assume a more militant posture.
6. The Pathet Lao, as an integral part
of the coalition government, will henceforth
play an increasingly influential role in the
direction and implementation of government
policies and programs. At the same time,
the Pathet Lao will probably receive covert
support from North Vietnam and other Commu-
nist powers for the enlargement of their in-
fluence and control over the Laotian country-
side.
7. The United States, which has played
a major role in Laotian affairs during the
past few years, will retain a major interest
in Laos in view of the impact Laotian "neu-
trality" will have throughout Southeast Asia.
While Souvanna will welcome US aid programs,
it is likely that--in consonance with his
policy of strict neutrality--he will restrict
any activities which might be construed as
an attempt to exert political influence.
8. The future course of events will be
greatly influenced by the attitude of the
Souvanna administration. As members of the
coalition, the Pathet Lao will try to change
Souvanna's neutralism into a pro-Bloc policy,
rather than resorting to a renewal of mili-
tary action. However, if they are unable to
accomplish this by political means, the
chances of renewed military or paramilitary
activity by the Pathet Lao would be signifi-
cantly increased.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in South Vietnam
1. The principal internal threat to
South Vietnam is the Communist (Viet Cong)
military and political drive to overthrow
the Diem government. The core of this move-
ment is the Viet Minh apparatus left in South
Vietnam after the country was divided by the
1954 Geneva settlement, but overall direction
is from Hanoi. The failure to hold reunifi-
cation elections as provided in the 1954
Geneva accords has led Hanoi to step up its
support of armed insurrection in the South,
with the aim of replacing Diem by a govern-
ment willing to negotiate unification on
Hanoi's terms.
2. Hanoi has infiltrated military cadres
and some materiel, but the bulk of Viet Cong
strength is made up of local peasants, re-
cruited voluntarily or by force. Viet Cong
strength has increased from an estimated
5,000 to 8,000 guerrillas in mid-1960 to a
present level of 17,000 to 19,000 in regular
units, plus up to 100,000 part-time military
supporters. The Communists hold several
"base" areas from which government authority
is virtually excluded; they partially control
or influence perhaps half of the villages in
South Vietnam and have cells in major cities.
They are influential among minority tribes
in the highlands where government control
has never been firm and among some remnants
of the political-military sects, whose dissi-
dent armies were crushed by Diem shortly
after South Vietnam's independence.
3. President Diem is staunchly anti-Com-
munist and top leaders share his determina-
tion to resist a Communist takeover. While
individual Vietnamese are strongly pro-Ameri-
can or even pro-French, the government is
nationalistic and feels little kinship with
democratic practices. A vocal intellectual
group has scored Diem's autocratic and highly
centralized rule, and even government offi-
cials have voiced concern that interference
in military command and inadequate administra-
tion have contributed to growing Viet Cong
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success. Suppression of political opposition
and curbs on civil liberties have led to wide-
spread apathy, and have forced the more active
opposition elements into irresponsible and con-
spiratorial activity. Coup or assassination
attempts have occurred in the past and pose
a constant danger. The Diem government's
widespread counterinsurgency effort, both
military and socio-economic, is being assisted
by US financial and logistic support and US
military personnel. US prestige is heavily
committed to South Vietnam's effort.
4. Although South Vietnamese army opera-
tions have stepped up pressure on the Viet
Cong and destroyed many Communist installa-
tions and food stocks, Communist military
capability does not appear so far to have
been seriously weakened. Recent Viet Cong
attacks show increased military professional-
ism, and there is evidence that the Commu-
nists are continuing to build up regular
units. The largest units now identified are
battalions, but regimental formations may
eventually appear. There is evidence sug-
gesting that North Vietnam has decided to in-
crease its support of such a build-up in re-
sponse to larger US aid to South Vietnam.
The most suitable area for a build-up is in
the northern part of the country where remote
trails provide access directly from the North
and from across Laos, and where the mountain-
ous terrain is less advantageous for use of
the government's superior equipment. The
Viet Cong probably will continue smaller-
scale erosive attacks in coastal provinces
and the Mekong delta, attempting to capture
rice supplies and weapons, as well as to
sever road and rail communications and to
interdict government aircraft, possibly em-
ploying ground sabotage and antiaircraft
weapons. The Viet Cong at any time may in-
tensify its efforts to destroy the govern-
ment's "strategic hamlets" and other rural
projects which seek to isolate the peasantry
from the Communists, and may increase terror-
ism in the cities both for psychological and
economic effect.
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5. A constant possibility in South Vietnam
is the assassination or overthrow of President
Diem by non-Communist opponents or by such
groups in cooperation with the Viet Cong.
Diem's death probably would lead to some form
of military rule, possibly through a civilian
facade. To be successful, a coup probably
requires military backing. There is,however,
no apparent popular or strong alternative
leader to Diem on the horizon; Diem's removal
might result in an early internal struggle
for power or a rapid deterioration of govern-
mental stability. Such a situation would pre-
sent the Communists ready-made opportunities
for military or political exploitation.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in Thailand
1. There is at present no insurgency as
such in Thailand. There are, however, two
principal areas of discontent where active
insurgency could develop. These areas are
the northeastern provinces of Thailand bor-
dering on the Mekong River and Laos, and the
southern provinces along the Malayan border.
In the northeast, where the residents con-
sider themselves Thai but are closely related
to the Lao, the cause for discontent is the
poverty and undeveloped economy. In the
south, it is ethnic and religious differences:
the people are Malay Moslems who resist gov-
ernmental efforts to assimilate them linguis-
tically and religiously.
2. In both areas there is a built-in alien
Communist minority--in the northeast the Viet-
namese refugee communities, estimated at about
45,000 and currently in the slow process of
repatriation to North Vietnam, and in the
south, a handful of Malayan Communist Party
insurgents who use the Thai-Malay border area
as a refuge from Malayan security forces.
Ethnic minorities of the hill country of north-
ern Thailand could become dissaffected through
Thai efforts to modernize their forms of liv-
ing. By themselves, however, they are too
few and too weak to cause much concern at
this time.
3. Bangkok has long recognized its diffi-
culties in the south and has handled the prob-
lem by permitting a great deal of autonomy to
the Moslem minority. Furthermore, the Malayan
government has persistently discouraged anti-
Bangkok action on its side of the border.
4. In contrast, Bangkok took steps to al-
leviate the long-standing discontent of the
northeastern Thais only recently when the
spread of Communist influence in Laos became
significant. Bangkok's neglect, combined
with inter-marriage and easier communications
with the Mekong peoples, has created close
identification with Laos and isolation from
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the capital. As a result, the local peoples
are relatively easy targets for Laotian-based
Communist propaganda and subversion. The
government's present program of dealing with
the discontent in the northeast consists of
a three-pronged approach: increased super-
vision of the Laotian border, increased police
surveillance of known and suspected Communists,
and a newly launched (and United States sup-
ported) program of economic development for
the area. For the short range and depending
on developments in Laos, the Thai government
should be able to contain its discontented
elements and, perhaps, decrease their com-
plaints.
5. The present Thai government is basi-
cally stable and faces no organized internal
opposition. So long as Marshal Sarit's health
remains adequate, there is little likelihood
of a significant domestic change. The Thai
government has been a close partner to the
United States since SEATO was founded in
1954. The United States has staked much
money and prestige on military and economic
development, and Thailand has been quite
amenable to United States influence. Re-
cently, however, and especially since the
extension of Communist influence in Laos,
Thailand has become increasingly irritated
by US policy and it is probable that, while
both countries will continue their efforts
to contain Communist expansion, relations
between them will become increasingly diffi-
cult.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in Cameroon
1. Cameroon's moderate regime is plagued
with an armed rebellion which has been in
progress in the southwestern region of the
country since 1956. It began as an effort by
the Cameroon People's Union (UPC), then the
largest nationalist party in the French trust
territory of Cameroun, to win independence and
reunification with the adjoining British-
administered segment of the old German colony
of Kamerun. When French Cameroun achieved
independence under the moderate French-sup-
ported Cameroon union party (UC) in January
1960,; many UPC adherents abandoned terrorism
and returned to legal political activity.
The rebellion's political appeal declined
further last fall with the reunification of
former French Cameroun and British Southern
Cameroons. However, a small faction of UPC
irreconcilables, who regard President Ahmadou
Ahidjo as a puppet controlled by Western
"imperialists", has continued in active
insurrection, exploiting widespread unrest
among youthful elements of the important
Bamileke tribe.
2. The bases of this tribal unrest--and
thus of the rebellion today--are largely
economic and social rather than political.
They are overpopulation, a rigid social
structure in which the chiefs remain powerful,
and, especially, a traditional land tenure
system which fails to provide profitable
employment for thousands of young Bamileke
reaching maturity each year. Unable to
find work in their own tribal area and un-
wanted in others, many of these young men
drift into the largely autonomous small ter-
rorist bands which comprise the UPC's rebel
"National Liberation Army."
3. Although insurgency has been on the
wane in Cameroon for the past two years,
Cameroonian authorities estimate that there
are still about 2,100 active terrorists
based in inaccessible areas of the dense
rainforests and rugged mountains of the
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southwest. They are largely armed with home-
made guns and crude ammunition, but have oc-
casionally received limited amounts of more
professional material, including some weapons
of Czech origin, via a pipeline controlled by
UPC leaders operating out of Cairo, Conakry,
and Accra. A small number of the terrorists
have been trained in guerrilla warfare tech-
niques in Communist China. Supplying arms
clandestinely to the rebels has always pre-
sented a major logistics problem to foreign
sympathizers and has recently become even
more difficult as a result of Cameroonian
pressure on Nigeria to control its borders
more effectively. Moreover, Nasir, Nkrumah,
and Sekou Toure all have been curbing their
overt support for the rebellion in recent
months and at least the UAR appears to have
reduced its covert assistance as well.
4. All of the rebellion's top external
leaders and a few of those operating within
Cameroon are strongly pro-Communist. This
orientation results from the UPC's many
years of close association with the French
Communist apparatus, which provided important
organizational and financial support.
5. At present Ahidjo and his party, the
Cameroon Union (UC), appear to be firmly in
the saddle at the federal level and in Eastern
(former French) Cameroon. While the regime is
still based essentially on the support of the
traditional Moslem rulers of the northern
region, Ahidjo has won over many individual
tribal leaders of the more politically volatile
Christian-pagan south. The legal opposition
is badly fragmented and its political vehicles
appear to be crumbling under increasing regime
pressure. However, the government still lacks
real broad-based popular support and little
has been done to transform the UC into the
spearhead of a genuine mass movement. Heavy
dependence on France for economic and tech-
nical assistance continues to alienate many
students and other politically dynamic elements.
The government has yet to develop a meaningful
program attacking the basic causes of the ter-
rorist problem.
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6. Cameroonian security forces, totaling
about 7,800 men, evidently are completely
loyal to the present government. They are,
however, heavily dependent upon a large French
military mission which provides officers and
non-corns for key positions in the Cameroonian
forces in addition to training and technical
addistance. There are also two French infantry
battalions based in the country. The French
commander of the Cameroonian Army believes his
troops would be very hard pressed should the
terrorists acquire any significant quantity
of arms.
7. The Ahidjo regime's present close ties
with France narrow the potential for exerting
US influence. Moreover, the government was
disappointed in the US response to its initial
bids in 1960 and 1961 for economic, military,
and diplomatic support. Nevertheless, rela-
tions now are generally cordial and Ahidjo
would still like to offset the French presence
with an increased US aid commitment. US na-
tional interests revolve around the desirability
of promoting stability in the area under an
essentially Western-oriented regime.
8. Assuming that the terrorists do not
acquire substantial new arms supplies, it
seems unlikely that they will be able to step
up their operations over the next few months.
On the other hand, terrorism has probably
reached an irreducible level until the govern-
ment deals effectively with its basic causes.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency in 'Iran
1. The main threat to stability in Iran
lies in the antiquated and reactionary nature
of its social, political and economic structure
and the inability of successive governments to
achieve significant reforms. The bureaucracy
is top-heavy and corrupt; the entrenched ruling
class is devoted primarily to pursuing its own
interests; the military officer corps is inef-
ficient and faction-ridden; and the nationalist
opposition works persistently to embarrass the
government. All of this contributes to the
progressive deterioration of the monarchy as
a unifying force in the country and increases
the long-range chances of a violent upheaval.
2. However, active insurgency'is unlikely
in Iran in the near future. The nationalist
opposition is small, poorly organized, and
largely ineffective. The masses of peasants
are lethargic and without an effective voice.
Articulate expression of dissatisfaction comes
only from a relatively small group of educated,
politically aware Iranians; University of Tehran
students spearhead most violent expressions of
dissatisfaction. Urban workers, primarily in
Tehran and to a degree in Isfahan and Abadan,
can, under certain circumstances, be moved to
violence, and are natural targets for anyone
wishing to whip up expressions of mass support.
Demonstrators and organizers can also be bought
if a genuine issue is lacking. Tribal groups,
which historically have sparked uprisings, have
declined in influence and power, as the Tehran
government has extended its control into the
remoter areas, but the tribes, especially the
Kurds, could still be a source of trouble if
they received large-scale outside support or
if tribal uprisings concided with disturbances
in the cities.
3. Although Iran has many ex-Communists
and Communist sympathizers, some of them in
government offices, Communist forces do not
now appear capable of action against the govern-
ment. The leadership and the best-organized
elements of the party are outside Iran, mainly
in Europe. During a period of chaos, however,
Communist capabilities would probably increase
rapidly.
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4. The present government of Asadollah
Alam is only a few days old. It appears,
however, that it will be no better, and perhaps
somewhat worse, than the governments which held
power from 1953 until last year, when Amini took
over. In all these the Shah pulled the strings
and the prime minister acted as his mouthpiece.
Little progress was made in meeting the rising
expectations and demands for economic improvement,
social reform and more representative government.
Although Alath's government has announced that it
intends to carry on the program of land reform,
anti-corruption measures and other activities
set afoot by Amini, it seems unlikely that it
will do so effectively unless the Shah dem-
onstrates a greater willingness to oppose the
entrenched interests than has so far been the case.
5. Government forces, police, gendarmerie,
military and civilian security, have the capa-
bility of controlling any foreseeable disturb-
ances short of a country-wide armed uprising.
If ordered to fire on rioting civilian crowds,
the army's reliability might be questionable.
Indeed, any excessive violence against demon-
strators could snowball into widespread disturb-
ances in the Tehran area, but organized or
prolonged fighting would be unlikely.
6. The Iranian government is Western oriented
and linked with the United States through CENTO
and a bilateral defense pact. It depends on
American military and economic aid and accepts
and sometimes seeks American advice and guidance.
The Iranian government has supported American
25X1 policy on most international issues and has
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SUBJECT: Insurgency Threat in Colombia
1. Armed bands have terrorized rural
areas of central and western Colombia since
1948 and continue to cause more than 200
deaths each month. An estimated 75 groups
of varying size are active, some of them
remnants of former guerrilla bands that
participated in Liberal-Conservative hostil-
ities from 1948 to 1953, but most of them
are simply bandits without political affil-
iation.
2. The existence of most of these groups
is due largely to the absence of adequate
police forces in the remote areas where the
bandits operate. The bands form the private
"armies" of local bosses who exert political
control over the small communities from
which they derive their support. Although
there has been some evidence of Communist
attempts to coordinate the bandits into a
unified revolutionary movement, most of the
bands operate independently. Communist in-
fluence has been confined to several small
enclaves which the Communists have controlled
for more than 20 years. Even in these re-
doubts Communist influence is declining.
3. In early 1962, a group of leftist ex-
tremists formed an organization known as the
United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR).
It is engaged in a campaign to form a guer-
rilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the
government. Leaders of the organization have
had contact with the Castro regime and have
probably received financial aid from Cuba on
a regular basis. The FUAR has succeeded in
drawing members from the extremist wing of
the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) who are
dissatisfied with the PCC's reluctance to
engage in armed revolution. An increasing
number of Communist university students is
joining FUAR.
4. Colombia is enjoying a period of
political stability. The National Front
coalition, under which the presidency is
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to alternate between the Conservative and
Liberal parties every four years with all
appointive and elective offices divided on
a parity basis, was strengthened in the re-
cent congressional and presidential elections.
5. Colombia has enthusiastically endorsed
the Alliance for Progress, and has made con-
siderable progress in restoring representa-
tive government since the overthrow of dic-
tator Rojas Pinilla in 1957. Prospects for
stability will depend to a large extent on
the incoming administration's success in
executing the "General Plan for Economic
and Social Development." The plan is con-
sidered a sound and potentially effective
socio-political reform. Declining world
coffee prices threatenL:to disrupt Colombia's
coffee-based economy, but steps are being
taken to diversify exports.
6. The only security force in many rural
areas is the local army garrison, but it gen-
erally is inadequate and lacks the proper
training to combat armed bands. Moreover,
the army does not consider'the suppression
of banditry to be its mission.
7. Unless and until the army decides to
eliminate rural violence, the bandit groups
will continue to dominate much of rural
Colombia. Although no large-scale insurgency
is likely to develop in the immediate future,
the Communists and FUAR are expected to step
up subversive activities. Leftist agitation,
particularly among student groups, will prob-
ably increase.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency Threat in Ecuador
1. President Arosemena's administration
continues to be threatened by both the left
and right. There is general dissatisfaction
among conservative groups with the govern-
ment's inability to quell the growing unrest
resulting from leftist agitation. Military
leaders are concerned that government poli-
cies and reform programs may result in politi-
cal gains by the left.
2. The Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE)
has succeeded in forming the nucleus of a
guerrilla organization. Members of the guer-
rilla group were drawn largely from the pro-
Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean
Youth, which was involved in a two-day battle
with government forces last April. The Com-
munists have stepped up guerrilla warfare
training, including special courses in the
use of explosives. PCE members are report-
edly stockpiling arms in rural areas in prep-
aration for a general insurrection. There
is some evidence of Cuban arms assistance,
and several PCE members have received train-
ing in Cuba.
3. While the threat of a military coup
has abated somewhat, the political situation
in Ecuador remains unstable. President Arose-
mena is attempting to effect a reform program,
but he faces resistance from rightists in
Congress who may be able to muster independent
support and to block his proposals. Those
whom the reforms would benefit are dissatis-
fied with the lack of progress. Widespread
strikes and Communist-inspired demonstrations
have added to the tension.
4. The administration supports the Al-
liance for Progress, but any indications of
external attempts to influence Ecuador's
policies are likely to arouse the country's
extreme sensitivity to apparent encroach-
ments on its sovereignty. Arosemena is
struggling to follow an independent line in
international politics.
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5. Government security forces successfully
suppressed the only recent leftist outbreak and
arrested those involved. However, the National
Civil Police (NCP), responsible for internal se-
curity matters, lack the capability to deal ef-
fectively with widespread insurgency. Coopera-
tion between the NCP and the military is vir-
tually nonexistent.
6. There is no immediate threat to Ecuador's
internal security. However, the Arosemena ad-
ministration will face continued leftist efforts
to discredit the government through agitation
and possibly violent demonstrations. Rightists
may attempt to impeach Arosemena. There is
also the possibility that the military will
become convinced that a takeover by the armed
forces is necessary to restore order.
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SUBJECT: Insurgency Threat in Guatemala
1. The Communists' Guatemalan Labor Party
(PGT) has favored a policy of "active insur-
rection" for about a year, but PGT leaders
have recognized that the party is too weak
to take decisive action by itself and that
it must therefore secure the collaboration
of other revolutionary groups.
2. The PGT has a hardcore membership of
about 1,100 (in a total population of nearly
4,000,000) and is able to control perhaps
another 1,000 among the members of the Com-
munist-front United Revolutionary party (PUR),
Communist-dominated labor unions, and various
student organizations. It also has connec-
tions with the "13 November" group, a small
group of ex-army personnel which has engaged
in sporadic guerrilla activity since early
this year. It has succeeded only partially
in influencing and directing this group.
3. The "13 November" group, led by Major
Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, engaged in guerrilla
activity in Guatemala's northeast region dur-
ing February. In March and April, Cuba sent
the group at least $10,000 through contacts
in Mexico. Presently inactive, it probably
had no more than 50 members at the height of
its guerrilla activity.
4. When the Communists attempted to launch
their own guerrilla movement, under the leader-
ship of pro-Communist former Guatemalan army
colonel Carlos Paz Tejada, the attempt was a
fiasco. The 15- to 18-man band was routed
quickly by the Guatemalan army.
5. Though opposition groups presently
lack unity and strength, their importance is
potentially great because of the widespread,
though still unchanneled, public dissatisfac-
tion with the regime. The government lacks
any well-defined political orientation, and
its position is weakened by the corruption
and maladministration that has discredited
it publicly and led the more able Guatemalan
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civilians to shun any association with it. It
appears incapable of a significant attempt to
fulfill the aspirations for social and economic
progress which animate many Guatemalans. Eco-
nomic stagnation since 1957, resulting largely
from the lower world prices for coffee, the
chief Guatemalan export, turned into recession
in 1961, when per capita real income declined
an estimated 3.5 percent.
6. The armed forces are the ultimate locus
of political power in Guatemala. While they
are presently supporting the regime, they are
responsive to public opinion and would probably
remove Ydigoras' if public pressure against him
assumes major proportions.
7. The 7,000-man army showed up poorly in
action against the "13 November" group last
February. It is widely deployed throughout
the country and lacks an effective intelligence
capability. Police forces consist of about
3,000 non-administrative officers and men in
the National Police and about 800 in the border
patrol force. While these forces are not badly
trained and are improving, they are deficient
in riot control methods and, outside the capi-
tal, are thinly distributed.
8. Events in Guatemala are important to US
interests since developments there have often
in the past had significant ramifications in
neighboring countries. Also, the US is widely
held responsible for the revolution of 1954
which ousted the pro-Communist regime of Presi-
dent Arbenz. Arbenz now resides in Cuba, and
the Castro regime evidently considers the Guate-
malan government one of its primary targets
for subversion in Latin America.
9. Any new incident, such as the death
of a student at the hands of the police, could
quickly arouse the public against the regime
to such an extent that the armed forces would
feel obliged to seize control. A military
coup would be explained as necessary to restore
order and "prevent a Communist takeover."
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SUBJECT: Insurgency Threat in'Venezuela
1. The guerrilla movement in Venezuela
has a substantial potential in terms of organ-
ization, equipment and finance. Numerous en-
counters between guerrilla and Venezuelan se-
curity forces have occurred in recent months,
resulting in several deaths on both sides and
the capture of more than 100 insurgents. How-
ever, peasant support is essential to the suc-
cess of any insurrectionary movement, and at
present President Betancourt enjoys the sup-
port of the peasants.
2. It has been clearly established that
the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) with the
aid of its ally, the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR), is directing the guerrilla
movement. Aware that President Betancourt's
downfall would remove one of Castroism's lead-
ing enemies and encourage future revolutionary
activities in the Hemisphere, the Communists
are determined to overthrow the Venezuelan
government.
3. The Communists appear to be concentrat-
ing on the procurement of arms and the forma-
tion of a well-trained cadre before undertaking
any major effort to gain mass support for wide-
spread armed action. While conditions in
rural areas are not suitable for insurgent ac-
tivities the economically depressed' urban
areas are susceptible to Communist exploitation.
Aside from the PCV paramilitary group of some
200 men, the Communists rely largely on students
for recruits, primarily from the Central Uni-
versity in Caracas.
4. The guerrilla effort is believed to be
part of the Communist strategy to create un-
rest throughout Venezuela by the use of terror,
sabotage, and armed action. The ultimate ob-
jective is to seize power either directly or
by provoking a military coup and subsequently
exploiting mass resentment to oust the mili-
tary.
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5. Venezuela's political situation has re-
mained unstable since the abortive revolts by
leftist marine units in May and June. The
military continues to press Betancourt for
firm measures to halt the growing terrorism,
much of which is aimed at military personnel.
Betancourt is extremely concerned that recent
action taken by the armed forces in Peru and
Argentina will encourage Venezuelan military
leaders to demand a greater political role.
6. The government is hampered by an oppo-
sition-controlled Chamber of Deputies which
refuses to approve severe restrictions against
the Communists and other extremists. Dissen-
sion within the government coalition over the
means to be used 'in combating violence further
aggravates the situation.
7. Government security forces appear capa-
ble of preventing the present insurgency from
becoming a serious threat to the survival of
the government. The National Guard is particu-
larly effective in suppressing violence in
rural areas. While a small number of leftist
and rightist extremists in the armed forces
continue to plot Betancourt's overthrow, the
majority of the officers are believed to be
loyal.
8. Much depends on the continued support
of the rural population. Relations between
the peasants and the military are good, and
the peasants: will probably continue to coop-
erate against the guerrillas as long as Betan-
court remains in office. The government con-
tinues to effect its moderately successful
land reform program.
9. The present Venezuelan government is
strongly anti-Communist and is prepared to
cooperate with the US to forestall the spread
of Castroism in the Hemisphere. However,
Betancourt is sensitive to criticism that he
is overly influenced by US policy, and be will
be careful to avoid any position that indicates
compromise with Venezuela's independence.
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10. Venezuela's value to US policy derives
primarily from its position as probably the
most staunchly anti-Communist country in Latin
America, and from its bitterly anti-Castro at-
titude. The country's position as the world's
leading exporter of crude oil is also signifi-
cant.
11. The political situation in Venezuela
will probably become more unstable as the
country approaches a presidential election
in 1963. Communist efforts to exploit the
situation by fomenting popular unrest and
provoking disturbances are likely to increase.
Incidents of sabotage, terrorism, and armed
violence will become more frequent as the Com-
munists and other leftist extremists increase
their paramilitary capability. However, sus-
tained guerrilla warfare on a national scale
is not likely to break out in the immediate
future.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
ROOM NO. I BUILDING
We don't need this any longer --
either return or destmr , making
sure it is properly 21mgx ix recorded.
1 FORM O `'41 REPLACES FORM 36-8 FEB WHICH MAY BE USED.
EXTENSION