LETTER TO BRIG. GEN. EDWARD G. LANDSDALE FROM []

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000800040043-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961
• Content Type: LETTER

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?
Briz# Gong EdwArd 0.ZONOW01 J6V-
Assbrtlant to the tecmtery or Defense
ia4Partalent of Defona4
Weetanzton 25p D. C.
relate a:
ER 61-1864/a
14,-. the ebeenoil ,-0:' AI.. LAillea who is out or tllot
city on et brief trip, I 'mead Itite to aelmoti,..edee Ares I
thank you e'er, Aeth Zor -arir mizeoreekhee i4S: 4 Noy- *ad
tor the manned etzer# that John Varncr, I-exec; on
atation or Special Rateiations.'
Appreciate ykur tfulnest La azi:Lo.;-_th
tO us aado Alen Kr. _t_kia tea return his
asreieet I will "orIng It to hie attention.
25X1 0/
:bak(11 May 61)
Distribution:
Orig.841 - Addressee
1 - JBE
'
Mr. Warner ?cA4
AAB wibasio for hold file
- ER
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
8 May 19 61
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: John Warner's Study on "Organization for
Special Situations"
John Warner, Lt. Col., USAFR, recently com-
pleted his two-weeks active duty with my office. It
was a pleasure to have him on the staff, and his con-
duct and performance impressed those with whom he
dealt on the Secretary's staff most favorably.
I have inclosed as of possible interest to you the
interesting paper on "Organization for Special Situations"
which Lt. Col. Warner prepared during his tour of duty.
Inclo sure
EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, USAF
Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
PROM AUTOiki-ATT---IC
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PROBLEM: To consider certain organisational alpects within DOD
relating to the handling of special situations suCh es
Cuba and Laos.
A. We
ve seen that, while absolutely essential as it:maybe to
prepare to night a nuclear war or even a conventional limited ver (with
contending claime for the budget doller), we may still lose the ultimate
victory simply for failure successfully to wee* ".peace" in the COmmunist
version. Perhaps there is no batter we to express this problem than to
use the vords of President Kennedy of April 20, 1961.
'Too lunge' have fixed our eyes on traditional
military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders or
missiles poised, for flight. low it Should be clear
that this is no lowlier enough -- that our aecuritY way
be lost piece by piece, country by sountry, without the
firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single
border.
We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend
to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our
tactics and our institutions here in this community. We
intend to intensify our effbrts for a struggle in many
ways more difficult than var."
Too semyeeople are saying that if the Welted States with all
reeources, and power cannot defeat, or prevent the estebliah-
Cbmmunist regime on our doorstep ninety miles away, then there
for the feture. But we must marital' our assets realigning
them necessary to meet thin threat which is sot new but 4hich is being
put to use in a new background of erupting netioneliem and the etruggles
of underdeveloped nations to feshion a stable destiny. The tools used are
the typical Communist weapons welded into an overall program of propaganda,
sUbversion, diplomatic action threat of military fbree, guerrilla activi-
ties, political action, aconoile aid and the rest. It must be recognized
that the problem we floe does not comipartment itself into neat segments
representative of the jurisdiction of those U. B. departments and agencies
having responsibilities to counter the threat.
1. All will agree that there must be a telly integrated effort
or all aSaaciaa or the O. R. Government, utilising to the fullest
the capabilities of each, developing new ems* for some of these
existing capabilities or creating new tools, if necessary.
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2. In the blending of the efforts of the interested agencies,
narrow jurisdictional lines of responsibility tend to be blurred.
What is strictly military as opposed to the political aspects? How
can one disassociate the propagenda impact or military moves or
political actions? Allocations or jurisdiction based solely on the
distinction between overt and covert will deserve marticular
attention. Proper applications of overt assets can be covert, or
possibly more ea-curate "plausibly deniable or "non-attributable".
C. Past efforts to arrive at an organisational molution on the
national level attempted various approaches utilizing the NBC and its
leaning Board, The 5412 Group vas established to give policy approval
to covert activities of C/A in support of the cold ver, specifically in
countering covertlyCWmmunist activities on a world-wide baste. The
derenct OCH was another effort at effective iatereageney coordination.
At the working levels in the various agencies there were extensive efforts
at coordination and mutual support. None of this answered the question
of "Who below the President himself is in command and Who is responsible?
This question becomes tremendously important in times of crisis with the
accompanying acceleration of actions and decisions. The emphasis was on
a mechanism for achieving full participation in arriving at a joint policy
but left unansvered the problem or a mechanise ter joint implementation.
D. Available within the Department of Defame there is no leek of
knowledge or the nature or the enemy. throughout the country, in the
interested agencies of the Executive :eeineh and within the Department of
Defense, there is what appears to be a eroun4swell of recognition of the
seriousness of that part of the Communist threat which utilizes subversion
infiltration propaganda, guerrilla verfare, and other means Short of
orgenized warfare. 'Accompanying this is the further apparent recognition
that the UL S. mat do more to counter this type or threat, utilizing
similar weapons or other tools designed to cope with the specific tasks
at hand. In fact these techniques are well understood by some in the
Department of Defense and have been for a long time. We see new studies
such 414 the Ad Hoc Otudy Croup Deport entitled, "Counter-Guerrillal.
Warfare" approved in August 1960, and the more recent one by the Policy
Planning Council of State entitled, "Ceunter-Gberrilbe Operations." The
essential points of these and many others were rely explored in WSW 17
entitled, *limited War" prepared in 1956 and WM 29, both of which dealt
with guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency operations. There have
been many "live" examples of the Oameunist potential fbr egging "ear"
without employieendlitary forces in the conventional sense. We have
also had abundant experience in countering this type of threat. We have
only to list the failures and successes in this regard to establish that
we ehould know the yea:bleu and the ways of oountering it - Malaya,
Philippines, Indo.China? Chi:mini:Weald, Laos and Viet Elm. While some
in =hove recognized the emblem and have known it thoroughly, there
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has been an inability within DOD to translate this knowledge into action
in order to derive appropriate organisations 'with policies to meet this
threat successfelly. While organisation will not of itself provide the
answer to all problems, the existing structure, primarily organised a
plan fOr and wage a war, if necessary, has not brought to bear the fell
weight of its potential in conducting too "peace".
III. DISCUSSION:
A. Our inability to throw back Communist indirect aggression calls
fr ocissitting a greater portion of U. S. capabilities to the fray.
Particularly in the action fields, such as guerrilla training and direct
support of qussi-ailitary activities, the DOD inevitably will be called
on to do more simply because of its greater potential. In this and
elated fields, other agencies of the government are strained to the
limits of their cepebilities. Some redirection of effert? of course, is
always possible, but in Sheer size DOD remains the giant; e.g., in termo
of people alone the ratio between DOD and CIA is in an order of atignitude
of 200-1.
1. Greater use of DOD will call ter continued recognition that
such activities are truly special and their Objectives different in
concept than in aver. At times the methods and procedures will be
unorthodox and not in military nanuals. There will be a fell inter-
twining of political and mdit tary considerations. In soar eituations
there will be requirements for total security of a nature not
generalla, appreciated. On the other hand these concepts are not
unknown within DOD and no other agency has a monopoly on security,
ingenuity, and elendestine know-how.
2. Pertinent to DOD in this respect is the current review of
pare-military activities' of the U. S. Govermment. In that review
it in almost a certainty that an examination will be made of
whether CIA is or ever will be equipped to conduct an operation of
emdlitary character against an entrenched Communist regime equipped
with a plentiful supply of armaments. It is a reasonable estimate
that the hater* will disclose a larger role fez' DOD whether it be
one of closer support of a specific CIA operation or a new role of
having command responsibility fer ouch an operation.
D. The recently approved Critical Areas Board and the Teak /twee
concept is a new approach in attempting to mmrthall the assets of the
agencies concerned. Selection of the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the
Task Force Commander for Viet Sea answers many of the critwriashieh
Should be fa:Unwed in any selection of a DOD representative to be a Task
Three Commander* Such a person should be or sufficient rank and stature
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to enjoy the respect of participating agencies and to command the Aill
cooperation of DOD componeats. Organisatioually, such person should be
easily accessible to the Secretary of Defense since the objective* of
the Task Pores mill have political implications of sufficient importance
to be of daily concern to the Secretary of Defense ani the President.
While depending fully on the three military services, the JCS, and
ISA, a =Task 'Force Oammander should not organisationally be appended
to any of these, but Would be tied directly to the Secretary of Defense
or his alter ego, the Deputy Secretary or Whose.
C. The designation of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for certain special activities tithe Operations Officer for the Viet Nam
Task ftree lama* than an acknosloigmeet of that individual's personal
experience and intimate association with the area. Any representative
of DOD designated to a Task Weree should be cloeely associated with the
function of that Assistant to the Secretary of Defense mho vas placed in
the Secretary's office in recognition of the unique nature of the activi-
ties tor vhich he is reeponsible. These require not only the closest
security but also expeditious handling with a flexible approach. Another
important Vector is the special nature and sensitivity of certain of the
activities which requires a focal point within DOD for its relationship
mith =end its covert operations and clandestiee activities, The
Assistant to the Secretary and his staff have acquired an intimate know-
ledge of special operations in DOD including the activities in support of
CIA covert operations 'which would be essential to have available to a DOD
representative on a Task Force. If letere designations or DOD represen-
tatives to serve on Critical Area Task Perces, whether es member or
Commander, are tied orgsnimationally to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
he by direction then eould be associated with the Assistant to the
Secretary to use to the fullest the accumulated experience in substantive
know-how In the special operations field and in ObtnAning secure expedi-
tious staffing and coordination throughout DOD.
D. /he concept of a Critical Area bard meeting at th. call of any
member to consider recommending to the President a determination that
there is a Crisis Area imposes a new responsibility. What shall be the
criteria for recognizing that an area is in a crisis situation or
epproaching it? Does a country have to be in a clear and present danger
of slipping into Communist hands or will some lesser degree be the bench
mark? Will it be enough that there appears to be an opportunity for a
strong team effort to solidify what had beenameak but not yet dangerous
situation? Presumably, criteria and indicators will. have to be developed
which milli* utilized by those concerned. Within DOD lobar* shall the
responsibility rest for this? Where in DOD shall the responsibility rest
for continuous monitoring of the morld situation and making recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense to call fer a meeting of the Critical Area
Board? Certainly, intelligence is a basic ingredient and one could con-
aider assigning such responsibility to the proposed Joint alitary
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Intelligence Agency. On the other hand the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense is intimately aware of existing special operations and support of
CIA covert operations. These probably will be involved in those situations
which would be likely candidates for consideration as a Critical Area.
This special knowledge affords an epportunity for appraisal of events and
potential for action which is more to the point of a determination of
riticality within the Critical Area :Board concept than would an intelli-
gence estimate. Through day-to-day relationships with CIA and State, the
Aseistant to the Secretmry of Defense is in an excellent position to
fOrmulate recommendations, utilizing all components of DOD. This reepot-
sibility could be carried out with infringement upon or adjustment of
existing responsibilities of other DOD components. It is but one step
further to require the Assistant to the Secretary to develoo? in coordi-
nation with other DOD elements, the indicators and criteria for considering
an area critical for submission of Buda criteria to the Critical Area
Board for their approval.
E. The Teak 'tame concept, except for the fact that it has a
Commander, might be compared to an expanded Special Group (5412) particu-
larly if designation of mselbership is retained at the level of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, the Director of
Central Intelligences etc. Whereas the Special Group gives policy
guidance and approval to covert actions of CIA, the Tisk 'brae will give
direction to efforts of all agencies within the plannold Objectives
cUbmittmilw the Tisk 'Oros to the President for his approval. Under the
Special Group, there was no joint xethanism to ieplememt or execute policy
approvals. There is considerable evidence that Where the Lotion or tank
required. CIA to utilise something more than token DOD support, there
became apparent a definite need for closer collaboration in the fore of
some type of joint CIA-DODsmilenism to *mast in execution. This is
particularly directed at the problem of What has been described as Covert
Denied limited Wirt i.e., the application by the U. S. of force or the
direct support of force by fereign nationals in such fiehion that it was
non -attributable to the U. S. The current Tisk Ibree concept, where it
will have such Objectives or use such methods, does not provide flier or
recognize the need ter such a mechanism.
1. Fighting a Covert Denied Malted War (Which could be called
s -linftedwar) does not precisely fit the mold of either the
professional soldier or the professional spy. There are same
individuals in both DOD and CIA who could be considered knowledgeable.
To prepare for this type of joint operation will require considerable
preparation which 'Should not be left until the crisis im here. Utili-
zation for military purposes of CIA covert mechanisms including
proprietary orgmnixatioas requires some understanding of the techni-
ques. Sheepdipped military personnel ehould have security guidelines
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for their conduct and personal affairs. On the other hand, since it
is a Nose albeit of different nature, CIA personnel Would be
afforded the qpportunity of exercising in this field with professionals,
both in the active sense of command and tactics, but also in the
military logistica approach. A joint mmehanism established now,
preferably within CIA but under commend of* mutually selected military
officer, could prepare doctrine, conduct training, perform research,
and, provide a cadre for a crisis operation. The weep should be smell
with appropriate representation from State and USIA, with principal
staffing frau DOD and CIA let this grow work together learning each
other's language, getting exposed to the administrative and coordination
processes of their respective agencies. The participants would main
on behalf of their respective agencies a better perspective of the
capabilities and limitations of the other departments. The sum of
this group could well exceed the total of its various parts.
2. ler the operation of a Teak Three for a critical area the
nature of the objectives should be examined with the methods of
accoeplishing them to determine the degree of close coordination
required. If it appears to approach the nature of a joint operation,
and probably most weld, cereal consideration should be given to a
joint staff mechanism to assist the Teak Plorce Commander in directing
execution of the assigned tasks. Such a smehaniam, for the period of
=Jail', could perform a valuable role in the relationship between the
officer in charge in the field area and the Teak Perms Commander,
particularly if these two were representatives of different agencies.
The military servicee are experienced at joint operations and early
learned the advantages of a joint staff as opposed to the weaknesses
of coordination.
3. In view of the sheer size and couplexity of the DOD structures
the DOD representative mey find it desirable to esteblish an intra-DOD
task force to assist his with his responsibilities, Probably there
would be included representatives of the JCS, ISA, the military
services, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for certain
specialized activities. It is to be assumed however that the DOD
Task 'brae representative, even if he is the Commander, will utilise
existing elements of DOD to the fullest for staff support thus avoiding
the necessity of establishing any new DOD organizational unit which
might tend to over-lap functions of Present coWeents. However,
depending on the ciremastances, a Dap Tisk /twee Commander may well
consider it desirable to establish some type of Command Peet or 24-hour
watch operation, particularly if armed violence and fast moving actions
are involved.
P. Intensified efforts should be made within all appropriate components
of DOD to review, study, and adjust the existing capabilities of all types
to the end of focusing more strength on the threat of Communist indirect
aggression. The military services, the JCS, ISA and possibly others should
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be directed to study thorougbly this question nuking uau results known IA)
the Secretary of Defense. Adjustments of missions of specific comments
or units and increases in foods to support promising new avenues of
explorstion Should receive special attention for recommendation to the
Secretary of Defense. There may be new uses for existing assets or it
may be necessary to modify or create new units 'within DOD. As an example,
the concept that the mission of Special Perces was to provide sopport to
the regular forces in the event of hot war has seriouslyhamered a
broadened scope for full current utilisation of the Special Forces in
training of indigenous forces or in actual operations. While the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for certain special activities has a current
role in these matters, he Should re-doUble his effort at stimulation,
prodding, and assistance in these fields. The approved staff support
element of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to be within JCS has
promise in this regari by utilising the staff strength within JCS for
researeh and study, particularly on questions such as the policy aspects
of DOD special operations.
G. The importance of the present re*pan5ibilttieS of the Assistent
to e Secretary of Defense for certain special activities cannot be over-
emphasized. World events and the Critical Area Teak 'brae concept Sive
added significance to the importance of the function. The inevitable
increased role of the DOD in special operations points op the growth of
this responsibility for the future. Add to this the current designation
of the Assistant to the Secretary as Operations =leer for the Viet Nem
Task Force and then consider the possibility of one or two more Critical
Area Task Forces and one is forced to look at the question of saturation
of the office and. Whether there is sufficient depth. With only a total
of five professionals and having in mind certain contemplated Changes, a
conclusion is reached quickly. Granted the desirability of asmall veil
-
knit group, and particularly so lobar, the subject matter is always
"opecinr? there Should be more depth but certainly with qual4tymaintained.
POssibly, for a crisis situation, additional people could be detailed but
nevertheless there Should be a modest augmentation of the staff on
permanent basis so that full femdlerity can be pined of the special
nature of the prObleme and the different staffing techniques utilised.
Three to five additional senior pcofessiooals would permit more flexibility
for possible field tripe snd would provide required depth in event of
illness of key individumls.
H. As now caotempIated, a Critical Area Tae rce will prepare a
plan, including Objectives and funding, for Ilippr0,41 by the President.
The source of funds is not clear and it is assumed this will very with
the case. In the oast, and web-ably the future, the question of funds
has been an Obetacle in moving forward special operations. Policy approval
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has often been obtained, fbr example, fbr CIA to go forward with substantial
support from DOD, but often neglected is the qeestion of who pays and from
*what source are fUnds available. Thus, vale policy approvals have been
granted the implementation has been hampered. A portion of this preblmm
is undodbtodlyaquestion of administrative procedure* and leek of knowledge
on the part of some individuals. In other ?saes, it is alswaysiquestion
ot there being no funds available. Sines in many situations it is
impossible to foresee the events vhieh vill require the expeoditure, there
eill have been no opportunity to include fUnds for the situation in the
normal budget process. True, there Is alms same sleek, but eventually
there are emergeney actions fbr Which there are no funds. A request for
sepplemental Appropriatioe by the Congress is the normal answer, but there
will remain same situational *here neither time nor securityperedt this
approach. It is also tree that at times, Emergency Fends available to the
President have been utilised. Consideration should be given to requesting
the Congress to appropriate fends on a no-year basis to DOD as a Reserve
for Brergenclea to be expended in the field of Special Operations and
counter-measures to Communist indirect aggression. These fends Should,
of course, be handled most carefully and be limited to new and unforeseen
situations. Possibly, there should be a requirement that the Bureau of
the Budget approve any transfers from the Reserve to give some assurance
that the proposed purpose meets the criteria. The Reserve could be mode
available to the Secretary of Defense or it might be made available to the
President with or without deletion to the Secretary of Defense. There
is same precedent for a Reserve of this type and if the subject is oarefelly
and canlidlysomilained to the Congress, it is firmly believed. they would
approve.
Iv. RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Rot only does it appear inevitable that DC83will playalarser
role in eounterieg indirect aggreesion, but it is strongly recommended
that it should aggressively search fbr vows in 'which it nen participate
more telly. Within the government DOD has, in part by virtue of sheer
eise and. adeptabiliky of assets, the largest potential to bring greater
weight to bear on the problem.
B. It is recommended theteey DOD representative on a Critical Areas
Teak
Force be Appended organissGionally to the Secretary of Defense or
his Deputy. Additionally, he should be of swop/late rank, stature, and
qualification to meet the problem at hand with reedy access to, and
enjoying the confidence of the Secretary of Defense.
C. DOD representatives on Critical Areas Task Threes should have
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for certain 'venial activities
closely associated during the period of the Task 'brae and should utilise
to the fullest the Assist-antis substantive know4uov in the Special Opera-
tions field aud his administrative techniques for detainteg secure
expeditious staffing and coordination within DOL.
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D? Utilizing all available information, he Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for certain special activities should develop criteria
vhiCh would warrant Presidential determiaation of a Crisis Area and should
be responsible for continuous monitoring of the vorld situatior in order
to make recommendations to the Secretary aqto vhen considereen should
be given by the Critical Areas Board to a landing that a certain area was
"critical".
E. There should be establiehekwyl joint mechanisms staffed by
DOD and CIA with representation frozer--3iMUd USIA, to conduct training,
perform research, and provide a cadre for a Crisis operation involving
the application of military force, by the U. S., either direetly or
indirectly, but on a non-attributable basis.
F. Careful consideration should be given to establishing a joint
staff mechanism to essist in execution of the tasks assigned to any Critical
Areas Task Fierce.
.G. Any DOD representative designated on a Critical Areas Task Force
should utilize to the fullest existing DOD organizational units for
assistance and staff aupport, but should consider the desirability of an
intra-DOD task force to aid -aim in view of the scope and complexity of
the DOD structure.
H. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Per certain special
activities Should intensify his efforts in stimulating, prodding,
monitoring, and assisting other elements of DOD in the field of special
operations, and finding better or new vays to utilize existing capabilities
to counter Communist indirect aggression.
I. Granting the desirability of a small, well-knit, highly qualified
staff for special type activities, the staff of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for certain special activities should be modestly
augmented by three to five professionals at a senior level to provide more
flexibility to cope with increasing responsibilitiee.
J. The Congress should be requested on a carefUl and candid basis
to make evailable to the Secretary of Defense funds on a no-year basis
for a Reserve for Emergencies to be expended for unforeseen situations
involving the Special Operations field or other counter-measures to
Communist indirect aggression.
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15 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Brief of John Warner's Study on "Organization for Special
Situations" (prepared while on 2-weeks' active duty in
Ed Lansdale's office)
1. In John Warner's study on "Organization for Special Situations" he
considers the problem of having certain organizational aspects within the
Department of Defense participate more fully in the handling of special
situations such as Cuba and Laos. In a discussion of this problem, he points
out that throughout the country, in the interested agencies of the Executive
Branch and within the Department of Defense, there is what appears to be a
groundswell of recognition of the seriousness of that part of the Communist
threat which utilizes subversion, infiltration, propaganda, guerrilla warfare,
and other means short of organized warfare. He also gives some discussion to
the recently approved Critical Areas Board and the Task Force concept.
2. John recommends that (A) DOD aggressively search for ways in which
it can play a larger role as it has the largest potential to bring greater
weight to bear on the problem; (B) Any DOD representative on a Critical
Areas Task Force be appended organizationally to the Secretary of Defense or
his Deputy; (C) DOD representatives on Critical Areas Task Forces should
have the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for certain special activities
closely associated during the period of the Task Force and should utilize to
the fullest the Assistant's substantive know-how in the Special Operations
field and his administrative techniques for obtaining secure expeditious staffing
and coordination within DOD; (D) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
certain special activities should develop criteria which would warrant Presidential
determination of a Crisis Area and should be responsible for continuous moni-
toring of the world situation; (E) There should be established now a joint
mechanism, staffed by DOD and CIA with representation from State and USIA, to
conduct training, perform research, and provide a cadre for a Crisis operation;
(F) Careful consideration should be given to establishing a joint staff mechanism
to assist in execution of the tasks assigned to any Critical Areas Task Force;
(G) Any DOD representative designated on a Critical Areas Task Force should
utilize to the fullest existing DOD organizational units for assistance and
staff support; (H) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for certain special
activities should intensify his efforts in stimulating, prodding, monitoring,
and assisting other elements of DOD in the field of special operations; (I) The
staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for certain special activities
should be modestly augmented by three to five professionals at a senior level
to provide more flexibility to cope with increasing responsibilities; (J) The
Congress should be requested on a careful and candid basis to make available to
the Secretary of Defense funds on a no-year basis for a Reserve for Emergencies
to be expended for unforeseen situations involving the Special Operations field
or other counter-measures to Communist indirect aggression.
t t g
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AAB
ApeptofelAFActilftelifelt:200,8/021317a?4A-RDP801301676R0008C
During your absence, we acknowledged receipt
and thanked Ed Lansdale for making John Warner's
study available to US. Copies of Ed's memorandum
and our reply have been sent to John arner for
his information.
Attached for your reading co
brief of John's study.
AAB
15 May 61
(DATE)
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0040043-5
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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