V.P. RICHARD NIXON INTERVIEWED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000900010017-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 15, 1960
• Content Type: TRANS

MNTA -TV (Newark, New Jersey) May 15, 1960
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
V. P. RICHARD NIXON INTERVIEWED
CVen End with David Susskind at 10:00 P.14. over WNTA-TV
(Newark, N. J.):
Guest: Vice President Richrad Nixon
THE SCREEN SHOWED V. P. RICHARD NIXON
AND DAVID SUSSKIND SEATED IN THE STUDIO.
SUSSKIND: "I wondered if we might begin tonight by the issue that's on
everybody's tongue and mind these days, the issue of the 114 plane and aerial_
reconnaissance. There are aspects of that situation that deeply trouble many
people in the country. Your presence gives US the chance to explore the problem
a bit.
"One of the things that comes to my mind about that incident is the con-
notation of the incident, that it had -- that there was, in our government,
a lack of coordinated planning and intelligence in the sense that this situa-
tion persevered at an exquisitely bad time, on the very eve of the summit con-
ference. It would seem to indicate a lack of cohesion and planning within our
government. Would you comment on that, sir?"
NIXON: "W4,111 let me say that the incident is one which, as you say, has
calmed a great concern among many observers of the international scene, and of
our own policy. I think that if we examine first, what was done, and then,
what was said about mtat was done, that we can perhaps break the question into
its proper aspects.
"Now, as far as what was done was concerned, the President of the Unitet
States ordering that a program be set up for conducting aerial reconnaissancf
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
of the Soviet Union, a potential attacker of the United States and of the free
world, I think most people have agreed that the President was justified in
setting up such a program. Justified because we will recall that in 19%, the
President at the Geneva Conference submitted his 'Open Skies' proposal to me.
Khrushchev and Nk*. Bulganin, and that proposal was made for the purpose of pro-
tecting both the Soviet Union, the United States, and all other nations fer that
matter, from surprise attack.
"The Soviet Union has refused since that time to enter into any agreement
whereby such flights as the U...2 made would be reciprocal. The President,
therefore, felt that it was necessary for him, in order to obtain information
k which would alert the United States and the free world against any preparations
for a surprise attack, to institute this program. And so these flights of re-
connaissance planes, to which the President and Secretary of State Herter referred,
thave taken place.
"Now, let's go to the matter of the timing of the flight because you've
raised that question, and I think very properly. People say, first, that they
agree -- those who -- I don't mean that all agree even that we should have
entered into this kind of a program at all, but I think the majority of the
people would recognize the necessity for us to protect ourselves against sur-
prise attack and this was the only way that we could get this kind of information.
"We in the United States, for example, present an altogether different
problem to the Soviet Union. They do not have to engage in this kind of activity
because we are An open society. This is the problem which is posed, of cour3e,
by a closed society."
SUSSHINDI "I think that, probably, sir, very little equivocation about
our having this kind of progarm under these circumstances. It is the other
2
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
aspects -- the timing."
NIXON: "The timing ....- well, let me talk about the timing a moment."
SUSSKIND: "Is it a goof, air?"
NIXON: tiblos it was not a goof. Let ne say this. First of all, put
yourself in the position of the President and of those who have responsibility
for this program. The responsibility is a great one. The responsibility is
to, one, get information and two, to be sure there is no gap in that informa?
tion. We can no more effort, might I say, an intelligence gap, than we can
I afford a deterrent gap."
SUSSKIND: "Could we have afforded a two week gap here?"
NIXON: "Well, that ..."
SUSSEIND: "To make it comfortable for our President to arrive at the
summit under the best possible circumstances?"
NIXON: "Let ne put it this way again. As Aar as this particular incident
was concerned, the flight occurred approximately three weeks before the summit
conference. Now people say, 'Why didn't we have a recess at that period?' And
my answer is this: 'When is the right time to make a flight?' Let's go back
over the last year.
"Although it was not as important as the summit conference, certainly not
nearly as important, some might have said, Well, you shouldn't have a flight
like this at a time that the Vice President is visiting the Soviet Union.* I
AM sure that Jaw mould have said, 'Well, don't risk a flight like this at a
ktime that Mr. Khrushchev is coming to the United States.' 1 am sure ..."
SUSSUND: "Do you agree with that?"
NIXON: "No, I would not. I am sure that many others -- if I can eortinmr
IIII1 tell you why. I am sure that many others would say 'We shouldn't have
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
flights like this at a time that the President is visiting the uncommitted
countries of Southeast Asia,' and others would say 'We shouldn't have flights
I like this at a time when the President is visiting the countries of South
'America,' and I am sure that people would say 'We shouldn't have flights like
this and run any risk at a time that the President is visiting the Soviet
Union.
"The point I am trying to make is this: there is never a right time to
a"..t..ireowiNKIBMINOVETWO,44.400,90..**_.- ?t,.. ,
t make one of these flights if you're going_t2,geLqiugh$,.
"Now, there is never a right time, in other words, that you can select
because we have to have a continuing program -- a continuing program, having
in 4nd that - the problem with which we are confronted. And so while I
think a case can be made by the critics to the effect that these flights should
have been discontinued, say one month before, the question is one month, two.
months, three, where do you draw the line?"
SUSSKIND: "'Where overwhelming logic and diplomatic necessity would seem
to indicate that a cessation might be in order for a limited period of time.
"I wonder about a second aspect of the flight, Mr. Nixon, and that has to)
do with the early response of oir government that would seem to indicate that
the decision on these flights, and particularly this flight, may have leen a
Pentagon decision, an Air Force decision or CIA decision, of which the President
was not wares and on which he was not fully posted.
"There were some early indications that the President was not cognisant
tof this particular flight, that later was backtracked on. Is the President,
in your opinion knowledge -- fully conversant with this kind of inteilig enota
. operation and has he been over a sustained period of time?"
NIXON: "The answer is 'yes' to both questions."
"
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
SUSSKIND: "And I ask another thing, too. The early response of our
government, where first we -- well, I suppose the only word is 'lied' -- and
then we backtracked on the lie. Isn't this a damaging thing? I mean damaging
to basic credibility of the American image around the world, to our allies
and to the uncommitted countries?"
NIXON: "Tou know, strangely enough, I noted a columnist for the New Tort
Times indicating the other day -- or at least suggesting -- that we made a
basic mistake in admitteng that we were involved in this kind of activity at all."
SUSSK1ND: "That was Walter Lippman, I think."
NIXON: "And --I think he's in the Herald Tribune. But be that as it
may, it may have been Walter Lippman that I am referring to, but the point that
am making is this, that -- and this is a very key problem that you have raised
it's the problem of what you do in an open society where you are engaged in
activities like this, and you've got to do one of two things. One, you either
Ark4 4
ought to to be silent or you ought to tell the truth. Now, let's look at the
problem wish which our people in the Abate Department were confronted lidun
this information developed.
"They did not know that the pilot had been recovered and that they had
obtained information from him or otherwise which made it imperative that we
acknowledge that these flights had taken place. Now, some would say, 'Why,
then, didn't we keep our mouths shut and say nothing and wait until we found
out what they knew?,
"And here again we had the problem of the open society. We have newsmen
in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other
officials in great nuMbers, as they had a right to, and they asked for the
information. 'What about this?' and so under those circumstances it was felt
- 5 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
that the best thing to do was to engage, in effect, in what is usually engaged
in where so-called espionage activities are undertaken .,,- evasive action.
Evasive action so as to protect the pilot in the event that be had been cap-
tured and also evasive action so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushohev,
for example, an opportunity to accept the consequences of this flight without
admitting, as he has had to admit, that it had been conducted for espionage
purposes."
SUSSKIND: "I wonder, le. Nixon, though, if two fundamental questions dor it
underly the thing we're discussing right now. The first one is whether we car
any longer, as a country that is the leader of the free world, whether we can
any longer afford to equate the democratic process and the democratic way of
life with confusion and stupidity?
Some very reputable newspapermen of various political persuasions ...- &vice
Reston, Walter Lippman, The New York Times editorial section, have commented 'Oat
this was a stupid piece of policy and a stupid piece of timing.
"Our answer to that, invariably, as a people and as a government, is that
because it a free society with the newspapermen descending upon you and so
forth, that we are excusable on these counts because we are a democracy.
"Oen we, in terms of the responsibility that site on us so heavily and so
inescapably, any longer afford to 'goof' in this way?"
INIXON: "Let me say this, that I do not agree with the critics who say wo
should have remained silent and that we should not have told the trutig once it
became inevitable that the Soviet "Union -- W.. Kbrushohev -- knew what the trith
was."
SUSSKIND: "Nay I ask two 'motions on that, sir?"
NIXON: "Yes, surely."
6 10
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
SUBSKIND: "Should we have lied, because that's what we did in the first
instance?"
NIXON: "1 think a grave question can be raised as to the advisability e!.
the statements that were first made. On the other hand, may I Just say in defense of
those who have made those statements, Hr. Susskind, that I sat not one to
criticize them because I know the tremendous pressures under which they were
operating. They had to make a snap decision at the moment, and it proved that
-- it turned out that that decision was wrong. And in these kinds of activities
we, of course, want to try to avoid mistakes if we can.
Mistory may record that this was a mistake. In my own opinion, Ipeaking
now of a policy generally, I would agree with you that we must maintain a
44' ,V.54
posture of telling the truth when we do speak or of keeping silent."
--,
SUSSKIND: "Well, why did we not, sir, tel]. back on that legendary and mach
revered tradition among nations of suggesting in a sttuation like this, of
extreme national awkwardness, the response of, quote, 'we are investigating the
situation,' which response is repeated periodically and finally nothing is ever.
said? This is the tradition of England and the tradition of France and all the
great powers of yesteryear. Why did we find that not appealing for our purposes?"
NIXON: "Because we weren't dealing with the problems of yesteryear. We
sere dealing with the problems presented by Mr. Ihrushchev and the Soviet Union,
B4*, 4fF n
and he couldn't possibly let vs get away with it. Be had here, the pilot; he
44,50#41-"44444,2%.""t ''s/
had the wreckage of the plane; he knew what was going on. And under the eirerm-
_
-,41t 44110,960***Owlas,4444,41.01-1,..,,,,F,
stances, had we sat back and said we were investigating, Mr. I:brush/shay. welle
have made us the laughing stock of the world. I think under -- in the days cl
we 4 4
diplomacy of the past when/were dealing with France and with England and vitt
traditional diplomacy of the 19th century, this might have worked. I don't
think it'll work, today."
Approved For Release 2002/08/21.; fla-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
=MIND: "We probably haven't emerged in this situation as the laughing
stock of the world, but perhaps as the crying stock in the world. And I think
that a lot of us are very troubled about not only this incident, but what it
presages for other such situations in the future. The confusion of it, the
lack of response to it, the fumbling and the -- I use the word lie. Toss question
the wisdom, but whatever it be, we were depply wanting, it seems to me.
"You would agree to that in our response, at least, in the intelligence
and planning of our response."
NIKON: "I again say that I will decline to criticize those in the State
Department who had to make this decision at the moment. In retrospect I think
all of us being Monday morning quarterbacks might have found different ways ta
handle it better. But having had to make tough decisions myself, as I'M sure
you have at times, I realize that it's easy when you are faced with difficult
Choices, to make the choice that a majority of people may criticize."
SUSSKINDs "You know, sir I'm no sports fan. I have as little appetite
for the Monday morning quarterback as you do, but I am desperately anxious to
acquire excellent Sunday afternoon coaches. (Laughter). And I think that's
what we need. I wonder who of you would comment about the astounding statement
of Secretary Herter, lectured and endorsed by President Eisenhower, that it wi4
hence forth be our avowed policy to fly over Soviet ritory and ustn the
_
:-
territory of our allies as bases from which to launch and land such flights.
Isn't this a stunning and dangerous development?"
NIXON* "Well, I think, perhaps, that we ought to qualify your assumpticr
a bit. I don't think the Secretary said exactly that. I think you have implied
that what the Secretary said was that we would launch these flights in the future
from the bases of our allies. What he said was that we must continue to gei..
information of this type, as I recall. Now, let ne just say this ...''
\t,
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
-8-
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
SUSSKIND: "He also said -- forgive ne, sir -- he also said, Pa positive
because I read it three tines that he -- it would continue to be our policy te
conduct such aerial reconnaissance flights."
MON: now, without raising a question about it, because I will
assume your recollection of the fact was correct, and it very well may he,
"Let me say that I think that the position Secretary Herter was describing
is one that puts the spotlight, as it should be, on the cause for these flights
in the first place, and that is the fact that the world has no protection from
surprise attack today. And that is whfy at the conference in Paris which is
beginning tomorrow, it is vitally important that the leaders of the summit put
surprise attack at the top of the summit agenda. Put surprise attack there so
we can get this protection and so that flights such as Hr. Herter has described
and such as have been undertaken in the peat, will not be necessary in the
future.
"And may I say this, when you say should we continue to engage in activities
that will protect the security of the United States and the answer is, we have
to. But my answer also is that this is not going to be by our choice. Hi
answer also is that President Eisenhower will, supported by Secretary Herter, make
, every possible effort to get the surprise attack talks off of the dead center
in which they have been for the last five years.
"And I might just add one other thing. WS, all of us, talk about the U..2.
There's a very exciting plus out of it, I think, purely apart of the information
that we obtained which was important, very important. The plus is this: You
realize that this flight clearly demonstrated the feasibility of the open skies
proposal of the President. This demonstrates that unarmed planes can take
, ..goitwoh-./66%,
photographs without without causing any damage, any harm at all,to conmercial,aviation
or the national security of the country over which the flights are nada. And
*----''''APPrOVed For Release 2002/08/21 ? CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
79
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
so, it seems to me, that we should take these !lights as an example of what
can be done in the future.
"For example, this same type of plane, the plane that has so successful',
flown over the Soviet Union, can be used to fly over the United States, over
-------------------
the whole world. And once we have an agreement of that type between nations.
then the problem with which you are concerned of the United States urilateral4
having to take these steps, protect iteelf$ they no longer exist."
SUSSKINM: "Pthhaps there could be very little quarrel that for the
intelligence purposes needed in this era of secrecy, such flights are hecessarT?
but I wonder ,about the potenbially explosive and critically dangerous implic
tions of the stated avoised policy that such aerial reconnaissance flights will
continue.
"For example, no one need tell you, Mr. Nixon, about Mr. Kkrushchev. You
have met him, you have talked with him, you have debated with him. We have
issued him a frontal challenge before the world that we will continue such
flights. /our own comments about Mr. Drushchev as a political personality,
and as a man, seem to suggest that he cannnot afford to take that lying down
or passively, that he will rip up a crescendo of anti-American resentment and
feeling because we have stated, in the forma of the world, that we will con-
tinue to send our planes over his territory violating his sovereignty. Have
we not prodded him with pinpricks that could only bring forth a gusher of
anger, revenge and retaliation?"
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
- 10I.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
NIXON: "There's a very simple reaction that Mr. Kbruschev cars have under
these circumstances and that is to break down this wall of secrecy which made
this flight necessary in the first place. We constantly tend to beret*
ourselves for doing what is necessary to protect ourselves. We overlooked
the fact that Mr. Khrushchev does not have to violate our air space because
44grU
of his diplomats violate our ground space al u know day after day, year
Al...4141,.. 0+-139,16,. mtir 4'4 14
after year.
"Now, under the circumstances, it seems to me, that again we have got
to keep the spotlight on what is really the solution to this problem. Let's
look at it the other way. Let's suppose that as a result of what has
happened here, that we say, since this flight was discovered, the United
States will now announce to Mr. Khrushchev, well, since this plane has teer
knocked down we're going to discontinue activities of this sort. Look at
the position this puts the United States in.*
SUSSKIND: *Do we have to announce anything, we send our apologies...*
NIXON: *Well then you're suggesting we discontinue the flights are
not announce it.*
SUSSKIND: "Yes, sir since you prod me, yes, sir. But I think wher le
hit him full in the face with an avowed stated policy that we will violate
your sovereignty at will, and continuously...*
NIXON: *Maybe we're not so far apart then as I would think. 14y
problem is this. The first responsibility of the President of the United
States, as you and I think, you and I both agree, is to protect the security
of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the devistatior which
would result from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these flights were
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 :RAzIRDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
made in the first place. That is wli3r an indication has been made that
1
1
activities may have to continue in the future. I think the point that vo
raise is the advisability of announcing that those flights be continued in
the future.
"And I can only suggest that that announcement might serve this uselut
purpose of forcing this issue of open and closed society, forcing the issue
of open skies into the forefront at the Summit conference. Because, let me
say this. We can talk at the Summit conference about discontinuing atomic
tests as we should talk about it; we can talk about programs for disarmarent;
we can talk about the problem of Berlin, but the overwhelming major prebiew
confronting the world today, if we want to avoid a war which will destre:T
civilization itself, is the surprise-attach problem.
wAnd if as a result of this announcement, which you consider to be
inept, it tends to bring this subject out for discussion, put in on the
table there, so that President Eisenhower, Mr. Mac Millen, President De
Gaulle, and Mr. Khrushchev can talk about it in its hard realities, I
think a useful purpose could be served. We just can't continue to sweep
under the rug this problem of what do you about sx rise attack. For fir,
444,4
years we've done nothing about it. It's time to do something about it."
4roid.U.."1103.P.0,40,10040,40M144,16,11R ,
SUSSKIND: wWhat about the potential of this atatement blowing the
Summit conference sky-high, creating an atmosphere there in which 5eriois
and peaceful and milling negotiation among the powers VW rent asunder for
the arrogance of our statements,'
NIXON; net me say this, Mr. Susskind. I am as concerned, as I now
you are, about this conference, and as all people who are---who waat peace,
peace with freedom, are concerned about it. We want to succeed.
Approved ForRelease2002/08/21:UA-RDP801301676RD00900010017-16
-12 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
*But let me add, you mentioned, a moment ago, that I had 'bilked to Mr.
Khrushchev. Now I don't pretend to be an expert on him as I'm sure he may
not be an expert on me despite his recent reference to my being the goat ia
the cabbage patch; but on the other hand, I woad say this, that as I ee
Mt. Khrushchev, and as I know him, I don't believe that this incident 13
going in itself to tear the Summit Conference apart. Mr. Khrushchev is a
realist. Mr. Khrushchev is a man who is not a babe in the woods wen it
comes to, shall we say, espionage activity. He is a man who, of cpmrse,
makes the most out of the propaganda opportunity when it's presented to
him. But I think at the Summit Conference that we can and should expect
him to sit down and talk with the president and his two colleagues frenktr
and directly and that the chances for progress have not been substantial-17
diminished by whathas happened. Now that's my own judgment and I know till-A
many competent observers disagree.*
SUSSKIND: *k quick comment, Mr. Nixon from you, sit. What weld be
your posture, whether necessary or unnecessary, if the Russians were con.
ducting aerial reconnaisence over our country, it were discovered and our
government shot the plane down and captured the pilot* And the Soviet Unica
stated that it would continue to send aerial reconnaisance over our count
Wouldn't you take at the very least a dim view of that?"
NIXON: *Tau know, many years ago Mt. Franklin Roosevelt used to havt a
favorite answer to press conferences when he would say, *That's an If-1y
question,' and then he wouldn't answer. Now in this case certainly I say..
may I tell you why I think this is a hypothetical question that really
doesn't deserve an answer. Because this is impossible. We're an open
Approved For Release 2002/08/2.13SIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
society. It isn't necessary for the Soviet Union to fly planes over the
United States to find out what's in the United States, We even furnish them
with the pictures ourselves and the President said in a meeting a few days
'
ago, 'Me furnish them in color as to what's going on here.' Now, my poini
.Asu 4..
then, is is then, that the problem that we're confronted with here is alto-
gether different, from the standpoint of the United States, from the probJem
that confronts the Soviet Union because they do have closed society. I oar
tell you from my own trip to the Soviet Union that obtaining informatior
there is almost impossible unless you're in the air, I would say. And we
know it's very different in the United States. And, so I submit te you,
that while you can put this out as a hypothetical question, you would have
to add, let's suppose that the United States were also a closed society, a.
great totaliarian state, and the planes flew over, and that supposition !Ices
completely beyond the realm of possibility. So that's my answerte your
question."
SUSSKIND: "Mr. Vice President, several more issues pertaining to the
U.T.2 incident come to mind that I think are really important. Have we not by
the statement that we shall continue such reconnaisance over Soviet terri.-
tory?have we not placed our allies, Turkey, Pakistan, Norway?Japan is ncw
deeply worried about it--in a desperately untenable position in the seneet
that they are now faced with the alternative of violating the canors of
international law or disavowing the United States. Isn't that a great
danger to our cause, to our side?"
NIXON: "Well I come back again to my theme that the responsibility
here rests squarely on Mr. Khrushchev. If he will participate in the very
reasonable proposals that have been made by the President and our associates,
Approved ForRelease2002/08/21:UA-RDP801301676RD00900010017-16
'.114'.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
at this conference, for moving against surprise attack, the necessity I'm'
this, or any other kind of activity of this type will have been removed.
"New you have mentioned our allies. They too have a stake in avoid:L:4
surprise attack. It isn't just the United States and they know this. And
I would say that until we get through this conference, when we can take
another look at it, that we should not junp to the conclusion that as to
what our allies may feel about the situation.
SUSSKIND: *They've jumped to the conclusion."
NIXON: "Oh of eaaree..."
SUSSKIND: "...Mr. Nixon..."
NIXON: "...they- have..."
SUSSKIND: "...and they're desperately worried. They under the
muzzle of the Soviet ballistic missiles they?that's a strained phrase,
I guess--they're in danger and they are alarmed and notes have been served
upon their governments that should their bases and their countries be used
they be visited by a retalliation quick, and well, I guess, final.
They want an answer from us. Failing to answer them satisfactorilr, I
think we may alienate them, giving them nocanice, but to disavow us in thit
particular policy area. Is our State Department in your view, treating mdih
that issue now; is the solution impending, an answer?"
NIXON: "The State Department is certainly concerned about this and Ly
discussing the matter with our allies. And, I again, say that they will by
watching this conference, as we will be matching it, to see what pragresa
can be made with the Soviet Union on the problem of surprise attack so whai
we can remove the necessity-for this kind of operation in the future.
SUSSKIND: "If no progress is made on the open skies approach, as
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
progress was not made previously, would we then, in your view, have to
reexamine our policy of continued aerial reconnaissance in view of
satisfying our allies that we have not placed them in incredible danger."
NIXON:. "I mould say that when a conference of this magnitude is being
conducted, that I would not want to go so far as to indicate that, even
by answering a hypothetical question, that I had no hope that progress could
be made. I believe that this matter, this issue is of such importance that i
will be discussed and that we should give the conferences every opportunity
to discuss it before indicating hypothetically what we will or will not do
if it should fail to deal with the issue."
Approved For Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
? 16 ?
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
SUSSKINDt Mgr. Nixon, another question that worries a good many 'aeopla
in this country. For 18 months, in Geneva, the three powers, United States,
Britain and Russia, have been attempting to mike progress oncessation of te
of atomic weapons. And strangely enough in the past few months quite substanilal
progress has been made. The key issue that has impeded us through the 18 sonthe
is the whole area of espionage, the hypersensitivity of the Soviet Union wiSth
respect to their borders being violated, their secrets being ascertained. !WC
we have assured through painstaking efforts of James Wadsworth, over a austa',1-1-d
period, that we are trying to build walls of protection against espionage that
would admit of progress on atomic testing cdssation. Now an intricate system
of permanent control posts and inspection teams has been almost agreed upon.
Did not this indident, does not this new policy of continued aerial reconnaisanbe
threaten the very substantial and critically important progress that has been
achieved at the Geneva Conference.
NIXON: "Again, I think the conference at Paris will tell us a great deal
as tbl,What the answer to that question would be. I would also point out that a4
far as this incident is concerned that Mr. Khrushchev has indicated that he hal
known about these flights for a considerable period of time. If knowing of tawie
flights, over a considerable period of time, he has yet instructed his representatives
at Geneva to reach the agreement or at least the area of agreement towhLch you have
already referred, it would seem to me that that would indicate that the fact st ,t
there was an open acknowledgement of the flight would not have appreciable effect
in destroying the progress that had been made.w
SUSSKIND: "If any setback in Geneva is a consequence of this incident, vet,
would regard that as an unmitigated tradegy w3uldn't you?"
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
- 17 se
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
NIXON: "I would, yes."
SUSSKIND: "Well, let. . ."
NIXON: "May I say that I don't believe that this incident will cause
the setback to the test negotiations. I don't believe so because I think
that those test negotiations stand on their awn merits; they have been going
on separately, as you know, from the surprise attack negotiations. The Soviet
Union has shown a great desire to reach an agreement; we have shown a great
desire to reach an agreement, and there may be other roadblocks to an agree-
ment, but I don't believe that this incident in itself will have destroyed
the polsibility for an agreement."
SUSSKIND: "Mr. Nixon, I thought by way of summarizing our discussion
on this issue, I would like to give you two short quotations and ask you which
one you endorse.
"The New York Times editorial said the following: 'Intelligent activity
is not an end in itself, but an arm of policies serving the national interest.'
It went on to say that this incident at this time, (in its view, the New York
Times) seemed to be a manifestation of protocol stupidity.
"On the other hand, Mr. Eisenhower at his ime recent press conference said:
'The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed nonmilitary plane can only refien
a fetish of secrecy.
"Which of those two statements?. . ."
NIXON: "I agree with the second. I agree with the second. And I can
speak with great feeling on that because I know about this flight and I also
have considerable knowledge of the espionage activities that Mr. Khrushchev
and his representatives have conducted in the United States and all over the
world. We, of course, could have seized upon incidents of those type, tts he
has, to block the road to settlement of international differences. It seems
Approved ForRelease2002/08/21:UA-RDP801301676RD00900010017-16
-18 YR
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
to me, if I may jest quote Et. librushchev, out of context, leer recall when
Mt. Powers, or at least when he alleged that, and I have no reason to doubt
that this is the case, when he alleged that Mt. Powers was still living. BO
said that be was supposed to destroy the plane and be didn't. And then as
recall he said, the reason is that everything alive wants to continue to live.
Now, this is a very, very sage and I believe true statement. But the fact
that everything alive wants to continue to live will be motivating Mk. Khruebchav
as well as the other leaders at the Summit, regardless of what has happened
as the result of this 54 incident, regardless of the criticisms that can be
made. And I recognize that reasonable men can riase great questions about
the advisability of what our first reaction was, the advisability of admitting
anything at all, and some may question the timing. But I would say that as ue
look at this incident it served one useful purpose and that was to bring
forcibly to the attention of the world the great danger that hangs over all
, 4.4 ; ye n
oft us; that is, war coming from surprise attack_or_
ILLIAM10-0?U.151:7=t-i3P-.^1.11:
destroy the wor And Mt. Ihrushchev, I can assure you, is no more interestEd
in having Leningrad and Mbscow and other cities taken out and we aren't having
New york and Washington taker?. out. And these would be the factors that scuae
be motivating him at this, at this conference, as it would be motivating us.
And they will affect his attitude on Berlin; they will affect his attitude or.
tests, they will affect his attitude on the other problems with which he and we
are confronted. Now, I'm not suggesting by this that this means that agreezscrt,
therefore, is inevitable. But I do suggest, that in today's world, incidemr 1
of this type that should, in times past, might have destroyed a conference
altogether. In times past leaders might not have even come to a conference.
That incidents like this can no longer have that effect and will no longer hime
that effect. Because he knows and we know that, as a matter of fact, we all
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
-3.9-
have to learn to live together or we're going to die together."
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900010017-15
* * * * *
SUSSKIND: " A final question and a short one, sir. Witi-you privy,?
to the U-2 serial reconnaisaTejolicy_and did youindof,aeltn_
NIXON: "I was privy to it and I do indorse it."
SUSSKIND: "Thank you."
* * * * *
SUSSKIND: "Mister Vice President, another issue on which a lot of
Americans are troubled today concerns the announcement, just last week,
about the resumption of underground nuclear testing. Again, that seems to
be a product of exquisitely bad planning coming on the heels of the U-2 inci-
dent, not having forewarned even our allies of the announcement because we
obviously caught Great Britain by surprise. And also the notion of resuming
testing just a little ahead of, again the Summit meeting, seems to be indica-
tive of consummate insensitivity to world opinion. Would you comment on that?
On, again, the timing. First let's talk about the timing, then I'd like to
ask you about the resumption itself."
NIXON: "Well let me say first that the -- I think you commented very
effectively, and I disagree of course. First, with regard to the timing,
the timing of this announcement was not designed to counterbalance the reaction
to the U-2. Second, of course, as you know, the tests that are being resumed
are not weapons tests."
(Susskind asks about proximity of resumption of nuclear tests & U-2
Incident)
NIXON: "Getting to your point of timing. You may question the timing,
but the timing was not a result of choosing this particular time because of
what had happened at, with regard to the U-2."
# # # # # #
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R000900010017-6
- 20 4.,