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October 24, 2002
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April 8, 1960
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Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 699 $ April 1960 Honorable Glenard P. Y.ipscom House of Representatives Washington as, D. C. Dear Mr. Lipscomb: During the Director's absence from the city your letter of April 4 was ret'erte4 to me. I know I can speak for r. L `les when I say that he too enjoyed the S.O.S. breakfast on Larch I know he enjoys meeting with such groups and particularly in 4u0 an informal manner. As you know. the smatter of publication of classified inf tier in the public press is of concern to Mr. Deli** and many t then is official circles. I believe the Appropriations Hearings bef re Vi Defense Subcommittee an March 24. 1944. which you enclose4, illustrate one aspect of this problem. This parttcnlar item % t l bw brought to Mr. des' attention upon his return. On behalf of the Director I would like to express his thanks for your continued interest in the Agency. As in the past. it y believe we can be of any assistance at any time please 4 not hesitate to call on as. Sincerely. Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee /l - i)Gi 2 - Leg. C. - Subject i- _Q Chrono. OGC/ LC:JSW :mks (7 April 60) Approved For Release 2002/10% Jahn S. Warn r Legislative Counsel RDRaoB01676ROO0900030049- STAT GLENARD P. LJPSCOftproved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-gc,%IMII-rEvi Qongreo of the Entteb'tateo 3ouge of Repregentatibeg Aoinaton, M. C. April 4, 1960 Honorable Allen Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. APPROPRIATIONS suewMN1TTEK6: DEFEN 36 STATE_ JUSTICE. JI DI MARY It was a real pleasure to listen to your discussion with the S.O.S. at breakfast on Wednesday morning, March 30th:. I always enjoy your very analytical approach to the great problems which confront you. During the discussion the matter of the publica- tion of classified information in the public press was brought up. Perhaps you have already had the opportunity to review the hearings which were held before the Appropri- ations Subcommittee on Defense on March 24, 1960, but in the event you have not, I would like to call to your attention t e testimony on page /1 of the printed copy of these hearings. Again, may I express my thanks for the time that you so generously spend with us at the S.O.S. breakfasts. Sincerely yours, Glenard P. p comb Member of Congress GPL:bl Enclosure Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961 HEARINGS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California ROBERT L. F. SIRES, Florida W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania ALBERT THOMAS, Texas GERALD R. FORD, Ja., Michigan HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska WILLIAM E, MINSHALL, Ohio KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming REAPPRAISAL OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM REVISIONS IN 1960 AND 1961 AIR FORCE PROGRAMS Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961 HEARINGS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS GEORGE! H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania ALBERT THOMAS, Texas GERALD R. FORD, Ja., Michigan HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska WILLIAM E. NINSHALL, Ohio KEITH TIIOMSON, Wyoming 0 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1900 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS CLARENCE CANNON, Missouri, Chairman GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California ALBERT THOMAS, Texas MICIIAET, J. KIRWAN, Ohio W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas JAMIE L. WRITTEN, Mississippi GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama. JOHN J. ROONEY, New York J. VAUGHAN GARY, Virginia JOHN E. FOGARTY, Rhode Island ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida PRINCE H. PRESTON, Georgia OTT O E. PASSMAN, Louisiana LOUIS C. RABAUT, Michigan SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois FRED MARSHALL, Minnesota JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina Jolt L. EVINS, Tennessee JOHN F. SHELLEY, California EDWARD P. BOLAND, Mass~ichuse DON MAGNUSON, Wasiington JOHN '.i'ABER, New York BEN F. JENSEN, Iowa ii:. CARL ANDERSEN, Minnesota WALT HORAN, Washington GORDON C \NFIELD, New Jersey IVOR I). FENTON, Pennsylvania GERALD R. FORD, JR., Michigan IIAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York: FRANK T. BOW, Ohio CHARLES RAPER JONAS, North Carolina MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan GLENARD 1'. LIPSCOMB, California JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona JO1IN it. PILLION, New York PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio KEITH THONISON, Wyoming ROBERT H. MICIIEL, Illinois SILVIO 0. CONTE, Massachusetts WILLIAM 11. NATCHER, Kentucky DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania WINFIELD K. DENTON, Indiana TOM STEED, Oklahoma HUGH Q. ALEXANDER, North Carolina ALFRED E. SANTANGELO, New York 7OSEPII M. MONTOYA, New Mexico GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois KENNETH SPRANELE, Clerk and Stag Director Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961 THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 1960. REAPPRAISAL. OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM REVISIONS IN 1960 AND 1961 AIR FORCE PROGRAMS WITNESSES GEN. THOMAS D. WHITE, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE MAJ. GEN. H. M. ESTES, JR., ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE MAJ. GEN. B. K. HOLLOWAY, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL RE- QUIREMENTS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE MAJ. GEN. R. J. FRIEDMAN, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE HON. LYLE S. GARLOCK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT) MAJ. GEN. H. C. DONNELLY, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE MAJ. GEN. B. J. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE COL. D. L. CROW, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE COL. E. B. RASMESSEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE LT. COL. FRED H. DIETRICH, CHIEF, MISSILE SECTION, WEAPONS BRANCH, AIR DEFENSE DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF OPERA- TIONAL REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE BRIG. GEN. R. H. CURTIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR. REAL PROP- ERTY, DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE MR. L. C. MEYER, CHIEF, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND MISSILE DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER Mr. MAHON. Secretary Garlock, General White, we are pleased to have you and your associates before the committee this morning. We understand that you have very significant statements to make. We understand that there have been some tentative changes in im- portant programs. Whether or not they have been finalized, I do not know. You will, of course, give us that information. We realize that this business of defense is a fast-moving business and that decisions made yesterday may not necessarily be the best decisions today. We have to react to the situations which exist; we have to react to facts as they are and not as we might want them to Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 be. There is much uncertainty in this whole picture, and no one can know with complete assurance just. what should be done in each and every instance. I wish you would proceed in your own way to present your pro- posals. General WIIrrE. Thank you, sir. I. have a prepared statement with which to lead off, if I may. Mr. MAHON. We will not interrupt you. GENERAL STATEMENT OF CHIEF OP STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General WHITE. Mr. Chairman and. members of the committee, first of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the committee for this opportunity to further discuss the Air Force's fiscal year 1961 budget estimates. I am here to request your consideration of a substantial adjustment to the President's fiscal year 1961 budget request. The Department of Defense has approved my presentation of these recommendations today; however, the Department of Defense is not yet prepared to approve our recommended addenda in substance. Mr. Chairman, you will note that I have made a change from the prepared script and have used the word "addenda" in place of the word "revisions." The reason is that these recommendations have been made by the Department of the Air Force and the Department of Defense has approved the deducts but has not approved "addenda" in substance DOT) has only approved the,addenda for presentation. REASONS FOR PRESENTATION PRIOR TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROVAL OF REVISED PROGRAM Mr. MAIIoN. I would think it appropriate to state that there had been. an indication from the Department of Defense through Deputy Secretary Douglas that it would be desirable for us to postpone this hearing a few days in order to perhaps get a more authoritative report from the Bureau of the Budget, but we are concluding our hearings soon. We must get busy with important decisions as to what, we want to do, so we could hardly afford to mark time. Moreover, Mr. Sheppard and some of the other members of the committee are hevily engaged in the bill on military construction. Furthermore, as I understand it, You are going, as our country's representative, to a. meeting in the Middle East, at Teheran. General WHITE. Yes, sir. Mr. MAIION. Under the circumstances, I told Secretary Douglas that it did not seem desirable to try to postpone this meeting until after Secretary Gates returned. from the NATO meeting he is attending, which I understand will be concluded in. early April. I think we all understand the problem to which you make reference. CHANGES IN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM General WHITE. First, I am recommending major changes in the air defense system we had previously programed. These revisions result in an overall program reduction in the fiscal year 1961 budget on the. order of $500 million. Second., I further propose that in order to expedite the improvement of our overall military posture certain critical projects be substituted. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :3CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Specifically, my recommendations are : (a) Reorient the air defense ground environment system by can- celing the SAGE super combat (--enter program. (b) Further limit the BOMARC B program. (c) Adjust our all defense programs to assure earlier completion of the revised system. (d) Expand our intercontinental ballistic missile program. (e) Improve our fighter-interceptor force. (f) Accelerate space and ground systems to provide warning against ballistic missile attack. Attached to your copy of my prepared statement is a summary list- ing of the fall-outs and of the recommended add-ons, as well as the program dollars associated therewith. I will discuss briefly why this revised program is advisable and the advantages we expect to gain for national security. Members of my staff will cover the specific changes in detail in their presentations to follow. Three primary objectives will be attained by the actions we are recommending today. These are : (1) More timely completion of an improved defense against the air breathing threat; (2) acceleration of systems designed to provide ballistic missile warning; and (3) an improved deterrent posture. The revised air defense system will have capabilities substantially greater than those we currently possess. These will be obtained through significant improvements in the capabilities of our Century series interceptors and modernization of our current radar coverage. The units in the. revised BOMARC program will be concentrated to strengthen the area defense of the industrial Northeast. In addition, the completed air defense system will be operational at least 2 years earlier than the system it replaces. We would accelerate our systems to provide ballistic missile warn- ing under this proposal. To improve our overall deterrent posture, we propose an expanded ATLAS program and additional funds for the MINUTEMAN pro- gram. In conclusion, I should like to give this committee my earliest opinion that the proposal I have discussed today represents a signifi- cant step toward improving our existing air defenses and enhancing our future deterrent posture. General Estes will, at your pleasure, continue to give more details of the changes in the system which we propose, to be followed by General Holloway, who will discuss the additions we propose, and finally General Friedman will be prepared to discuss the budgetary aspects of these changes. Mr. MAHON. Proceed, General Estes. GENERAL STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE Maj. Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., was born at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., September 18, 1914. He received his commission after his graduation from the U.S. Mili- Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 4 t:a.ry Academy in 1936. In July 1.939 he began flying training and after graduat- ing from primary and advanced flying schools was rated a pilot and trans- ferred to the Air Corps on March 23, 1940. During the Korean conflict, General Estes was assigned as vice commander of the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command, in which capacity he served from. March 1951 until July 1951. Throughout his career General Estes has been closely associated with strategic and atomic test operations. In October 1952 he was designated commander, Air Task Group 7.4, Joint Task Force 7 for the atomic test known as Operation Castle. In August 1954 he was assigned to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and at that location became assistant deputy commander for weapon sys- tems, Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command. On August 15, 1957, he was reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D .C., as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Defense Systems- with further assignment with the headquarters, in May 1958, as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Opera- tions, which position, he holds at the present time. General Estes has been awarded the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross, American Defense Service Medal, American Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, Occupational Medal for Germany and Japan, Korean Service Medal, National Defense Medal, the United Nations Service Medal, Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster, and Czechoslovakian War Cross. (The prepared statement of General Estes follows:) Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, General White has covered the overall changes that we are recommending In ear fiscal year 1961 budget. As he mentioned, we are proposing very substantial changes in our program for defense against manned aircraft. The purpose of my presentation is to cover these changes in air defense in more detail and to compare the program origi- nally presented to you with that which we are now recommending. In order to refresh your memory, 1 will begin by showing in simplified form the sequence of events that occurs in conducting air defense. As an enemy aircraft, approaches the country, the first function that must occur, of course, is that of detection. This is accomplished primarily by the use of radar and is illustrated by these figures on this first chart (chart No. 1). Having detected an aircraft approaching the country, the nett functional step is to determine whether it is, in fact, an enemy aircraft or a friendly aircraft. This function is called that of identification and is performed by a combination of steps. The final determination is made by the air defense commander with the aid of the electronic computers in the SAGE' direction centers shown here. Assum- ing the incoming aircraft to have been identified as hostile, the next functional step is that of determining the most effective weapon to use and issuing instruc- tions for that weapon to begin. the interception. This function we call control, and it is also performed in the SAGE direction centers. It is, of course, neces- sary to communicate continuously with the interceptors after they are launched in order to insure actual interception. 'this requires communications from ground to air and is our next functional area.. Finally, the actual interception and destruction occurs, using one or more of the weapons available to the air defense system. Therefore, our final function is that of interception. In order to preserve an orderly sequence, our presentation will be made in this same order by the functions of detection, identification, control, communica- tions, and interception. [Beginning first with detection, you will recall that this function is performed by a variety of equipments using radar techniques. Most of these radars are installed on ground sites. This type of radar provides for detection of rela- tively high-flying aircraft and is supplemented by a larger number of smaller radars whose purpose is to detect low-flying objects. These smaller radars are called "gap fillers." In order to extend the range at which we are able to first detect aircraft over the seaward approaches, we also have radars mounted in aircraft. These are called "airborne early warning and control aircraft." I am sure that you can appreciate that these equipments are, in essence, the eyes and ears of our whole defense system and, consequently, must be of the highest possible reliability and performance. For the past few years we have been engaged in a major program to upgrade the radar system. Because of the high importance of achieving very effective and reliable detection, our revision of the air defense program does not materially change our previous radar pro- grain. The next functional area is that of identification. Procurement of ground and airborne equipment for this function. has been completed with prior year Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : FIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 funds. No appreciable change is being made to these installations in our recom- mended program. The next area--that of control-is performed primarily by the SAGE coin- puter system, with which, I am sure, you are all familiar. You will recall that when we applied the SAGE computers to air defense, the United States was divided into a number of operational sectors. In each air defense sector is located a direction center equipped with a large electronic computer. Also located in each division is a combat center where the division commander super- vises the air defense battle over the entire division area. The program sup- ported by our original fiscal year 1961 budget called for completion of the direc- tion centers and three of the combat centers, and in addition, a number of her- dened facilities called supercombat centers, which would have been deployed throughout the United States and southern Canada. As stated by General White, we are recommending today that this program be deleted. With the deletion of the super combat centers, it is obvious that certain rearrangements to the SAGE system are necessary. Cancellation of super combat centers also leaves us without division headquarters facilities for three divisions. However, with some modification of already built facilities, we plan to alleviate this defi- ciency. Since our recommended program is much reduced, it is expected to be completed earlier The next function that I will cover is that of communications. As I stated previously, these are the communications required to direct the weapons to their target and consist of ground radio installations connected to the SAGE control centers. Equipment for these stations has all been placed on procurement with prior year funds. Construction of some of the stations and antennas remains to be funded in the fiscal year 1961 budget. As you would expect, these stations are deployed throughout the air defense system wherever the associated weapons are deployed. Asa result of the changes in types and deployment of weapons that I will cover shortly, it is possible to reduce to some extent the number of com- munication stations required. This completes my discussion of the functions that are performed on the ground in air defense. I will now discuss the all important function of interception. The primary weapons to accomplish the interceptor function are the F-102, the F-101B, the F-106, and BO VIARC. The F-102 is a delta wing, single place, all weather interceptor currently armed with a GAR-1 and GAR-2 FALCON missiles. The F-102 can operate at 50,000 feet at speed up over mach 1. In 1961 this aircraft will be equipped with un- proved armament. Recommended changes are to reduce this program by a small number of squad- rons in fiscal year 1961. These squadrons are to be phased into the Air National Guard in the same time period. Also recomended as add-on's to our current program are certain modifications. Another of our manned interceptors is the F-101B. This is a two place, two engine, all weather interceptor armed with MB-1 nuclear rockets and with FALCON missiles. The F-101B can operate above 50,000 feet at speed up to 1,200 miles per hours. There are no changes recommended in the number of operational units or aircraft for this portion of the program. However, there are aicraft modifications and improvements recommended. Another one of our interceptors is the P-106--a delta wing, single place, all weather interceptor armed with nuclear rockets and GAR-3 and GAR-4 FALCON missiles. The F-106 holds the current world's speed record for operational aircraft of 1,525.9 miles per hour. No changes are recommended to the composition of this force. However, as shown for the previous interceptors, there are certain modifications and improve- ments recommended as add-on's to our current program. These include modifica- tions required to standardize the F-106 fleet. Also, we have the BOMARC surface-to-air missile. This is a supersonic nuclear armed missile capable of defense against hostile aircraft and cruise-type missiles. It is recommended that the BOMARC "B" portion of this program be reduced. The deployments planned for the current program and the area coverage which these weapons will provide is depicted by a series of charts. In order to indicate the contemplated capability of all weapons currently planned for allocation to CINCNORAD control, I show: (a) First the location and coverage of the NIKE-HERCULES batteries. (b) The BOMARC program. (c) The location of manned interceptor squadrons of the regular force. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30: CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 (d) The location of the manned interceptor squadrons of the Air National G card. (e) The coverage provided by BOMARC. (f) The coverage provided by the manned interceptors. The deployments and resultant coverage which can be provided with the recommended weapons is indicated by these charts. With the exception of ItOMARC the deployments to be shown are intended as illustrative deployments only. NOMAD has not completed detailed studies required to determine optimum deployments for this revised family of weapons. (a) The NIKE-HERCULES deployment is identical to that shown with the current program. (U) The operating locations provided by the reduced BOMARC program. (c) The location of the married interceptor squadrons of the regular force. (d) The location of the Air National Guard manned interceptors. (e) The coverage provided by the reduced BOMARC program. (f) And, lastly, the coverage provided by the manned interceptor forces. This concludes this portion of the presentation. General Holloway will cover recommended program additions. GENERAL ESTES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is my purpose to amplify General White's remarks by covering for you in some detail a comparison between. the program which we have recommended for air defense and that which we now propose. Al- though this committee is certainly well informed on air defense, I think it might be worth while to refresh your memory first on the major functions that we perform in air defeense in conducting an intercept, because it is of these functions that I will speak of the air defense system. I will break it down into each function. With our air defense system, obviously our first function is that of detection. We must insure that we have a target to begin with. Through the various radar devices, which are, shown pictorially on this chart, we perform this function of detection. This is done by various equipments using radar techniques. The second function is that of identification, as shown here. This function is conducted essentially by the electronic devices which we have airborne and on the ground, which query each other to determine whether the aircraft involved is friend or foe. Furthermore, through the use of the electronic computers in the direction centers, the sector commander correlates flight plans from the FAA with the informa- tion he has on the aircraft coming in on its track. By this means lie determines whether the aircraft is friend or foe. Having determined that the aircraft is hostile, he then dispatches a weapon on the track of the target. During this period we refer to what we know as control. This is to say that the weapon must be controlled on its course toward intercept. This it does by means of continuing to obtain radar information on the track of the air- craft and through the use of the electronic computers in the direction centers the weapon directors are able to control the aircraft toward the target. The next function during the time that the interceptor is on its way to its target, it must be given constant course direction. This is accomplished by the ground-air communications we have as shown here. The final function is that of interception with the weapon actually being vectored to an intercept with its target. Now, under each of these four headings-detection, identification, control, communications, and interception--I will discuss our present program and the changes that are related to it. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : G IA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 DETECTION The first function is detection. As I have said previously, this function is performed by a variety of equipments using radar tech- niques. The main backbone of the detection force is the heavy radars, which are, for the main part, located on around-based station. This is a typical station, this is known as an FPS--24 modern radar sta- tion. Now, in addition to those radars, which do the job mainly at medium and high altitudes, reaching way out, getting targets far in advance, we require smaller radars known as gap fillers, of which this is a picture, which are located in between the heavy radars. They provide the low-altitude coverage below the lobe of the heavy radar and in-between lobes of consecutive heavy radars. In addition to this, we require information out over the ocean areas of approaching targets, particularly at low altitudes. For this pur- pose we put radars in aircraft. This is typical of one, a Lockheed aircraft known as the RC121D, which is our airborne early warning and control vehicle. All of these equipments which I have just discussed are vitally im- portant to air defense. If you do not have modernized or compe- tent radars, you obviously have no air defense capability at all. Therefore, we consider the part of the system which I am discussing now, detection, as the most vital part of the system. We attempted various fixes on these radars to improve their elec- tronics countermeasure countering capability, but these are not en- tirely successful, particularly against the advanced electronics counter- measures we expect in the future. Therefore, we have been involved in the past few years in a program of modernization of these radars, the heavy radar of which I showed you a picture a moment ago, FPS--24, is one of those mdern, curreptly designed radars, which will provide us the modernization we have to have. These radars are not only far superior in range, altitude, resolution, but they have designed into them means to counter elec- tronics countermeasures. This program has the unfortunate name of frequency diversity. I am afraid that people have not understood exactly what that terns means and, therefore, do not understand that the real purpose of it is to modernize the. radars we have available in this country. Now, the coverage which the program we recommended to you in this budget will provide is as shown here. The orange on the chart is essentially coverage which is contemplated to be provided by present- day types of radars. There are differences between these types of radars. The radars up on the DEW line are far superior to some of the radars shown in orange on these areas. The red represents the coverage which will be provided by the mod- ernized radars as they become available. Off the coasts in red is the coverage that will be provided by the airborne early warning and the control aircraft. Now, in our revised program the change is as shown here. There is one thing T should mention. You also see some green areas on the chart, this area and over here. These are additional extensions to the DEW line which are provided by Navy airborne early warning and control aircraft as well as by some non-NATO radars that are in- stalled here in Iceland. 53292-60--2 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 The flip that I just took off the chart shows the reduction in coverage in this area and on the west coast, which is possible in airborne early warning and control coverage due to modifications in the weapons program, which I will discuss l ust a little bit later. Furthermore, within the interior of the United States there are certain radars which I have just taken off here which we believe pos- sibly can be decommissioned. They are older-type radars. We are currently discussing this with Norad and believe these radars can be taken out. This then, as shown on this chart,, is the final coverage that we will have from radar under our proposed reduction. This chart shows the phasing by fiscal year of the detection pro- gram as it would have come in according to the program which we have submitted to you already. In each year it shows how much of the program. would be completed by that year. As you can see, the pro- gram would complete with the final few percentage out here in ---. The next chart shows the revisions which we recommend in our proposed program.. We slide some of the program further forward so as to get these modernized radars in a little bit earlier throughout the program. However, essentially the final completion, the last few radars, still come into the program in --. The next area, sir, is identification. On this chart you see the geographical distribution of 236 ground stations that provide the querying transmission system to the electronic equipment on board the aircraft to determine whether it is friend or foe. All of these sites have been previously funded out of previous fiscal years. They are installed. In the event we deactivate the radars in the center of the country that I mentioned a few moments ago, certain of these sites will not be required and can be deactivated. There are some 32 sites in this part of the country that will be deactivated in the event that the radars which I mentioned are decommissioned. Some years ago when we applied the SAGE computer to.Air De- fense for purposes of air defense, we divided the United States into several geographical areas. The heavy lines which you see on the chart are what we know as Air Defense divisions or, as Norad calls then, Air Defense regions. The dotted lines represent air defense sectors. In each of these sectors there is a direction center from which the sector commander directs the air battle within the sector. In each division there is a combat center from which the division commander supervises the overall air battle and allocates weapons to the various sector commanders. As far as the direction center is concerned, this is a photograph of a direction center building. The computer equipment, the various displays, the sector commander, and the weapon and intercept direc- tors are inside this building. Our original program that we submitted to you in 1961 called for 20 of these sector direction centers and 3 combat centers located with- Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 in these yellow areas. In addition to this, this was the original SAGE program, which was not to have automatic SAGE control. This chart shows the phasing of the total of eight supercombat cen- ters as they would have come into the program in accordance with our initial 1961 recommendations to you. As you can see, the program would have been completed in 1964. For a variety of reasons con- structionwise, as well as difficulties in integrating this entire system, in our recent, analysis of this program we feel that quite probably this date would have slipped further out toward 1965 or fiscal year 1966. As you can see, therefore, this tremendous system would have been considerably late in coming in. Our proposed program, therefore, has as its purpose, as General White stated, getting in a system against the threat at the earliest possible date. This will provide 98 percent completion of the pro- gram in . The remaining 2 percent represents completion of the sector up in Canada so that the entire system will be com- plete in . Mr. MAHION. General Estes, is it proposed that these charts be placed in the record or not? General EsT.s. You have them, sir, already in the material. Mr. MAHON. But is this sort of information to be included in our printed record or is it secret? General FRIEDMAN. I think we will have to examine each of them. We certainly would want to give some indication in support of the committee's approval or disapproval, as the case may be. I am not, prepared to state right now, Mr. Chairman, that they could go in exactly as they are, but certainly I believe we can provide a picturo that explains the change. Mr. MATION. We do not want any information in the printed record that should not be there. Of course, this chart here is very meaning- ful. If we should have an early printin of this hearing, we want to bear in mind the difficulties involved with respect to clearance. General Esrrs. We will immediately examine that, sir, and do the best we can in providing charts which can be published in the record. The next area, sir, is communications. This shows a total of 154 ground-air transmitter sites that were included in the program sub- mitted to you in this fiscal year 1961 budget. These sites are what is known as time division data link sites. They provide automatic con- tact between the SAGE centers and the BOMARC as well as the fighter-interceptors. They work with the data link equipment that is on board our fighter-interceptors and the BOMARC. Due to changes in the weapon distribution and employment and the types of weapons, as well as due to some of the changes which I mentioned earlier with reference to taking out some of these interior radars, this is the communications distribution which we recommend in our proposed revision of the program. This will be a reduction. to 144 sites from 154. The schedule for this program is as shown on this chart. This is the way it would have been for the 154 sites in our initial program and the flip an the chart shows how the program will complete with the reduced number of time division data link sites. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : ctl4-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. ATAHOK. You will. complete the program in ? General ESTES. That is correct, sir. This is largely due to the fact that you are reducing the number of sites. From here I would like to go to the, problem of interception and talk about our various weapons. The first weapon is the F-102. Tlris is a picture of it. This aircraft is a Delta wing, single place. It is an all-weather interceptor, currently armed with the Falcon missile- namely, with the GAR-1 and GAP-2. The F-102 can operate up to 50,000 feet and at speeds at the maxi- mum up over mach 1. In the GAR-1 and GAP Z-21) missiles, which this aircraft now carries, will be replaced by a missile which will. be known as the GAR-11, which is a guided nuclear weapon with a very small nuclear yield. This will tremendously increase the capa- bility of this F-102 aircraft. The current program is as shown here. I would like to remark to the committee, sir, if you attempt to compare these various figures for total F--102's, which I have shown on this chart, with information which may have been submitted to you by General Friedman, you will not find that they directly compare. These are programed operational aircraft in operational units, as I display them here. You appreciate the fact that in addition to this we have aircraft in depots undergoing modifications; we have command support and attrition aircraft that are not shown here, but these are the operational aircraft in opera- tional. units. I: should also mention, sir, that in the light blue I am showing the aircraft which are overseas. The dark blue represents the F--102 air- craft as programed to be in the North American air defense system. Currently there are ---- in. the program to round out through squadrons. Our recommendations on the F-102, sir, are that in fiscal year 1961 all of the, aircraft which we planned for our inven- tory start phasing out, of our inventory to the Air National Guard, and that the green line here shows the. buildup for Air Defense and Air National Guard units equipped. with F-102's. As you recognize, the Guard is largely equipped now with F-fees and other such aircraft. It has been our purpose here to attempt to bring the Guard fully into the Air Defense act, and utilize the services in which they are most competent. Our recommended program shows the various squadrons which will be in the U.S. inventory in red. (Discussion off the recor(l.) The remainder of the squadrons phase into the Guard. The reason for the disparity in figures, if you add these up here, is because the additional aircraft than T mentioned that we have in depots carving back from overseas, et cetera, become. available to fill up these Guard units. So the F-102's, as far as the T-SAF inventory under our proposed revision, will phase out the units going into the Guard. With reference to the 102, we intend in our program to complete certain. modifications. The first is to complete the installation of time division data link, the electronic equipments of time division data Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 11 link, in all of the F-102 aircraft, so that the communications sites that I showed you a moment ago can communicate automatically with these F-102 aircraft. We have this installed in practically the entire fleet now. All this does is to install it in the rest of the fleet so that the Guard aircraft can operate with the same communications system that our regular Air Force aircraft will be operating with. The second modification is to improve the low level kill capability of these aircraft. Right now, because of problems of radar clutter which the aircraft radar and missile see, it is difficult to achieve an assured intercept at low levels. Our purpose here, and as you will see in the other weapons which I mention a little bit later, we intend to improve this low level kill capability. The next is the F-101-B, a picture of which is shown here. This aircraft, as you can see, is two-place. It has a pilot and a radar op- erator and, further, it is two-engine. This aircraft has the MB-1 rocket, not these two which are shown here (indicating). This is the reverse side. These are FALCON rockets but in addi- tion to the armament door it carries an MB-1 nuclear rocket known as the GENIE. This aircraft can operate up to 50,000 feet and it can go to a speed of 1,200 miles per hour. The current program is as shown here. There will be a maximum point of squadrons phasing down to - because of attrition by the end of the 1964 time period. We do not propose any change in this program for these aircraft in our revision. This is a fine interceptor and is doing a good job. As you can see by the overlay, the program remains exactly the same in our revised recommendation as it did in the ori- nal. There is one exception to that as shown on the next chart, which is the im- provement modifications we intend for the F-101-B. As is the. case with the F-102 this aircraft did not fully get the time division data link installation in production. We will complete; equipping the fleet with that and, furthermore, this aircraft:, because it is going to be one of the backbone interceptors in the, fleet, for some time to come, must have further improvements in capability. We intend first to provide certain improvements which will give it, a greater ability to counter electronic countermeasures. These are mainly modifications to the fire control system and they do not do anything to the aircraft itself. They are modifications to the fire control system and radar on the aircraft to give it a better capability to counter electronic countermeasures. Secondly, we intend to improve the nuclear kill capability of this aircraft and as we get further out, in the program, the MB-1 rocket, although nuclear, is not the system we would like to have on the F-101-B. The reason is that as time goes on, any potential enemy has a better electronic countermeasure capability and it. becomes extremely diffi- cult to get range information to utilize the MB-1 nuclear rocket and you have got to have precise. range information. Therefore, we in- Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 12 tend to equip this aircraft with the GAR-11 missile I mentioned for the F-102 in place of the MB--1 in this later time period. This will give us a much greater assurance of nuclear kill. Finally, we want to improve its low level capability by the same modification as on the F-102. General Holloway is going to talk in more detail about some of these in reference to add-ons, but 1 will say that a very considerable number of modifications are involved in this IECC'M modification of the F-101-I3. The third aircraft is the. F-106 and a picture of that is shown here. This is a single engine aircraft, single place, all weather. This is the aircraft that currently holds the world speed record of 1,525.9 miles per hour. This is a very fast airplane. The next chart shows our current program of building up to through squadrons at the maximum point and phasing down because of attrition by the end of the --- time period. As with the F-101-B, as the overlay shows, we do not contemplate any change in this program. As with the F-101-B, there is one exception to that and that is in terms of modifications we intend to provide. This airplane is an extremely complex airplane and as it has gone into production and out into the inventory, we have found that we needed a number of modifications to bring it up to design standards. Therefore, the final aircraft coining off of the production line will incorporate all of these modifications. This being a very potent weapons system, we want to go back and pick up all of the modifica- tions that were incorporated in production on those aircraft that got out of production before we had the modifications, before we had the fixes complete. In other words, we want to standardize the F-106 fleet. Acain, we want to get time division data links in those aircraft whi.c i did not get them in production. We want to improve the capability of this aircraft electronic-counter-measures-wise and do it by providing a better low-level kill capability. The next chart shows BOMARC and this is the operational BOMARC in a shelter at McGuire Air Force Base. The next chart shows the BOMARC program as it was presented in the 1961 budget projected. There would have been seven A squadrons and I would like to make a point clear here so we all know what we are talking about when we refer to squadrons. The squadrons of the IM-99-A of the initial BOMARC have a unit equipment of missiles. There are --- of these squadrons in the program but they are located on five bases. The first two bases had two unit equipment squadrons on the base. In the B program we intended, when we presented the 1961 pro- gram, to have a total of --- of these ---- unit equipped squad- rons. These would be located on a total of 16 bases so that we had, with the inclusion of the A bases that were included, all bases at missiles. The program buildup is as shown here so that at the end of Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 13 the program we would have had operational BOMARCS in- cluding both A's and B's. The breakdown here would have been A missiles and B missiles. The revised program which we are recommending to the committee is as shown here. At the end of the program there would be the A missiles which are already going on pad arid operational B missiles. It would reduce the B program from 29 squadrons of the type I men- tioned a moment ago down to - . It would reduce the total number of bases on which BOMARC would be deployed from 1S down to . The next chart shows you a summary of what interceptors we would have had on the blue line against time versus the number of interceptors that we will now have with the revised program. For ex- ample, in 1963, including all the BOMARCS and fighter interceptor;;, we would have had total interceptors. Mr. MAHON. In referring to interceptors, I believe you have made it clear that you are referring to aircraft and missiles? General EsTrs. Aircraft and missiles. Mr. MAlION. You are counting an aircraft as one unit and a mis silo as one unit? You are considering them to be equal in your evaluation? General Es' r s. That is correct. In that connotation, there would be total interceptors in 1.963. In the Regular Air Force program we have shown you there would be interceptors in the same time period. However, the total number of interceptors in the North American Air Defense System would be up at this point (indicating) because of the build-uup of the F-102 and the Air National Guard which I mentioned earlier, which is represented here (indicating): The total actually drops then including the Guard. I would like to show you by means of a couple of charts here the differences between what the NORAD weapons capability would have been under,our fiscal year 1961 proposal and then what they would be under the proposal as revised. On this chart we have shown the locations and the coverage of the 139 NIKE batteries that are included in the NORAD system. Obvi- ously, this is not part of our program but you have got to show this as a part of the total coverage. The second chart shows the 18 locations in green for the BOMARC. The next overlay shows the squadrons of the Regular Force in the yellow dots. The next chart shows the 37 locations of the current Air National Guard squadrons. The next chart shows the coverage which would have been provided by the 18 BOMARC locations. You would have had this much air defense coverage with it (indicating). The final chart shows the coverage that would have been provided by the fighter interceptors, both. the 37 squadrons of the Guard and the squadrons in the Regular Air Force. This is the total coverage capability that would have been available within the NORAD system. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 14 Obviously, the darker areas here indicate t hat you have got more coverage in that area due to the BOMARC and the- fighters. These areas show where you would just have fighters and the purple dots show what you would have in fighter and NIKE-HERCULES coverage. The next chart shows how this is modified. by our revised program. We will have the same 139 NIKE batteries located here (indicat- ing). In discussing this point, I would like. to mention that what I am going to show you is how it would look if the Air Force were deploying the fighters in this particular program. Obviously, the question of deployment is a question that is up to General Kuter. I am showing you a representative deployment and the coverage you would get from it. If General Kuter wants to shift the fighters around-- Mr. MAHON. Would you please identify General Kuter for the record? General Es ,s. He is the commander of the North American Air Defense Command. The purple dots are still the locations and the coverage of the NIKE-HERCULES. The next chart shows the sites in the reduced BOMARC program in this area in green [indicating]. I would mention that with reference to these sites and with ref- erence to the proposed operational missiles, we would tell General Kuter that these are the sites we are talking about so we would not construct sites in other parts of the country. He can deploy the mis- siles however he so desires on these particular sites which have been constructed. The next chart shows the reduced squadrons of USAF interceptors in the orange dots. Finally, these dots show the same location as at present for the Air National Guard squadrons. The coverage which would be provided by I3OMARC in the locations is as shown here [indicating]. Finally, the coverage from the reduced fighter interceptor squad- rons, plus I3OMAR.C, plus HERCULES, that will be available with our revised program is as shown here. Mr. MATrON. Would you please take off that last overlay and let us look at it again ? Talk about that a little further, General. General Es-ms. As T have shown, there are locations of BOMARC which start down here [indicating] at Langley and go urn through the Canadian sites through Bangor, Maine, in the United States and through the two Canadian sites and out to Duluth, which is the westernmost site. These will provide coverage in the area as is shown here indicating]. Mr. MATror. Is that the whole BOMARC program for the future as recommended today? General Es-rrs. In -our revised program this is the entirety of the B OMA RC program. Mr. MAHON. We will talk about that later. Proceed. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3?5 CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 General EsTEs. To put back on the other flip, this then is the final total coverage which the commander of NORAD would have available to him under our revised program. This completes my material, sir. Next is General Holloway who will talk to you about the recom- mended additions to our program in place of the air defense cancella- tions which we have mentioned. TOTAL FUND REDUCTIONS IN PROPOSED PROGRAM Mr. MAHON. General Friedman, please refresh our minds at this point on approximately how much money will be freed, so to speak, from the original 1961 budget program as heretofore presented to us by the proposed changes presented today. General FRIEDMNMAN. Yes, sir. The reductions which General Estes has indicated would represent a decrease in requirement for new obligating authority in the amount of $516.7 million. The addenda which General Holloway will dis- cuss would require an increase in new obligating authority in the amount of $393 million. Considering both fiscal years the net result in terms of new obligating authority, compared to the President's budget submission, would effect a reduction-net savings-of $138.7 million. If you just made a simple subtraction of the two larger figures that I have given you, it would indicate a decrease in NOA requirement of $123.7 million. However, certain of these reductions took place in fiscal year 1960, against appropriations already enacted. The net savings there would be $15 million. In total, then, the President's budget could be reduced in the amount of $138.7 million. Mr. MAHON. You mean the President's fiscal year 1961 budget which was presented in January could be reduced in that amount if we followed precisely this new recommendation of the Air Force? General FRIEDMAN. That is correct. Mr. MAHON. I think that is clear enough, but we will have a fur- ther statement from you later. Proceed. General HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, for the sake of brevity and to maximize the time for questions, I would like to read my statement. Mr. MAIION. You read very well. Proceed. GENERAL STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, USAF BI0ORAPI3ICAL SKETCH OF WITNESS General Holloway was born in Knoxville, Tenn., on September 1, 1912. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1937, from California Institute of Technology (aero engineering) in 1941, Air Command and Staff School in 1947, and the National War College in 1951. He received his pilot rating in 1938, and held various assignments in fighter units, including Chenault's Flying Tigers, which he joined in 1942 and com- manded as the 23d Pursuit Group early in 1943. Since World War II he has been assigned as Director of Air Defense and Director of Plans, Headquarters, ADC ; Deputy Commander of the 9th and 12th Air Forces ; and he has held Pentagon assignments in flans, Research, and Development, and Requirements. He assumed his present duty in July 1959. General Holloway is credited with 13 enemy aircraft destroyed during World War II in 110 combat missions. His decorations include the Silver Star, Legion Approved3R3r1 ete se 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :1 IA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Chinese Order of the Sacred Tripod, and Chinese Pilot Wings. He is a command pilot with over 4.500 flying hours. GENERAL HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chai.i-man and members of the committee, the Air Force is proposing some additions as priority items for im- proving our national defense. As brought out by General White, some of these additions are tailored principally toward aircraft or airborne missile defenses, some toward ICBM defenses, and some toward increased offensive strength. I will give, first, a resumi of the current program; second, the changes or additions proposed; and, third, the net effects realized. The first and foremost conclusion to be reached in considering the package of recommended changes just. presented by General Estes is that the responsibilities of our manned interceptors have appreciably increased. The F-101's, F-102's, and F-106's are our area defense weapons, and these are the weapons which must, insofar as possible, fill our requirements. There is quite abit that. can be done to improve the capability of these aircraft to do this job, and these things can be done for relatively modest costs. The F-101B and the F-106 will remain in the inventory for many years. The ASG-18 long-range pulse doppler radar and GAR-9 air-to-air missile have been under development since 1956. These two sub- systems, originally programed for the F-108, are the heart of the long- range interceptor concept and represent; a tremendous improvement over present fire-control systems and missiles. The fire-control system has the capability of detecting a B-47 type target head on at very long range. This long range plus the ability to search from very low to very high altitudes would allow us to locate targets with only crude DEW line information, or to operate in areas where the ground environment has been degraded. The GAR-9 missile is being developed to insure a high degree of kill capability against targets detected by the ASG-18. This missile can be launched at targets from both. low and high altitudes and can kill at long range. Firing from high altitudes, this missile attains a. velocity of many times the speed of sound and will be effective against targets flying at great speeds. Fire control. systems and air-to-air missiles have historically been the pacing items in the development of air defense interceptors. A substantial effort was expended in the development of these two sub- systems before the F-108 was canceled. Development has continued on a reduced scale, and to date we. have accumulated over hours of operating time on the radar, of which --- hours was airborne in. R-2i and T-29 test aircraft. We consider it extremely wise to con- tinue this program on a modest basis. BALLISTIC TTTSSILE EARLY WARNING Turning now to those efforts which we propose for improving our defenses against ballistic missiles, we would like to accelerate the Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : fJA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 ballistic missile early warning system to the greatest, practicable ex- tent. This chart shows conditions of ICBM warning coverage with and without the third site. The solid red areas are those parts of the United States which will receive no warning of missiles launched frti,m the cross-hatched areas. One depicts a low trajectory attack and the other a medium trajectory attack. With site III completing the sys- tem, all of the United States will be afforded warning, as indicated on the left block of the vugraph. Because of our concern over the phasing of the threat relative to the implementation of our ballistic missile detection system, we Dive studied the program to determine what expediting action is possible. Here is shown what we are buying for the additional funds e?e- quested. The costs are mainly in additional labor and, as indicated, represented expedited construction, emplacement and integgration, and test of the electronic components. Advanced training schedules and certain airlift requirements are also included. The primary objectives of the Discoverer program are to develop components, subsystems, and satellite system reliability; also, to de- sign, develop and demonstrate the ancillary equipment that goes with orbiting vehicles. The biscoverer is contributing directly to two of the Nation's most important programs, in addition to supplying design data for oilier space programs. The contributions made to the SAMOS and MIDAS efforts by DISCOVERER are basic airframe, attitude control, com- mand and program functions, orbit ejection, and recovery techniques.. We need to provide additional THOR boosters and Arena vehicles for further development of components or systems to used in a space environment. The Air Force has provided funds to protect the lead time for both the Department of Defense and NASA future THOR booster requirements. The DISCOVERER program is of vital importance to continueAl development of MIDAS. It became apparent in 1958 that the advancement in IR detection capabilities warranted the priority development of a satellite-based ICBM detection system. MIDAS will provide instantaneous warning of individual ICBM launches. MIDAS will provide the United States with a highly reliable ICBM attack alarm system. The infrared sensing devices will detect the launching of any ballistic, missile as soon as it gets above approximately 50,000 feet, and will re- lay this detection to a ground readout station for immediate relaying to the appropriate users. This system will provide continuous sur- veillance of the entire U.S.S.R. The warning time available from Midas will be appreciably greater than that afforded by BMEWS. This will provide time to start count downs, scramble the airborne re- taliatory forces, alert the active and civil defenses, and alert BMEWS for verification of attack. The current program as reflected in our present budget provides for R. &. D. launches at low altitude from the AMR. The first of these was launched on February 26, 1960, with a failure in the separation mechanism between the first and second stages. This completes the aerospace defense items which we are recorn- mending. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3108: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 I will now discuss improvements we propose for our offensive forces. We recommend changing the configuration of some of our ATLAS squadrons. You see the effects of these changes depicted here in re- lation to the overall program. Beginning at the left, the first five columns indicate designation, loca- tion, hardness, operational date, and the number of missiles on launch- ers under the present schedule. The next column, in red, indicates the number of missiles on launchers under this proposal, and in the last column are shown the dates the squadrons will he completely equipped if these dates differ from presently programed operational dates. Funds to be programed in fiscal year 1960 will cover costs of exca- vation, and building brick and mortar facilities to include launchers, launch operations buildings, and related real installations. The re- maining funds will be programed in fiscal year 1961 for missiles, ground support equipment, installation, and equipment checkout. In using funds for ATLAS in this way. we are getting the same number of missiles on launchers that we would get by building addi- tional squadrons; however, since no new squadron support facilities are required, this increase in force strength is being obtained more economically than it would be if totally new squadrons were pur- chased. This addition to the force, as you can see, comes very appro- priately in the critical time period. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my delineation of the additions pro- posed. Mr. MAHON. We will proceed. with General Friedman's statement. He will relate this proposed change in programs to dollars. General White and the others have covered the broad outlines, but you will give us the details, will you not? General FRIEDMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. GENERAL STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR of BUDGET, U.S. AIR FORCE General FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the purpose of my presentation is to discuss the fiscal aspects of the program program changes which have been discussed by General White in terms, and by General Estes and General Holloway in some detail. Summary of changes ] NCillions] Fiscal year Fiscal near 1960 1961 Current Programs------------------------------------------------------- $2,807.0 $2, 793.2 Revised programs----------------------------------------------------------- 2, 792.0 2,669.5 -15.0 -123.7 The air defense programs and missile and space programs in- volved in these adjustments total more than two and one half billion in both fiscal year 1960 and fiscal year 1961. In fiscal year 1960, the effect of air defense net reductions of $116.8 million and missile, missile warning, and space program increases of $131.8 million is Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : 1jA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 an overall program reduction of $15 million. Funds in this amount, if not otherwise reprogramed in the meantime, would be available to offset in part our fiscal year 1961 or fiscal year 1962 requirements, thereby reducing the new obligational authority request for either year. For fiscal year 1961, the air defense program net reduction ag- gregates $516.5 million. Offsetting against this amount the $393 million additive requirements for missiles, missile warning, and space programs leaves us a net reduction of $123.7 million in program re- quirements-and in new obligational authority required-for fiscal year 1961. With the committee's permission, I will touch upon each of the major program segments involved in these adjustments and state the dollar effect of each adjustment. BOMARC program [millions] Fiscal year 1960 Current program------------------------------------------------------------ Revised program------------------------------- ---------------------------- The greatest single program adjustment is in the BOMARC pro- gram, which reflects a downward adjustment of $381 million in fiscal year 1961 in the "Missile Procurement" appropriation. As was stated earlier, this is predicated upon a decision to curtail BOMABC B production. $394.1 394.1 Fiscal year 1961 $421.5 40.4 -381.1 SAGE program [Millions] Current program------------------------------------------------------------ Revised program ------------------------------------------------------------ Ad]ustments---------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal year 1960 $280.2 138.4 Fiscal year 1961 $235.2 102.8 -132.4 Another quite substantial adjustment is in the SAGE program. This is comprised of reductions of $141.8 million in fiscal year 1960 and $132.4 million in fiscal year 1961. Both the military construction and the other procurement segments of the program are involved in both years' adjustments. Identification and control program [ Nrillions] Fiscal year 1960 -Current program------------------------------------------------------------ Revised program ------------------------------------------------------------ Ad]ustments---------------------------------------------------------- $31.8 28. 5 Fiscal year 1961 $18.3 15.5 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/*: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 The identification and control program reflects decreases of $3.3 million in the current year and $2.8 million in fiscal year 1.961. Both military construction and other procurement are affected. These amounts derive from reductions in certain equipments in these pro- grams. interceptor improvement program [Millions] Fiscal year Fiscal year 1960 1961 Current program-.. ---------------------------------- --------------------- $109. 8 $96.9 Revised program----------------------------------------------------------- 108. 1 232.6 -1.7 } 135.7 In the interceptor improvement program, which involves the F--101, F-102, F-106, and GAR,-11 programs, we reduce the fiscal year 1.960 programs for military construction by $1.7 million, and in the fiscal year 1961 programs we propose a decrease of $11.5 million in military construction and an increase of $136.2 mil lion in aircraft procurement, fora net program increase of $134 million. The decreases in military constructionrepreseiit facilities which fall out as a result of changes in force structure. The increases in fiscal year 1961 relate to modifications to improve the effectiveness of these defensive weapon systems. Surveillance program [Millions] Fiscal year Fiscal year 1960 1961 Current program-----------------------------------------------------------1 $95.6 I $130.3 Revised program---------------------------------------------------------- 96.9 145.7 Adjustments ---------------------------------------------------------- +1.3 +15.4 In the surveillance program we propose to increase the fiscal year 1960 program by $1.3 million and the fiscal year 1961 program by $15.4 million. All of the adjustments involved are in the "Other procure- ment" appropriation. The fiscal year 1960 increase derives from price adjustments while the increase. in fiscal year 1961 provides for restora- tion of radar items which had slipped from the fiscal year 1960 pro- gram due to production difficulties. R1TEW program [Millions] Fiscal year Fiscal year 1960 1961 Current program --------------------------------------------------- .--------- $257.1 $107.3 Revised program------------------------------------------------------------ 272.0 134.9 X14.9 +27.6 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :2C}IA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 In the ballistic missile. early warning system we propose to make $14.9 million more available in the current year and request an addi- tional $27.6 million'in the budget year, fiscal year 1961. These addi- tional funds will be used to advance the initial operational capability dates of the second and third sites. They will buy us vitally needed time in this field, about ntontlis in the case of site No. 2, alid an estimated - - mouths for site No. 3. Both "Military construc- tion" and "Other pro ttrement" funds are involved. GAR-31ASG-18 program [Millions] Fiscal year Fiscal year 1960 1961 Current program -------------------------------------------- Revised program------------------------------ ------------- Adjustments ---------------------------------------------------------- $t I ---- }-15 Provision is made for continuation in fiscal year 1961, in the amount of $15 million, of the GAR-9/ASG-18 program, which had been scheduled for termination after fiscal year 1960. Space program [M illtons] Fiscal year Fiscal year 1960 1961 Current program --------------------------------------------------- - $298.9 $333.0 ------ -- Revised program----------------------------------------------------------- 324. 5 308.8 +35. 8 In the space program, which embraces the DISCOVERER, MIDAS, and SAMOS programs, we plan on increasing the fiscal year 1960 program by $25.6 million and the budget year program by $35.8 million, all in the R.D.T. & E. appropriation. The increased funding includes provision for additional research and development firings of the DISCOVERER series of satellites. These provide the engineering and test bases required for the MIDAS and SAMOS programs which will exploit the early warning and reconnaissance satellite capabilities which are so vital in the ballistic missile era. The bulk of the fiscal year 1960 increase is related to the high priority MIDAS program. ATLAS program [Millions] Fiscal year Fisc'sl year 1960 1361 Current program---------------------------------------------------------- $987. 2 $1,1101. 6 Revised program ----------------------------------------------------------- 1,077.2 1,137.6 Adlustments------------------------------------ ---------------------- +136.U Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3Q2 CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 The adjustments proposed in the ATLAS program have the effect of increasing the current fiscal year 1960 program by $90 million, all in "Military construction," and increasing the fiscal year 1961 program by $136 million, all in "Missile procurement." These additional. funds are required to increase the number of missiles per squadron at a significantly lower cost. MINUTEMAN program tMillioncl Current prosram-------------------------------- ---- ------------- Revised pro"ram------------------------------------------------------------ Adjustments-------------------------------------------------- ....... I fiscal year 1960 $343. 2 343. 2 Fiscal year 1961 An increase of $27 million in the fiscal year 1961 MINUTEMAN program is proposed for some production facilities expansion and for additional effort in the research and development tasks associated with the mobile MINUTEMAN development program. These funds will allow additional reliability testing and additional component engineering effort, as well as enlarging approaches on ground support equipment and launch equipment for the mobile con- cept. In addition, these funds will provide for further definitive testing of missile trains and associated equipment in relation to operation and targeting of this system. To recap, the net effect of these several adjustments is to reduce the obligational authority requirements for fiscal year 1960 by $15 million and for fiscal year 1961 by $123.7 million, or a total reduction of $138.7 million for the 2 years. These are the net results of numerous adjustments between and among appropriation accounts and as between the 2 fiscal years. Without going into details at this time--although they can be made available to the committee, if desired--I can state that the necessary adjustments are possible through combinations of (1) adjusting the carry forward of old procurement funds as, authorized by the terms of the fiscal year 1960 procurement accounts language; (2) by repro- graming within appropriations; (3) through transfers authorized by the OSI) emergency fund language, as broadened by section 633--this will be the first time we used section 633, we had not had to use that special authority before; (4) and by deferring some items from fiscal year 1960 to fiscal year 1961. The adjustments which have been presented have little or no effect on overall Air Force net expenditures for the 2 fiscal years involved. The net result of all of these adjustments can be expressed as decreases of $95.7 million. in "Aircraft procurement" and $43 million in "Other procurement." These amounts could be .deducted from the fiscal year 1961. appropriation requests and still leave us the capability to make the program adjustments which have been discussed. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : IA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. MAHON. Gentlemen, earlier in the year when most of you ap- r ared before us and we discussed various programs, the committee, think, made known its desire to accelerate the intercontinental bal- listic missile program as much as reasonably possible during the so- called critical time period of 1960-63. It seems to me that you have submitted a program which will accelerate the ATLAS program to a limited extent during this critical period. We have all been tremendously interested in the MIDAS, SAMOS, and other satellite programs. The acceleration you propose in those fields seems to be a step in the right direction. Last year we provided you with an appropriation of $87 million, I believe, above the budget in an effort to accelerate what appears to be in many ways a better weapon than the ATLAS or the TITAN; namely, the MINUTEMAN. As I understand it, in your revised program you propose some additional acceleration of the MINUTE- MAN. How much is the money involved? General FEUCDMMAN. In the amount of $27 million, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MAHON. That all seems to be good. There has been considerable concern an the part of the committee in regard to air defense. Some of the members have had one view, others have had a different view. There has been some confusion and a great deal of interest, and on the part of some members of the com- mittee much disappointment and unhappiness over certain features of the air defense program. I think it would be fair, if there is no objection, to place in the record at this point some paragraphs from our committee report of last year in. regard to air defense. Then we do not need to belabor that ques- tion further. (The material referred to follows:) [P. 14, H. Rept, No. 408, Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1960] A primary objective of the defense program is to deter war. All facets of our defense program, the capabilities of each service down to the last man, play a role in this great effort. Inasmuch as a complete defense against a potential foe is practically unattainable, and that is especially true today, there is com- mon agreement that an overwhelming offensive capability is the best defense. Our military program has been patterned in that direction for years. This is sot to say that no effort has been made or should be made to attain a good defensive posture. Indeed, our offensive power must never be left open to destruction from surprise attack. Protection against such an eventuality is the primary role of our air defense forces. In an effort to protect our offensive retaliatory forces, as well as the popula- tion centers of the Nation, we have spent over the past 10 years in the area of $29 billion. This includes radar warning networks, fighter aircraft and antiair- craft missiles-the entire air defense package. Proposals have been made and are under study within the Defense Department which could increase this total spending to about $49 billion by 1963. A detailed listing of what the system entails would be of little value for our purposes here. Generally, however, the system now in being can be described as encompassing (a) early warning radar networks and radar coverage of most of the United States tied into the elec- 63292-60--4 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/394 CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 Ironic computer control centers of the semiautomatic ground environment sys- tem known as SAGE, (b) hundreds of supersonic tighter aircraft stationed throughout the Nation, and (c) NIKP4 antiaircraft batteries surrounding most major target areas. The so-called BOMAR(" antiaircraft missile defense system, and ability to combat the ICBM or even to detect its approach, is yet to come. By the end of fiscal year 1959, we will have expended or committed for expenditure nearly $3,700 million for NIKE-AJAX and NIKE-HERCULES air defense missile systems. By the end of fiscal year 1959, we will have expended or committed for expenditure approximately 81,900 million on the BOMARC air defense missile system. The above figures for both missiles are all inclusive, including direct assignable costs for military personnel and operating expense. The NIKE is an Army program ; the BOMARC is an Air Force program. In addition, the 1960 budget contains estimates amounting to nearly $1 billion for these two missile systems. This, of course.. is only a part of the total overall air defense budget, and if all programs are approved the cost curve is projected to rise sharply. Coupled with the air defense program is the increasingly important anti-ICBM program, including an ICBM early warning system. This will add additional billions to the expense involved. The question naturally arises--wherein lies the greater threat. and what is to be done about it? Systems are under construction to provide for early warning of intercontinental ballistic missile attack. Actual defense presents a much more difficult problem. This problem is being attacked and the commitee is providing additional funds for advance procurement in order to speed along the NIKE- ZETTS anti-ICBM missile program. Development takes time and there is little more that can be done for the present. We have a number of competing systems, however, for defense against aircraft, Great progress has been made in aircraft warning systems, in fighter interceptor aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles, and in the development of ground-to-air mitsilcs, such as the BOMA.RC and the NIKE-IERCULES. The problem in this area may well he that we have too many possibilities, or too many services involved. Competing systems supported by enthusiastic industrial and service advocates tend to create confusion and un- certainty. Great promises, often somewhat nebuiious but calculated to get sup- port and contract awards. are held out by the advocates of all systems. The availability of more than one promising possibility frequently makes it necessary to pick and choose, often an extremely technical and difficult process. Iu the air defense area. we have a very definite problem of this tvne in the competing concepts behind the BOMARC and the NIKE-IERCULE$ ground- to-air missiles. The BOMARC air defense missile system has been under development for many years. The first missile was test fired in 1952 and still none are in opera- tional units. This missile is designed to intereept attacking aircraft at much greater distances from the target area than the NIKE-HERCULES missile. The greater range capability which is sought for the JROMARC has added com- plexity and additional cost to the missile. However, because of the greater range planned for the BOMARC over the HERCULES missile, and therefore the fewer number of missiles required to defend a given target area, it is not definitely known which system would be the more expensive in the long run. The committee, in the light of all the uncertainties, is unable to make such a cost determination at this time. The. official position of the Department of Defense is that we need both the NIKE-HERCULES and the BOMARC missiles. This conclusion may be correct but the entire issue is clouded by the claims and counter claims of representa- tives of the individual services. Billions of taxpayers' dollars are involved in this controversy. It is believed that a. final decision in this area can only be made after a careful military analysis. Admittedly the issues: involved are extremely complex and difficult to resolve. An immediate reexamination of the whole problem at the highest level is urgently required. The committee requests that such action be taken. The committee in a further effort to focus attention upon the necessity for an early decision on the air defense missile controversy has made a sharp re- duction in funds requested for the BOMARC missile system. The budget re- quest for the BOMARC missile for production. development, test and evaluation totaled $447,300,000. Of this amount, $84,606.000 is for test and evaluation. The committee has reduced funds for production by $162,700,000. This is not claimed as a long-range saving. The committee would be willing to appropriate the full budget estimate and more if it had full confidence in the proposed BOMARC missile-if it had the assurance that the system would actually work. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :201A-RDP801301676R000900030049-9 The contractor for this missile has already received over a period of years com- mitments in excess of $1,100 million. Before further commitments and expendi- tures pile up, a new hard look should be given to the proposed BOMARC and the whole air defense problem. The so-called Furnas Committee, at the request of the, Department of Defense. has recently completed a study of the BOMARC. The committee gave the BOMARC approval with certain important reservations. By the terms of Its directive from the Department of Defense, the Furnas committee did not give full consideration to NIKE-IIERCULES, fighter aircraft, and other important air defense factors in making the study. The study as a result is inadequate and not conclusive with respect to the overall air defense picture. It should be observed that neither the NIKE-HERCULES nor the proposed BOMARC are capable of combatting the ICBM or even missiles of the ROUND DOG type launched at targets from distant aircraft. We are spending vast sums on air defense. It is time to reexamine what we are getting for our money. Mr. MABON. You have made some rather significant recommenda- tions in this field of air defense. We have not had an opportunity to examine them in detail. Of course, we are not in a position to commit ourselves with reference to what our views and recommenda- tions will be when we submit the: Department of Defense appropria- tion bill to the House of Representatives for consideration within a few weeks. In other words, I have no authority as chairman of the subcommit- tee to say that eitlier your original program as submitted in Jamiary or your revised program completely meets with the approval of the committee. I want to commend you for having a further look at this whole picture. I had assumed that the Army, Navy, and Air.Force kept all military programs under constant review. I have felt, however, through the years, that the services have not been sufficiently flexible and responsive to changing conditions. The most obvious question here, General Wliite and Mr. Garlock, is this: If this is such a wonderful idea which you present today, why did you not come to the Capitol in January and present us with this money-saving, defense-improving, eye-catching, more attractive pro- gram? Will you please comment on that? General WunTE. I will to the extent of my ability, Mr. Chairman. I think it is a very cogent question. I think the -No. 1 point to make is that the technology and the enemy threat. are constantly changing. I think it is fair to state it takes time, maybe too much time, for some of the implications to seep into all the brains that have to work on these things. It is also very cogent, in my opinion, that somewhat of a revolution took place in the air defense field under the Department of Defense master air defense plan just 6 or 8 months ago. That took some time to digest. Mr. MArroN. You are referring now to the so-called master plan which was approved last summer and which to some extent grew out of hearings and discussions pertaining to the Department of Defense appropriation bill last year? General WrirTE. That is correct, sir. Mr. MAaox. All right proceed. General WurTE. Another factor which I think has a very big bear- ing on it is that actually the responsible commanders-and you get Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 into quite an involved situation when you come into this-the actual responsible commanders of the air defense of the United States report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force; This is true of all unified commands. Somebody has to step up to these problems, and it devolves in a military sense upon the Chief of Staff of the service to take the initiative, and sometimes perhaps-I will later state the position of CINCNORAD on this-to step up and in many ways overrule him in the light of the overall picture-the integrated threat; the moneys available; the weapons systems which are present and forthcoming; and in the light of other threats. That, in. effect, is one reason that this may seem to have been somewhat late. I would point out, however, without any attempt to be defensive in the matter, that we have stated on numerous occasions that these things are under review, and it does take time to evaluate and work out the plans and equate, them to dollars and deployment. In addition to those items, we have the Joint Chiefs of Staff machinery through which we must work. All of these things have been worked on. All of them have taken time. We have stepped up to this problem from the point of view of the Air Staff and, of course, my own, to cut through some of the inhibitions, some, in my opinion-for want of a better word--"cling- ing" to concepts. While I recognize the threat of the air-breathing bomber exists as of today as the most important, most deadly threat against this Nation, it is quite obvious that the intercontinental bal- listic missile is to become the predominant threat to this Nation. I do not downgrade the manned bomber threat, but of the two sys- tems, the ICBM will, in my opinion, become the dominant one. We are trying here, within the President's budget, to shift our emphasis to give us a good air defense earlier than we would have had it and to put some of the moneys on systems which will better meet the future as we see it. In line with that, we are going to strengthen our offensive capability. As you know, it is my opinion- and has long been Air Force strategy-that offense is the best defense. All. of those things together, plus the space systems which are for the future, as well as having a very direct bearing on the ICBM warning threat, are the integrations. I think with that statement I should tell you where each of the various echelons stands on our proposals, because there is more to it than just. my initial statement. I should of course first state that the Secretary of the Air Force approves both our recommended cutbacks and our recommended addenda. I should next state that the Commander in ,Chief NORAD does not agree completely with our recommendations. I can cite you some of his particular programs that he would like to see continued in greater numbers and at greater cost than we have in this program. OPINION OF GENERAL KUTER ON NEW AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM Mr. MAIioN. The Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command does not fully agree with this package which you have presented here? Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : GJ4-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 General WiHTE. He does not, no, sir. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the cancellation of the super combat centers and the cutbacks in the BOMARC. The De- partment of Defense has approved the cutbacks and has stated its approval of my presenting to you our recommendations for the ad- denda, but is not prepared at this time to state its complete concur- rence with those items which are add-ons or which are substitutions. Mr. MAHON. Do you foresee that we will be notified of DOD approval? Mr. GARLOCK. I assume as soon as Mr. Gates gets back from Europe, it will be taken up with him and you will be advised very promptly of his position on this matter. It is his absence from the country which prevents our presenting the Department of Defense position at this time. Mr. FORD. Does SAC approve of the add-ons? General WFIITE. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. I wanted the picture complete as to who has disapproved and who has approved in the several commands. Mr. MAHON. I would prefer not to yield too much, because I want everyone to have an opportunity to interrogate. Mr. FLOOD. I want to ask just this. This is not personal because you have not been a part of this. Have you been permitted also by the administration Olympians to say to us that it is no longer lese majesty for a Member of Congress to question the Defense Depart- ment budget, and that it is no longer considered that we are aiding and abetting, the enemy if we publicly declare our doubts? I am. just wondering if you have been commissioned to permit us to go that far. You have not been particeps criminis to this operation, but 60 days ago it was made very clear that it was presumptuous and impertinent for us to do what you all have been doing. That is rhetorical. I will answer that myself. General WHITE. It has been my impression that the Congress not only does, but is entitled to say what it thinks. I might say it usually does. I think a fair expression is that some of the things which have been said by this committee and elsewhere have unquestionably had an influence on at least my steeling myself to come up to make this kind of change. Mr. FLOOD. We have been flying in the faces of the gods, you know. We were concerned about whether the wax on our wings would crash us to the ground. Mr. MAHON. Just how unhappy are the people in the North Amer- ican Air Defense Command with the proposed reduction in air de- fense programs? They would be the best witnesses on this but we shall probably not have an opportunity to hear them. You have talked with them about this matter. What are their views? General WHITE. Sir, I would have to start with this type of answer as a preliminary : I have never encountered a major commander yet who wanted to give anything up. I think that is basic to all of them. No commander ever wants to give anything up as long as he can justify utility for it. I think General Muter is one of the most competent officers we have. He has done a superb job as Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command. Now-in more direct response--I will give you some of the items which he feels he needs to Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/280 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 have an ideal defense. He has studied these in increments of annual cost of $5.5 billion down to $4 billion annual cost. In general, he has maintained the BOMARC program at its full strength. In fact, he has added. At $5.5 billion lie has asked that there be ---- BOMARC missiles in the progran i. Mr. MAIION. In other words, he does not want to reduce the B()MARC program as you have recommended. General Wrlrrr;. That is correct, sir. Also, he does not want to can- cel the supercombat centers. Mr. MAn0N. All right. General Wnri :. He wants to build up the NIKE-ZETTS to the maxi- mum capacity possible. He wants to mainl ain---- Mr. MAHON. I do not know what you mean by that. You mean he wants to go into the operational production? General Wsirrt~:. That is correct, sir. He carries that right on down to his lowest level of $4 billion. He wants to maintain the fighter-interceptors at the full current strength without the transfers to the National Guard. He wants to reinstate the F--108. How he does all of that with those figures we have not figured out, because almost from cursory inspection I do not think it can be done. Nevertheless, those are his major items. I do not think of any others that come from the top of my head right away. I should point out that in our program we would stipulate the two major things, the cancellation of the supercombat centers, the cutback of the. BOA [ARC, and then the details of all the rest of the progr. am, of which there are many additions, such as the very significant improve- ment to the fighter-interceptors. I am sure he welcomes that. The new radars he welcomes. The point I am trying to make here is that the detailed disposition of what remains in the program would be almost entirely up to him. Mr. MAITON. I assume that General Kuter opposed the cancellation of the F-108. General Wince. Yes, sir, and would like to reinstate it. Jr. IM.unox. Since he is the field commander and should know most about this, how have you brought yourself to the decision that lie should be overruled in these tremendously important and expensive pro- grams ? General WHrrEE. It. is a very difficult thing. As the Chief of Staff of the service which has cognizance of the budget, I have to consider the requirements of SAC, of the Tactical Air Command, of MATS, and the general support, of the, Air Force. When we are given certain guidelines for the budget, things must fall out. As I stated, I believe, before this committee, to address myself directly to the F-108, I feel that a long-range interceptor is of very great importance, but I was told that we could only develop one manned aircraft, and as between the F-108 and the B-70, after great self-introspection I came up with the belief that the B-70 was the more important. Mr. MAHQN. We will not get into that field, although it is pertinent. Who proposed the changes you have presented? Have you done some studying and some restudying of the plans and programs? Have Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3029CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 General Estes and others made any special surveys? Why have you reached these conclusions at this point? General WiirrE. Sonia time ago, Mr. Chairman, I think I originated the idea that we could have a better overall security position by mak- ing certain changes in the defense program. I gave the job to Gen- eral Estes who, with I think approximately 100 other officers, worked day and night for many weeks in producing a number of solutions tp this problem. WVe studied them very carefully. Also- (Off the record.) POSITION OF SECRFT. RY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Mr. MAHON. This is not just the proposal of General White and hi$ staff, but it represents the idea of others. To what extent does it rep- resent the views of the Secretary of Defense or of the Def ense Depart- ment as such, and to what extent does it represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff '? General Wrirn.- I will take the last one first, if I may. The Joint. Chiefs of Staff have approved the two major elements; the cancella- tion of the super combat centers and the cutback in the BOMARC. The complete briefing was not given to the Joint Chiefs of Staf because they felt they were familiar enough with the problem to take action without a detailed briefing, because they keep abreast of these things. Mr. MAI-ION. Are they solidly behind you General WIIrc s. Yes. Mr. MAIION (continuing). In this proposed addition and change. in configuration of the A it Force budget and program? General WIIrrE. 'Pie additions' have not been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff because that is a service consideration. (Off the record.) Mr. MAIroN. You are recommending actions here which have to do with the destiny and the survival of the Nation. We have a_ lot, at stake. We had a briefing yesterday in which we were discussing estimates of what an all-out atomic exchange would cost in human lives, so we are not playing with some trivial matter here, as you and I and all. present, well know. I want to be sure that this proposal has been very, very well considered and that it represents the best judgment which you have been able to bring to bear in the executive branch of the Government. General WHITE. I have stated the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense have approved the cutbacks and the cancel- lations stipulated, and at least the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Dr. York and others have gone through the same process that I did when I arrived at my decision to make this recommendation to the Department of Defense. Mr. MAHON. They are on your team in this matter? General WI?rrr. I feel sure they are, sir. Mr. MAIION. General Estes, you and a considerable number of Air Force officers have worked on this problem of air defense. Have you worked on it actively in recent weeks? Tell us of your deliberations. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3030CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 General ESTES. All right, sir, I shall. As General White outlined earlier, during the latter part of last year, in attempting to respond to the Department of Defense master plan which you mentioned for the record, the major members of the same group who have prepared the material to which General White has been referring were deeply involved in a determination of how best to meet the master air defense plan. submitted by the OSD. Ob- viously, many portions of this were not completed by them. They were referred to us for detailed completion. Essentially, the members of that group worked on the effort at that time, and then worked with members of the Air Research and Development Command, the Air Materiel Command, our special tech- nical advisory organization at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massa- chusetts, known as ADSID/MITRE, and we drew upon technical information from members of the Air Defense Command. We did not ask them specifically for their detailed ideas for the very simple reason we knew already their ideas would not coincide with ours with reference to reductions, but we drew upon their technical knowl- edge of air defense as necessary in our studies. As General White has said, approximately 100 various technicians from all these organizations were assembled early in February. We went through in minute detail the exact technical status of every single component of the air defense system. Our purpose was to determine whether or not we could in fact meet the schedule, both moneywise and timewise, which we had set for ourselves with ref- erence to each of these components. Our purpose subsequently, after that detailed examination, was to examine every possible alternative to produce an air defense system against the threat to which General White has referred, at the earliest possible time period with the minimum possible dollars. As General White has said, we carne up with on the order of six different alternatives as to how this could be done. Mr. MArrON. When did you come up with these? General EsrEs. I believe, sir, if memory serves me correctly, this was around. the 12th or 15th of February. * It was approximately that period, sir. Mid-February, let me say, without specifying the exact date. Mr. MAHON. What has happened since that time? General EsrEs. Subsequent to detailed discussion of this entire ma- terial with General White and his deputies, we briefed General Kuter, commander of the North American Air Defense Command, General Atkinson, the commander of the U.S. Air Defense Command, and members of their staffs. Of course we briefed our own Secretary and the Under Secretary and their staffs. Mr. MAHON. If necessary, elaborate that for the record, but I want to ask one further question. Just how well did you tie in all of these studies and briefings and deliberations with General Kuter, commander of the North Amer- ican Air Defense Command? Has he really been in this act and has he had a chance to present his views adequately to the officials here in Washington? General WrhITE. May I answer that, please. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : f lA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 General Kuter gave me his comments in writing. He was queried by the Joint (111iiefs of Staff on these two major items and sent in his reply. Mr. MAIHON. Have you anything further on that, General Estes? General ESTES. Only to say, sir, we have briefed members of the OSD staff. As you know, Dr. York's staff has been conducting sim- ilar studies on air defense, and they are very familiar with the ma- terial on which we have been working. (Off the record.) Mr. MAIHON. Tliank you very much, gentlemen. We will see you at 2 o'clock. AFTERNOON SESSION We shall resiuiie our hearing. The actions which are recommended here today by the Air Force have implications which affect the overall defense posture of the United States. It seems to me that actions of this type should not be recommended without consideration havMi g been given them by all the services through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Did the Joint Chiefs study the overall implications of these ro- posals and did the Joint Chiefs approve these proposals? I' am speaking specifically of the reductions in the program. General WllrrE. Tito Joint Chiefs of Staff looked at these specific proposals as to cutbacks, but within the context of purely Air Force programs. There was not a triservice look across the board. There was no comparison of whether it was better to cut out something iii the Army or Navy or Marines and leave the full BOMARC program or supercombat centers in. Mr. MAIION. Was there any consideration given with respect to the impact of this proposal on the NIKE-HERCULES program? General WHITE. To this degree only: That presumably General Kuter will ask for any compensating weapon systems in other service budgets. Ile has asked to maintain the NIKE-HERCULES, as I understand it, under his proposals about where they are, but with this change lie may well ask for more NIKE-HERCULES. Mr. ATnIioN. That eould be true General Willrr;. That could be true. Mr. MAHON. The Joint Chiefs should not sit idly by and see a big hole pulled in our defense structure. General WiirrE. I am sure they have no intention of doing that, sir. Mr. MA1EON. If this proposal had that effect, would it have come. here under these circumstances? General Wirim. It would not. Mr. MAHON. The President submitted to us in January a Defense, Department budget. The total dollars have not been changed dras- tically, though there is a reduction in this proposal. Nevertheless, the program has been clianged quite markedly. It seems to me that we would have, before this is over, an approval by the Budget Bureau and by the President in an amendment to the budget. General Wuri'E. I aiu sure that it is fortlicoming, sir. That is thee point where I stated OSl) was not prepared to give approval to the substance of the addenda. 53292- CO -- 5 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3Q3,CIA-RDP80B0l676R000900030049-9 Mr. MAIION. Do you assume, then, that the Secretary of Defense will probably work out these arrangements upon his return from Europe? General WHITE. I know it is being actively worked on as of the present. Mr. MAiioN. All right. I have before me the final sheet of your statement, General White. You give the reductions and then you give the add-on. Do ,you suppose that it would be better to subtract more money from the BOMARC program? We have downgraded it as one of our weapon systems in this proposal you make. Is the remain- ing BOMARC program a face-saving thing? Should we step com- pletely out of this picture? General WHITE. Not in any respect, Mr. Chairman. That is cer- tainly a very proper and, I may say, searching question. We would not recommended that any BOMARC's be in th is program if we did not have the utmost confidence that the system is going to work. To take the BOMARC's out would really leave a serious gap in our defensive system. As I stated earlier, CINCNORAD does not even approve of this cutback. Some of the money in the BOMALW program is applied to fighter-interceptors. If nothing were done, we would really have a defective air defense system, in my opinion. The money that could be saved by complete cancellation of the BOAARC program would not buy interceptors or other types of defense, in anywhere near the quantities needed, that would be as effective. Mr. MA~EloN. The word "SAGE" a few years ago was more or less a magic word. That is semiautomatic ground environment. It was a great word and we had great plans for it. It has not, apparently, progressed as had been planned, so now you propose this $132 million reduction. Is it wise to downgrade the SAGE system, to make it soft, and so forth? General WHITE. The SAGE system, of course, continues in exist- ence, but we do not build these supercombat centers which, if I am not mistaken, were a subsequent development in which it was pro- posed that certain of these advanced type SAGE computers be placed m hardened positions, hardened to pounds per square inch. (Statement off the record.) General WRITE. You can carry this on ad infinitum and practically put the entire national wealth in this thing bee?ause if you harden your centers, to, say, a thousand pounds per square inch, then, your fighter fields, your subsidiary communications, your BOMARC's, whatever von have, also would have to be. hardened because they equally could l)e destroyed. This way we do not, I think, now expend this money for something which we foresee will not really pay off. We do con- t Tune the SAGE. Remember, however, it will be susceptible to break- down into regional controls. So, if one part goes out, at least you have the other part to continue to operate. I am getting into some technical aspects, but I think General Estes could elaborate in more definitive terms than I have. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : gjA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. MAHON. General Estes, do you feel that the SAGE system, as contemplated in this presentation today, will be a highly significant and important, part of our defense mechanism? General EsrEs. I do, indeed, sir, or I would not recommend it. Mr. MArrON. Do you think we are going to get considerable value for our money with the SAGE system as now envisioned? General ESTES. I (lo, sir. Mr. MAIION. General Friedman, at this point in the record I wish you would place approximately the amount of money which has been provided to date and that which is included in this new proposal for the entire SAGE system and give us a paragraph as to just what the SAGE system does. General FRIEDMAN. We will do that, sir. (The information to be supplied follows:) Program per President's fiscal year 1961 budget--------------------------------- Proposed amended program_______________ Construction and equipment program requirements (in millions) Fiseel year 1959 and prior years $1, 165.9 1, 105.9 Fiscal year 1960 $280.2 138.4 Fiscal year 1961 $235.2 102.8 Balance to completion $291.6 166.9 $1, 072.9 1, 574.9 - -398.9 The proposed amended SAGE system will provide a semiautomatic ground environment for the detection, identification, control, communications, and inter- ception of air-breathing weapons in designated areas of the United States. and Canada. Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? Mr. MAIION. Yes. QUESTION AS TO SAVINGS FROM CANCELLING 130MARC PROGRAM. Mr. ANDREWS. General Estes, you stated that you needed or would get BOMARCS. I believe General White stated we had and you want ilew ones and that will wind up the BOMARC program. General ESTES. Yes, sir. Mr. ANDREWS. Could ,you tell site haw much will cost, or how much could be saved if the whole program were stricken now? General Ful-Eu L\N. If you were to cancel the entire program, this would net a savings on the order of $250 million. We have made a reduction, as we indicate, of $381 million. There was $421.5 million already in the budget. This leaves about $-10 million to carry on, clean u the GSE and otherwise settle out the program. Mr. ANr uIws. The saving would be General FRI DMAN. About $250 million. Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. Mr. SIKES. May I ask a question at that point? Mr. MAIION. Yes. Mr. SINES. Could you recapture all of the $250 million? General FrUEDMAN. Yes, sir; that is net-sustaining the cancella- tion costs. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3%4 CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Mr. SIKFS. What could you use for a weapon as a substitute for the BOMARC in the areas where you have programed BOMARC as an air defense weapon? General FRIEDMAN. I would prefer to have General Estes answer that, sir. General ESTES. Mr. Sikes, I did not want to use my own judgment on this particular point and, therefore, I sent a message to our Air Defense Command and explained to them the extent of the cutback which we have just been discussing here and pointed out to them the approximate amount of savings which would be realized if we went for a zero BOMARC-B program, as expressed by General Friedman a moment ago. I asked the Air Defense Command to examine this and to deter- mine what alternate weapon could be put in and whether or not that alternate weapon for the amount of money would be the equivalent military capability. I further asked them if they would check their answer with the headquarters of NORAD, with the Commander of North American Air Defense Command, and then send me a reply. Their reply stated essentially that they did not under any circum- stances consider that they could purchase for the amount of money General Friedman has just mentioned enough fighter-interceptors- that is the only weapon you could put in in. place of these BOMARC squadrons to be the military equivalent of the squadrons of IBOMARC's which we have me:ntioned earlier. 28 UE, equiv- alents. They stated in essence in their opinion. on the basis of the assumptions they had made with reference to the competence required in the area, that they believed they would have. to purchase fighters wi a 1-for-1 basis to equal the same military equivalent. This would be a dollar cost far in excess of the savings we. have discussed. Mr. SIKEs. Could you make an estimate of the dollar cost? General FRIPDTTAN. I think a good rule-of-thumb, assuming you are going to buy the F-106, which is probably the one you would buy if you were talking about the same time period, it would cost you- including development, attrition, and everything else-on the order of about $4.4 million for the fighter, the 106., and $3.2 million-inchud- iug your test and research missiles-for the BOMARC. In other words, it would be about $4 million per article to replace it on a 1-for-1 basis. So it would cost you about $1 billion total to go the fighter route. These costs are on a historical basis. To be more realistic we should consider that development costs are behind us. I will provide for the record here what these costs would be on. the basis of simply procuring additional aircraft. (The matter referred to follows:) The eosts for substituting --- F-106s for the same. number of 13OMARC R Would total approximately $900 million eompared to the $460 million for this number of BOMARC B's. Neither of these amounts include development costs. Mr. SIKEC. What. is the comparative time of availability of the two systems? Which would be available earlier? General. ESTER. T do not think there would be a great deal of differ- ence, sir. The 101 line is still open. The 106 line ends in . I do not know about the leadtime. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : ~Jj4-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Assuming that the 101 and 106 lines are both open, there would be a gap but some of it could be made up by extra funds, I would feel you have about an 18-month leadtime to get started. I can provide for the record here costing data for some alternative that would price out somewhere near the added $250 million saving which General Fried- man mentioned. (The matter referred to follows:) Alternative 1: Three additional squadrons of F-101B aircraft can be provided for approximately $242 million with aircraft deliveries starting in January 1:162. Alternative 2: Three additional squadrons of F-106 aircraft can be provided at a cost of $300 million with aircraft deliveries starting in January 1962. Mr. FORD. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. MArroN. Mr. Ford. Mr. Foxn. If you cancel BOMARC--B now, the statement has been made you would recover $250 million. General FRIEDMAN. That is right, sir. This is in addition to the $381 million that our proposal contemplates. Mr. FoRD. How much would you have spent on BOMARC-B that would have no return whatsoever? General FRiEDMAN. I can get that in just a moment. Mr. FORD. Give use a round figure. I am certain it is substantial. General FRIEDMAN. Yes, it is substantial. On the BOM ARC- B, procurement of which started in fiscal year 1958-and we are involved through fiscal year 1960= since we have essentially cut off procurement from the 1961 budget-it would have been about $800 million in pro- gram value. I would say some $700 to $750 million of that is prob- ably expended as of now. Mr. WHITTEN. General White, during World War II, shortly after Pearl Harbor, for some months thereafter, here around the Capitol on top of most of the buildings you could see these mounted guns. I do not know whether it gave any sense of security to Members and others, but finally one of our colleagues went up to see and they were wooden. It would not hurt anything in case we had been under attack and if they contributed to the Congress' sense of security, perhaps it was all right. I If have heard the testimony right about BOMARC, at the present time it is in fact an unproven weapon system with high hopes after one or two tests that folks kind of indicate may be all right-to release this information showing that you are going to have BOMARC around these eastern highly populous areas, is that some more of this wooden- guns-on-the-Capitol business as it stands now, as subtracting from that your high hope as to what this weapon system might do in the future? General WirrTL. _1 do not see any relationship. This is a weapon system that is going to work. The wooden gun never would work, I am sure. Mr. WIIITTEN. As of this time you just have high hopes; is that right ? General Wjin s. As of this time we have a great deal of scientific and test background which makes those hopes rational. Mr. WrrrTTLN. How many things have you had in the past that you did phase out where your hopes came to naught in your experience at high level? Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3360 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 General WIIITE. I can think of some weapon systems which we did not purchase, not necessarily because they did not work out but because something else better came along. Mr. WHH'TEN. I am just going to ask one question but to point out a whole lot of things here. Secretary Sharp was before this committee a few weeks ago asking us to go along with purchasing five planes, I believe, from Lockheed. It is the third time the Air Force has been in here to try to get a committee to go along with a contract with Lockheed for such planes. One time they needed the planes for executive, use, another time they needed them for another use. They got them neither time. He finally let the matter come out on the table when he said somebody in the Air Force indicated to Lockheed and McDonnell that if they had compe- tition on a certain type of plane, the Department likely would need some. So the Air Force felt that since they had had that discussion, apparently orally, there was some obligation to buy at least enough of the planes to justify what Lockheed spent without any contract whatsoever. On the face of it, it looks to me as though there is possibly an element of that in this BOMARC. General WHITE. There is absolutely none, sir. Mr. FLOOD. There is something else, Mr. Chairman. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. MAHON. Will Canada continue the use of the BOMARC missile? General WHITE. Yes, sir ; they very much wish to. Mr. WHiTTEN. I would not want to charge that, but I want the record to show that from the press the last couple months this matter has not been completely outside of political discussion in this coun- try, this matter of defense. General Wiiim :. I can only say, Mr. Whitten, that we have high confidence in this weapon system and that it is a. very important part of our area air defense. Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman; I want to be sure I heard the answer to your question about Canada. I)id I understand you to say that Canada does want to use the BOMARC in its defense system and is, in fact, preparing to do so? General WHITE. That is correct. Mr. MAHON. In short, it is Canada's plan to continue with some considerable dependence upon the BOMARC system? General WHrra. That is right. Mr. MAHON. It is the plan of this Government to continue with some dependence upon the BOMARC system. You are phasing out the system insofar as requesting appropriations is concerned. You have reduced your appropriation request in the fiscal 1961 budget for BOMARC substantially. General FRIEDMAN. That is correct, sir. Mr. MAITON. How much money do you now request for BOMARC? General FnuWMAN. There will be about $40 million left. The President's budget contains an amount of $421.5 million for procure- ment of BOMARC. We are reducing that, by $381.1 million. Mr. MAHON. So there is still some financing for BOMARC but relatively little money as compared with your January request; is tliat right? Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : %A-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 General FRIEDMA\. That is correct, sir. Mr. MA-TON. What will there be in 1962 according to present plans for the BOMAPC missile? General FRIEDMAN. Fiscal year 1961 would finalize our procure- ment, Mr. Chairmaii-except for follow-on spares. Mr. MAHON. You might have some construction problems, or would you? General FREEDMAN. No, sir. Mr. MAHON. I want to explore this matter a little further with respect to the additions. As I said this morning, I feel very strongly that we ought to do more about the airborne alert. I real- ize there is some money in the current budget for fiscal 1961 for pre- paring for an airborne alert, but it surprises me that in this revision of your program you did not allocate more money to the airborne alert. I think it was a big mistake, and-I am speaking only for myself-I do not understand why you failed to do this. I say that is especially trite in view of the fact that you made some reductions. If we can save money, we want to save it, millions or bil- lions, but we want it well-balanced defense program and are concerned about not being caught off balance during the next 2 or 3 years, which are very significant years. Another thing I do not understand it all is why, in view of the fact that you freed some money through this adjustment, that you did not undertake to do something about the problem of airlift. General Le.mnitzer tells us he is getting together with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General White, and that he has some hopes we may work something out. Here is an opportunity to work some- thing out and nobody tries to do anything about it. I would just like to know why, in making this revision, which is certainly quite major you did not do something about these things which seem to me to be very high priority. Will you speak to that, General White? General Wiirri. Yes, sir. May I refer to the airborne alert first? Mr. MAHoN. All right. General Whir%. The decision on the part of the Secretary of De- fense was made very recently on that subject, and there was "t differ- ence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the level of airborne alert. I had my full opportunity to present my side of the case, as has General Power. The Department of Defense ruled against my position on it, and it would have been a futile exercise to bring it up to them and expect approval for additional funds for the airborne alert. That is a decision, insofar as the Department of Defense is concerned, which has been taken. Moreover, section 612 of last year's appropriation act, as I under- stand it, intends that if the Department of Defense and the Presi- dent determine that more fiords are required for the airborne alert, the Congress has granted them the authority to go ahead with it. Mr. MArroN. You have the authority but you would not actually have the money unless you took it from something else or incurred a deficiency. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/?9 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Mr. GARLOCIi. We would assume if we got Presidential approval we 'would also get approval for a deficiency. General WirrrE. That is the answer on that., VIr. Fr.oon. You mean if Congress is in session. Mr. GARLOCK. We have the right in general law to run it deficiency. Mr. MATRON. Whether Congress is in session or not. Mr. FLOOD. I am speaking to the point of Congress being in session or not. This can come before or after, but, to act without our being here is interesting. General WTTrrEP. On the airlift, Mr. Chairman, I subscribe to Gen- eral Lemnitzer's statement that the Air Force and the Army have reached certain agreementsto attempt to get; more airlift. In this particular instance. the first problem was to not gut the air defense but to improve our existing air defense and still save some money in order to improve the future aspects of air defense against the TCBM threat. On that basis our first priority in putting addenda here was in the air defense field. The second was that. I believed that the ATLAS add-ons take prior- ity over airlift at this time, particularly in view of the fact that, if you will note, the expenditures are what have limited us to the items that we have put up for addenda. There is actually more NOA available as between the proposed changes and the President's budget than there are expenditures available. We did go to the Department of Defense with a request for addi- tional programs and authorization-additional changes-to make up the full NOA. That list did include a request for additional airlift. Mr. MAHON. It me get this clear : The add-ons which you have presented us today are not all the -add-ons you requested of the De- partment of Defense in connection with this presentation? General WHITE. That is correct, sir. Mr. MAxox. What was the stumbling block with these additions and why did you not get the funds and approval, or do you know? General Wtimi . Yes, sir; I know. It is an expenditure problem. We must abide, by Service, as to the expenditures that can be made in any given fiscal year. Mr. MAxox. Is your expenditure limitation for fiscal year 1961 $18.6 billion? General FRIEDMAN. $18.6 billion; yes, sir. General WHITE. These addenda bring us up to that figure. Mr. MAHON. Were you not already up to that point? General FRIEDMAN. We were. But, on a comparable basis--al- though we dropped out some $500 million and we put in $300 million-- the space programs and the missile programs spend out at a higher rate than the types of programs which we dehcted. Therefore, on an expenditure basis we net out.. The point is that we cannot use the additional $140 million without exceeding the $18.6 billion expendi- ture. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/303.9CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 . :ADDENDA REQUESTED VERSUS ADDENDA APPROVED Mr. MASON. I would like for you to place in the record at this point Just what you asked for in this addenda as compared to what you have. presented here. General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. (The information follows : ) Addenda requested versus addenda approved [Millions] Requested Atlas ------------------------------------------- Space------------------------------------------ sMEWS............... ? --------------- Rocket development _________-_-_______________ Minuteman-------------------- - -- - - ---- -- - --- OAR-9/A60-18---------------------- ---- MATS MOD (on-sheltprocurement)-----_---- Interceptorimprovement ------------- -------- C-130-B---- ------------------------------ Cadin--- Surveillance____________________________________ 1960 new 1961 now 1960 new 1961 new obligational obligational obligational obligational authority authority authority authority 90.0 136.0 1 90.0 136.0 25.6 45.8 28.6 35.8 14.9 27.6 14.9 27.6 4.0 12.0 0 0 47.7 27.0 0 16.0 16.0 0 75.0 0 0 136.2 136.2 0 32.0 0 1.0 0 so 0 1.3 16.4 1.3 15.4 +138.8 +131.8 I Construction authorization required. 2 No amount included, but approval of item was contemplated. Mr. MAIION. I have this pa e before me and I would like for you to have it before you, Genera Friedman. You might handle these figures, if you like. I am looking at "Interceptor improvement," $136.2 million. million. Is that what you asked for? Was that your request? General FRIEDMAN. That was our request. Mr. MAIION. Surveillance, $15.4 million. General FRIEDMAN. That is correct. Mr. MAIION. BMEWS, $27.6 million. General FRIEDMAN. That is what we asked for. Mr. MAIION. GAR.-9, and so forth, $15 million. General FRIEDMAN. That coincides with our request. Mr. MAIION. Space, $35.8 million. General FRIEDMAN. We requested $45.8 million. Mr. MAIION. ATLAS, $136 million. Is that what you asked for? General FRIEDMAN. It is, sir. Mr. MAJION. That will give you how many additional ATLAS? Mr. GARLOCK. For the record, we still hav'e a problem with Mr. Sheppard's Committee on Military Construction. That is being handled there and we will take that up then. Mr. MAIION. You can discuss that with Mr. Sheppard in a few minutes. You got all you asked for and you' ot;" Approval, tentative ap- proval, for - wldtf you asked for, in all othese programs: Whit about MINUTE"MAN?_ Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/304cPIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 General FRIEDMAN. For the MINUTEMAN, we asked for an amount of $20.7 million more in our initial discussions than is, shown in the addenda here. Mr. MAI3ON. Why was it reduced? General FRIEDMAN. It was reduced on the basis which General White discussed, that this appeared to be the maximum funds we could apply and still remain within the expenditures reflected in the President's Budget. General WHITE. May I put it this way : The list that you have read adds up to the amount of expenditures which we have deleted by our proposed changes. Mr. MAnox. I seethe point. General WHITE. We have the Department of Defense authoriza- tion to-state that we have made these recommendations to them. The other recommendations which you are now pursuing do not have that same degree of Department of Defense approval. Under questioning `I am certain that we can state what the addi- tions were; however, there is that distinction. Mr. MAHON. That is exactly what I am trying to get from you now, a statement of what you sought, if you sought anything, in addi- tion to the ';addenda which we have ,lust .counted: here. You explained the MINUTEMAN. General WHITE. The lower MINUTEMAN -figure is within the addenda. Mr. MAHON. Within the,spending ceiling? General WHITE. Yes. I think General Friedman is more facile with figures than I am. General FRIEDMAN. To go down the list, sir, we asked for $715 mil- lion for modernization of MATS. Mr. MAIION. You did ask? General FRIEDMAN. We did ask. Mr. MAnox. What would you do with that money? General FRIEDMAN. It is not included in. the list. Mr. MAHON. I know, but you asked for it and you must have asked for it for a purpose. General FRIEDMAN. What did we want to do with it ? Mr. MAHON. Yes, sir. General FRIEDMAN. I thought you asked what did I do with it. Mr. MAHON. What would you do with it? General FRIEDMAN. General Holloway will respond. General HOLLOWAY. We asked for that as a part of our overall re- quirement of $128 million to buy two squadrons' worth of off-the- shelf-type aircraft that would be modified to the minimum extent necessary to do the MATS job. The type of aircraft under con- sideration, we do not have'a final selective position on it. It would probably be either the cargo version of the KG135, the CL-44 Canadian aircraft, or the DC-8, sir.' Mr. MAHION. This would be the area you would spend $75 mil- lion on? General HOLLOWAY. That is correct. On the estimates we have, it appears that we could get- the first of these aircraft, and there would be a total. of 37 of them including at- trition, to be exact, in 1962. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : (ZWA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. MAHON. In fiscal year 1962 you will be able to. get these aircraft? General HOLLOWAY. Starting to get them. Mr. MAIION. If you will not be spending the money in fiscal year 1961, why would the expenditure limitation deter you here? General HOLLOWAY. No, sir; I am sorry. This is when they would be realized in the inventory and it would require expenditure of 1961 money. General FRIEDMAN. You would really have to Mr. GARLOCK. As soon as the contractor has his first payroll, we have to start reimbursing him. Mr. MAHON. What else was included in this package. when it was presented to the Department of Defense? General FRIEDMAN. We requested an amount of $40 million for DISCOVERER. The addendum which we are presenting today, with DOD approval, contains $30 million. We had requested an increase for the C-130B aircraft-which is the troop carrier aircraft assigned to TAC-to raise the production rate from two to three per month. This required an additional $32 million. Mr. MAIION. Is this the sort of thing that General Lemnitzer wants done, General White? General WRITE. Yes, sir. Mr. MAIHON. Mr. Mendel Rivers of the Armed Services Committee is very much concerned about this and lie has held some hearings on it and is going to appear before this committee next week. Insofar as I know, this is the kind of thing that the friends of airlift want done, and yet the Defense Department is not requesting it apparently. General WRITE. It is exactly the kind of thing, and I might say we want them, too, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MAHON. What else? General FRIEDMAN. Only one other item. We requested $12 million to pursue an accelerated program of rocket development. I think General Holloway might explain that.. Mr. MAHON. What do you mean? General HOLLOWAY. One of the tremendous expense items we fore- see in the future, in both missiles and space, is the cost of rocket boosters. They are very expensive. The nozzles, for example, are made of the highest quality materials. They have to be cut to eery fine tolerances, and all in all they are the most expensive. There is enough research to date to indicate that it is possible, and, in fact, it appears quite feasible, to make rocket motors that are on an order of magnitude cheaper than the ones we have today. For example, if you could make a nozzle out of an ablative material, such as the nose cone of a missile, that would still work but would deteriorate at such a rate that it still is workable until the burnout point. It would probably cost a tenth or less than what the current nozzles cost. There are other areas, such as variable geometry of nozzles through a sort of parametric spike, that might be preset or ultimately auto- mated in flight. This would enable you to build one basic rocket Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/49: CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 motor design that would have, a tremendous number of applications, and this would be a cheap way to get flexibility. There are a lot of areas like this that we feel would save a tremendous amount of money in the future as we go into space, if we get a little more research and development money to accelerate it now. That is the nature of this request. Mr. MA iox. General Friedman, will you place in the record a statement of where all of these add-on funds, which are included in your submission today, would fit in the appropriation bill structure? General FRIEDMAN. We will be happy to do that. (The information follows:) Air defense reorientation sainniary of adjustments by appropriation [Millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1960 n8w obligational autho;lty Present program Aircraft procurement--------- 89.2 Missile procurement ----_____- 1,338.4 Military construction --------- 517.9 Researcb, development, test, and evaluation______________ 351.1 Other procurement___________ 510.4 2,807.0 Fiscal year 1961 new obligations]. authority Revised program Present program Revised program 89.2 81.9 218.1 136.2 1 338 4 1 824 7 1 546 7 --278 0 , . 557.9 -------40.0 , . 166.8 , . 146.1 . -20.7 376.7 25.6 296.4 407.2 110.8 429.8 -80.6 423.4 351.4 -72.0 2,792.0 2, 793. 2 --123.7 Mr. MAIION. Will you also give us information at this point in the record as to where these items would fit into your program insofar as appropriation language is concerned, if they should be approved? General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. (The information follows:) The program adjustments which were discussed would not require any changes in appropriation language. These changes could be accommodated within the terms of the appropriation language and general provisions which are now in effect and as proposed in the President's budget for fiscal year 1961. Mr. MAIION. Will you also state- what the situation was with re- spect to your original fiscal 1961 submission with regard to this addenda which is included and the addenda which you sought to have included in your submission here in recent weeks to the Secretary of Defense? General FRIED 1:AN. Yes, sir. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :4IA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 (The information follows:) Addenda requested versus addenda approved [Millions of dollars] President's fiscal year 1961 budget I Addenda requested Addenda approved ATLAS -------------- -------------------------- -------------- 991.2 136.0 136.0 Space------------------------------------------- -------------- 316.0 45.8 35.8 BMEWS------------ --- ----------------------------------- 107.3 27.6 27.6 Rocket development --------------------------------_-_------ MINUTEMAN------ --------------------------------------- 23.7 389.4 12.0 47.7 ----------87.0 Gar-9/ASO-18----------------------------------------------- -------------- 15.0 15.0 MATS MOD (on shelf procurement) ------------------------- Interceptor improvement----- _----------------------------- ---------81.9 75:0 136.2 ---------136.2 C-130-B------------- ---------------------------------------- 70.4 32.0 Surveillance --------- -------------------------------------- 92.9 15.4 15.4 Total --------------------------------------------------- 393.0 'Excludes military construction. Mr. MAHON. As suggested this morning, Mr. Sheppard, as chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee, along with Mr. Sikes, Mr. Whitten, and Mr. Laird, in addition to their work on this commit- tee., also have an important responsibility in connection with the pro- gram for military construction. Construction is involved in ways which I do not fully understand at this point, but as agreed to this morning, I will recognize Mr. Sheppard for 30 minutes and then I will recognize Mr. Ford, following which we will proceed in the regular order. Mr. FLOOD. That is going to make it 10 minutes to 4? Mr. MAHON. We also agreed that we will stay here until we get this completed this afternoon. Mr. SHEPPARD. General Friedman, this morning I think you gave an answer to the question I am going to ask, but I would like to have it in here so that my questions will be in sequence and continuity. I think your statement was that the total add-ons, as such, came to approximately $400 million; is that correct? General FREEDMAN. It was $393 million, sir, in new obligating authority. Mr. SHEPPARD. The total of all of the add-ons? General FRIEDMAN. That is correct. General WLIITE. All of the add-ons that fall within the expenditure limitation. Mr. SrHEPPARD. It is my understanding, and this has been discussed in different ways here this morning but I would like to get it clear in my mind at the moment, that insofar as the total clearance for presenta- tion to this committee is concerned of the program you are presenting presently, the reductions, yes; add-ons, question mark. Is that a correct or an incorrect interpretation General WrrmTE. Add-ons to the extent of equaling the expenditures approved by the Department of the Air Force for us to- present to this committee. The add-ons that the chairman asked about, which equal the amount of NOA, have not been approved even for presentation to the committee by the Department of Defense. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/344: CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 I would put it this wa.y : The Department of Defense has been silent on the subject. Mr. SIIErrARD. And would obviously follow a different type of presentation than the one you are presently making because of your reprograming possibilities and potentialities; is that right? General FRIEDMAN. That is correct. Mr. SIIEPPARD. What will be the effect of your present proposal on the military construction requirement in the presently funded pro- gram that is pending before our committee that has jurisdiction over construction? General FRIEDMAN. As Mr. Garlock indicated, there will be a prob- lem insofar as authorization is concerned. However, Mr. Sheppard, we were able, by an adjustment to programs, to hold to the amounts contained in the President's budget for military construction. That is $740 million including all accounts, and $725 million for the regular Air Force specifically. In other words, there was no change in NOA. There will be some change, however, in program composition which would be discussed in detail with your subcommittee. Mr. SIIEPPARD. Have you pursued this situation in the changing of your requirements, moneywise, in your construction bill so that, there is no question of compatibility or detrimental reflections on the other services' construction requirements? General FRIEDMAN. We do not know, sir: the only possibility is that which was raised by General White this morning insofar as General Kilter's position with regard to NIKE-HERCT?LES. I do not know that there would be any other possible impact on the other services than the one on the NIKE-IIER.CITLES. General WHITE. This would be a new problem. I ain quite confi- dent that anything we have in the public works side of this would not have any impingement on any other service. Mr. SHEPPARD. What was the basis for your decision to stop BOMARC with the last site? What. was the basis of the decision to stop at that particular place? General WHITE. I suppose it really was money, Mr. Sheppard. We had to figure out the most economical place to make these cut- backs in order to have the money, we hoped, to go on to these other programs which we feel, in the overall context, will provide a better military posture for the Nation. Mr. GARLOCK. It is a combination of where we happened to stand in the production of missiles and where we happened to stand in con- struction. This could not help have a bearing on this. General Estes said these sites are all in the Northeast, if you recall. Mr. SHEPPARD. Are you going to be in a position, when you appear before the Military Construction Subcommittee, to give the members of that committee a rather firm answer as to the acquiescence in this program in its entirety and firmness? I do not think from a practical standpoint you have gone all the way upstairs yet. General WITITE. Yes, sir; we have, but upstairs has not gone all the way yet. That is the difference. Mr. SIIErrARV. I do not want to be unnecessarily political, and that is not my point of view, but in press releases and declarations, the President of the United States has said that he knows what he Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 4CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 is talking about when it conies to the military. In the absence of his voicing his particular and personal concept of this situation at the moment, I obviously have to take the position that we are still unde- fined to that degree, is that right? General WHITE. I am confident that the Department of Defense will be able to clear this up. Mr. SHEPPARD. I have confidence in the President., too, but at the moment neither you nor I have sampled that confidence, have we? General `BITE. We cannot go beyond where we are. Mr. SHEPPARD. He may take your judgment 100 percent but I have known him to refuse to take the judgment of others; have you not? General WaiTn. That has occurred. Mr. SHEPPARD. That is a problem until it is finalized and cleared up ? is that correct? 4eneral WHITE. Yes. Mr. SHEPPARD. It occurs to me, gentlemen-and I tried to elicit this in responses in the presentation very carefully this morning-in this particular presentation you are presently addressing yourselves to, if it is consummated this puts a definite approval on the BOMARC as a. good missile? General WHITE. Yes, sir. Mr. SHEPPARD. That is it? General WIHTE. Yes, sir. Mr. SHEPPARD. What has been your experience with the testing program for BOMARC A and B since you were last before this com- mittee? What is your particular attitude at the, moment as compared to what your attitude was then? There obviously must be some change which has not been brought out to my satisfaction, and which I would like an answer to. General WHITE. We have here Colonel Dietrich who can discuss that in detail. Mr. ShIEPPAR.D. Very well, whomever you desire. Colonel DIE?riztoH. May I ask your permission to give a short briefing before we get into the question and answer? Then I will be glad to try and answer the questions you have. Mr. SHErrARD. What was that comment? I did not get your answer to that. Colonel DIFTracn. With your permission, I would like to give a presentation very briefly winch summarizes the flight test program for the A and B missile system. Mr. FLOOD. Wait a minute. This is not right. Mr. SIRES. The witness is answering the question. Mr. FLOOD. I know he is answering the question but who runs this committee, an Air Force lieutenant colonel or the members? Mr. SIRES. Customarily the principal witness may defer to other witnesses in our hearings. Mr. FLOOD. I object, Mr. Chairman, because for 3 months we have decided that we are going to have a special hearing on BOMARC. Mr. MAHON. And we are going to leave a hearing on BOMARC. Mr. FLOOD. Again? Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/346, CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Mr. MAxoN. Yes. Mr. FLOOD. Fine. I love that. Mr. SIIErPARD. In your response to the question I have just raised, you are going to present a chart and briefing to the committee later that will answer my questions? Colonel I IETRICH. Yes, sir. Mr. SHE:rrARD. All right. I wish you would insert in the record the percentage of completions and expenditures to date on each of the BOMARC sites and the esti- mated cost of canceling the remaining work at each site. General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. (The information requested follows:) BOAT A /?C sites completed and under contract Percent complete (Apr. 1, 1960) Curr work estim (thous ent ing ate ands) Cancellation costs (thou- sands) Recoup (thousands) srcGuire--------------------------------------- $1 3.6390 $13,690 0 Aufiolk--------------------------------? --- 1 3, 190 13,190 0 Otis------------------------------- --------- 7,610 7 610 0 1)0w 7,750 , 7,750 0 Langley (Site 1)----------------------?---- 6.060 6,000 0 (Site 2)------------------------------ 2.700 2,170 $530 Kincheloe------------------------------------ 3,840 3 240 600 Dulnth 3.800 , 3,230 570 Niagara --------------------------------- ...... 3,840 3, 270 570 1'nine------------- 3,040 2,480 500 Adair------------------------------------ 3,000 21780 220 Travis-------------------------- ----- V d b 3,340 1, 990 1, 150 an en erg --- ------------------------ 3,000 2,440 560 Mr. SHEPPAR.D. When did you let the contracts for the last four sites, if you have done so? (The information requested follows:) Sites for which no construction contracts have been awarded: Fiscal year: Site 1959-------------------------------------------------- Malmstrom. 1959----------------------------------------- ------- Glasgow. 1959 -------------------------------------------------- Minot. 1961-------------------------------------------------- Charleston. Last four sites for which construction contracts were awarded: 1959------------------------------------------------------------------ Paine------------- Aug. 4,1959 Aug. 1959-------------------------------------------------`---------- Adair- ----------- Do. 1`'4159 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Travis ------------ ----------- Oct. 28,1959 1959-----------------------------------------------------------'--------- Vandenberg------- Vandenberg ------- Aug. 3,1959 Mr. GARLOCK. The last four we let were on the west coast and we will give you the dates when we let those contracts. Mr. WAIT rEN. Will you. yield to me briefly to ask him if he means by that that you have some authorization but have not let them? Mr. GArr.ocic. Yes. We have additional site authorizations and money where we have not let any contracts. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 #1'CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. SHF;PPARD. In the letting of those contracts, was your A. & E. work perfected at the time you let the contracts, and, if so, to, what degree? General CuRTIN. I am sorry but. I did not hear. Mr. SHEPPARD. Read the question, please. (The question was read.) Mr. SIIEPPARD. Perhaps the word "perfected" should be supplanted by the word "definitized" so you could use the contract procedure for some degree of understanding without going into an explanation of what will be done without a, lot of change orders and so forth. General CuRTIN. Yes, Mr. Sheppard. The A. & E. work was definitized to permit orderly progress of the work to the standard we hope to achieve in all construction. Mr. SHEPPARD. All right; that is your answer and you are respon- sible for it. I anl. not. General CuRTIN. Yes, sir. Mr. SHEPPARD. What recoupments would be possible if the last four sites were stopped as of now? General CuRTIN. The last four sites for which contracts have been let? Mr. SIIEPPARD, The gentleman on your right said we let four on the west coast and those are the ones we are addressing ourselves to exclu- sively at the moment. General CuRTIN. Itow much money can be saved? Mr. SHEPPARD. That is right. General CuRTIN. I cannot give you a precise figure but I can give you an order of magnitude. I suspect that the savings will be an average of up to $600,000 per site, sir. Mr. SIIEPPARD. In other words, those sites have proceeded in their construction completeness to that degree? General CURTIN. T am now trying to estimate what the contractor will buy out on a negotiated basis. Usually we get taken pretty badly on this. Mr. SIIEPPARD. I can go along with that. EFFECT OF PROPOSED REVISIONS OR OTIIEP. ASPECTS OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMME This particular presentation this morning, General White, is in- triguing to me, in a way. I am not being critical at all, but I ant thoroughly curious about the whole situation. What is the ultimate going to be? To me this more or less punches right in the middle of your so- called air defense program and changes the complete philosophy- perhaps I should not say "complete" but I will say "proportion- ately"-and to a large degree changes the complexion of the decisions made in this particular field up until, we will say, this presentation. It really switches the entire technique, does it not? General WIIrrE. I do not think it is as radical as that, Mr. Shep- pard. It does takw funds from defense against the air-breathing threat. as presented in the basic 1961 budget to produce a lower level than planned under that program for defense against the air-breath- Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/304$CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 ing threat, but provides a better than existing defense at an earlier period, and by virtue of the savings proposes to put the funds on what we consider to be against higher risks. Mr. Sr3EPPARD. This also goes beyond the abilities of the BOMARC itself, or any missile of like character as far as that is concerned. This is now influencing what I understand to be a large portion of our communication requirements as heretofore presented and definitely indicated as necessary. (general Wiirrs. Communications, sir? Mr. SHEPPARD. Yes. I am talking about; your SAGE operation. Mr. GARLOCK. SAGE operations and large communications. As a matter of fact, we have special authority for entering into these lease agreements with the telephone companies. We have not made any evaluation as to the extent to which this change may modify that particular cost. Mr. SHF,1.'PARD. Insofar as we know at the moment, this has not been shaken down to the degree where you feel justified in saying to this committee that it is going to have any effect of diminishing or increasing? Mr. GARLOCii. It would have to diminish. It is a case of how much. Mr. SHEPPARD. To what degree are we downgrading that so-called communications requirement as against the total communications re- quirement as heretofore justified before the committee? Mr. GARLOCri. I am premising my statement on the basis that there will be less in dollars. Every time you take out a radar or any other installation of that kind that has to be connected with another place, you have taken out the fixed communication line we had to have with it. That would not necessarily have any effect on the overall com- rnunications problem; it would not necessarily. If you remember, on that area on that that showed white with no radars--well, when we had planned to put radars and all of those things in there, we would have had to put in communications which would have been associated just with this system but would not have been associated with any other commands and control communications for general use. Mr. SHEPPARD. In other words, in dropping out what is being de- leted from the SAGE program at the moment, this, then, is not going to have any detrimental effect upon your so-called communica- tions system that previously was justified before this committee as being an intense requirement for backup purposes and operational purposes? Mr. GARr.oari. That is my opinion, but I would rather have my cohorts in uniform comment on that. Mr. SHEPPARD. Whoever wishes to answer that. General ESTES. I would say that is correct. It has no impact on tali at. Mr. FLOOD. I do not understand the question and answer. If I understand the question, I do not believe the answer. Mr. SIrEPPARD. My question was predicated upon the following: We have all sat here and listened to the story on SAGE requirements. The requirements for what? Backup and operational requirements. That, is the way it was presented and conveyed, as I recall. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 4CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 We needed tliis as a secondary requirement. And now, by backing out of it, what are we losing in the communication aspect? The gen- tleman said "Nothing." Mr. FLOOD. Is that right? Is that what you said? General EsTES. In the SAGE system we are talking about putting in, there are communication requirements for those centers that have direct connections wtih radars, direct connections between centers and direct connections from centers to combat centers and direct connec- tions to Norad. In addition to those regular circuits, there are alter- nate routings if you lose one line, so you have another line. Those are backup lines. Then there are certain engineered circuits you can call out if you require further backup. In the supercombat center program, which we are recommending be deleted, you would have had to provide additional communications to those centers in addition to the communications you had otherwise. Mr. FLOOD. I know all of that, but I think what Mr. Sheppard im- plied was that if all of that is true, why did you ask for it in the first place? General WnrrE. To go with the supercombat centers we previously asked for. General ESTEs. That is required for SAGE and is still going to be there. It has to be there. It. has to be there for the supercombat ce-- ters and that all comes out. Mr. FLOOD. I do not want to cause any trouble with this thing. Forgot that I brought it up. Mr. Rmu pARD. What you have done here is to eliminate your so- called hardened Norad headquarters approach that heretofore you were interested in securing? General WnrT>. That is correct. Mr. SmWPARD. That ties right back again into what you are talk- ing about because there were component parts in the hardened opera- tion. At least, that is my interpretation of all of the testimony f have heard. General Esms. The hardened communications associated with the hardened combat center would go out. Mr. SH EPPARD. You are dropping this out and SAGE? General EsTES. As far as the supercombat center is concerned. General WinTE. Associated combat centers drop. Mr. SrrEPPARD. What are you going to do on the Colorado situation You have about a million dollar road running up the hill to nowhere. What is going to happen? General WHITE. We intend not to build it as of now. Mr. Srrr;PPnED. That falls out with all other so-called hardened headquarter presentations we have had heretofore? General WnmTis. Hardened ones; yes, sir. This is in the air defense field we are talking about. Mr. S7[1:PPARD. General White, I know that is true, but insofar as you know in your requirements as of the moment, your answer is correct. Now, if we come along later on--and I am not quarreling with it at all-and if there is something unforeseen at the moment which de- velops, you might possibly use it, but as of the moment the answer is "No" ? Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 General Wriiz '. That is correct. Mr. SHEPPARD. Because that falls by the wayside, the rest of them do? General WniTE. That is correct. Mr. SFnErr_Ann. What do you propose to do about the so-called CADIN communications system for which you are presently request- ing funds in this year's program? General ESTES. The CADIN package, remains essentially the same, Mr. Sheppard. This will certainly require some modification of the C.ADIN package. It is impossible, however, to state overnight what those modifica tions will be. It will be necessary for the Canadians and NORAD jointly to review this entire CADIN package. Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to deviate from construction and go back to other matter for a moment. General White, you have many airplanes constantly flying with some in use for detection and other purposes. It would occur to me that when. you have trouble with them, it is most important for you people to locate, that plane immediately. General WHITE. Correct. Mr. SHEPPARD. In fact, it is equally important that you locate it immediately whether it is in a military category or in some other passenger-carrying civilian craft, or whatnot? General Wrr'vi . Yes, sir. Mr. SrrEPPARD. At the moment, do you have any estimate what the average cost is when you send out search planes to locate a downed plane? Has there been any reasonable assumption as to the cost factor involved? General FRIEDAIAN. No, sir. This would be very difficult. It would depend on the type of plane and the number of hours in search. The closest you could come to it, Mr. Chairman, would be to take a hypo- thetical case and say that if it is of a C-47 type, it would normally cost on the order of $100 per flying hour-to include maintenance, overhaul, fuel and oil, and other direct costs. This is about as close as we could come today. General WHITE. I would put it another way, if I might. I think that is true, too. I think, if you like, we could take. some actual cases and perhaps trace down what the costs were. They vary widely according to the type of action, location, and so on. Mr. SHEPPARD. Based upon some responses I received in the field when I was recently making a survey and your people were very gracious and courteous in their responses, the general estimate for any search that runs over 24 hours would be $150,000 to $200,000. That was an estimate. General WrirrE. Even in this day and age, that seems high to rite. Flying hours are expensive. Personnel pay would be included. We make contracts and quick arrangements to get ambulances, doctors, Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : ( [I4-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 and all the rest of it, to the scene of the accident if they are available. On an emergency basis, I am sure the costs are extra high. Mr. SHEPPARD. Of course, there are many ramifications here aside from the dollar. None of us can set a price upon a human life, and nobody intends to. It is a very unfortunate situation. Getting to the basis of this thing, I have been advised by the military people with whom I have talked in various different locations that the more rapidly that you, the military, can determine that plane's physical location where it cracks up, the better it is for you and every- body else. General WiiITE. There is no question about that. Mr. SHEPPARD. If you could determine it within, let us say, 15 min- utes after the plane went down, would you consider it would be an advisable thing to do if the expenditure was within the bounds of reason? General WxiTE. We are assuming that this is something that really works and within reasonable costs. I would say it was very desirable and a thing that we would owe to our people and to the Nation. Mr. SUEPPARD. I am very glad to hear you say that because you already have, and the Government has bought and paid for, at least 75 percent of research and development, what is known now, without having an official name hung onto it, as the plane down locator. It is a beeping device that goes off on water and land. It has been tested and it works. The item itself is a very light payload thing, not any- thing which will create an extra weight problem. The device can be put on the plane at a conservative estimate for less than $7,000. It is my understanding that we have four requirements indicated in that field. With the tremendous responsibility you in the military have, not only in locating these planes but locating people, irrespective of who may be making it, why are we not interested in doing this? General WiirrE. I believe we are investigating this. Mr. SHEPPARD. You have not been expressing a view from any source for the last 11 months. It has been operational. It has been tested on water and it has been tested on land by the military itself. General WRITE. I have only general knowledge that there is such a system and that our R. & D. people are aware of it. Mr. SHEPPARD. We have so many other things that are important. They are all important, but it seems to me here is an item which some- body is overlooking, and I am wondering whether we find ourselves in a position dollar-wise that we just cannot afford to look at things like that. Yet when you look at a situation of this character and something else over here that we are procuring, the difference between the two is so outstanding it makes it very difficult to understand. We have had people lost in Air Force and in other military air- craft, and it has taken us a long time to find them. I should think, insofar as the immediate locating of those planes, you people want to get your hands on them as fast as you can. Is that right or wrong `? General WiirrE. I would have to say, Mr. Sheppard, it is like tTie Government insuring itself. I am sure we would have to consider how many aircraft are not located within so many minutes, what is the incidence of that, and then weigh it against the cost to complete it. You would have to have one in every aircraft in the inventory. I can only say that I will now have a look at it myself. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/5 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. SHFPI>Ann. I am calling it to your attention for that purpose. As I say, I have no interest in the situation other than I have seen it operate. The military have produced their own pictures of its opera- tion, both on land and on water. There is no question that. it is avail- able and almost an off-the-shelf operation. I think it merits a lot of consideration. Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions, but they have already been answered to a reasonable. degree through your inquiry, and I. do not want to take any more time. (Off the record.) Mr. MAxox. Mr. Ford. 1ir. Foxe. Mr. Chairman, since January the Secretary of Defense, the various civilian Secretaries, the Chiefs and others, have submitted justifications for the 1961 budget. Throughout the hearings it has been indicated that when new information was available on pro- grams, we would hear from them if there were certain breakthroughs which justified revisions in the program or programs as submitted to us originally for fiscal year 1961. It always has been my feeling that rigidity based upon stubbornness is completely indefensible, and that flexibility based on new information is very commendable. I gather the impression here that the Air Force is taking the route of flexibility based on new information. Is that the basis for this presentation, General White? General Wm'FF. Mr. Ford, I have to downgrade that a little bit. It is not based so much on new information as it is, let us say, new concepts based on better studies. There are new inputs. That alone has had a great bearing on our decision to recommend that the super- combat centers be cut back. So it is a combination of both. I think a fair statement would have to include, in addition, greater study and an opportunity to have digested and analyzed the master air defense plan inipl ications. Mr. FORD. The original 1961 fiscal year budget was put together more or less starting in September of 1959, and submitted to the Con- gross in January. General WIITTF. That is correct, sir. Mr. FORD. The net result is that 5 or 6 or 7 months have passed. by between the inception of the fiscal year budget in its original form and what is before us today. General WHITE. That is correct. Mr. FORD. If you had had the information in September-October 1959 that you have today, would you have come up with this kind of program that we have before us now, rather than the original 1961 budget program? General Wirrn,. That is a, difficult, thing to give a categorical answer to. I would say something approximating this might well have been the plan rather than the one we have submitted. The master air defense plan really was it considerable change, and it just took time to adjust our thinking to it., to convince certain people that further changes could be made to the overall benefit of our national security. Then we had the various steps, such as the briefing of NOI1AD, the Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :AIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Joint Chiefs, and the Department of Defense angles, all of which have taken time. Mr. FORD. Basically, you would have made the same decisions in the fall of 1951) that you are making now if you had this information and had the benefit of these studies? General WHITE. That is correct, sir. I would. say, had we made the analysis we have made starting in December, I think it was -bad we made the same analysis in September that we made in December, I think we would have come somewhat close to this same position. NEED FOR IMrROVE[? DETERRENT CAPABILITY Mr. FORD. It has always been the Air Force philosophy, as I under- stand it, that an overpowering offense is a great, if not the greatest, deterrent to auuy war, all out or limited. General Wi Irrr:.. That is correct, sir. Mr. FORD. I assume it is the Air Force's position that if you bolster .your offense, you can afford to take perhaps a little different view of what you need. In the way of a defensive capability. Is that correct? General WHITE. of course, our philosophy is based on the fact that offense is the best defense. First, we must have, a deterrent, so we hope we do not have a war. But we must not only provide the offense to be sure that we can prevail if war does come, but we must blunt the enemy's attack to what I would term the limit of the law of diminishing returns. That is very difficult to define in this sitna- tion. I cannot begin to do it. But I am perfectly certain that the subject of air defense could absorb the national budget, and you still could not guarantee 100-percent defense. So, in the final analysis, it is a matter of judgment at what level you balance out between offense and a minimum adequate defense. Mr. FORD. As I look over the listing here of those items on the addenda, a vast majority of the increases are in the offensive capability. General WRITE. Dollarwise, that is true, with the exception of the interceptor improvements, which we feel are a vital part of this whole program, because if that fell out, the program, in my opinion, would not give us an adequate measure of defense. Mr. FORD. The net result is that if the addenda is approved both by the Congress and the Executive, your offensive capability will be increased. General WHITE. It will be increased. Mr. FORD. If we increase our offensive capability, under the theory of the Air Force that is an increase in our deterrent capability. General WHITE. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. That in itself will not make General Muter feel any bet- ter because he has had some revisions in his program. Nevertheless, from the overall point of view of the country, you think it is a sound program ? Gbeneral. WurrE. I do. That expresses it exactly. General Kilter is charged with one thing and, to put it hypothetically, had it been the other way around and as a result of analyses we felt, something should be taken off SAC and put on Air Defense, I am sure General Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3Q CIA-RDP80BOl676R000900030049-9 Power would have been very unhappy about that. It is exactly the same type of thing. Mr. Foxe. Can the committee assume that the items listed here in the addenda group are the ones which the Air Force is recom- mending as of the highest priority when you relate those listed. here with those three or four which were eliminated or slightly reduced? General WHITE. It is my best judgment, sir, that these repre- sent the highest priority items within the dollars stated. Mr. Foxe. As has been testified, you are going to have cutbacks in BOMARC and SAGE. Are you going to lose any money by these changes? Will there be any substantial cancellation costs because of the changes or revisions in the programs? General WIrITE. One occurs to me right away. As Mr. Sheppard has indicated, there are some BOMARC sites which are partially constructed now which under the new program will not be com- pleted, and that will be a complete loss. I do not think the dollar value is very high, but as far as I know, it will be a complete loss. Mr. MAHON. You can. approximate, it at this point in the record. General FRIEDMAN. Very well. Mr. SIRES. As I recall it, we funded 15 BOMARC sites in the fiscal 1959 and prior programs. Mr. GARLOCK. We have not contracted for them as yet. Mr. SIKES. Now you propose to have ---. Relate the difference between the 15 and the presently planned , will you? General FRIEDMAN. How much per site? General C'uRTIN. About $6 million per site including augmenta- tions. General FRIEDMAN. About $12 to $14 million would be the differ- ence, I understand, in the program. Mr. SIKES. Have you contracted for any of the sites above --? Mr. GARLOCK. Two. General FRIEDMAN. Have we contracted for any above the General WHITE. How many BOMARC sites have we contracted for as of now? Mr. SIRES. Above General CIIRTIN. Two above . That makes a total of sites. Mr. GARLOCK. The answer is correct. There are four sites under contract on the west coast. They run from Washington down to California. Mr. SIKES. It would be well if you submitted a statement showing exactly what the situation is, the number of sites and the money we shall pick up as a result of this change, if any. Mr. FORD. I am not sure the question has been asked and a. response given, but I think we ought to show not only the BOMARC cancella- tion costs if this program. materializes,. but also the SAGE super- center cancellation costs if this program is executed. In other words, we want the full picture. General FRIEDMAN. We will give that for both systems, sir. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :IA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 (The information requested follows:) Costs of amended programs versus fiscal year 1961 budget request-Development, construction, and equipment program requirements [In millions] BOMARO Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Balance to 1959 and 1960 1961 comple- Total prior years Lion Program per President's fiscal year 1961 budget ---------------------------------- $1,799.4 $394.1 $421.5 $451.3 $3,086.3 Proposed amended program--------------- 1,777.4 394.1 40.4 0 2,211.9 Difference--------------------------- ' -22.0 0 -381.1 451.3 -854.4 Program per President's fiscal year 1961 budget---------------------------------- $1,165.9 $280.2 $235.2 $291.6 $1,972.9 Proposed amended program--------------- 1,165.9 138.4 102.8 166.9 1,574.0 Difference--------------------------- 0 -141.8 -132.4 -124.7 -398.9 I Represents savings against fiscal year 1959 and prior amounts as contained in fiscal year 1961 President's budget. This amount ($22 million) is Included in current line item reprograming of the military construo- tion programI Cancellation costs for the SAGE supercenter program are only associated with the preplanning and design of the centers. It is estimated at this time that less than $500,000 would be involved. Mr. FoRD. It has been indicated that under this program you will procure operational BOMARC B's. The suggestion has been made by one of the committee that perhaps even those missiles should not be procured; that, it might be wiser to procure interceptors in re- placement. The testimony has indicated that those interceptors, if procured, would cost about $4 million per aircraft. General FRIEDMAN. That is correct, sir. Mr. FORD. For the record, what would be the total cost of those interceptors if they were rocured? General FRIEDMAN. Ifpyou were to procure them on a one-for-one basis, it would be slightly over a billion dollars. Therefore, if the savings in the BOMAR.C was of the order of $250 million, as I indi- cated before, you would have a net increase in requirements of some- thing on the order of $750 million. Mr. FORD. As I recall the testimony of General Estes, or General White, you have to procure interceptors on a one-for-one basis. General ESTES. That is the opinion of the Air Defense Command, as checked with NORAD. Mr. FLOOD. You mean missile per plane? Just missiles? Weapons system? You mean missile? Is that your question? Missiles? Mr. FORD. The statement was made that we would have to procure a plane to replace a missile. Mr. FLOOD. Oh. Just so I know. A plane for a missile. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/396 CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ROCK ST DEVELOPMENT Mr. FORD. (general Hollowvay, you indicated that $12 million had been requested in rocket development. It did not make the grade, priority wise, in this list before us. How much is there in the R. & D. budget currently for rocket. development for fiscal 1961? General HOLLOWAY. I do not know exactly, sir. We would have to furnish that. General FRLEnM N. It, is about. $24 million, Mr. Meyer tells me. Mr. Fo1ID. In other words, there is $24 million in the current 1961 budget program. The $12 million was over and above that? General FRIED_MAN. That is correct. I would like for the record to indicate what kinds of rocket develop- ments we have already in the fiscal year 1961 budget. (The information to be furnished follows:) The amount in the current budget for rocket development in fiscal. year ]361 is: Liquid rocket technology ---------------------------------------- $11,490,000 Solid rocket technology---------------------------------------- 12, 24O2., 000 Total rocket development----------------------------------- 23, 692, 000 Mr. Foa n. That is all, Mr. Chairman. (Off the record. ) Mr. MAnoN. I recognize Mr. Sikes for 15 minutes. Mr. SIKES. It is my understanding that the sums which have been listed previously do not affect? the BOMARC test program, the. R. & I). program. General WIIrrE. No, sir. Mr. Slurs. Is it planned to continue the R. & D. or testing program on BOMARC even if this operational cutback in BOMARC is approved? General W.IrrE. That is correct. The full test program. will continue. Mr. SIDES. What do you propose to buy with the $40.5 million that is still. included in the *)MARC program for fiscal 1961? Mr. MEYER. $19.5 million of that is for completion of the. develop- ment program, and the balance is procurement of ground support equipment--cleaning up the squadron equipment. Mr. SIDES. How much of the BOMA.RC program is now available and operational? General Esa:Es. I have a chart, Mr. Sikes, which we can give you on it. Mr. SIDES. May we see it? General Es'r>s. Colonel Dietrich has the exact figures, and I would prefer to have him give you the exact figures. We have just gotten the latest information on it, and I would like him to show it to you, if we may. EXISTING BOMARC A CAPABILITY Colonel Diirnucx (slide). Mr. Sikes, the five bases containing the BOMARC A missile are listed here. The combat-ready missiles at these sites are listed. over here. These are the missiles on hand at these sites, and those which are combat ready. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 :5 lA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 Mr. SIKES. We do have a substantial capability in BOMARC A at this time. That is an important fact. Colonel DramTcTT. Yes, sir. One site has a substantial capability. It is not fully operational ready. It is nonscheduled to become op- erational ready until May. These are initial operational capability dates when we have one missile on the site, checked out and ready-to r. This schedule was mat as indicated by the diamond on Septeln- r 1 at McGuire. The December date was met at Suffolk. At the present time we have combat-ready missile. They are process- ing them in at about Mr. STKES. All right., what is the situation on the others? Colonel DIETRTCTr. We have had about a month's slippage in the operational capability of these two bases. Mr. SncEs. When do you expect those two to be operational ? The one at Otis, Mass., will be operational when? Colonel DTnmIdH. Actually, it is the -- Mr. STxrs. When is Dow, Maine to be operational? Colonel DTETiucn. Dow is to ~e operational General ESTns. Those are initial operational dates. Colonel DIETRICH. At Langley, the first operational missile will be ready to go . Mr. STKES. Woultl that capability in five existing bases be lost if you were to cancel the entire BOMARC program? Mr. Gang OCK. It would be almost impossible to cancel that because the missiles are almost all complete and the construction is complete. We have not proposed any cancellation of "A" and none of the figures we have given here have assumed any cutoff of the A program. I am sure if you examine it you will find it is so far down the road that it is almost impossible to stop it. Mr. SiKEs. Then such cancellation would be a very unwise thing to contemplate, both from the standpoint of costs and needed defense. Mr. GAr.LOCK. Yes, sir. Mr. SncrS. What is the situation in Canada? Do you know how far toward operational capability they have progressed . General ESTES. Yes, sir. The Canadian sites are not supposed to become operational until --- because they have no A missiles. They are. entirely 13 missiles. The Canadians--I believe this figure is essentially correct, sir-are about percent complete with the construction of their first site, which is . They have not yet started construction on their second site. Mr. SrKES. They have notified you, I believe you stated, that they intend to continue with the BOMARC B program. General ESTES. They have, sir. Mr. STKES. Where is their BOMARC B testing being done? General EsTES. It is being done as a part of our program, sir. Mr. SIKES. They benefit from our test program. They do not have an R. & D. program of their own. General WxrrE. They are dependent on us for the BOMARC pro- grain insofar as testing and development are concerned. Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/3po$ CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 VULNERABILITY OF "SOFT" CONTROL SITES Mr. SINES. To what extent are you disturbed about vulnerability from the soft configurations which we will have if we eliminate the hardened complexes which you propose to eliminate? General ESTES. Obviously, sir, it would be preferable to have an extremely hard center that you knew would survive a missile attack. As General White pointed'out in his testimony earlier, if you do this, then you have to go for hardening the whole system, and the costs become astronomical. What we have tried to do, therefore, in our analysis, is to provide a manual backup to the soft SAGE. There is already a backup in the SAGE system itself. If one center is knocked out, the two adjacent centers can pick up that area. If two centers are knocked out, we have recommended for NORAD's study putting a limited number of individuals on what we call a firehouse manning concept at certain selected radar sites, of these modernized radars that I have mentioned, and further, that they establish five similarly manned manual. divisions. These would not be located in the same area as the SAGE centers themselves. In the event, then, that the SAGE center at any particular area were eliminated, you would still have certainly a very considerably degraded capability, but nonetheless still a capability to conduct an air battle with inter- ceptors. This is one of the reasons for the recommended improve- ment in the fighter-interceptors. Mr. SINES. What substantially, other than hardening will you lose from the SAGE system as,a result of the cuts which are proposed? EFFECT OF CHANGES ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITY General ESTES. You lose capacity as well, sir. Furthermore, you will lose an ability to operate with the FAA in flight planning, na- tional air traffic control, to the degree that we would have been able to accomplish with the. supercombat centers in the future, the FSQ7-A computer, as it is known. Mr. SINES. Do you still feel you will have a substantial and effective operational capability? General ESTES. As far as air defense is concerned, yes, Sir. As far as FAA is concerned, I have talked with Mr. Quesada about this. He understands the situation and recognizes that we must immediately sit down to devise a new plan for national air traffic control. Mr. SINES. Is that new plan likely to run into such a substantial sum that there will actually be no savings? General ESTES. Insofar as the FAA request is concerned, sir? Mr. SINES. Yes. General ESTES. Mr. Sikes, I cannot answer that, Sir, because we have not yet had the opportunity to work with Mr. Quesada's people and, therefore, I have no real basis for giving you a factual answer. Mr. SINES. You have given us the anticipated savings in fiscal 1960 and fiscal 1961.. Are there 1959 and prior savings in this program as you have outlined it? Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 General FRIEDMAN. No, sir; there are not. We have projected out on a basis through completion, and it is our estimate this plan would run about $2 billion less cumulatively over the period than the plan we are proposing today. Mr. SiKES. Is R. & D. money included? I think you might well provide a summary for the record, if it would be preferable to do that. General FRIEDMAN. We shall be happy to do that, sir. We can show you the long-range cost on both plans and the difference. Mr. SIKES. Are the savings in R. & D. money included in the pro- gram you have presented to us, or is that an additional amount? General FRIEDMAN. The figures I have given you cut across all ap- propriations. As I indicated to the chairman, I would give you a breakdown by appropriation. (The information requested follows:) Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/386 CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9 tiw V uJ a .r .r ~ ~.n rn .n to o ti c>ao