REACTIONS TO US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO NATIONALIST CHINA (AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS.1-3

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001100070007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 1, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORS SOI. TIM ZATIOJAL s IJ.ITy COUJCIL
SUB; =$ Reaetions to U8 Courses of Action with Respect to
Istionaliet Chins. (as dssaribed in paras. 1-3, "-
4-7# of ?ss +ramdum considered b r the Csuoi1 on 21
October)
Thor* follows an estiaate of samnist and aon-Coness;tist
actions to certatin propose, VS courses of cation with respect
rationalist China. Pursuant to eo*tersatioss between tke
Secretary ant Under $ecrotary of tutee mad the Sirector,, this
hia CIA
ed
ith
-- +- :--
-it
w
out sonanLfatTSB with
asabsrs of the iatslligeaco Advisory Casemittss.
A SSWT101[e
L The l?atual Defense Treaty will be assatiatst reprtless
of UN Security Cou* it actis& on the off-share isl&ad.s.
2. The VS intent to negotiate a ntusl Defense Trsathi
rationalist Ana will be announced before or simeilisaeeously
kho introduction of the resolution in the $.esritr Council.
f le, 'a-y
F
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Chines, Coa+reanists would continue minor he,ras:cents,
they would rrobably not tease courses of acetior that
clearly contravened the spirit of the resolution,
b. in the unlikely event that a resolution were
adopted, not covering e. territorial settlement for the
we believe that the ohanees of chinos*
each of the resolution would be increased..
a. If no resolution were adott,d and if the
e to believe that the Us would not support
the defense Of the islands with its own fore&#. the
Chinese Communist* would, sooner or later, a
off-shore islands which osanot successfully be d
by Chinese Kttiomlt Ott forces alone.* The USSR might,
for a period of stevsral, uonths at least, try to persuadse
the Chins. Gonunists not to tak* such action,, iibwever,
d par;iotpse.te in defenir of the iselan+is, t'any urould.
e Chins $# 0021=tet4 were convinced that the
probably proceed to attack thee.
01"$e vii =ads in NI1 100-411.40t
The Sit
0
-
"On with Respsot to the Nationalist Ocsupled Islsends
off the Coast of Mainland Ohinrmsv
1954. , published 10 September
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 !a114,a t
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
to 93 Courses of Action with Respect to
Nationalist China (as described in parts. 1-3, pp.
4-7, of a readum considered by the Council on Pd
October)
There follows an estimate of Cnist and non-Combat
actions to certain proposed. US courses of action with respect
er Secretary of State and the Director, this
estimate has been prepared within OIL without consultation with
the members of the Intelligence Advisory Ceaaittes.
1. The Mutual Defeats Treaty will be negotiated regardless
of Security Council action on the off-share islands.
2. The US intent to negotiate a tatuai Defense 'T'reaty
Chian will be announced before or sisal tazoemoly
with the introduction of the resolution in the Security Council.
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c-y
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The Nationalist goverssment has given its approval
y Council resolution a.nd the geographic limitations
in the Defense Treaty.
ACTION ON TEE RESOLUTION
1. Most non-Communist countries would probably approve of
proposal that the UN be Seized of the problem of the off-
2. The Chinese Communists feel strongly that the off-shore
ads are an integral part of Peiping's terrt*ory and would
be reluctant to have the question of their disposition dealt with
by the UN. Nevertheless, we believe that the USSR will not veto
the Resolution oat of hand* though this may result in some
o-Soviet relations. Rather we believe the USSR
will introduce or support expansion Of the Resolution to provide
for an immediate or eventual territorial settlement covering
off-Shore islands and possibly lormosa as well. Unless
the Resolution is *banged to cover such a settlement for the
Islands, the USSR will almost certainly exercise its veto, if
the Resolution were to cover a settlement for the off-shore
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Islands 'but not for Porrao,e, we believe the ebanoet of a 'jevist
Veto would be substantial but lass than even.
a1'
let China and the USSR would vigorously de-
nounce the 'reaty. Although we believe that the Cowuniste
will maintain their basic objective of gaining control over
'oz sa. they would probably attempt to obtain control through
subversion rather than through military action. Ai for the
do not believe that either itt ad rtiean or re-
icantly affect Gamunist policy toward Yormosa..
4. We believe that the Chinese munists would not attaek
the oft-ehore- islands while the Resolution was rending, provided
that the period, of d;iseuseioa did not exceeds say, 3 dmWs.
would be deterred from such action by Tsar of a strong adverse
worldwide reaction and by uncertainty as to T18 reaction. T ere.
a. If a resolution were adotsdt covering territorial,
settlement for the islands, we believe that, although the
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)htnese Qe nists would continue minor harassaeemts,
they would probably not tsXee courses of action that
clearly contravened the spirit of the resolution.
be in the unlikely event that a. revolution were
adopted not covering a territorial settlement for the
e believe that the obaneeet of Chinese
On u let breach of the resolution woul& be ineroatod.
s wee to believe that the Ud would not support
resolution were adopted and if the
the defense of the islands with its own forces, the
Ohiaaose Communist* would, sooner or later, assault the
off-shore islands which cannot snsessefu ly be ,,famed
e Nationalist forces alone** The USSR might,
for a period of several months at least, try to persoads
note Communists not to tyke such actione
viLlese the Chinese Communists were convinced that the
d participate in defeueee of the islands, thir woultt
pr'obabi,V proceed to attack thee.
eeeada in 61i11fi 100 -4/1-54# "Twee
then with A*spe*$ to the 2iationglist a heed Ieelaueds
off the Coast of i ainla ci China+r, published 10 Septeebo r
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5? The Chinese Communists would probably esti?spte
Treaty (with or without the Resolution) did sot sigifiaantly
alter the balencs of power situation in the I'ormoss: Brea* geeae**
the Treaty would be unlikely to bring about a major redeployment
armed forces or any siificrint cb,enge in their souses
of action elsewhere in Asia.
III, 3 QN-OWU iBT X"CTIOIi
S.
The nonCoisrunist wort:. would generally receive the
Treaty with r ualified approval. klthough iuort peop'lee and govern-
meats have little sympathy with the Chiang regime. ,.td. would
perpetuation of the JS commitment, approval
will be generally forthcomings if the defensive character of
the Treaty and particulArly the restraints on Chinese fiationalist
action can be well established. In these eircumstancse? the
er with US support of us notion on the off-ehore
be regal ed as a welcome indication that the US
not bent on. policies involving considerable risk of war. It
will seen a contribution to the current relaxation of lasts-West
tensions.
7, To South. koreat the new J -policy will be unwelcome
because it will indicate an end of the chances of strong tT
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'e on i ommunist China. To India, on the other hand, the
Treaty with Chiang will appear as further evidence of US ie-
interference in Asian affairs. Mon-Canuniut Southeast
t iateerpret the restraints on the Nationalists as indi?
eating a weakening of US determination to resist Communism, but
we believe that the importance of this factor would cieand
primarily on subsequent Us policies in this area.
8. The Overseas Chinese have been increasingly looking to
the Communist Chinese rather than the Nationalists as the effective
power in China. The Treaty would tend to increase this trend..
i oweevor, whether the Overseas Waste become an increasing source
of instability will. depend far more on the policy of the local
governments toward 'these'.
9. By virtually ending the possibility of Chiang's "return
to the mainland'". the Treaty would tend to undermine the guiding
principle and the chief inspiration of Chiang's regiie. 4eeadjust-
meeat would be difficult. Possibilities for Oomm ist subversion
be increased. Developments on the isssland would
dapensi greatly on the nature of U8 policy toward the lormosa
AD/NE:Dr Kent (1 Nov 54)
Distribution:
Orig - Gen Cutler (given to him by P. CABAL
Gen Cabell at NSC mtg 2 Nov 54)Lieutenant General, U`
Cy 42 - DD/ I Acting Director
Cy V3 - Exec Reg file ey 7 AA.
A,, A
Cy 4 - DAk o i$c 'For Release 2003/04/18 ? CIA-RDP80B01676RO01100070007-8 d
Cy 45 - M owi of Sec/S at' '3 6 ON
Cy 96 - DDfj cs ~ienY PUI~I~ ~Ynt ateo flceSC mtg, 2 Nov)
pe v ou s
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