INFORMATION RELATIVE TO NESC ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001100070013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 18, 1955
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2003/04/18: CIA-RDP801301676R001100070013-Ir3 102200
Director, Net Evaluation Subcomt ttee Staff
Information Relativi:: to FSC Aetivities
Letter of NESC Staff Director dated 24 June 1955
with enelosures
1. Comment on reference Enclosure 1 (Procedure) has been forwarded
to the Chairman NESC by letter dated 22 June 1955 as a follow up on the
discussion of procedure and the decisions taken in the 10 June meeting
of the NI:SC in the Chairman's office.
2. Enclosure 2 (Plan "A" Surprise Atte(*) has been examined.
This tvoneral war plan appears well presented to serve the purpose of
the evaluation and to exercise initial control of the ler geeing inci
dent to the later steps of the approved procedure.
3* After completion of the mar gaming, I would very much appreciate
ormed by briefings or otherwise of the major *mansions reached.
also sem to me desirable for our comaittet to consider these
fore the final stages of the study suCh as damage assessments
ken. I suggest this primarily to avoid our being confronted
of the exercise with an indigestible mass of material to review.
ONE:
Rewritten ODDI:RAmory, Jr.:j
11 July 1955
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - forward
2 - 0/DCI
1-
- 0/DD
1 - ER
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11 July 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
1. Attached hereto find memorandum to you from General George
25X1 together with suggested draft for your signature and
a revision thereof that I have prepared. My rewriting of paragraph 3
is intended to clarifyl luoint and relate it to other
aver?all responsibilities of the committee as such, aad to stress the
point that if everything is left to the end of the exercise, the
chance for anywise review of the war game will be negligible.
2. I have omitted his paragraph 4 for two reasons:
(1) I disagree on technical grounds with the implied
estimate that the "long and runs" would jeopardize Surprise.
(2) Since the committee has decided to present two
"extreme possibilities", I believe it is right that the most
pessimistic be one that deprives of the warning that would be
received if our forward bases were struck first.
25X1
3.
with you on call.
is on leave but I am prepared to discuss this
1),A. rar5t. Q_A\VAAA6 (-)A.
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gApproved For Release 2003/0411 Cg tOB01676R001TOQUAGD1s8-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMIrnTO, STAFF
SUBJECT : Information Relative to NESC Activities
REVERENCE: Letter of NC Staff Director dated 2h June 1955
with enclosures.
1. Comment on reference ,',:-.1olosure 1 (Procedure) has been
forwarded to the Chairman NSC by letter dated 22 June 1955 as
a follow up on the discussion of procedure and the decisions
taken in the 10 June meeting of the TESC in the Chairman's
office.
2. Enclosure 2 (Plan -PAH Surprise Attack) has been exam-
ined. This general war plan appears well presented to serve
the purpose of the evaluation and to exercise initial control
of the war gaming incident to the later steps of' the approved
procedure.
3. Since many major decisions having very imoortant bear-
ing on the aver-all evaluation are to be made in the war gaming
exercises, it would be helpful to me in forming my judgments
on the final evaluation to be informed through briefings or
otherwise of the interim assumptions or estimates and the major
interim conclusions reached before proceeding with the steps
necessary in final damage assessments. An example of one item
is the determination of the optimum air strike as a result of
war gaming various combinations of penetrations and bombing
profiles.
4. Although ?I assume that the plans for Initial Phase A,
Initial Phase B and Second Attack as set forth in Annex C will
not be finalized until some preliminary war gaming has been
conducted, I question the judgment that the Soviet leaders
would be willing (as Plan A now indicates) to accept the risk
to their security of delaying for many hours the initiation of
Initial Phase B overseas attack in order to seek surprise for
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the Initial Attack Phase A. In view of the routes over busy
sea lanes of the adopted flank attacks and the over-all
magnitude of the InAtial Phase A attack, I do not believe
that the Soviet leaders would expect with confidence that the
attack could reach our US contiguous or early warning radar
lines without discovery prior to A hour. No doubt your pre-
liminary war gaming will reveal the cost to the USSR under
the circumstances of loss of surprise and will influence the
final plan adopted.
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director
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CIA CONTROL NO.
201100
DOC. NO. la. 18 1955
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