LETTER TO COLONEL HARRIS B. HULL, USAF FROM C. P. CABELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001200040047-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: July 21, 1958
• Content Type: LETTER

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21 JUL 1953
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ILLEGIB
USAF review(s) completed.
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HEADQUARTERS
THIR`T'EENTH-AIR FORCE
United States Air Force
APO 74
San Francisco, California
131D C
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL MOORMAN.
2* The unanimous opinion
SUBJECT: (U) VISIT OF COL JAMES E. MAHON, DCS/I, 13AF TO
DJAKARTA
Following are additional items summarizing conversations
held or impressions gained during my visit to Djakarta 11-16 June.
1. I arrived Djakarta 11 June "under wraps." I was requested
not to identify myself with 13AF or Clark Air Base. On 12 June it
was suggested to Ambassador Jones that the situation thus created
was awkward, possibly naive, and likely to be unproductive. His re-
sponse in effect was: "It is time we change our approach. Put on
your uniform, tell everybody who you are, from where you come, and
why you are here. And by all means call on Surydarma and Siswadi."
From that point on the visit was much more satisfactory.
and his ro ram. -d-- -A Lt.uunesia lies in support of Nasution
P g Ambassador Jones and DCM Cottrell gave detailed
exposition of their thinkin
g on this point which can be summarized as
follows. Nasution does and has been encouraged to think of influencing
the re-orientation and re-habilitation of the Djakarta Government in
three phases:
a. Bring to an end the formal fighting with the Rebels,
b. Effect desirable changes in the manning of the cabinet
and other key posts.
c. Apply whatever pressures or use whatever measures
are necessary to neutralize the effectiveness of or destroy the Com-
munist Party of Indonesia. (PKI).
It is anticipated that phase one will be accomplished by the
end of June 1958. It is hoped that the first major step in the accomp-
lishment of phase two may be undertaken by 17 August, which is
Indonesian Independence Day. It is recognized that the accomplish-
ment of the third phase may take a long time, and that phases two and
t ORM
23 June 1958
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three may be pursued concurrently. In this context it may be inter-
esting to note that certain Indonesian military men reckon that it
may require from two to five years of guerrilla type fighting com-
pletely to eliminate the influence of the Rebels after a formal cease-
fire has been achieved. (See paragraphs 7e and 8 below). Obviously,
it will be to the PKI interest to keep the Rebels and the GOI forces
apart, and they are expected to attempt to do so. With regard to a
reconciliation between GOI and Rebel leaders, I gained the impres-
sion that the Nasution group would be willing to do so, but at the
moment doubt that the Rebels would.
The Jones-Cottrell thesis, which I was told had been
communicated to the State Department, is that the US should be pre-
pared to react quickly with tangible substance in what may be a slowly
evolving situation. This assistance to be on the call of the US Embassy
when the Indonesian leadership has demonstrated satisfactory accom-
plishment of each phase. They estimate that the first requirement will
be for sufficient small.arms and ammunition to re-equip the Indonesian
Army when it is ready to redeploy from the outer islands and consoli-
date itself as a major counter-poise to the growing Communist strength
in Java. Subsequently, there will be a real requirement for shipping,
civil and military air to include both hardware and facilities, and a
greatly improved communications capability. Cottrell and Jones rea-
lize that this is a large order, and that it presages a long term expen-
sive country program,. but they submit that the potential gain is worth
the investment. They emphasize that at least at the outset we cannot
too strongly or obviously direct the Indonesians in their program, but
that we must lead by indirection. They are optimistic that this can be
accomplished.
3. Ambassador Jones' personal assessment of Sukarno: "He
will tolerate a force or entity only so long as it is personally useful
to him. Up to now he has believed that he can move down the middle
of the road towards an 'active independent foreign policy,' carrying
the Army in his right hand and carrying the PKI in his left, bal ancing
them against each other and using both to his advantage. Recently,
however, with the Army dispersed and fighting in the outer islands,
and with the PKI beginning to show signs of insolence and disobedience,
he is coming to regard the PKI as a net threat. He may be expected
soon to take steps to dissipate their strength by causing the formation
of another leftist political party built around the nucleus of a group of
Trotzkyite Communists who reportedly detest the PKI as much as
they do anybody.
Ambassador Jones feels that although the myth of Sukarno's
ability to unify the people may be stretched a little bit, as witnessed
in the great lack of unity between them at the moment, he still feels
that he probably has the greatest ability of any Indonesian to bring a
large number of people together on a given issue at a given time. This
stems not from any astuteness in statecraft, but simply from his
ability as a spell-binding orator.
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Reference the myth of Sukarno leadership.: Where we
have from time to time been led to believe that Sukarno was not
only the political but also the great moral and spiritual leader of
the masses, who would spontaneously rise up in his support, a
report by Americans on the spot indicates otherwise. At the time
of the recent abortive bombing attempt on his life, it is said that
for about six hours, while it was believed that The BangB? had been
killed, the Indon in the street was completely apathetic. It seems
that while he is in close contact, Sukarno's personal magnetism is
well nigh irresistible, even to his enemies, but there is no real
love for him among the people.
4. Ambassador Jones, and other key Embassy personnel,
reference Air Vice Marshal Surydarma, Chief of Staff Indonesian
Air Force: Surydarma is a comparatively weak man, not respected
professionally by his officers, who owes his continued existence
entirely to the favor of Sukarno. His wife is recognized as an active
Communist and is alleged to be one of the mistresses of Sukarno.
Although he is undoubtedly strongly influenced politically by his
wife, his own actions ostensibly favoring Communist programs, and
his actions in the acquisition of Communist aircraft and equipment
probably stem also from the fact that up to now he has been neglec-
ted and to his thinking spurned by leading Western airmen. In re-
sponse to my question, reference the efficacy of planting in Surydar-
ma's mind the idea of inviting Generals Kuter and Moorman to visit
the Indonesian Air Force, Jones said that if Surydarma could demon-
strate to his countrymen that he, like Nasution, could have some
attention by leading Western opposite numbers, it would have such
an effect on his morale and ego that he could "be had" for whatever
value it would serve to have him. Jones enthusiastically indorsed
planting the idea.
5. Anticipating a barrage of questions from the Indons,
reference Pope, Mahon requested guidance of the Ambassador in
answering them. The guidance received in effect was: "We have no
knowledge of nor responsibility for the actions of Pope. At your
request the US Government took what steps it could to have Rebel air
attacks stopped. They have stopped. If we are to make any progress
towards a harmonious relationship between our two governments, we
must look forward from there, not backward." Evidently this posi-
tion had already been satisfactorily enunciated by the Embassy, be-
cause in subsequent conversations with Indonesians, I encountered
no embarrassing questions nor accusations, but rather an indication
of desire to forget about the whole business.
6. Lt Col Smith, US AirA, Djakarta, and I had a 45-minute
visit with Surydarma in his office on 14 June in which the latter did
most of the talking. He appeared somewhat ill at ease, he frequently
giggled (a characteristic which has been observed - n other Asians
when they were nervous or embarrassed), and generally presented a
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picture consistent with the Ambassador's assessment of a weak man.
He spent some time on meaningless amenities, and a discussion of
his hobbies, which include hunting (wild boars, but not tigers), pistol
shooting, and gardening, before he could be brought to any substan-
tive discussion. When he did come around, he stated that he had
already discussed in detail with Ambassador Jones those things re-
quired by the Indonesian Air Force which they would like to have from
the US to make it an effective entity. In view of that, and much dis-
cussion which had gone on in the past, he doubted that a reiteration
of the same points would be fruitful. At that point he would like to
have some action rather than words. When he was reminded of ac-
tion taken by the State Department on 20-21 May to issue Export
Licenses on some $1, 300, 000 worth of hard goods to Indonesia in-
cluding $283, 000 worth of aircraft and electrical spare parts, he
denied knowledge of the action. He stated that three recent cables
to his AIRA and the Chief of his purchasing mission in the US had
indicated to the contrary. Then evidently, in spite of his determina-
tion not to identify requirements, he complained about the difficulty
of running an Air Force with inadequately trained staff personnel.
He stated that their efforts to acquire training in the Staff Schools
of India and the UK have been unsatisfactory, and in his belief, the
only satisfactory arrangement would be to have USAF Staff Training.
He stated that as a military man, he had neither the
time, the inclination, nor the prerogative to concern himself with
politics. (The night before, his wife, as one of a supporting cast
of four to Sukarno, had delivered a red rabble rousing speech in
Surabaya against the testing of atomic or hydrogen bombs anywhere,
against anyone, at any time).
At my suggestion that the best way for the problems of
his Air Force to be appreciated by the USAF would be to invite some
Senior U S Airmen like General Kuter and General Moorman, for
instance, to visit him, he said, "Yes, that would undoubtedly be a
very good thing."
7. Following the conversation with Surydarma, Smith and I
had a lengthy visit with Lt Cal Siswadi, Intelligence Chief of the
Indonesian Air Force, who is generally believed to be a Communist.
I had met Siswadi the night of 12 June. When the introduction was
begun, "This is Col Mahon," Siswadi interrupted with, "Oh, you
mean the Deputy for Intelligence of the 13th Air Force." He exhibi-
ted a great deal of glibness and strength of purpose. The details of
the conversation were recorded by Smith, and will be the subject of
an Intelligence Report by him. The following is presented as a sum-
mary and review of highlights only:
a. Reference Pope: See message 13ODC, Cite TS-58-
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b. Reference Soviet aircraft acquisitions: He stated 15
Czech built two-place Trainer MIG-15 type aircraft received. At
least two arrived Kemajoran Airport, Djakarta on 13 June. MIG-17
types on order, but not received. He did not know what model they
would be. Six IL-14 type Transports received; flown in through
China and Burma, more enroute; five IL-28 type Bombers received;
arrived by surface transport; being assembled at Kemajoran. Some
communications gear received; Czech technicians on hand.
c. Siswadi discussed the Air Order of Battle of both
the Government and the Rebel Air Forces and their respective
combat losses. He credited the Rebel Air Force with having had a
total of eight B-26 aircraft, three of which had been destroyed, five
of which were unaccounted for. He indicated the belief that the
Rebels had at least one B-29 type Bomber. At this point, I stated:
(1) Categorically, that there are no B-29's in the
Southwest Pacific - Southeast Asia Area.
(2) That there are some .RB-50's used for Weather
Reconnaissance based at Clark, but that none of these had been or
would be remodified to bomber configuration.
d. Siswadi frankly and emphatically stated that the
Indonesian Air Force is desperately in need of US built equipment
and US training. He said they have committed $63, 000, 000 of a
$100, 000, 000 budget to the purchase of Communist Bloc aircraft and
support equipment. They would like to spend the remaining
$37, 000, 000 in the US, and if a way could be discovered to do. so,
would like to stop order on some of the undelivered Communist Bloc
equipment and re-commit those funds to additional US purchases.
They want, in the following priority, C-123 Transports, Search and
Rescue Aircraft and equipment, Piston Engine Fighter Bombers and
Light Bombers.
e. Siswadi indicated they wanted the Piston Engine Air-
craft to continue the guerrilla warfare phase of fighting against the
Rebels, which might take two more years.
f. When asked in what role they expected to employ their
MIG Fighters, i.e. , as air defense, ground support, or interceptor
roles, he appeared puzzled for a minute and answered, "Why we will
just use them as fighters." When asked what they expected to gain
with their IL-28 Bombers, he said in effect, "Prestige."
g. When asked if he contemplated that the IL-28 would
be used to bomb West Irian, he merely laughed and said he doubted
West Irian would ever be bombed. At a suggestion that West Irian
was probably much more valuable to the Indonesians as an issue on
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which to bring the people to an agreement than as a piece of real
estate, he laughingly agreed that that was probably true.
h. At Smith's request to see and photograph the MIG's
and IL-28's at Kemajoran, he simply said, "I'm afraid that that
would not be permitted for a few days yet."
i. Like his boss Surydarma, Siswadi volunteered the
statement that he had no time for, nor interest in politics; but at
slight urging, he gave a somewhat detailed description of Commun-
ist techniques and tactics for advancing their campaign in Indonesia
by non-military means. I ,.deacribed the approach as a very simple
one in which the Communists promised to each trade, labor, or
regional agricultural group the things which that group wanted. He
then advanced the belief that very shortly Sukarno might, as another
experiment'in Government, abolish all political parties in order "to
stop political bickering."
j. In connection with Siswadi's strong plea for US equip-
ment and training to include training for himself at a USAF Intelligence
school, I repeated the suggestion that a visit by Generals Kuter and
Moorman might be profitable to them. Siswadi agreed that this prob-
ably would be effective and was worth considering.
8. I had dinner with Brig Gen Gatot Subroto, Vice Chief of
Staff, Indonesian Army, at his home on 13 June. Other persons
present were Madame Subroto, an unidentified Army Lieutenant who
acted as interpreter, and for a short time, Lt Colonel Andi Jusuf,
who was represented as being the Commander of Over-all Military
Operations in the Celebes, and two officers of his staff. General
Subroto was very jovial and hospitable. He displayed an extremely
colorful personality, describing himself as the George Patton of
Indonesia. He stated that with no education and nothing to advance
himself in a military career except a fighting heart, he often wonder-
ed how he ever got to be a General, but he had always been gratified
to find that men would follow him in combat. He repeatedly assured
that the Communists would never be able to take over in Indonesia,
because if they ever became a serious threat, he and other fighting
men like him would kill them all just as he had done at Madiun in
1948. He repeatedly reiterated his admiration of and praise for
America, Americans and American things. He was enormously
impressed by the hospitality he had recently received at CINCPAC's
fire power demonstration. He took great pride in showing the
"American" metal name plate which he had worn while attending the
Meeting and a cigarette box which had been presented to him by
Admiral Stump. He offered to take me anywhere in Indonesia I
wanted to visit. I was impressed with his being just what he claimed
to be - a forthright ego-centric, fighting man, strongly pro-American,
strongly anti-Communist, whose personal friendship can probably be
maintained at very little cost. Col Andi Jusuf appeared somewhat
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shy, but responsive to questions. He estimated the formal fighting
would end by 30 June, but that gu-~.rrilla fighting might last" .... a
long time. Maybe five years."
9. On 12 June, Major George Benson, Asst Army Attache,
US, reported to me a conversation he had had with Major General
Nasution, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army. After having talked
with a number of the key staff personnel, Hq Indonesian Army,
during a reception on 11 June, Benson approached Nasution, with
whom he is on very friendly and informal terms, and said, "After
talking with some of your Chiefs, I believe that they are in sym-
pathy with the Rebels." To which he reports Nasution as respond-
ing, "You think they are in sympathy with the Rebels ? I am in
sympathy with the Rebels ! Many of them are personal friends of
mine. We are both seeking the same objectives. Unfortunately,
they have chosen to seek them from outside the Government. I.
a loyal soldier, propose to seek them through the Government."
Nasution is reported to have described two types of Indon military
leaders: one, the progressive who wants to make a unified military
force, and the other, the War Lord. He classified his group as
progressive, and many of the Rebel Group as War Lords. A pos-
sible exception to the War Lord type among the Rebels is Colonel
Kawilarang. He is reported to have been an intimate associate and
the closest personal friend of Nasution for much of their lives.
When he "defected" to the Rebels, Nasution was visibly deeply
grieved for some days. Another occasion of Nasution grief, as
opposed to anger, was the allegation of American aid to the Rebels.
10. During dinner with Ambassador Jones and DCM Cottrell
on 14 June, and through the morning of 15 June, I reviewed my
conversations with Indonesian personnel. Ambassador Jones was
much interested in the assurances of no B-29's in the area, stating
that he had been "put on the spot1s the night before by Premier
Djuanda with that question. I explained that the RB-50's at Clark
and the P-4Y's of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force are the only
four-engine aircraft in the theater of bomber external configuration
and that neither of these could be used in bomber roles without major
refitting.
11. The following conclusions and recommendations are
offered:
a. The unanimity of opinion of the key personnel of the
US Embassy in Djakarta is impressive. Although Ambassador Jones
obviously makes full use of his Attaches, and is very capably assisted
by his DCM Cottrell, be is without question an effective team captain
and leader, who is highly respected, not only by his own people, but
by the Indonesians. His support of my visit, and his attitude on visits
by General Kuter and yourself indicate that we can expect a high degree
of cooperation from him in the future. The key members of the Embassy
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were convinced that they are following the right approach. I found
their confidence contagious, and recommend that Ambassador Jones'
proposals be given serious consideration in whatever echelons of our
national structure is appropriate.
b. The statements of General Subroto can probably be
taken at face value; those of Surydarma should be considered with
caution; and those of Siswadi must be regarded with suspicion.
c. Based as much on hunch as on the spoken word, I will
be surprised if Surydarma does not at least attempt to have General
Kuter and yourself visit the Indonesian Air Force. If this material-
izes, you should not "come to explore the situation, "? but be prepared
to discuss things which can be done to satisfy some of the AURI
requirements for US assistance. In this sense, it is evident that
the United States has realized enormous gain through the efforts of
the US Army with the Indonesian Army. The opinion was stated on
all sides in the US Embassy, Djakarta, that the Indonesian Army had
saved the day for the US in the past few weeks, and they attribute it
to the influence of a comparatively small group of key army personnel
(the self-styled Eisenhower boys) who take great pride in having been
trained at Fort Benning, Fort Leavenworth, and other US Army
Schools. If the USAF can find ways to accommodate some of the
desires of the Indonesian Air Force for USAF training and equipment,
it is not improbable that some similar benefits may accrue to that
effort.
Signed: James E. Mahon
Typed: JAMES E. MAHON
Colonel, USAF
DCS/Intelligence
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