THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM-NIE 11-2-59 (C)

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R001200090027-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 28, 2005
Sequence Number: 
27
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 11, 1959
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R001200090027-3.pdf178.01 KB
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1 Approved For Release -RDP80B01676R00123 Q~090027=3-: fp-N C,vr w _ - HEADQUARTERS V DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. JUN 1 1 ;959 MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SUBJECT: The Soviet Atomic Energy Program--NIE 11-2-59 (C) 1. (U) I wish to thank you for your favorable consideration of my request to postpone action on Section VIII of NIE 11-2-59 for one week. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the nature of my dissent in more detail than is contained in my footnote now affixed to the draft Section VIII. 2. (S) In the first place, I consider that the publication, backed by the prestige of the intelligence community, of Section VIII, especially Tables 13 and 14, portrays an estimate of Soviet intentions in such detail as to create the serious danger of misuse and miscalculation by the planners in the various agencies of the government, particularly when used out of context. Even if used completely in context, the impact of the numerous and significant qualifications and caveats in the accompanying text is such as to raise substantial doubts both as to the validity and value of the Tables as well as to the propriety of presenting such "illustrative allocations." Thus, I am extremely concerned that the prestige of national intelligence estimates generally will be lowered through the publication of such untenable detail. On the one hand, mistaken confidence in the figures could lead to grave miscalculation and, on the other hand, for the more discerning reader, the text itself discounts the validity and value of this estimate. 3. (S) Further, I am disturbed by the manner in which this section has been prepared. It is my understanding that detailed Terms of Reference n, for this important part of the estimate were not developed. In addition, while this estimate is essentially a technical one and, as such, q properly was undertaken by JAEIC, Section VIII is of a scope far beyond what I believe to be the responsibility of JAEIC. Uncoordinated advice to JAEIC from the various elements of the Office of National Estimates and of the community's estimative machinery is not sufficient to provide the detaled analysis of broad strategic factors which an undertaking of such magnitude warrants. I had believed that it was to provide for just such a problem that the USIB agreed (paragraph 7, USIB-M-22, 27 January 1959) that, even in the case of JAEIC and GMAIC estimates, the extent of deviation from normal ARMY, JCS, DOE reviews completed Approved For Release 200510211 -: -,CIQ-RDP80B01676R001200090027-3 Approved For Release 2005/(J OB01 676RO01 200090027-3 SUBJECT: The Soviet Atomic Energy Program--NIE 11-2-59 (C) estimative procedures would require USIB approval in each instance. Of course, such USIB action would have to occur early in the development of the Terms of Reference in order to define the scope and methodology. In the absence of Terms of Reference and advance agreement as to the scope of this estimate, it is now too late to propose substantive changes or revisions to a draft text which is unacceptable as a basis for discussion. 4. (S) On the basis of the aforementioned factors, I strongly recommend that Section VIII be deleted in its entirety from NIE 11-2-59 and the main text be published forthwith. If it is felt that there is a community obligation to provide a more detailed appreciation of Soviet nuclear capabilities than appears elsewhere in NIE 11-2-59, I suggest that we explore through the normal estimative machinery the feasible scope of such an estimate and the development of appropriate Terms of Reference. In such case, it would appear essential that the forthcoming estimates, NIE 11-8-59, NIE 11-4-59, and NIE 11-3-60, be available in order to provide an authoritative and current source for missile inventories; this area is but one of numerous significant deficiencies in the present Section VIII concept. 5. (U) Naturally, I have no objections to further dissemination of this Memorandum by you to other members of the Board. " ~i~ 04~~ WILLIAM W. QUINN Major General, GS Deputy ACofS for Intelligence 2 Approved For Release 20Q5102/,J 7 : CIA-RDP801301676R001200090027-3 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001200090027-3 25X1 FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10.101 1 AUG 54 101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47) Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001200090027-3 r CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP DD/I CONCURRENCE I I INFORMATION I I SIGNATURE TAT 00 EO/DCI J 11p 221 Admin 112 Jun 59 (40) FORM 55 237 wbich Replaces may be Form 30-4 I APR 55 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFI :1955-0 342531 used. II K CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP NAME AND ADDRESS DD/I 2 1, 4 H ACTION DIRECT REPLY TAT 1954 STAT PREPARE REPLY RECOMMENDATION RETURN SIGNATURE FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER EO /DCI / C Replaces Form 30-4 whieb may be used. 1p 221 Admin U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF(fE ; 1955-0-342531