LETTER TO THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK FROM MARSHALL S. CARTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060058-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: January 2, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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2 January 1965
The lonorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Wauahington? D. C.
? sar Mr. Secretarys
In order to pull together the bulk of ~ catlrO
of increased Communist military Posture and
in southeast Asia, the attached intelligence Memory duet
has been prepared.
I think you will find it of interest.
Faithfully yours,
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant Gonoral. USA
Acting Director
Attacbment:
Intelligence Msxnorandum, dtd 31 Decernber 1964.
STAT , subject. "Communist
Military Posture an paabiltties vii. a`triie Southeast
Asia.
MSC:be c
Orig - Adse
I d DDCI
1 ER via Ex Dir
1 - DD/P
I A AD/CI via DD/I
NSA review(s) completed.
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31 December 1964
I
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
COMMUNIST MILITARY POSTURE AND
CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS SOUTHEAST ASIA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
31 December 1964
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Military Posture and Capabilities
1s?auv -s u e ST-Agla
In recent weeks we have noted a number of Com-
munist troop movements in Laos, both into the Plaine
des Jarres area and farther south in the area adjacent
to the Seventeenth Parallel, These deployments have
put the enemy in a considerably better position to
launch an offensive either out of the Plaine or to-
ward the Mekong. Coupled with the continuing develop-
ment of Hanoi's infiltration apparatus, they also
could supply a significant increment to the already
substantial--and as yet not fully committed;:Viet Cong
strength in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.
With the continuing long-range build-up of a
logistic base in the Kunming and Canton military dis-
tricts which began in 1960, and the short-range
buildup of air strength in these districts and in
North Vietnam which was triggered by the Tonkin Gulf
episodes last summer, the Communists are increas-
ingly able both to defend against any US air at-
tacks on North Vietnam and to retaliate by raising
the level of ground action in Laos and South Vietnam.
Although there have been no major Chinese ground
force deployments, Chinese and North Vietnamese
forces now in the area are already strong enough for
this purpose. They could be massively reinforced
within a few weeks from the Chinese interior.
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Peiping's Ground Threat
1. The Chinese have long been interested in pre-
paring a base for military operations against Southeast
Asia. They have been building up their military facil-
ities--airfields, barracks a,re-,a,s: , supply points, etc. --
since at least 1960, especially in the Kunming Military
Region. In conjunction with these activities extensive
road building projects were initiated. A rail line
north from Kunming which will link with the main Chi-
nese rail arteries was begun. Recently work on this
line was given a higher priority, but it will still be
several years before it is completed.
2. While this construction has been going for-
ward, Peiping has maintained a fairly large ground
force in both the Kunming and Canton military regions.
This force remains today essentially at the strength
it had five years ago. There are about 250,000 troops
within 200 miles of the Laos - North Vietnamese border
which could be moved into the area on short notice.
These forces could be further augmented by additional
reserves farther to the north within a matter of weeks.
While these forces could intervene in Laos or Vietnam
directly, the Chinese would probably intervene with
ground forces only if the North Vietnamese should find
it impossible to defend their joint areas of interest.
Peiping is able to achieve its purposes by providing
support to the-relatively large North Vietnamese armed
forces who in turn channel material aid and men to as-
sist both the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong as required.
Communist Air Deployments and Air Defense Measures
3. Peiping, made aware in early August that the US
was.willing. to use its air: power:.against Communist targets,
reacted quickly and in force. The Chinese immediately
moved a regiment of jet fighters into North Vietnam's
Phuc Yen airfield and in the following four months
more than doubled their air strength in the area--from
jet fighters. This air build-up in-
cluded a number of MIG-19 (Farmer) and a few MIG-21
(Fishbed) jet fighters. An increase in radar instal-
lations, many with long-range early
warning and ground-con ro - ntercept equipment, has ac-
companied the build-up of fighter strength. In addi-
tion, elements of one antiaircraft artillery division
were transferred from East China.to the Sino-DRV border
area near Ningming where construction of a new airfield
was recently begun. Since mid-December jet fighter
strength at Phuc:Yen has been further increased
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4, Peiping's South China Fleet--the weakest of
Peiping's three fleets--recently initiated steps to
increase its capability in the Tonkin Gulf. The head-
quarters of the South Sea Fleet was transferred from
Canton to Chanchiang on the Luichou Peninsula and a
new naval base was established at Lungmen on the north
shore of the Tonkin Gulf. Although the South Sea Fleet
has no major-naval vessels, it has numerous patrol
craft and motor torpedo boats which could constitute a
limited threat to US naval operations in the Tonkin Gulf.
North Vietnamese Military Forces
5. Hanoi maintains the largest ground force in
Southeast Asia. It is well trained for the type of
operation it is engaged in and has a dedicated leader-
ship which views the conflict in Southeast Asia as a
long-range objective. It is prepared to wage a long-
term conflict to achieve its ends and is also prepared
to run considerable risk vis-a-vis the US.
6. The main element of Hanoi'smilitary strength is
force,
which
now numbers about 220,000. Sev-
major
units
have had a long history of ex-
Laos.
Since
1960 'the- Vietnamese have- moved
these
units
in and out as necessary to sup-
port the Pathet Lao. They have a demonstrated effective-
ness against the Lao forces which is to some extent psy-
chological, but there is also no doubt that these units
are better trained and more determined.on the battlefield.
its ground
eral of its
perience in
elements of
7. Hanoi's tactical air strength now includes the
E et fighters at Phuc Yen. How many of these are un-
er Chinese control and how many are North Vietnamese
is not known, The capability of these aircraft for ef-
fective interdiction has been improved by the appear-
ance of ground-controlled-intercept equipment and height-
finding radar in the North Vietnamese air defense sys-
tem.
DRV Support to Viet Cong
8. The North Vietnamese have apparently stepped
up the flow of men and materiel into the hands of the
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Viet Cong during the past year. There is recent evi-
dence that in at least some areas of South Vietnam the
Communists have provided the Viet Cong with a family
of Chinese Communist - manufactured light infantry weap-
ons, all using the same caliber of ammunition. This
reduces their dependence upon captured equipment and at
the same time simplifies the logistic problem of sup-
plying many different types of ammunition to the Viet
Cong units.
9. The infiltration of military personnel into 25X1
South Vietnam appears to have been maintained at a high 25X1
rate this year, or perhaps even stepped up. I
10. The appearance this year for the first time
of substantial numbers of native-born northerners in
the ranks of the infiltrees indicates that Hanoi is de-
termined to push ahead with the insurrection even though
it means the more open identification of North Vietnam
with the Viet Cong. There has been other evidence re-
cently of the open recruitment of northerners for serv-
ice in the south.
11. Communist forces have been engaged in'a steady
build-up in Laos since the end of the rainy season in
October. The major effort has been directed toward
strengthening Communist positions in the Plaine des
Jarres area. Since late September, when the Route 7
supply artery from North Vietnam was reopened for large-
scale truck convoys, a daily average of between 15 and
20 trucks has moved onto the Plaine. Although in the
majority of observations the cargo was undetermined,
both troops and supplies are known to have been trans-
ported.
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12. To date, the Pathet Lao have refrained
from any major moves in the Plaine area. Their in-
creased strength, however, has been demonstrated by
the failure of two recently mounted government
drives. Although supported by the T-28 aircraft
of the Laotian Air Force, both offensives--one
against Communist positions north of Tha Thom and
the other against the strategic hill position at
Phou Kout, northwest of the Plaine--ran into stiff
opposition and failed to make any significant head-
way.
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13. More recently, the Communists have been
strengthening their forces in southern and central
Laos. In mid-December an estimated 500-600 troops--
reportedly North Vietnamese--were transported along
Route 12 toward the Nhommarath-Mahaxay region east
of Thakhek. At about the same time substantial
numbers of troops--probably several battalions--were
reported moving south on foot along Route 23 toward
the Tchepone - Muong Phine area. The next week this
route, which had been impassable for over six months
during the rainy season, was opened to truck traffic.
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reported that southbound traffic was con nu-
ous y moving" between the hours of 1900 and 2400
during the period: 23-26_'~December?. .Although
the ultimate purpose of these troop and truck move-
ments is unknown, they may be slated for deployment
along Route 9 to the Ban Nang Boua Lao area where
rightist forces have been stepping up their military
pressure. Some of these forces--perhaps including
antiaircraft artillery specialists--will very likely
be charged with increasing the security of the
infiltration routes to South Vietnam.
Elements of the 325th in past
years have been suspected of operating in central
Laos, where they have served to protect vital trans-
portation routes used for the supply of Communist
troops in Laos and possibly in South Vietnam.
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15. In summary, these developments mean that
the Communists, although they have thus far refrained
from major aggressive action, have increased their
capability to move sharply against government posi-
tions near the Communist-held Plaine des Jarres and
along the Mekong Valley.
Communist Propaganda
16. Communist propaganda continues to reflect
the determination of Hanoi to push ahead in South
Vietnam in the face both of stepped-up air strikes
in the Laos corridor and of rumors in the Western
press of US intentions to carry the war in South
Vietnam to the north, North Vietnam's defiant at-
titude was reiterated most recently in connection
with the 20 and 22 December anniversaries of the
formation of the Liberation Front and the North
Vietnamese Army,respectively. There was no hint of
any give in Communist terms for a negotiated set-
tlement. The North Vietnamese party daily on 19
December stated that Hanoi would not talk peace
"until the aggressor abandons his schemes,"
17. Moscow and Peiping have continued to give
full propaganda backing to Hanoi and have reiterated
earlier pledges of support for North Vietnam in the
event of US attacks on it. The Chinese repeated their
earlier warning that US use of Laotian territory to
expand the war in Vietnam could spread the "flames
of war" throughout Indochina. Moscow has also cautioned
Souvanna Phouma along the same lines.
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