LETTER TO THE HONORABLE EUGENE G. FUBINI FROM MARSHALL S. CARTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300070008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 20, 1963
• Content Type: LETTER

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20 August 1963
The Honorable Eugene G. Fubini
Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Gene:
This responds to your memorandum of 8 July, Subject
JCS, NRO Relations, which forwarded for comment a draft
proposed agreement between Tar/NRO and JCS-JRC prepared by
Dr. McMillan and you as a shortened version of an agreement
previously submitted to Mr. McCone by Mr. Gilpatric.
I have spent much time "viewing the now, shortened
version of the proposed agreement, especially in the light of
Mr. McCone's letter of II June to Mr. Gilpatric, and our sub-
sequent conversations. While it is a shortened version of the
agreement, it does not address itself to the major points of dif-
ference that Mr. McCune so clearly covered in his letter of
ti June. Z would be loss than frank with you if I did not state that
I am still at a complete loss to understand just what the purpose
of this proposed agreement is and Duet what benefits will derive
from it, especially in the furtherance of a program for the col-
lection of intelligence information.
JCS and NRO review(s)
completed.
NASA Review Completed.
OSD, DIA review(s)
completed.
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I can see no valid reason for combining under a single entity
the operational control of NRO denied territory overflights and
DOD (JRC) peripheral mission flights. If this is desired with a
view toward coordinating such activities, it appears unnecessary
since there are already in existence procedures and well-defined
understandings between the NRO (CIA operations element) and the
JRC under which the SC3 is kept fully aware of NRO overflight
activities on a very current basis. If the problem here is one of
highar?levol policy, then the coordination is effected at the Special
Group (541Z) meetings and I would support a move on the part of
the Department of Defense to have a JCS representative available
at such meetings when denied area overflights are discussed.
I am sure you realise that existing relationships in the field
of covert overflights between CIA operational elements, acting in
behalf of the NRO, and the United States Air Forces are close and
totally adequate. If the JRC, which is responsible for overt
peripheral flights, were to be injected into this relationship, it
would appear to me to complicate and encumber what are now quite
workable methods for technical and operational coordination and
technical and planning support for denied area overflights.
I agree that during periods of war, or at imminence of
hostilities, or in theaters of active, military operations, or in
periods of high tension, it would be appropriate for higher authority
(and I w 1.d consider higher authority to be either a Presidential
directive or mutual agreement between the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense) to authorize overt,
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military overflights of denied areas -- in such a case, this could
be clearly a military responsibility and should be assumed by
the 3C8 in areas so designated. In this connection, there is
already an Emergency War Plans Operations Order to which CIA
and SAC have agreed which facilitates such action. During the
Cuban crisis such a transfer was affected smoothly and expeedi-
ly, as you know.
The initial proposal for as NRO/JCS Agreement was gener-
ated sometime back in App and has been through a number of
revisions at the working level as well as several at the policy level.
to be no closer to an agreement than we Were at the
winning, and I think this is primarily because we do not have a
meeting of the minds as to just what the purpose of the agreement
is, I. o. , what is it to accomplish that is not now being accomplished
in a perfectly adequate and entirely satisfactory manner, what errors
of omission or commission is it designed to correct, whaf transfer
or realignment of responsibilities is it designed to effect, and
basically what is b*itig dcas that should not be done and what is not
being done that should be done ?
lu the belief, then, that it may b* desirable from the standpoint
Depart rent of Defense to have the NRO execute, supervise,
.~..__ guide, and control those specific, denied area overflights now being
conducted by SRC -- I. ?. , BRASS KNOB missions -- 25X1
and in accord with my ressed agreement that the NRO should be
prepared to effect transfer to the military of certain overflights
during period* of hostilities, I have attached a draft proposed agree-
meat which I think will clearly put these two factors in proper
perspective.
In the event it does not, I suggest that we got together around
the table at your convenience to see what additional articles of what
treaties need to be negotiated -- I am certain we all have only one
mission in mind in thin connection -- the most expeditious collection
of usable intelligence information with the least disruption of co m-
men prerogatives and the most economical utilisation of all of our
combined resources.
Faithfully yours,
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
V-/-, -7
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DRAFT
AGREEMENT
DINRO and JCS4JRC
denied areas or other sensitive regions.
2. in order to ensure that technical and operational
coordination is provided between JCS rated missions and NRO
operated m esionsi that NRO and JCS are kept fully informed on
and control of aircraft reconnaissance flights over
This agreement establishes arranger-enta for NRC
Ion planning and mission status; that necessary logistic
and operational support can be pro aided with adequate lead times,
the D/NRO and the JCS agree that,
assigned to the JRC by the D/NRO in accordance
The Chief, JRC, will report to the D/NRO and Will
make the services of JRC available as the D/NRO directs,
for the implementation of those aircraft recom aissance
operations conducted by the JRC over denied areas or over
other sensitive regions.
D. The duties of the JRC will be in accordance with
existing directives, understandings, and arrangements.
amplified where necessary to reflect additional functions
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3. During periods of war or tension as determined by
Hi xeer Authority at as agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense, and over such areas as may be desig-
nated by them at that time, airborne reconnaissance missions will
become the responsibility of the JCS and necessary control and
resources will be transferred from the NRO as required.
4. Except as specified above, nothing in this agreement alters
existing arrangements for the conduct of NRO airborne reconnaissance
technical and logistic support thereof by the JCS
a military services, nor does it alter the basic NRO agreement
March 1963 between the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense.
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." VI-v1:41
1 2 JUL 196:
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Comments on Fubini's Proposal for a
DOD-NASA Agreement on NASA
Reconnaissance Programs
1. As I indicated to you orally, this agreement is a follow-
up to the meeting I had with Seamans and Fubini on 3 July 1963.
It is not necessarily a unique corollary,to that meeting in that it
decides a question by pre-emption which that meeting had referred
to McCone, McNamara and Webb; namely, whether CIA or DOD
should monitor NASA exploitations of reconnaissance contractors.
2. I believe that Fubini's proposal is completely consistent
with the spirit of the NRO Agreement in that NRO is the joint
CIA/DOD mechanism for dealing with reconnaissance programs.
Insofar as DOD is the executive agent for NRO, the wording of the
agreement is quite proper.
SECRET
NASA
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NASA
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(IFFTCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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9 JUL 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: First NASA/DOD/CIA Meeting on mutual
Programs for Reconnaissance
1. The meeting was held at NASA Headquarters on 2 July 1963.
NASA was represented by Dr. Robert Seamans and two of his
Staff. DOD by Dr. Eugene Fubini of DDR&E, and CIA by the
undersigned with of DDR / OSA.
2. The topic of this meeting was narrower than originally
expected and focused only on ways by which NASA could obtain
lunar photography using cameras and/or contractors already
working for DOD and CIA. It was agreed that the broader question
of reconnaissance exploitation of regular NASA flights should be
taken up in a smaller meeting after considerable homework had
been done.
3. NASA has two programs under consideration for acquiring
lunar photography as a direct and apparently essential support to
the APOLLO manned lunar landing mission:
a. An unmanned lunar satellite launched in 1965 with
an ATLAS-AGENA vehicle (200 lbs. in lunar orbit), sending
back pictures by video link with a promised resolution of
five to ten feet from an altitude of 60 km.
b. A manned reconnaissance of the moon using the
actual APOLLO capsule fired into lunar orbit by the
SATURN C-5 vehicle. The film would return from the
mean with men after a complete APOLLO mission save
only the landing.
e6g~y11l -'
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*)L jnLt IWMP
SUBJECT: First NASA/DOD/CIA Meeting an Mutual Programs
for Reconnaissance
4. Dr. g'ubini has asked the Air Force to look at existing
cameras to see if any could be carried to the moon by an
ATLAS-AGENA. and expects an answer in three days. (I would
be very surprised if a light camera and video link combination
can be found to fit the payload constraint.) Dr. Seamans stated
that NASA would contract independently for its development if no
existing hardware is available for this program.
5. The APOLLO capsule presents no real weight problem
for the manned lunar reconnaissance and the choices are large.
However, it is unlikely that any existing camera would have the
precise characteristics necessary for lunar photography, and it
agreed that we were discussing direct conversion of existing
camera/film technology developed under DOD/CIA sponsorship.
The NASA preference was for a split contract with an existing
DOD/CIA payload contractor, with NASA sponsoring an unclassified
project at the same firm directed toward their specific lunar
mission.
6. Dr. Fubini suggested a meeting of McNamara, Webb an,
.McCone on Tuesday. 9 July 1963, to settle whether CIA or DOI)
ought to oversee such a program so as to insure security on the
black side.
7. My view is that CIA might do better at controlling a
potentially dangerous split arrangement like this than DOD, but
that it would be a thankless chore. On the other hand, if we intend
to work with NASA in the future an exploiting their space opportunities,
it might be a good. way to got started and develop a working pattern
for more important (to us) programs.
9. In the course of the meeting and afterward, Dr. Fubini
offered the following interesting views:
C EJ
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SUBJECT: First NASA/DOD/CIA Meeting on Mutual Programs
for Reconnaissance
a. He and the Air Force felt that NASA was
completely incapable of controlling classified information,
never mind protecting a black program.
b. He sees little if any potential in manned earth
reconnaissance, but has allowed the Air Force to proceed
with some modest planning for GEMINI. He doubts that
man will be able to contribute to came a lnting and
adjusting to the precision required by but has 25X1
directed the Air Force to perform some ground experiments
on inertial tables to establish this potential. In any case,
he feels that only 50% of the satellite malfunctions could
have been corrected by a man, and that malfunctions of the
life support system might have caused as many missions to be
aborted to save the man.
c. He is not so pessimistic about exploiting unmanned
or piggyback orbital opportunities, except that we could not
fund them from NRO in competition with the job we can now
do with Air Force boosters. He suggested that the Webb offer
is not one of "free rides" but rather a plea for budgetary
support of their program.
d.. Dr. Fubiat pleaded with me to consider carefully the
NASA offer, and is obviously opposed to its exploitation. This
may be a result of the long and vigorous NASA/DOD battle
(about which Gene spoke frankly). It may also spring from a
genuine concern for the economic, security, and technical
pitfalls of taking this gift horse home. In any case, his earnest
recommendation adds up to an exclusive reliance on Air Force
boosters for the ',SRC? program, and I believe that we should
continue to explore the NASA offer with a completely open mind.
25X1 " Swill
N RO cc. DDCI DD/
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