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December 15, 2016
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October 17, 2003
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Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 Copy of this book review sent Ted Shackley special delivery and received per 2 July 1964. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 The Invisible Goyertiment The authors of mfhe Invisible Government". David Via. of the New York Rerald Tribune and Thomas B. Ross of the Chicago gun-Tines, admit that Communist subversion and espionage pose a unique threat to the American people and their government. They accept the necessity under certain circumstances for secret American efforts to prevent Moscow and Peking from gaining control of now territories. But in this work they are not directly concerned with the nature and extent of the Soviet and Chinese subversive apparatus. The real villain makes a very brief appearance on the stage and then vanishes. The authors profess to believe that our own government's secret attempts to meet the Communist challenge constitute so real a threat to our own freedoms and democratic processes that they must be exposed in as detailed and dramatic a way as possible. If the Soviets profit from these revelations, as they will, the authors apparently think that such self-inflicted wounds must be endured in their battle against excessive secrecy. Broadly stated, their thesis is that the E.S. "intelligence community" with the CIA at its heart has grown so big in men, money, and power that it has become an invisible government threat- ening the very freedoms it was designed to defend. The CIA, they claim, conducts its awn clandestine foreign policy, and even the President, to whom the Agency is nominally responsible, has been unable to control it. The State Department, both in Washington and in the field, is powerless to exert policy direction because Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 its Mbt-asadors are kept uninformed and are habitually by-pasad by CIA operatives. The Congress, they insist, has voluntarily abdicated its legislative role and supinely votes huge secret funds without any adequate knowledge of haw the money is spent. If all this were true, American democracy would certainly Messrs. Wise be in serious trouble, and the alarm professed by and Ross would be justified. But is it true? Strangely enough, even the authors themselves provide an ambiguous answer to this question which is so central to their major thesis. Theyconcede the existence of certain institutional arrangements which would appear to give the President and hi.s principal foreign policy advisors the very kind of close policy control over secret operations that they ought to have. Early in the book, the authors mention the existence of a "Special Group" which makes the major decisions regarding operations and which is so secret that it is " unkfown outside the innermost circle of the Invisible Government." The reader must wait with baited breath for 255 pages before he learns that the members of this in the White Souse, Secretary sinister cabal are McGeorge Bundy of Defense McNamara, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under- secretary of State for Political Affairs and McCone as Director of CIA. The" are just the officials that one would expect the President to have chosen to advise his on matters of high ~O r~ )mil fey and they are far from invisible. Having conceded the ezistowo of such a supervisory body p the authors - in order to prove their thesis - try to demonstrate Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140001-4 +affectiveness of the special Group? 'Without reveal tug how the in ete in they cone to their conclusions, they "Sect the Group me "a highly informal way without the elaborate records and pro- cedures is no cedures of other high Government c,mitt:~ece ? " At another "outside analysis" and "little detached criticism." occupied point, the Group's members are castigated for being too function with their of ~.e." duties to perforX' th~_ Lr supervisory suatel. The impression is left t'jat the President ;,putt tiie a+dec_, Y oY State arf not even inf(yo cd of their secr(t dccisioas. SeCx`etfary k'11itr One rutet .a rem a very low opinion. o the sense of rest. 3t~E"eJ.~3`1 L.;T and coxa t,e=nre )J-, tl,!e Me ia the , . .;