MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL CARTER FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300140012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 6, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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6 May 1964
In connection with DCI's directive that each and every Agency
official mentioned in The Invisible Government" comment on those
passages and indicate inaccuracies, I have gone over the text and
find that you are mentioned in four places.
The references to you are on pages 85, 186, 197 and 293.
These pages are marked with a paper clip.
So far as I can determine, there are no inaccuracies. Your
letter, which is quoted on page 85, is, with the exception of one
word, a verbatim quote.
The reference to you on page 186 is routine and factual.
So far as I know the references to you on page 197 are accurate. J
Your role in getting the word and passing the word on the
discovery of the Cuban missiles in October of 1962 is described on
page 293. This includes references to the meeting at General
Taylor's home and the first Ex Com meeting on the morning of
16 October. I am not aware of any inaccuracies in this. Perhaps
you can find some. I am attaching a memorandum for you to send to
Chretien for inclusion in his study for the DCI if you agree.
J
STAT
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 Approved For Release 2003/05/06 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0013001ffA .2
STATEMENT ON "THE BAY OF PIGS" BY HAYNES JOHNSON
(The following statement is to be used internally and in
off-the-record discussions with individuals outside the
Agency, particularly members of Congress)
The Haynes Johnson book on the Bay of Pigs done in collaboration
with the four leaders of the Brigade, referred to as Brigade 2506, is
basically the Brigade's story of the Bay of Pigs. It also devotes a con-
siderable portion to the efforts to free the Brigade starting with the
Castro proposal to exchange tractors for the Brigade and concluding
with the actual exchange.
The author has done considerable research on this book and has
had considerable assistance on certain portions. He undoubtedly has
discussed not only the exchange of the prisoners with all of the pertinent
people concerned but probably has also interviewed many people who
were involved in the original plans for the landing and the landing itself.
The author did not consult the CIA. If he had it is unlikely the
Agency would have made any comment. The principal allegations
against CIA in the book are that Agency personnel allegedly told the
Cubans to go ahead and land even if Washington canceled the operations
and that there would be help coming. While it is difficult to ascertain
through facts of who said what in a situation of extreme tension, parti-
cularly now that memories have been affected on one side by years of
imprisonment and on the other by years of controversy, the principal
U. S. concerned categorically denies that he had ever told the Cubans
to ignore cancellation orders. The same would apply to the allegations
that they would be supported by additional forces of the U. S. military.
Other critical comments in the book concerning the CIA revolve
around alleged miscalculations concerning Castro were their ground
forces, page 223: "Castro3s army was far stronger and fought more
fiercely than anyone had anticipated. Consequently, the Brigade
would have needed many more men--perhaps ten thousand, perhaps
twenty thousand--to accomplish its mission. Added to this was the
erroneous belief the Brigade B-26s would control the air and enable
the men to operate at will on the ground. Another miscalculation was
obvious: there had been no uprising, no mass defections from Castrots
forces. And the CIA's alternative plan for the Brigade had not been
employed. "
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The author then goes on to say that none of the Cubans knew
anything about the Agency's plan to disperse for guerrilla warfare in
the Escambray Mountains and that the operations which started out
as a clandestine covert action changed to a full-fledged overt military
campaign. The author concludes that the Bay of Pigs was a classic
tragedy of good intention and finally the responsibility must rest with
the CIA. He adds that the CIA is necessary to the survival of the
United States and alleges that CIA men in the Field tended to take
matters into their own hands.
It may be some time before we can categorically state that
the intelligence on the landing was either inadequate or accurate. It
is significant to note that Castro himself indicated that the landing
came close to succeeding and expressed admiration for the plan.
What the Agency can state categorically is that no one to the best of
our knowledge violated orders or acted without proper authorization.
Approved For Release 2003/05/06 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001300140012-2