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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 4, 2007
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Publication Date: 
November 28, 1964
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R001400020001-6.pdf454.5 KB
Approved For Release 2007/05/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400020001-6 ? 0 N Review Completed. r 1964 f FOR T18 REC SUBJECT: -Meeting on Southeast Asia, 1100 hours, 28 November General. Carter represented Mr. McCone. I. All Principals were present except Mr. Bail and Mr. McCone. 2. Prior to the meeting, General 'Wheeler pointed out that the other words, we must assiduously avoid any press contacts. to talk to the Press in any way nor to give any backgrounders. In should be taken out first prior to any commencement. of a long-range program.. Likewise, Secretary Rusk pointed out that the Pres*nt was quite disturbed about what appeared to be continuing leaks of policy discussions. Secretary Rusk enjoined everyone present not Joint Chiefs of Staff felt strongly as a body that the MSG's and the PGt 3. Papers were handed out as follows: Tab A - Subject: "Scenario for bnmediate Action Program.17 (Prepared by Bundy Working Group.) Tab B - "Draft Statement to GVN. It (Prepared by Gener Taylor) Tab C - "Military Annex. it (Prepared by Mr. McNaughton Tab D D. List of Questions (Prepared by General Taylor) 4. Secretary Rusk pointed out that although planners and operators maximum flexibility on a decision-by-decision basis as events occurred. be careful not to back the President into any such corner and to give him wanted decisions to cover periods several months in advance, we must 5. Mac Bundy pointed out this would be difficult "hut we must be sure that the President was alerted to all problems that he would have to face up to whether or not they might occur in the light Of subsequent events. NAVY review(s) completed. r J revies completed. 0-0 DOS 05D reviews, Approved For Release 2007/05/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400020001-6 BEST COPY Available THROUGHOUT FOLDER Approved For Release 2007/05/06: CIA_RDP80B01676R001400020001.6.. 0 0 6. General Taylor pointed out that be was much encouraged over events in the past 24 hours as indicative that the Huong government seemed to be getting its feet on the ground. He stated-that his proposed statement to the GYN would be made initially or, a Top Secret basis and only to Huong Suu, Vien, and Khahn. Bundy said Taylor's statement should be so phrased that the GYN would know that it they did certain things then we would follow by doing certain things, and that the opt was ours,. not theirs. Likewise, we should put a time, schedule on accomplishment of those things we wanted GYN to dc, . Rusk was hesitant about any calling of a leadership meeting because of the high-noise level it would raise prior to the convening of Congress and would create many problems. He stated that the President -$had ruled against General Taylor seeing any of the congress- sional'leadership (except Senator Humphrey) until after the President had made his decisions, probably next week. 8. McNamaraa, said we must take care of the critical problem ol how we surface the new developments on infiltration since this could a political bomb shell. `heeler pointed out that he understood' P hound was coming to this country before too long and hoped to make speech before the UN on infiltration. 9. Rusk said that the UN would probably meet long enough to appoint a committee to study Article 19 and then to report to the Assembly, and therefore Assembly activities would probably be pushed over into March, and there r. sight not even be an Assembly if the Article 19 matter is not cleared up. 10. Mac Buuidy said we must make it clear to the President exactly what our plans are and spell out clearly what: the first month' a activities would be under these plans. He stated that the President had discussed the various options and was generally familiar with them. 'W'heeler insisted that the President be informed that the SCS opted for much faster, harder action and unanimously so, but they would, of course., do whatever the President decided. U. There was then discussion of greater participation by "other flags. '' specifically on the part of the Philippines, and the Australians, and possibly New Zealand, with more support from Thailand. These would be in the form of combat advisors or possibly even small combat units. McNamara said he wanted no Koreans and no Nationalist Chinese and that what he is really looking for is symbolic support, particularly r circumstances where some of these third country nationali ended and killed as is happening to the United States every day. c.._o,?.I,?.--- nnn-71nC1nc C'IA onoQn Qnlr,7rannI nnnl)nnnl a Mclllama:ra said he told Hasluck that the united States had no intention of going it alone in Southeast Asia and if the Australians did not help more they might find us withdrawing. a2. There was a general discussion of the need i.or constructing t 4%-_ -- permanent jet air f{eIds b u .it./4 YAZlG.iL. Armu~ and taxi making further studies. are "aylor sai?i h~~ w l d oo prepare an le to his paper indicating e xpiicj ' in detail just what we epected the C to do and the timetable mentioned s on which it should, be cane. He $ u h c t rng$ as. increases in armed forces, increased dior~-latsc re ? p- eseYrtauves overseas, improved police. forces, imDlx cation of d i a aa nistraion, removal of incompetents, etc., etc. 13. There was involved and lengthy discussion of the stoppage of flow Of dependents as well as the removal of dependents presently in, VN. The various pros and cons were thrown back and forth and it was decided that this .s a major policy. decision which they were not yet prepared to consider. 14. A discussion then ensued of Tab C. Option C (Graduated pressure) of the ilits i. A-- . y ex. McNamara stated that tk four items would probably take lac A i n yN a txr g the first 3v days. He also stated that the Situation ins -ocxid stable in its oresant not,- in his opinion, remain r.,r-ris~~t.,.., __ ~,. _.a, _ ..... gaL ve?rer or Would get worse, but we would not have the status quo. He also stated that if the ESOTt patrols were' resumed (and there was much discussion of this) and they were attacked by air, he would propose tthe ake fields. General Taylor stated that there were threeaso s for the fEs OTO patrols, i. e., intelligence collection, assertion of our marittme &-",w# and to provoke incidents. We must weigh advantages and timing in the I-),* f it IV a three of these reasons. (MeNaughton mentioned the paper that he and the Joint Staff had prepared on the value of DF-SOTO patrols for intelligence collection. Several people mentioned that this was a fine study -` I was not familiar with it so made no. comment. 15. The following decisions were made: follows: a. Five papers were to be prepared for the president as proved For Release 2007/05/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400020001-6 ,he general concept (Z) Actions during first 30 days (3) What to say to GV T (4) What to say to the public ?(5) What to say to third countries. //. (undy undertook to work on all of these during the weekend staff. b.. One man to work fulltime to prepare a report on infiltration and to get the Jorden report ready. The problem here is how to present both to the public. It was agreed that Chet Cooper would be assigned by Bundy to do this job. c. Prior to Tuesday, the Principals should agree on the concept of Tab I of Military Annex, i. e. , what type of reprisals would be used against what type of VC provocative*. d. The next meeting would be at 11:00 a. zn. on Monday and papors would be distributed by Bill Mundy as soon as they were completed. M 'ars hall S. Carter Lieutemant General, LISA Acting Director Distribution: - Orig - D CI(A'j"- - - Y Lei a.X c-~ 9 ~c w-r~ 2_1-DDCI 3 --1 - ER via Ex Dir L1_57 E - DD/P (Mr. Helms; Mr. Colby) 6-7 2 - DD/I (Mr. Cline; Annrnirar1 Pr%r PalancA 9nn7/ntitnn r.LA-RnPRnRn1n7RRnn14 nnn9nnnl-n pprove or a eas6 `2007/05/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400020001- 77- SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS TION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED FIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY / ' ' G O) n>~FICIAL ROUTING SLIP COMMENT CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL (40) 1961 0-587282 FORM NO. 23 7 Use previous editions d U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2-61 Dyed Fnr Ralamco n~rnr_ n~ - UNCLASSIFIED when blank _T ECRET when attached to Top Secret D ent - Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is ached from controlled document. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE CIA CONTROL NO. DOC. NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. 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