MEETING WITH MR. VANCE AND DR. MCMILLAN ON THURSDAY, 25 MARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 26, 1965
• Content Type: MFR

25X1
Approved For*
26 March 1965
SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Vance and Dr. McMillan on
Thursday, 25 March
1. Upon reading Mr. Bross' memorandum for record of
his discussion with Secretary Vance on 24 March 25X1
it was apparent to me that Secretary Vance had been fed a lot of
misinformation by Dr. McMillan on the hassle that McMillan and
I were engaged in in connection with CORONA operations on the
West Coast (see my memorandum of telephone conversation with
Dr. McMillan conducted at about 6:00 p. m., 24 March). I immedi-
ately telephoned Vance's office anda sked for an appointment as
soon as possible. I subsequently met with Dr. Wheelon, 25X1
and others who felt it was essential that I meet with Vance in order
to straighten him out since, in his present frame of mind based on
McMillan's innuendoes or worse, it might have a bearing on overall
discussions on the NRO agreement. I subsequently talked to Mr.
McCone who likewise felt the matter was urgent and telephoned
Secretary Vance, urging an appointment for me immediately.
2. I met with Secretary Vance in his office at about 1:30. Mr.
Vance read in toto my memorandum for record of my conversation
with McMillan. He stated that, up until reading that memorandum,
he had the distinct impression that the matter was simply one of CIA
withholding from the Air Force satellite people information that the
latter needed in order to conduct launch and recovery. I then told
him exactly how the calibration data and telemetry charts were
developed during manufacture and checkout of the payload and how
the operation was conducted at the AP facility during flight. I assured
him that all information on the condition and operation of the payload
and the payload section of the vehicle which could in any way affect
the health of the vehicle or bear on the decision to de-orbit was
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Greer himself was really a party to them. I said if he wanted
names of the trouble makers, I would give them to him and it was
perfectly apparent to me that there was a clear-cut effort to run
CIA out of the satellite business and make this critical intelligence
collection system a complete blue-suit operation. About this time
Secretary Vance telephoned McMillan and informed him of his agree-
ment in the message I had read to him. McMillan was docile and
uncommunicative to Vance. He then attempted to reopen with me the
entire matter to include acquisition of all the basic telemetry and
calibration data. I told him he could not have it, that his people
would not know what to do with it, that I had no intention of estab-
lishing or allowing to be established a separate diagnostic, analytical
function by an agency having no responsibility for the payload. Dr.
McMillan dropped that subject by stating that this was a matter which
would have to be settled in a different arena and that he would not
press that point now, since he had a satellite waiting for his approval
to launch. At this point I suggested that any delay in launch for other
than technical reasons would be a most serious matter to the entire
intelligence community and especially Mr. McCone who had been
told that the satellite would be launched in a few hours. McMillan
then said that the people at STC did not even get the results of
telemetry analysis (as claimed by Maxiets memorandum) and I stated
that this was untrue. I again reiterated that STC got every piece of
information necessary for them to perform their function and that
any results of the telemetry analysis which could have any bearing
on STC operations was made available immediately and, where
necessary, in specific detail. McMillan said it was just as important
for STC to know whether everything was normal as to know of any
abnormality. I told him this information had always been furnished
to the STC. McMillan asked me if I would include in the message a
statement indicating that the results of payload telemetry analysis
would be quantitatively and in detail provided the STC. I ignored
his exact phraseolo and said I saw no reason why the results of
the analysis shoulke made available as appropriate but that before
including it in the cable, I would want to check it with my staff.
McMillan said, "I get the impression that McCone and you are cap-
tives of your staff and unable to make decisions. " I told McMillan
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that he would do well to learn how to use a staff himself as well
as exerting some caution in his use of the English language. I
told him I would let his last comment pass since it was apparent
he was most discomfitted by Mr. Vance's decision. His final
statement was that the matter of whether or not other people had
access to the technical telemetry data and calibration charts was
a matter for further action in the future.
4. I then returned, discussed McMillan's request with the
DD/S&T people, and dictated I Iwhich the DD/S&T folks
concurred in.
5. I want especially to be alerted to any action that McMillan,
General Martin, or others may take which in any way would reflect
25X1 on r Colonel Conway or Colonel Heran who, so far as
I can make out, are acting like good, national-interest citizens and
doing the job they should be doing. You may rest assured that
while we have clearly won this skirmish, the battle will continue
so long as McMillan, Martin, Worthman, Bussard, and Murphy are
in the act.
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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
MSC:blp
Distribution:
Original - DDCI
Copy 2 - DD/S&T
Copy 3 - D/NIPE
Copy 4 - EA/DCI
Copy 5 - ER via ExDir
Copy 6 - EA/DDCI
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