MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM MARSHALL S. CARTER

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CIA-RDP80B01676R001400040006-9
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RIPPUB
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S
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25
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December 16, 2016
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September 23, 2004
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6
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Publication Date: 
July 24, 1964
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MFR
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( Approved Forlease 2004/10/20: N4 tr. MORANDUM FOR THE R :11';1:1 167 001400040006-9 ILLEGI 1. This is a brief of the executive session of USIB that took place Wednesday, 22 July, at 11:50. Present were the regular members of USIB, plus Dr. MclYillan of NRO, who is a member, for NRO :natters, of USIB, and !Jr. Fubini, who appeared at the request of McCone. because Dr. Irubini represents Secretary Vance sad Mr. McNamara on NiO matters, and the responsibility for NRO is shared equally by DCI and the Secretary of Defense. I r-,,a1.,e a point of this because it explains why they were there and why the Director did not bring in his opposite member. the monitor of Dr. .16,heelon, or why he did not have John Bross, or or someone 25 else. This was the membership. So the only true outsider was Fuhini. Mr. cCone mentioned both of these points prior to making his opening remarks. He said the question that be was faced with was the establishment of requirements for overhead reconnaissance, and by requirements he re- ferred not alone to targets that had to be covered, but the degree of resolu- tion, and accordingly, therefore, the swath width, since they were related, and he felt that the U. S. Intelligence Board had perhaps been derelict in its duties over the years in not making these requirements clearly understood by the NEO or by other collection agencies. He said that in June of 1960, USIB had gone to the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum -- and I think he quoted the subject, "Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance." It was an old paper. It was two months after the shootdown of the U-2, but was prior to the collection of any satellite reconnaissance. And he quoted from this paper, indicating that the requirement udsted for a photographic system capable of object resolution of 25X on a side; however. the 100-foot resolution -- and apparently that was then a concept in satellite reconnaissance -- would be utilized to the maximum extent possible. Mr. McCone pointed out that subsequently he had been con- cerned about this whole problem, even without the knowledge of this letter, and that in April of '63, USIB had considered updating the requirements on NRO and had asked COlviOR to review these requirements and to establish a new set, providing to USIB the guidance whieb the DCI and Sec Def could then give to NEO, and that at that time that the paper should be discussed and coordinated and at least talked over with the NRO. Mr. McCone pointed out that COL OR did this, and submitted the paper to d#4*311?, I presume, in April, and that to September of 1963. NRO expressed a ntunber of reservations on the paper -- not back to USIB, apparently, but perhaps to COMOE. In any event, all this is what Mr. McCone said at the meeting. Z. At this point, then, Yiefer, acting for McMillan - and I am still quoting Mr. McCone -- got together with (X)MOR and they met a couple of times to see if they couldn't come up with an agreed paper. At thie point, NRO and DIA review(s) completed. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/10/20 : CIA-R P80601676R001400040006-9 P80601676R001400040006-9 25X1 25X1 " Approved For lease 2004/10/20 : ClAzgDR80601676601400040006-9 , Mr. McMillan said, apparently DIA. was advised by Secretary Gilpatrie that any views DIA put into the COMOR-puto machinery should be submitted to him, Secretary Gilpatric, prior thereto for, apparently, DOD approval. Gilpatric left. and Secretary Vance toe IT over, and there has been no prog- ress in this field. The DIA. paper, which was submitted to Fubini's office, namely to Augenstein, never came down from that office back to DIA or into any other portion of the machinery, and accordingly. DIA has had no authority to proceed. At this point. rubini interjected and said that is not true, that is false. But McMillan countered by saying -well,, he was still checking. At this point a parg athetical comment by me, itNiue subsequently brought out that Fubini had the papers in his hand and apparently his office had been hatching them throughout this entire period, although this admission was not clear-cut. 3. 2vicCone said again that he felt that US1B was deficient, since they had not established requirements, and he felt that we must do it -- we, being USIB. Be said that on 18 March Dr. McMillan had briefed USI B on new systems that covered several search systems -- some going halfway between the EB-4 and he had mentioned rather casually. 6. fie pointed out that there were three things, then, that might be done and his problem was: do we go parallel or do we place priorities on these two? He said that all the new systems have serious technical problems 25X1 which may foreclose any one of thorn. I NRO Fie said all of these thing. must be explored before they can be accepted as a system for the expenditures of heavy money. Fe 25X1 Approved For Release 2 004/10/20 : CIA-RD 25 25 4 4/10/20 : CIA-RDP Approved For !arse 2004/10i -:.HCIA-RDP80B0167601400040006-9 25 said there was not enough money to take care of both of these approacies in the FY '65, although there might be some reapportionment activities within the FY '65 NRO tentative program if we really dug into it. He said, there- fore, that USIB should express itself as to the input that was required for the intelligence inventory. Where should the major effort be placed? Should we keep CORONA as & sparcb program and develop or should we 25 r getting the swath width 9 Be said we must answer 25X1go all out on all the imponderable, of both systems just as quickly as we can through re- search and the proving of those still doubtful components, and then decide on one or the other, or on both. 25X1 8. Ile said that he 111&11 in a dilemma, since he thinks we were negligent in not forcing the issue through the COMOR-NRO machinery. On the other hand, he said he didn't know what would be gained,, because it was only two days ago that he had the slightest concept of whati was, and it was only a mouth ago 25 25X1 when' started to settle down. So maybe really nothing would have been proven had we put this thing in writing. 9. At this point Fubini said, "Leek, there is no fiscal ceiling on the NRO or on NRO research and development" -- if there is a good case presented which convinces the Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone, then he is sure that more funding will be possible. He said its quite likely that we can carry on both programs simultaneously, if the proper case is made with Sec Def and DCI. Be says what we have to knew is what does USIli need and how well can you make the case in support of these needs. Mc/villan seemed to cast some doubt on this, because he said he was still torn and bleeding from the beatings he'd been getting from Mr. McNamara on money and savings, and so forth. Fubini then held up this stack of papers which be said were the papers from DIA and the NRO, and he said they could be extremely helpful, there was a great body of information is these papers, although he did not agree with some of it. These were obviously the papers 1 had referred to previously, 10. Fubini said two and a hall years ago, Charyk had asked bids for a payload to be carried by the Titan 3 and weighing up to 20.000 pounds. capable of low orbit, and they had asked I and 25 25X1 and that subsequently all the copies of these proposals and bids had been burned at the direction of the Department of Def011/0,1 but he. Fubini, had a remarkable espionage system and he had a copy of all of these. Be did not offer to provide them to anyone. This was designed for very broad cover- age and a small resolution, He said 25X Approved For Release 200 80601676R001400040006-9 25 25X1 25X1 5X1 sirh ' Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B016711001400040006-9 r 7,117. Kodak had nether at would appear to hal This was all that be don't know. they are now bringing up to date, entioned at this paint. What this might 11, Mr. McCone Amid it is not the province of USIB or COVOR to say how the camera. works, or what the machinery will be to acquire the rAeces - Nary resolution or the necessary swath width. It is lop to them to say what areas are of important priority interest. And to establish the needs for these acquisitions. said he wanted WIC to townie., what we get on marginal resolution. For example, he said, we used the CORONA camera in the U-2 over Cuba and it really didn't help us any from the intelligence viewpoint, even though the resolution was considerably greater than the regular U-2 camera. 12. At this point, General Blake said be was greatly impressed by the weather limitations, and that while the present search may not give us enough resolution, reducing the swath coverage greatly increases the weather prob- lem. I can awe the relationship here. 14e said we must continue to broaden the coverage with the greatest resolution we can, and that really, because of weather and other factors, at times we seem to be doing our requirements work in somewhat of a vacuum. 13. Mclvfillan said there had been considerable analysis of one factor swath width - but in search we need coT%tiersons territorial coverage with a reasonable number of missions at a raaaonable cost. Be said what is the size of the area that must be examined in one picture? He said that there bad been considerable analysis of the dimension of targets, that of the 600 targets they had bean told to concentrate on, only two were larger than 50 miles in diameter, and that these were both missile complexes. that of all the rest 95% had a diameter of less than three miles ? so that we had to consider swath width versus economy. He said that in order to pick up all the targets by pointing -- and by this I think he meant spot pointing -- the operation gets very expensive. He said technical requirements imply the need for coverage of some breadth -- say search in a limited area some - 25X1 thing on the order o 14. At this point, General Thomas said as far as they're concerned the Air Forces are still far from giving up either search or spot and the Air Force says their technical intelligence requirements are Admiral Taylor said the Navy's stated technical requirement is 25X1 I He also said that NPIC should be able to tell us what resolution could reasonably settle for to meet the limits of both technical intelli- Eence and any other types of intelligence. As a matter of fact, there are astro -physical limitations which you reach, I think, when you get in the 25X1 neighborhood of certatnly_by,the time you get to 25X1 Approved For Release 200 4/10/20 : CIA-RE P80601676R001400040006-9 25X 25 25 4/10/20 : CIA-RD 25X1 you* Approved Foirlease 2004/1(y21A-RDP806016e001400040006-9 _ exceedingatmospheric tattoos that you might expect. 15. McMillan said there has not been much experisace with resolution and we still bad a lot to learn in this area. Mr. Mc Cone said that there was really no limit to the demands for technical intelligence, that the intelligence guys would like to count every bolt and every nut in a piece et machinery. From the USIS viewpoint. on the other hand, in the broad look -- IRBMS's and so forth there is a lower limit past which resolution does not raaterially help, although and so forth, could be helped greatly by greater resolution. 25X1 with NRO inputs through the NRO membership and possibly Kiefer or others joining in. lie hoped also -- looking directly at Fubini - that DIA could reflect their views without DOD influence and delay and procrastination. Fubini felt that needle, I might add, right up to his navel. 18. Futrini says it has been his experience that it takes six to eight years to develop an operational airplane, and at least two and a half to three and a half years to develop an operational satellite with its payload. This would mean that there would be nothing in the inventory, at the earliest. before the end of 1966, which would be a new system, and that an interim capability by improvements could be done more timely. I think here he was probably looking ahead to as brought out by the briefing yesterday. 19. Mr. McCeme agrees that we've got to get on with this right away, that we've got to provide NRO Nome programming guidance on the USIB re- quirements in the form of resolution and swath width, and particularly we 25X1 Approved For Release 20C -71 P80601676R001400040006-9 25X1 * Approved For *ease 2004/1 oigo ,:t1A--RDP8060167g01400040006-9 should start programming our current assets to cover our China require manta in the fall when the weather starts getting good. He felt says tbat CON101- and NRC) were on top a this, but he threw it in again as a tinr. McMillan said be would immediately look into the possible use of pulling some of our Lanyards; out of the stockpile and cranking them up in a few inesittug for the possibility of targeting of Odra. I then pointed out that after beasts. Fuhini's counnents about the budget. I felt like the boy who was asked dap you want chocolate ice cream or vanilla ice cream and he said I want bora sad lots of it. Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy ai rector Approved For Release 200 / _ 80601676R001400040006-9 25 25 -1 Approved For fp ase 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B01671101400040006-9 22 Tuly 1964 DDCI, 1648-1717 hours DDCI's Office Mr. Bross ,/ DDCI:, This is a brief of the executive session of USIB that took place! today; Wednesday, Tilly 22nd, at 11:50. Present were the regular members of USIB, plus Dr. McMillan of NRO, who is a member, for NRO matters, of USIB, and Dr. Fubini, who appeared at the request of Mr. McCone, because Dr. Fubini represents Secretary Vance and Mr. McNamara on NRO matters, and the responsibility for NRO is shared equally by DCI and the Secretary of Defense. I make a point of this because it explains why they were there and why the Director did not bring in his opposite member, the monitor of NRO, Dr. Wheelon, or why he did not have you, John Bross, or you ,4 or someone else. This was the membership. So the only true outsider was Fubini. Mr. McCone mentioned both of these points prior to making his opening remarks. He said the question that he was faced with was the establishment of require- ments for overhead reconnaissance, and by requirements he referred not alone to targets that had to be covered, but the degree of resolution, and accordingly, therefore, the swath width, since they were related, and he felt that the U. S. Intelligence Board had perhaps been derelict in its duties over the years in not making these requirements clearly understood 1 Approved For Release 2004/10/ :C1A-RDP80B01676R0014000400Cr ii C flt;'.;;) Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B016711031400040006-9 by the NRC or by other collection agencies. He said that in Tune of 1960 USIB had gone to the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum -- and I think he quoted the subject, "Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance. " It was an old paper. It was two months after the shootdown of the U-2, but was prior to the collection of any satellite reconnaissance. And he quoted from this paper, indicating that the requirement existed for a photographic system capable of object resolution of however, the 100-foot resolution -- and apparently that was then a concept in satellite reconnaissance -- would be utilized to the maximum extent possible. Mr. McCone pointed out that subsequently he had been concerned about this whole problem, even without the knowledge of this letter, and that in April of 163 USIB had considered updating the requirements on NRC and had asked comsR to review these requirements and to establish a new set, providing to USIB the guidance which the DCI and Sec Def could then give to NRC, and that at that time that the paper should be discussed and coordinated and at least talked over with the NRC. Mr. McCone pointed out that COlVLOR did this, and submitted the paper to I presume, in April, and that in September of 1963 NRC expressed a number of reservations on the paper -- not back to USIB, apparently, but perhaps to Approved For Release 2004/1 2 RDP80B01676R001400040006-9 25 Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B0167.01400040006-9 CO1VISR. In any event, al11I2m doing is telling you now what Mr. McCone said at the meeting. !Don't correct me until we get all through. : At this point, then, (Keefer), acting for McMillan -- and I am still quoting Mr. McCone -- got together with COMOR and they met a couple of times to see if they couldn't come up with an agreed paper. At this point, Mr. McMillan said, apparently DIA was advised by Secretary Gilpatric that any views DIA put into the COMOR-NRO machinery should be submitted to him, Secretary Gilpatric, prior thereto for, apparently, DOD approval. Gilpatric left, and Secretary Vance took over, and there has been no progress in this field. The DIA paper, which was submitted to Fubini's office, namely to Augenstein, never came down from that office back to DIA or into any other portion of the machinery, and accord- ingly DIA has had no authority to proceed. At this point Fubini interjected and said that is not true, that is false. But McMillan countered by saying - well, he was still checking. At this point a paranthetical comment by me, it was subsequently brought out that Fubini had the papers in his hand and apparently his office had been hatching them throughout this entire period, although this admission was not a clear-cut ' McCone said again that he felt that USIB was deficient, since they had not established requirements, and he felt that we must do it -- we, being USIB. He said that on 18 March Dr. McMillan had briefed USIB on Approved For Release 2004/10/20 :,014-RDP430B01676R001400040006-9 ' 7 Approved For *ase 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80601676.1400040006-9 new systems that covered several search systems -- some going halfway between the KH-4 -- and he had mentioned, rather casually, He pointed out that there were three things, then, that might be done -- and his problem was: do we go parallel or do we place priorities on these two? He said that all the new systems have serious technical problems which may foreclose any one of them. For example, Eastman Kodak system depends on a very rapid new film speed -- they pointed out approximately 60% increase over present film speeds. Mr. McCone said Approved For Release 2004/10/20 :161A-RDP80601676R001400040006-9 25 Approved For 1410ase 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B0167601400040006-9 there was a problem of stabilization of the vehicle, as well as greatly increased weight, as well as the size of the mirrors that were really a quantum jump in lens and mirror development. He said all of these things must be explored before they can be accepted as a system for the expenditures of heavy money. He said there was not enough money to take care of both of these approaches in the FY '65, although there might be some reapportionment activities within the FY '65 NRC tentative program if we really dug into it. He said, therefore, that USIB should express itself as to the input that was required for the intelligence inventory. Where should the major effort be placed? Should we keep Corona as a search 25X1 program and develop I or should we go all out on getting the swath width? He said we must answer all the imponderables of both systems just as quickly as we can through research and the proving of those still doubtful components, and then decide on one or the other, or on both. He said that he was in a dilemma, since he thinks we were negligent in not forcing the issue through the COMOR-NRO machinery. Approved For Release 2004/1q201CIA-RDP80B01676R001400040006-9 ' 25 25 Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B01676.1400040006-9 On the other hand, he said he didn't know what would be gained, because it was only two days ago that he had the slightest concept of what and it was only a month ago when really .maybe/nothing would have been proven had we put this thing in writing. At this point Rubin') who had obviously been hatching something over there, said, "Look, there is no fiscal ceiling on the NRO or on NRO research and development" -- if there is a good case presented which convinces the Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone, then he is sure that more funding will be possible. He said it's quite likely that we can carry on both programs simultaneously, if the proper case is made with Sec Def and DCI. He says what we have to know is what does USIB need and how well can you make the case in support of these needs. McMillan seemed to cast some doubt on this, because he said he was still torn and bleeding from the beatings he'd been getting from Mr. McNamara on money and savings, and so forth. Fubini then held up this stack of papers which he said were the papers from DIA and the NRO, and he said they could be extremely helpful, there was a great body of information in these papers, although he did not agree with some of it. These were obviously the papers I had referred to previously. started to settle down. So was, 25X1 Fubini said two and a half years'Charyk had asked bids for a payload to be carried by the Titan 3 and weighing up to 20, 000 pounds, Approved For Release 2004/10/200Alkty'80B01676R001400040006-9 13 25 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B0167601400040006-9 capable of low orbit, and they had asked and that subsequently all the copies of these proposals and bids had been burned at the direction of the Depart- ment of Defense, but he, Fubini, had a remarkable espionage system and he had a copy of all of these. He did not offer to provide them to anyone. This was designed for very broad coverage and a small resolution, He said Eastman Kodak had another study, which they are now bringing up to date, which would appear to be a This was all that was mentioned at this point. What this might be I don't know. Mr. McCone said it is not the province of USIB or COMOR to say how the camera works, or what the machinery will be to acquire the necessary resolution or the necessary swath width. It is up to them to say what areas are of important priority interest, and to establish the needs for these acquisitions. He said he wanted NPIC to examine what we get on marginal resolution. For example, he said, we used the Corona camera in the U-2 over Cuba and it really didn't help us any from the intelligence viewpoint, even though the resolution was considerably greater than the regular U-2 camera. At this point General Blake said he was greatly impressed by the weather limitations, and that while the present search may not give us Approved For Release 2004/10/20 :`Cl j*R1A04301676R001400040006-9 25 Approved For Oase 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80601676.1400040006-9 enough resolution, reducing the swath coverage greatly increases the weather problem. I can see the relationship here. He said we must continue to broaden the coverage with the greatest resolution we can, and that really, because of weather and other factors, at times we seem to be doing our requirements work in somewhat of a vacumn. McMillan said there had been considerable analysis of one factor - swath width - but in search we need continuous territorial coverage with a reasonable number of missions at a reasonable cost. He said what is the size of the area that must be examined in one picture? He said that there had been considerable analysis of the dimension of targets, that of the 600 targets they had been told to concentrate on, only two were larger than 50 miles in diameter, and that these were both missile complexes, that of all the rest 95% had a diameter of less than three miles -- so that we had to consider swath width versus economy. He said that in order to pick up all the targets by pointing -- and by this I think he meant spot pointing -- the operation gets very expensive. He said technical requirements imply the need for coverage of some breadth -- say search in a limited area something on the order of At this point General Thomas said as far as they're concerned the Air Forces are still far from giving up either search or spot, and the Approved For Release 2004/10/20 :8CIA-RDP80601676R001400040006-9 25 25 25X1 25X1 Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP8060167601400040006-9 Air Force says their technical intelligence requirements are Admiral Taylor said the Navy's stated technical requirement is He also said that NPIC should be able to tell us what resolution we could reasonably settle for to meet thelimits of both technical intelligence and any other types of intelligence. As a matter of fact, there are astro- physical limitations which you reach, I think, when you get in the neighbor- 25X1 hood of -- certainly by the time you get to exceeding atmospheric limitations that you might expect. McMillan said there has not been much experience with resolution and we still had a lot to learn in this area. Mr. McCone said that 25 you are 25X1 there was really no limit to the efineness) require for technical intelligence, that the intelligence guys would like to count every bolt and every nut in a piece of machinery. From the USIB viewpoint, on the other hand, in the broad look -- IRMS's and so forth -- there is a lower limit past which resolution does not materially help, although so forth, could be helped greatly by greater resolution. 25 and 25 9 Approved For Release 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80601676R001400040006-9 25 Approved For FOase 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B01676.1400040006-9 to work on this at once, with NRC inputs through the NRC membership and possibly Keefer or others joining in. He hoped also -- looking directly at Fubini -- that DIA could reflect their views without DOD influence and delay and procrastination. Fubini felt that needle, I might add, right up to his navel. Fubini says it has been his experience that it takes six to eight years to develop an operational airplane, and at least two and a half to Approved For Release 2004/10/20 :11111A-WP801301676R001400040006-9 25 Approved For *Ise 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B0167601400040006-9 three and a half years to develop an operational satellite with its payload. This would mean that there would be nothing in the inventory, at the earliest, before the end of 1966, which would be a new system, and that an interim capability by improvements could be done more timely. I think here he was probably looking ahead tol as brought out by the briefing yesterday. Mr. McCone agrees that we've got to get on with this right away, that we've got to provide NRC some programming guidance on the USIB requirements in the form of resolution and swath width, and particularly we should start programming our current assets to cover our China require- ments in the fall when the weather starts getting good. He felt sure that COMAR and NRC were on top of this, but he threw it in again as a reminder. McMillan said he would immediately look into the possible use of pulling some of our Lanyards out of the stockpile and cranking them up in a few months for the possibility of targeting of China. I then pointed out that after hearing Fubini's comments about the budget, I felt like the boy who was asked do you want chocolate ice cream or vanilla ice cream and he said I Fr-Th want both and lots of it. 1 And with this Mr. McCone told the story of the skipper of of the carrier who had invited his wife and two children to come down and have lunch with them, and they came down in their car, and were met by boys and the Executive Officer, and taken up to the captain's Approved For Release 2004/1 11 ,-.,-GPIrRDP80B01676R001400040006-9 Approved For Flpase 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B0167601400040006-9 wardroom area, and they sat down in plush chairs, and the Filipino boys came in and served them this and that and everything else, and then they were taken into this lovely dining room, with the sterling silver and the beautiful pictures and the lovely view out on the harbor, and were served this beautiful lunch, and everything was delightful, and they were escorted back down past the , and down the gangplank, and they got into this beat-up old Ford, and one little boy turned to his mother and said: Mommie, why is it daddy's so rich and we're so poor? (Laughing) So that's about the meeting. That's the end of the Memorandum for the Record. Approved For Release 2004/10/20 : t3A-RDP80B01676R001400040006-9 Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B0167.1400040006-9 ILLEGIB N Plc Imel?r- 104- -Cur- nrpce? rer Sii-,743/ O)&J4J47. Of -C?tiv444;ii rvn 7? 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LAI tf Ira? q-7 C4tL.. c.? bv-Pet/ Aewqm4.0..t- C414Le_.- 12e_ 4A-A-4c_ vir:htt Sat=0, _ kArko-N cyttA4 we4 _ Afigitv Mk_ fra-A----'-P I 024 4664? .(3/ (J5-ke 27-7)--yrfl , GIA4-14_ ae,-4440. 424, t7/6:4,-/lit4rebyr pzyet-04 I 041 ?cor-a- tb4-4-4-4/ 4714 A44? u 04-e-t_14( 4.06 25 1,7-0444 ccb-evay vt frit,c,./0 ope a.---Ce7r2ek a1/40 cl-e) ketj cAtTsy-k-ok a41 cp;:its AA") tAr-0.0--,v4410.t 1e 4?Jr4-44.14, kual, kle-tet- Approv4WefiA4rea$YRdo0/4t: Cati9IL,?0130' .167~04041-9tie4?.. 25X1 Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80B01676.1400040006-9 au.,? 144-vrIpA-4 - C 4-044( L I 1`14tfr--7--- ? 174-vagk 417 0,44/-- ktkA, "9,42-0c,r,&_ vt:,(1.- NoLe-etd-ceZ CIAA-4-xrc_ ? P11,404- C44A )4) 4AS. - CYt--b? bc0-6 , krvrie? v-Azttuoi- ige-P1 ? j a-10 14 Olet.e .rei-eYrtr` R"e4112-?4 --et#444. 41e-rn &11:14 t*P-441 144 . 144:ftte. Agee-ACI IAPAi4 L?46):4L CIA4..et ?-e,V1?1? ht-t - ?1 P-Z4v%t Ca4iL" LLI-?C 01-1--444tp 4e-e9 "Irk /are- kr0 A4i.)10 441 r44', 9.1r%/. Atoc kZ. i 04-44-4 (5-w-ta-tv kA-site% vr, Vt, `Ar a'a? eo-,A43/ _ "2-ova._ p?. IirtuAof /ray n9 14-14 01,0 / l2X;1 44"`Prat,.4-r---.7 14P-- fralti - 4V-- te,'It7S "te7 C -,04141%,4?C 4.41Lie-1942ivelt..ovi ApprowtFceitaleasp20140/20r4Q}A-13DPBOB01676R001400040006-9 25X Approved For ease 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP8060167601400040006-9 /101 "491'. nt"It. 41194'14"44 te:"4. MCC 11- 11;v1rad.a.t.e k Fr7A,,,, UT- / tr'Z . iceo-ANJ Jzi? to-e-te- p-gtoki-- K.64^ kar edA-4.0 ere,4a-et7 1-44-1P-Lizr 25X1 25X1 25 A 44, A -FM fri-tre-Tn- hk:x40 Clyzuk. Frvu?.1 idt>ittL.14.-ptL `/--e-eA ca-r>3-1,044' 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80601676R001400040006-9 , Approved For Retse 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP801301676.1400040006-9 re1441117 ?0-42,A,74. cc-or>C-- at4h 1-1,11"fig- P-te h10 I. 1,4 ced,_ ettg-oy--- 14.62-d_ 1-1-% kuit4,) iir Plcc --"17rc L4I7 ;AL ---(R-bato76440,4-, (F. t hge4ech 6411/14, Approved For Release 2004/10/20 : CIA-RDP80601676R001400040006-9