NRO EXCOM MEETING, TUESDAY, 5 OCTOBER, 4 P.M. IN SECRETARY VANCE'S OFFICE
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R001400050013-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 26, 2004
Sequence Number:
13
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Publication Date:
October 7, 1964
Content Type:
MFR
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Body:
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7 October 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting, Tuesday, & October, 4 p. rn. ,
in Secretary Vance's Office
1. Present were Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, General
Carter, Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.
2. Mr. Vance opened the meeting by reporting that as a
result of General Carter's telephone call to him in regard to
CORONA systems integration contracting on the West Coast, he
had researched his records and could see where there had been
a mi. sunder standing. He said that his previous discussions and
agreements had been concerned with the payload contracting with
Itek, Fairchild, General Electric, and Lockheed and that these
should remain under the CIA. He stated that he had not made
any agreements as to systems engineering or systems integration
contracts with Lockheed and it was his position that these should
be transferred to the Air Force.
3. Mr. McCone stated that in connection with prior agree-
ments on the CIA CORONA organization on the West Coast, he
had prepared a paper indicating his concept of the organization.
(Copies of the paper were given to .r. Vance, Dr. F~ubini, and
Dr. McMillan.) Mr. Mc Cone then read the paper in its entirety.
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4. Dr. McMillan pointed out that since the Aerospace con-
tract for overall systems management had now been signed, it was
essential that the systems integration contract with Lockheed be
transferred to the Air Force so that General Greer would have
total responsibility for technical direction of the program. Mr.
McCune, in response to a question by Mr. Vance, stated that
responsibility for the CORONA program rested with General Greer.
Also, that the West Coast would
NRO review(s) completed.
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be responsible to, as well as responsive to, General. Greer and
would work under his guidance. Mr. McCone stated that there
was no doubt as to who was in charge of the overall program
and this was Greer, and this included command as well as
technical direction of the total program. Mr. McCone stated
previously and currently had in accordance with the chart attached
to his letter. This would include the systems integration con-
tract presently under discussion. These contracts would all be
and his people would continue all of the contracts which they
that his concept was as contained in the paper; i. e.,
administered and technically supervised by
and his people would have direct access to Aerospace
and the recommendations and findings of unit, as
well as Aerospace and I I would all be discussed, adjudi-
cated, and coordinated in the CORONA Coordinating Committee
or Configuration Control Board or whatever General Greer chose
to call his advisory group. There would be a cross flow of
information, discussion, and action and reaction between all of
the CIA activities and the Air Force activities but that the com-
mand decisions would be made by Greer who would look to the
Configuration Control Board for advice. Dr. McMillan pointed
out that, to the best of his knowledge, the sole point of contact
designated to all contractors in the CORONA program was the
program's manager = who was Colonel Herran. General
Carter stated that this had previously been under
Colonel Battle who was an Air Force officer seconded to the CIA
and who had been the technical director for the CIA. General
Carter stated that this had been transferred by General Greer to
the Air Force through reorganization procedures on the West
Coast.
thoroughly capable man, a good administrator, and had a fine
reputation and Dr. Fubini supported his appointment. There was
no further discussion of his capabilities and copies of his bio-
graphical sketch were given to Fubini, McMillan, and Vance.
had no satellite or rocket experience, he was known as a
5. Dr. Fubini pointed out, that even though
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Mr. McCone pointed out that once this matter had been agreed,
Dr. McMillan, General Carter, and should go out
to the West Coast, sit down with Genera Greer and make it
abundantly clear to all concerned exactly how the program was
to be administered. Mr. McCone stated that he was prepared to
send at once and to augment his staff as indicated
in his letter but he was not going to waste this sort of talent on
the West Coast unless it was clearly understood ' st what the
organizational procedures would be. would have
charge of all CIA activities in the CO program and would
retain the Lockheed systems integration contract. He would
report to and be directly responsible to General Greer. All of
the integrating activities between the payload and launch and
recovery procedures would be coordinated across the boards as
necessary and would be considered by the Configuration Control
Board as necessary. This Board would act in an advisory
capacity to General Greer who in turn had the final authority for
decisions. Dr. McMillan reiterated that this made General Greer
the technical director of the entire CORONA program and Mr.
McCone and General Carter agreed. (N. B. This point is made
a matter of specific record because it bears directly on the
responsibility for technical direction -- the CIA
position being that technical direction must remain in the Govern-
ment -- McCone, Vance, and Fubini all agreed that Greer had
technical direction of CORONA since he had full responsibility
and was in command of the project. )
6. It was not formally agreed that Mr. McCone's letter to
Mr. Vance was approved, but the indications were clear that it
was acceptable to DOD and we should press for a rapid response.
7. Mr. Vance then brought u his difficulties with the
technical direction of the program and reviewed the
bidding as he saw it. He stated that we had not conformed to his
agreement on technical direction of the program and that there-
fore he did not consider I as being an NRO program.
Mr. McCone reviewed the bidding in detail as he saw it and as it
conformed to the facts. Mr. Mc Cone stated his feeling that the
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question of technical direction was a matter of semantics. He
referred to his memorandum of August 14th, General Carter's
memorandum of August 27th, and Dr. Wheelon's approved plan
of implementation dated August 31st. He said all of these- con-
formed to agreements previously made. Mr. McCone stated
that he had personally read the proposed contracting procedure
for the implementation of technical direction and that it con-
formed in every respect to his prior agreements and certainly
to any concept of responsibility of the Government. McMillan
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with his agreements, that Wheelon had failed to comply with
McMillan's instructions, that McMillan had not had an oppor-
tunity to review the contracts and work statements, and that as
far as he was concerned, this was not an NRO program. Dr.
Fubini repeated these statements and said it was an unsatisfactory
working relationship as far as he was concerned. General Carter
pointed out that this was a CIA program under NRO aegis as agreed
at prior meetings. He stated that Mr. Vance's only objection to
the August 31 statement of procedures was on technical direction
and that this was well on the tracks in accordance with Govern-
mental procedures and responsibilities as well as authorities. He
stated that Mr. Vance had not objected to all the other procedures
which Mr. McCone had approved.
8. Dr. McMillan stated that the manner in which Wheelon
was letting contracts without McMillan's prior approval prevented
McMillan from conducting an objective review as well as injecting
his own thinking into the projects. He added that this procedure
also prevented the contractors from contributing anything such as
new ideas into the program. He stated that this was a Wheelon
project and that the contractors were inhibited in adding their
talented contributions and thoughts to the basic idea. .
9. General Carter stated that it was incomprehensible to him
how five high-paid Government officials could be continually
ar in about the precise management arrangements for a
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millions of dollars within the NRO had little if any supervision at
all, especially from these officials.
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10. Mr. McCone stated his complete and total disgust with
the entire' NRO arrangements and especially with the arrogant
intransigence of Or. McMillan. He said he could not see how
NRO could ever work properly with Dr. McMillan in charge of
the program. He stated that Dr. McMillan's activities throughout
their association had bordered on deceit in many instances. Dr.
McMillan interjected that Mr. McCone had said this before in
protecting his fair-haired boy WNheelon, and that Dr. McMillan
had asked for such statements in writing. Mr. McCone stated
that as far as he was concerned, the Department of Defense had
reneged on the basic NRO agreement as well as subsequent agree-
ments he had made in good faith with Vance, F`ubini, and McMillan
and that he, Mr. McCone, was thoroughly fed up with the whole
procedure. There was no further comment and the subject was
changed.
11. Mr. McCone distributed copies of the weekly SKYLARK
report but no discussion ensued.
12. General Carter asked Dr. Mckillan's assistance in
getting some of the new fast film from Eastman Kodak so that the
Itek people could work on it in connection with I General
Carter stated that Itek had been unable to get any of the film from
'Eastman Kodak and that it could have a very direct bearing'on
He pointed out that
depended in large measure on this fast film which was alleged
to be 60% faster than anything presently in existence and perhaps
might even have a factor of two to four times as great. He said
while he could understand some reluctance on the part of Eastman
Kodak because of proprietary interests, it should be noted that Ltek
is not in the film manufacturing business and that there could well
be some other reason for failing to provide the film. Dr. NI. Ov -Ilan
stated that he was sure the only reason was that the film was not
available in sufficient quantity but that he would look: into it and see
what could be done.
13. General Carter brought up the problem of studying
SKY-LARK vulnerability. Dr. McMillan stated.that Purcell had
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agreed to the radar cross section membership of the committee,
to include Garwin, and that McMillan had already contacted
Parangosky and it seemed to be well on the tracks. I proposed
that we have an overall vulnerability study at the colonel level
to be followed by a presentation to senior officers such as
Powers and others. It was agreed that Colonel Ledford would
chair such a panel immediately and select the membership across
the board of those people best qualified to look at the matter from
the technical (air defense, deception, countermeasures, flight
plans, etc.) level. Presentation would then be made to senior
people such as General Powers, General Gerhart, General Sweeney,
and perhaps the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to get the military completely
on board. The same presentation would then be given to NRO
ExCom and' the 303 Committee.
14. The meeting then broke up in general disarray.
A S%
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
MSC:blp
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