MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE, 10:45 A.M., 19 SEPTEMBER 1964

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400050041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: September 19, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

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19 September 1964
SUBJECT: Meeting in the Cabinet Room, the White House, 10:45 a.m.,
19 September 1964
1. The meeting called by Mr. Bundy last night for 10:00 in the
Cabinet Room was postponed until 10:45. Present were Mr. McGeorge
Bundy, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Ambassador Thompson, Secre-
tary McNamara, Secretary Vance, General Wheeler, Carl Rowan,
Mr. George Reedy, Mr. Bromley Smith and myself.
2. Mr. Rusk passed out a proposed press statement on the Tonkin
incident. Mr. Bundy did likewise and Mr. McNamara did likewise. After
some discussion, it was determined that Mr. McNamara's statement, as
amended, would be proposed for the President's approval.
3. The President arrived at 11:00 a. m. and the discussion continued
until 1:00 p. m. The President expressed some doubt as to whether there had
in fact been any vessels of any kind in the area. Mr. McNamara pointed out
various indicators and it was generally agreed that there had been unidentified
vessels in the area. The President turned to me and asked me what I thought.
I stated that from all of the evidence available it was evident to me that there
had been vessels in the area, that this had been supported by the radar sight-
ings from both ships including radar fixes, reports from the aircraft pilot,
reports of the two sailors who stated that they saw silhouettes and some of
the COMINT reports subsequently received. I stated, however, that I was
unable to assert that they were naval vessels, or that they were a menace or
that they had any hostile intent. I pointed out, however, that whether or not
such targets were a menace or had hostile intent was a decision that could
be made only at the time by the commander on the spot and the commander
had made an affirmative decision in this respect. I stated that we would
probably never know the actual facts as to threat or hostile intent on the part
of the enemy. Several times during the discussion the President reverted to
this point indicating that he still had doubt as to the propriety of the action
by our commander. Rusk pointed out that the President had no choice since
he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces but to publicly support
the action taken no matter what his personal reservations might be. I stated
that we should bear in mind that we had noted no evidence of a change in NVN
intent -- since the August episode in the Gulf of Tonkin, the enemy had appeared
to be both defensive oriented and apprehensive. I stated that it was possible
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that Sub-Unit 6 NVN Patrol had been over-zealous in shadowing operations
on the Desoto patrol but that we could see no intent politically or militarily
on the part of the NVN to be aggressive in this instance. I repeated, how-
ever, that the field commander on the spot was the only one qualified to
make the decision at the time.
4. The discussion then reverted to whether or not the Desoto patrol
should be immediately reinstituted, delayed for a number of days, or whether
the 34-A operations should continue on schedule. McNamara, Vance and
Wheeler were all in favor of postponing the 34-A operations but immediately
start another three-day Desoto reconnaissance, then three days after they
had been withdrawn to institute the maritime operations. Bundy was in favor
of standing everything down for a week since this would be inclined to keep
us out of trouble but at the same time keep the NVN's tense as to what our
intentions might be. Secretary Ball thought we should take a long, hard look
at exactly what we accomplished by the Desoto patrol, particularly in the
light that they could be interpretted as being deliberately provocative. He
raised the question as to what our course of action would be if we were to
lose a destroyer and its 250-man complement. Could we justify the need for
the patrols to this degree? Would the Administration's public image stand
up as being thoughtful and resilient and deliberate under such circumstances?
The President picked this thought up immediately and expanded on it force-
fully and reasonably. He stated that we should be in a position of justifying
both militarily and politically, the need for exposing ourselves to this sort
of action. He suggested that we all read the Pearl Harbor report so that we
would be confident that when we took actions and responded to actions we
would have full, logical reasons, well thought out and so desired. He directed
that McNamara prepare in most precise detail the arguments for and against
these patrols from the military viewpoint. He wanted to know how they were
conducted, what they accomplished, and what the end good was. He directed
Secretary Rusk ( who argued for continuation of patrols) to prepare the poli-
tical reasons as to why they should be continued. The President directed
that State and Defense plan ahead as to just what they would do both politically
and militarily in all contingencies and how they would justify their actions
under conditions of a serious military loss such as a destroyer. He then
wanted Secretary Ball to act as Prosecuting Attorney to determine whether
or not these arguments held water. The President agreed with General
Taylor's view (and the view held by all of us) that lacking any clear evidence
of aggressive intent on the part of the NVN's, there should be no retaliation
as was executed in August. Finally, as to the Tonkin Gulf incident, it was
agreed that no Desoto patrols and no 34-A operations would be conducted until
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further consultation and justification with the President. This was in no
way a stand-down as such; it was purely to get everybody's ducks in a row
in case the next operation turned on all the Christmas tree lights.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
MSC:bec
Distribution:
Orig - DDCI
1 - DD/I
1 - DD/P
1- ER via EX Dir
1 - O/DCI
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