NEW BOOK: THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS - 1967 BY RICHARD P. STABBINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600030002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 11, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release MA/Oltig:MAIREMAR001600030002
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT
11 September 1968
Director of Central Intelligence
New Book: The United States
Affairs - 1967 by Richard P. Stebbin.
I. This memorandum is for information only to invite your ettention
to certain passages about CIA in The United States in World Affairs - 1967
by Richard P. Stebbins (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968). just published.
This le the current volume of this prestigious series which has been pub-
lished annually by the Council on Foreign Relations since 1931.
2, Although CIA's relations with the Council have always been
friendly, to the best of my knowledge, the two major references to CIA in
the current volume are at best unfortunate. Mr. Stebbins, finds "Particularly
shocking" the fact that CIA. "in addition to other unlauded activities", was
involved in the clandestine financing of certain student and labor organisa-
tions. (p. 16). The full text of this paragraph is attached as Tab "A."
The footnote citing those who defended this CIA activity merely refers the
reader to the material on pp. 376-78.
3. On pages 376-18. the author goes further into "the CIA scandal."
Noting the development of the Administration's "credibility gap". Stebbins
points out that "This feeling of governmental obtuseness in ethical matters
was immensely stimulated by the disclosure ... that the Central Intelligence
Agency had for years been providing clandestine financial support to student
and intellectual organizations ." While citing longtime presidential ap-
proval of these activities, the author balances Mr. ICsIzenbachls favorable
quotation in our defense with Vice President Humphrey's initial unfortunate
remark concerning the affair. The full text of those paragraphs is attached
as Tab "3".
Attachments
Tabs "A" and "IS"
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Walter Pforzheimer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
oliAt61.6b5160003oo
1600030002-2
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16 INTRODUCING 1967
drinks and popular culture. The so-called "technological gap" be-
tween the advanced United States and supposedly backward Europe
had become a cause of ever-increasing complaint on the European
side and had even been made a subject of formal inquiry in NATO.
The year 1967 was to bring still further evidence of the extent to
which America and Americans were making their influence felt in every
continent, not only in economic and cultural affairs but even, in some
instances, through such underworld activities as gambling, narcotics
smuggling, and gun running. Particularly shocking to many observers,
at home as well as abroad, was the disclosure in February 1967 that the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, In addition to other unlauded
I activities, had for years engaged in the clandestine financing of student
and labor organizations on both a national and an international plane.
1 While there were those who found something to say in defense of this
activity," the net effect was to strengthen the international revulsion
against American foreign policy as lately manifested in Vietnam, in
- the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere. Revelations of some things
the United States had done in the past would make it easier to blame
it for still other things which it had not done but for which it could
nevertheless serve as a convenient scapegoat.
Many, though not all, in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America had already adopted an attitude of almost habitual ani-
mosity toward the United States in view of its allegedly dangerous
and reactionary course in Vietnam, its alleged support of "colonial-
ism," particularly in Africa, and its supposed arrogance and insensi-
bility to their grievances. The fact that many of these complaints
were either unfounded or greatly exaggerated did not diminish their
vehemence. Aside from Vietnam, two issues in particular had of late
years bred extreme resentment against the United States and its
Western partners and offered a characteristic opportunity for the
Communist states to pose as the true friends of the emergent coun-
tries. One of these was the limited success of the anticolonial forces
in their crusade against the remaining bastions of "colonialism and
racial discrimination" in southern Africa?in Rhodesia, in South and
South West Africa, and in the Portuguese territories of Angola and
Mozambique. The other was the unsatisfactory state of the poorer
countries' efforts at economic development, the comparative paucity
of outside aid in the form of new investment capital from other than
private sources, and their inability to obtain more remunerative terms
for their trade with the advanced countries.
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Each of these ;
by the war in Vit
out, had damage(
as it heightened
"Communist aggr
can obligation, a:
could be little do
itself were being I
human suffering,
and the deepened
by this time virti
tional community
and Far East wh
point, the United
its Vietnam polic:
little prospect thz
West or the "thirc
So long as the
scant prospect of
the countries of tl
whose leaders ha
relations with the
direction while tl
namese people."
members of Con;
of accommodatio
supported North
even the German
Georg Kiesinger,
their economic at
bloc; but the haa
by its.commitmen
More alarming
relations was the
ance between the
toward disarmarn
perennial and cos
series of recent ii
up its production
in a way that n1
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376 FOREIGN POLICY IN A "SICK SOCIETY"
ous tendency toward executive supremacy in foreign policy in recent
years." But with the attention of Senate critics so largely focused on
questions of Vietnam strategy and tactics, consideration of the larger
constitutional issue was put over to 1968.
Outside the halls of Congress, the legislative revolt against the
presidential conduct of foreign affairs was matched by a growing
rejection of the national foreign policy by substantial sections of the
public. A sense of alienation from the government and its processes,
and of incomprehension or anger at the actions taken in its name,
began to find expression not merely in assertions of a contrary view-
point but in open, personal disrespect for the President and members
of his administration. Americans had always felt free to criticize their
government, but rarely had they felt the impulse to deride and scorn
it as many of them did in 1967. PreSident Johnson, whose public
approval rating as measured by the Gallup Poll declined from 47 per
cent in January to 38 per cent in October, was widely if erroneously
accused of basing all decisions on a crass desire for reelection in
November 1968?a date whose approach was felt in all political
quarters as leaders of both parties sought ways of accommodating
their views about the war to the dictates of party politics. ...
\--r-- was
to the lack of respect for the national government
s a widespread feeling that its members had become hopelessly
i addicted to prevarication and even to outright trickery and deceit.
The "credibility gap," noted with such dismay in 1966, had by 1967
become so thoroughly assimilated into the national outlook that ad-
ministration statements, whether dealing with "progress" in Vietnam
or with other matters, were discounted almost as a matter of course.
This feeling of governmental obtuseness in ethical matters was im-
mensely stimulated by the disclosure in February, initially by the
"anti-establishment" Ramparts magazine, that the Central Intelligence
Agency had for years been providing clandestine financial support to
student and intellectual organizations, both national and international,
that had been identified with the liberal and anti-Communist cause
in the "cold war" confrontations with Communist-influenced organ-
izations, mainly during the 1950's.1
Undertaken in accordance with policies established by the National
Security Council and continued in effect under four Presidents (usu-
ally without the knowledge of the organization assisted), this activity
could be defended on the ground that no alternative sources of financial
backing had been available at the time the arrangements were made.
C.I.A. N,i)port,
"enabled many f
country in times_,._
the free world."17--
gence agency li=7;
mind was bount'--
lectual circles
could be comp-
aroused by the:
Daniel a few ri
enced defender (
"one of the sadd
ment has had."?
In the midst i
President set up
bach, Secretary c
and C.I.A. Direc
at protecting the
munity while ens
to play their "pr(
the recommenda
discontinue cove]
tary organization
by the end of t
recommended thi
that could open
activities; but the
ing, or scope of s
In an attempt
new guidelines w
of government-s:
and other privat
were, such corre
the government's
affairs. The new
this area had sl
although the wo
an International
interest if war co
In its domesti
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icy in recent
y focused on
of the larger
against the
.y a growing
:etions of the
its processes,
in its name,
cntrary
and members
criticize their
ide and scorn
whose public
from 47 per
.f erroneously
reelection in
a all political
:commodating
_1 government
me hopelessly
y and deceit.
had by 1967
_look that ad-
;" in Vietnam
:ter of course.
_tters was im-
.itially by the
-al Intelligence
:ial support to
international,
cmunist cause
kienced organ-
y the National
-esidents (usu-
), this activity
ces of financial
ats were made.
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's
47: National Fever Chart 377
C.I.A. support, in the words of Under-Secretary Katzenbach, had
"enabled many far-sighted and courageous Americans to serve their
country in times of challenge and danger to the United States and
the free world."8 Yet the clandestine involvement of a secret intelli-
gence agency like the C.I.A. in matters pertaining to freedom of the
mind was bound to create a deeply unfavorable impression in intel-
lectual circles at home and abroad. The ensuing international scandal
could be compared in intensity, if in no other respect, with that
aroused by the trial and conviction of Soviet writers Sinyavsky and
Daniel a few months earlier. Vice-President Humphrey, an experi-
enced defender of administration policies, referred to the affair as
"one of the saddest times, in reference to public policy, our govern-
ment has had."
In the midst of the uproar engendered by these disclosures, the
President set up a special three-man panel (Under-Secretary Katzen-
bach, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner,
and C.I.A. Director Richard Helms) to formulate new policies aimed
at protecting the independence and integrity of the educational com-
munity while ensuring that American private organizations were able
to play their "proper and vital role" in the world. In accordance with
the recommendations of this group, steps were presently 'taken to
discontinue covert Federal assistance to educational or private volun-
tary organizations, and secret C.I.A. funding was declared terminated
by the end of the year. As an alternative, the Katzenbach group
recommended the establishment of a new "public-private" mechanism
that could openly channel public funds into meritorious overseas
activities; but the year closed without agreement on the form, financ-
ing, or scope of such an organization."
In an attempt to deal with a related source of friction and criticism,
new guidelines were laid down late in the year to regulate the conduct
of government-sponsored research on foreign areas by universities
and other private institutions." Yet necessary as they undoubtedly
were, such corrective steps could make little positive contribution to
the government's programs in international educational and cultural
affairs. The new impetus President Johnson had sought to impart in
this area had slackened noticeably under the influence of Vietnam,
although the work of the Williamsburg conference and the plan for
an International Education Year12 held out the hope of a revival of
interest if war conditions eventually abated.
In its domestic impact, the C.I.A. scandal offered fresh stimu.us
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.11?????????????????????????
378 FOREIGN POLICY IN A "SICK SOCIETY"
to the mounting agitation among the dissident intellectuals, peace
marchers, draft resisters, and racial activists associated with what was
loosely known as the "New Left." Bound together more by dislike
of things as they were than by agreement on positive goals, the adher-
ents of this dissident trend were far from constituting a unified force.
A significant if transitory rift in the "peace" movement occurred in
, June as a result of the Middle East war, in which some peace militants
forgot their antiwar sentiments in their enthusiasm for Israel. In
September, a further splintering occurred at a conference on "New
Politics" at which a Negro militant group seized control in much the
same belligerent spirit that Stokely Carmichael had lately manifested
at the OLAS conference in Havana.13
Such differences among the dissenters did nothing to temper their
ever-mounting rancor against the government, which reached tumul-
tuous expression on October 21 in the Washington "peace" rally
organized by the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in
Vietnam. "From dissent to resistance" was the favored slogan of the
predominantly youthful demonstrators involved in this affair, whose
unsuccessful attempts to invade the Pentagon focused world-wide
attention on their antiwar and antigovernment sentiments. A com-
parable, though minor, disturbance occurred in New York on Novem-
ber 14 when Secretary Rusk arrived to deliver an unexceptionable
address on "The Political Future of the Family? of Man."14 President
Johnson, contrasting "responsible dissent" with "storm-trooper bully-
ing," suggested at his November 17 news conference that "some of
the things that are taking place in this country" were "extremely
dangerous to our national interest" and "not very helpful to the men
that are fighting the war for us." The President himself began to
confine his public appearances to times and places where no such
disturbances were to be expected.
The seriousness of such manifestations could easily be exaggerated.
Most of the nation's 200,000,000 inhabitants were still going about
their normal occupations, untouched or only remotely influenced by
the disorder on home and foreign fronts. Yet there were responsible
observers who could suggest that the nation was suffering "a kind of
national nervous breakdown," a "third trauma" or "depression of the
national spirit" as intense as those associated with the Civil War
and the Great Depression of the 1930's.16 On even the most optimistic
interpretation, the national mood invited comparison with the psychic
disturbanc(
in the 1951
phere to t
policy. Th
national pc
48: Turni
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATT
, 7 -.--e-1/---,
TO: V-
EX
ROOM NO.
7 II 5 c.)
BUILDING
1 IN * . (Tubs BX-3)
REMARKS:
FROM: WALTER P FORZHEIMER
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
1 EXTENSION
FORM NO .0A
1 FEB 55 LI' REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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