MR. KIRKPATRICK'S MEMO (ATTACHED) ON INTELLIGENCE WAR GAMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600120017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 16, 1965
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001600120017-6
MENOPAMUM FOR; Dep ity Director for Intel
'l rotor
DOPEW
ST13JJECT: Mr, 1Cirkj*trickte }33o (attached) on
Iute4 'I gaze War Game
Before I show this mum to the Dir ctor f I would
like to get your individual reactiam to the pmpasaI. I sm
a bit uncomfortable with the i oution that the Agency can
aar&wt such war gem 1 vacuo. In event,
p c ate YO W mice:.
'/s/, Richard He1fg
11110ha Ht
BWAF Dirsce#
Att ant - gR-X65-4036
RHelms/ecd - 16 July 65
Distribution: Orig & 1 - addres ees
K E
0
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001600120017-6
VIA: Ex"Itive Director
 Approved For'ReleaqSft : CIA-RDP80B0167001600
15 July 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Intelligence War Games
1. As a by-product of the planning exercise for the Agency
in which I am now engaged., it becomes strikingly clear that one of the
weaknesses in our present operations is a lack of intelligence war
gaming.
2. As a matter of background. I would note that Recommenda-
tion No. 3 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in
1956 urged that there be greater participation of CIA in war gaming.
Stance that date CIA has participated in war games, both national a>
on a theater basis. These have proved to be valuable, even though
unpopular.
3. In working on the long-range plan, and particularly in
tudying intelligence assumptions, it becomes apparent that there are
many contingencies which could occur and which would necessitate
rapid action on the part of CIA, including such things as redisposition
of personnel, vie. the Dominican crisis. I believe the Agency would be
much better prepared for these crises if it periodically engaged in
intelligence war games. These could be conducted either exclusively
inside CIA or by CIA in participation with the other intelligence agencies.
Some of the contingencies which could be war gamed might be very
remote from the point of view of possibility, but nevertheless would
provide valuable experience, while others could be events which
definitely will take place.
25)41
Each of these studies would revolve primarily around inter eve op-
ments in a particular country, 25)41
would definitely have regional effects. Or, on a broader scale, what
would be required of intelligence if Communist China sent forces into
the Vietnam war? Have we given any serious consideration as to what
our reaction would be should the Soviet Union seek a much closer
relationship with the U. S., including possible liaison with the intelligence
service and even exchange of information on Communist China?
yr) r GROUP 1
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4.. 1 would suggest that consideration be given to assigning
to the War Plans Staff of DD/P the responsibility for sponsoring
periodic war gaming of intelligence situations.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
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 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001600120017-6
'I RANSM ITTAL SL 1 P
DATE
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Executive Director
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