SOVIET MRBMS IN CUBA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R001700120015-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 26, 2012
Sequence Number:
15
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 31, 1963
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80B01676R001700120015-7.pdf | 266.14 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP80B0l676R001700120015-7
31 October 1963
1. On August 10th at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room
attended-by Rusk, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bundy, Gen. Taylor
and a number of others for the purpose of discussing General Lansdale's
Phase II activities, McCone reported on the sudden importation of
materiel -- at that time the characteristic of which was unidentified --
and Soviet personnel, and at that meeting speculated that this could be
electror:ic equipment for use against Canavarel and/or military
equipment including medium range ballistic missiles.
2. On August 21st at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office attended by
the same group, McCone again reviewed the situation as it developed
since August 10th, reported definite information on surface to air
missiles and again speculated on the probability of medium range
ballistic missiles.
3. On August 22nd McCone gave the same information to the President,
adding certain details concerning the number of Soviet and Chinese
personnel who had recently entered Cuba
4. On August 23rd in a meeting with the President, Rusk, McNamara,
Gilpatric, General Taylor, Bundy and others, McCone again reviewed the
situation and questioned the need for the extensive SAM installations
unless they were to make possible the concealment of MRBMs. This
meeting resulted in the issuance of a Presidential directive to department
heads concerned to make contingency plans against the possibility of the
introduction of offensive weapons.
5. The same reasoning was applied in discussions with Senator
Russell's Subcommittees, Chairman Vinson's Subcommittee and in
private talk with Chairman Cannon from time to time prior to McCone's
departure on August 23rd.
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6. On Saturday, August 25th, McCone urged General Carter,
Acting DCI, to propose low level R 101 flights over certain Soviet-
Cuban installations in order to obtain detailed technical information.
7. On September 7th, McCone wired General Carter as follows:
"Urge frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance
operations which Gilpatric advises informative. Also
I support use of R 101 if necessary. My hunch is we
might face prospect of Soviet shortrange surface-to-
surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could
command important targets of southeast United States
and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas. You
might suggest to Rusk that we develop joint policies
for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean, South
American states as an alternative to seeking unanimous OAS
action which most certainly will be an ineffective compro-
mise solution if past history is any indicator."
8. On September 10th McCone wired Carter from Nice as follows:
"Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly
defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly
measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consis-
tent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel,
etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being
taken are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some
offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed
by Soviets after present phase completed and country
secured from overflights. Suggest BNE study motives
behind these defensive measures which even seem to
exceed those provided most satellites."
9. On September 13th McCone received communication from Carter
stating that the BNE continued to feel that the installation of SA 2s is
most reasonably explained by other than a desire to hide MRBM
build-up. To this McCone responded on September 13th as follows:
"Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment
of defensive equipment and installations is merely a
prelude to the location of an offensive weapon
capability and once this is done the implementation of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R001700120015-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R001700120015-7
our policy as reported in the press might be
extremely difficult and involve unacceptable
dangers. I would like to talk with you on KY-9
from Norstad's headquarters to the White House
or Pentagon situation room tonight (13 Sept.)
between 1700 and 1800 your time. Unless
I hear to the contrary from you by twelve noon
today your time I will proceed Paris this evening
and make arrangements for this call. "
10. On September 16th McCone cabled Carter as follows:
"Also believe we must carefully study the prospect
of secret importation and placement of several
Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us
if Cuban defenses deny overflight. In reflecting
on my observations of Thor installation in Britain
and Jupiter s in Italy I can envisage a Soviet plan to
package missile, control and operating equipment in
such a way that a unit could be made operational
a few hours after a site cleared and a modest concrete
pad poured. Do not wish to be overly alarming this
matter but believe CIA and community must keep
government informed of danger of a surprise and
also that detection of preparatory steps possibly
beyond our capability once Cuban defense system
operative. Thrust of press reports reaching
me is that there exists a clear demarcation between
defensive and offensive preparations and I question
if we can be sure of this. I recognize Cuban policy
decisions most delicate and beyond Agency or my
competence. However believe we must give those
making decision our best estimate of possible
developments and alternative situations which
might evolve and unexpectedly confront us.
11. On 19 September Carter communicated the summary of the
conclusions of Cuban SNIE of that date, paragraph D stating that
in the opinion of the BNE, establishment of MRBMs in Cuba would be
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incompatible with Soviet policy -- and indicate a greater willingness
to increase risk in US/Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has
displayed so far--.
12. On September 20th McCone responded as follows:
"Ref DIR 37228: Suggest most careful consideration
to conclusion last sentence paragraph d. As an
alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet Cuban
base will provide Soviets with most important and
effective trading position in connection with all other
critical areas and hence they might take an unexpected
risk in order to establish such a position."
..j. it is reported that during McCone's absence, Acting DCI, at a
meeting held in Mr. Bundy's office on 10 September, proposed an
overflight which would cover the entire north and south
i
per
meter
of Cuba east of Havana and out to the eastern tip of Oriente Province
except for an area in the immediate vicinity of Santa Clara where
four SAM sites were known to exist and had been photographed. The
purpose of this flight was to make a final determination as to how many
SAM sites existed or were under construction. It is reported that
because of Rusk's concern for the safet of the U-2 in view of the
Sakhalin violation on 30 August and the loss on 8 September,
and the Secretary's understandable recognition of the consequences
resulting from a 11U-2 incident" over denied territory, which seemed
to him a possibility because of the existence of SAMs in Cuba, it was
the sense of the meeting (particularly that of Secretary Rusk) that
CIA be permitted to make 4 flights against Cuba, two peripheral and
two overflights of limited penetration, including the Isle of Pines.
These flights were executed between 26 September and 7 October.
14. On the 14th of September the meeting of the Special Group, JCS
representative outlined capabilities for low level coverage. Secretary
of Defense indicated he did not wish this operation considered until
the results were obtained from CIA reconnaissance as approved on
September 10th.
15. On October 4th McCone noted in an interdepartmental meeting
that there had been no coverage of the center of Cuba and more
particularly the entire western end of the Island for over a month,
and all flights since 5 September had been either peripheral or
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limited and therefore CIA did not know, no co _ld,,, ~aadvise, whether
an offensive capability was being created. `objected strenuously
to the limitations which had been placed on overflights and there
arose a considerable discussion (with some heat) as to whether
limitations had or had not been placed on CIA by the Special Group.
The National Reconnaissance Organization, CIA and Colonel Steakley
(for JCS) were requested to prepare a comprehensive plan for aerial
survey of Cuba and to submit the plan at a meeting scheduled for
Tuesday, October 9th.
16. On 9 October the report was made to the interdepartmental
group. They reviewed NRO and JCS proposals and it was agreed that a
U-2 flight flying from south to north across the western part of Cuba
where at least two SAM sites were known to exist should be under-
taken promptly and that a number of similar sorties might be mounted
if this flight did not activate ground-air fire. (Higher authority
approved this one mission and left consideration of further missions
until the results of the approved mission were determined.)
17. This mission was flown on October 14th. It was successful and
encountered no resistance. On October 15th at a Special Meeting (and
prior to receipt of the results of the October 14th flight), two
additional U-2 missions to cover all of Cuba were approved and
this was concurred in by higher authority.
JOHN A. McCone
Director
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP80B0l676R001700120015-7