NOTIFICATION OF NSC OFFICIALS OF INTELLIGENCE ON MISSILE BASES IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700140012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 27, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2004/08/: dF.: FCtAe ODP80B01676R001700140012-8
27 October 1962
SUBJECT: Notification of MSC Officials of Intelligence on Missile
Bases in Cuba
1. At about 21.00 on the evening of 25 October the President called
me on the phone at a dinner party I was attending at the apartment of
Mrs. Anna Chennault, widow of the late General, at 4101 Cathedral Avenue.
He said he had heard stories that CIA officers were alleging that intelli-
gence on offensive missile bases in Cuba had been available for several
days before it was called to the attention of the President. He asked
me to confirm that I was responsible for the analysis of this kind of
intelligence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities,
and to tell him the facts in the case.
2. I told the President that I was responsible in CIA for substan-
tive analysis of intelligence and the dissemination of current intelligence
to the President and the National Security Council. I said I could state
categorically that the stories he had heard were untrue, since I was sure
the mission with the first photography of the LMM offensive bases was
flown on 14 October and it took approximately 21.E hours for the film to
be returned, processed, delivered to the National Photographic Interpreta-
tion Center and scanned by PI analysts. I said I was sure the technical
analysis did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or early evening
of 15 October, that I myself heard of it first at that tiine, and that we
completed the analysis before passing the information formally to the
!,",'rite House on the morning of 16 October. The President seemed content
with this explanation.
3. In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling
of this sensitive information, I have tried to reconstruct what I know of
the events of the evening; of 15 October and morning of 16 October, as
follows.
)4. Under direct orders from the President, given to me and General
Carter at the White House several weeks earlier when the possibility that
the Banes coast-defense missile was a longer-range weapon, I had issued
instructions to the Director, NPIC, to see that intelligence on new offensive
weapons in Cuba came to me as soon as analysis had identified the type of
weapon and that absolutely no dissemination of this intelligence should
be made without my approval. On 15 October I spent all afternoon at the
opening session of the Commonwealth-US Intelligence Methods Conference.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/08/3x-;` CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
blhen T returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PT and military
intelligence analysts awaiting me. I do not know how long they had been
waiting to see me but it could not have been many minutes or they would have
passed a message to me at the Conference Room. They were all agreed that
they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of
350 miles. I reviewed their evidence and was obliged to concur.
5. The DCI had gone to the Viest Coast and General Carter was then
at an informal reception for the Commonwealth conferees in the Executive
Dining Room at the I-Ieadgaarters building in McLean. I was the host but
delayed my arrival until 1815 to study this intelligence. Upon arrival
I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelli-
gence. I said it would take several hours to wrap up a definitive report
with fully considered analysis. General Carter said he was going to dinner
with General Taylor and General Carroll (DIA) and would let them know. I
asked if he would notify Mr. I.ZcGeorge Bundy for the 'White House and he said
he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there.
6. About 2130 that evening my intelligence officers checking out
the evidence on the site reported somewhat cryptically by phone that they
had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in
the 700-mile and possibly in the 1,000-mile range. I instructed them to
complete a written report and stand by for action early the next morning.
7. A few minutes :Later I decided it was a mistake to wait until
morning to alert the key officers at the White House and State Department,
sftthey Aould. insure early attention to the problem on the next day. I
assumed General Carter would have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS
and D1A but that he might have missed the White House. Accordingly I
called 11r. McGeorge Bundy, found he had not seen General Carter, and
double-talked the information to him in broad terms. He was very clear
as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security
over the phone. This was about 2200. I then called Roger Hilsman of the
State Department and conveyed the same information to him. I had more
difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant !ARBM' s rather
than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated, but the light finally
dawned and he (as he later informed me) called the Secretary of State to
pass on the word.
8. Early the next morning, 16 October, at about 0830, I talked
again on the phone to Mr. Bundy. (I forget whether he called me or vice
versa.) I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and cal-
culated the ranges of possible missiles (by then we had settled on 700 to
1100 miles) and crudely indicated them on a map. At Mr. Bundy's invitation
I went immediately to his office, having cleared this with General Carter,
who had another engagement and instructed me +- I Ifollow through on the
White House formal notification. my missiles expert from 25X1
CSI, accompanied me. In Bundy's o :ice w told him the story. He shortly
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
brought in the Attorney General, whom I also briefed. His initial conrient
was one four-letter word, off the record. If I remember correctly, Alex
Johnson also came in to get the briefing. At any rate Ir. Bundy said that
he had arranged an 1100 meeting with the President to fill him in and con-
eider the US policy problems involved. At 0930 General Carter arrived. -:
showed him the memorandum we had prepared, discussed the evidence, and
advised him II could support him fully with analytical back-up. I
said I felt the Acting DCI should handle the briefing of the President,
with which General Carter agreed; tnat he probably did not need me, with
which he somewhat reluctantly agreed; and that somebody had better get back
to see that the DCI on the West Coast got the word, and continue research
and analysis on the Cuban missile problem -- with all of which General
Carter heartily agreed.
9. I presume General Carter did surface the information at 1100,
the DCI returned later that afternoon, and a whirlwind of intelligence
reporting and policy formulation on Cuba set in from which we have not
yet recovered.
25X1
AA -Y ~~ ULL
Deputy Dir or (Intelligence)
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700140012-8
27 October 1962
SUBJECT: Notification of ;;?SC Officials of Intelligence on Missile
Bases in Cuba
1. At about 21.00 on the evening of 25 October the President called
me on the phone at a dinner party I was attending at the apartment of
Mrs. Anna Chennault, widow of the late General, at 4101 Cathedral Avenue.
He said he had heard stories that CIA officers were alleging that intelli-
gence on offensive missile bases in Cuba had been available for several
clays before it was called to the attention of the President. He asked
me to confirm than I was responsible for the analysis of this kind of
intelligence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities,
and to tell him the facts in the case.
2. I told the President that I was responsible in CIA for substan-
tive analysis of intelligence and the dissemination of current intelligence
to the President and the National Security Council. I said I could state
categorically that the stories he had heard were untrue, since I was sure
the mission with the first photography of the M BM offensive bases was
flown on 14 October and it took approximately 2L hours for the film to
be returned, processed, delivered to the National Photographic Interpreta-
tion Center and scanned by PI analysts. I said I was sure the technical
analysis did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or early evening
of 15 October, that I myself heard of it first at that time, and that we
completed the analysis before passing the information formally to the.
White House on the morning of 16 October. The President seemed content
with this explanation.
3. In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling
of this sensitive information, T have tried to reconstruct what I know of
the events of the evening of 15 October and morning of 16 October, as
follows.
4. Under direct orders from the President, given to me and General
Carter at the Ahite House several weeks earlier when the possibility that
the Banes coast-defense missile was a longer-range weapon, I had issued
instructions to the Director, NPIC, to see that intelligence on new offensive
weapons in Cuba came to me as soon as analysis had identified the type of
weapon and that absolutely no dissemination of this intelligence should
be made without my approval.. On 15 October I spent all afternoon at the
opening session of the Commonwealth-US Intelligence Methods Conference.
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA;RDP80B01676R0017001
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
Men I returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PI and military
intelligence analysts awaiting me. I do not know how long they had been
waiting to see me but it could not have been many minutes or they would have
passed a message to me at the Conference Room. They were all agreed that
they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of
350 miles. I reviewed their evidence and was obliged to concur.
5. The DCI had gone to the uv'est Coast and General Carter was then
at an informal reception for the Commonwealth conferees in the Executive
Dining Room. at the Headquarters building in McLean. I was the host but
delayed my arrival until 1815 to study this intelligence. Upon arrival
I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelli-
gence. I said it would-take several hours to wrap up a definitive report
with fully considered analysis. General Carter said he was going to dinner
with General Taylor and General Carroll (DIA) and would let them know. I
asked if he would notify Mr. McGeorge Bundy for the White House and he said
he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there.
6. About 2130 that evening my intelligence officers checking out
the evidence on the site reported somewhat cryptically by phone that they
had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in
the 700-mile and possibly in the 1,000-mile range. I instructed them to
complote a written report and stand by for action early the next morning.
7. A few minutes later I decided it was a mistake to wait until
morning to alert the key officers at the White House and State Department,
sithey Aould insure early attention to the problem on the next day. I
assumed General Carter would have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS
and DTA but that he might have missed the White House. Accordingly I
called Mr. McGeorge Bundy, found he had not seen General Carter, and
double-talked the information to him in broad terms. He was very clear
as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security
over the phone. This was about 2200. I then called Roger Hilsman of the
State Department and conveyed the same information to him. I had more
difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant MRBM's rather
than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated, but the light finally
dawned and he (as he later informed me) called the Secretary of State to
pass on the word.
8. Early the next morning, 16 October, at about 0830, I talked
again on the phone to Mr. Bundy. (I forget whether he called me or vice
versa.) I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and cal-
culated the ranges of possible missiles (by then we had settled on 700 to
1100 miles) and crudely indicated them on a map. At Mr. Bundy's invitation
I went immediately to his office, having cleared this with General Carter,
who had another engagement and instructed me to follow through on the
White House formal notification. I I my missiles expert from
OSI, accompanied me. In Bunny's office 'o him the story. He shortly
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/08/3.: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8
brought in the Attorney General, whom I also briefed. His initial comment
was one four-letter word, off the record. If I remember correctly, Alex
Johnson also came in to get the briefing. At any rate Mx. Bundy said that
he had arranged an 1100 meeting with the President to fill him in and con-
sider the US policy problems involved. At 0930 General Carter arrived, I
showed him the memorandum we had prepared, discussed the evidence, and
advised him 0 could support him fully with analytical back-up. I
said I felt the Acting DCI should handle the briefing of the President,
with which General Carter agreed; that he probably did not need me, with
which he somewhat reluctantly agreed; and that somebody had better get back
to see that the DCI on the West Coast got the word, and continue research
and analysis on the Cuban missile problem -- with all of which General
Carter heartily agreed.
9. I presume General Carter did surface the information at 1100,
the DCI returned later that afternoon, and a whirlwind of intelligence
reporting and policy formulation on Cuba set in from which we have not
yet recovered.
25X1
RAYS CLINE
Deputy Dire or (Intelligence)
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CI'A-RDP80BO1676R001700140012-8