CUBAN OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 9, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
9 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor
SUBJECT Cuban Operation
1. At about 9:30 p. m. on 16 April (D-1) I was called in the
CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant
to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He notified me that we
would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until
they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Any
further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary
of State.
Z. I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come irnmed _att ly
to his office and discuss this decision. Mr. Bissell joined me at the
Secretary's office where we both arrived at about 10:15 p.m.
3. The Secretary informed us that there were political considera-
tions preventing the planned air strikes before the beachhead airfield
was in our hands and usable. The air strikes on D-Z had been allowed
because of military considerations. Political requirements at the
present time were overriding. The main consideration involved the
situation at the United Nations. The Secretary described Ambassador
Stevenson's attitude in some detail. Ambassador Stevenson had insisted
essentially that the air strikes would make it absolutely impossible for
the U. S. position to be sustained. The Secretary stated that such a
result was unacceptable.
4. In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications
of the decision. We told him that the time was such (now almost 11:00 p. m. )
that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation
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as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat
ashore, and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beach-
head area the first thing in the morning (D-Day) would clearly be
disastrous. I informed him that there would be four effects of the
cancellation order as it applied to strikes against Cuban airfielcs.
a. There would be a great risk of loss of one or more of
the ships as they withdrew from the beach. This would be :serious
but not catastrophic, provided that the unloading had proceeded
as scheduled and all planned unloading had occurred by dayight.
In view of the fact that this was a night landing and close timing
was required, it was pointed out that the probability of smooth
performance here was doubtful. (As it turned out, the unloading,
was not accomplished in the time planned.)
b. The disembarked forces in the beachhead would be subjected
to a heavier scale of air attack than would otherwise have been the
case. In view of the fact that the Cuban Air Force was inadequate
for massive air attacks, the attacks to be expected under the new
circumstances would be damaging to these forces but not decisive.
c. Failure essentially to neutralize the Cuban Air For ce very
early on D-Day would have its most serious effect on the use of
the Expeditionary Air Force's B-26s to isolate the battlefield.
The B-26s were being counted upon to attack approaching Cuban
ground and Naval elements and close-in artillery and tanks. No
fighter cover was being provided for the B-26s and they would
thus face the prospect of serious attrition during these battlefield
operations. The beachhead could then be overwhelmed by the
superior surface attack which could be brought against it.
d. Loss of efficiency would result from this late chang_= of
orders.
5. After considering the foregoing, the Secretary of State agreed
that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but conLir.t_ned
that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields, a harbor, and a radio
broadcasting station, could not be permitted and the decision to cancel
would stand. He asked if I should like to speak to the President. Mr.
Bissell and I were impressed with the extremely delicate situation with
Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire
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political position of the United States, and the firm position of the
Secretary. We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President
and so informed the Secretary.
6. Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the
necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carrying out the
instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require re-plannin-7
and re-briefing of crews. (This was barely accomplished as the orde=r
to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits. )
7. Our next task was to try and compensate for the loss of
effective air strikes. In order to protect the shipping as it withdrew
from the beachhead, I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending
authority to give fighter cover. At 4:30 a.m., 17 April (D-Day), I
called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiterated the need
to protect the shipping. The Secretary telephoned the President and
put me on the phone. After I made the request the President asked
that the Secretary be put back on. After conversation with the
President, the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover
was disapproved.
25X1A
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Deputy Director
The foregoing conforms to my recollection:
25X1A
RICHARD M. BISSELL, J
Deputy Director (Plans)
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