LIMITED ONE-TIME STRIKE (50 SORTIES) AGAINST MRRM SITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

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LIMITED ONE.TINE STRIKE (5) SORTIES) AGAINST NREN SITES
Action Colatiqmp/fted
A. aspic filatures
The target of the single strike contemplated by this
plan would be limited to the known NREK site, including the
EXEK's and Launchers, the warheads and the suspect nuclear
storage sites. Presumably this strike could be accompliithed
in & matter of minutes.
S. Adviptdiges of _flan
Because the contemplated action is of a severely
limited nature it should appear in the eyes of the world
as not incomensurate with the danger presented' to the
United States by the missile sifis. Particularly if the
operation were coupled with some diplomotic gesture,
the emphasis mightinell be shifted to the American
desire to achieve a political solutioa rather than to
the military action itself.
C. Alterm,tkys Potsibilitiak
Two possible approaches to this operation should
Le co tiered:
Altexnative One
The operation could be carried out without prior
notification either to Ihrushchev or to Castro but witn
simultaneous public announcenent and the delivery
messages to Khrushchem and Castro. Under this
alternative Nacmiilan, Adenauer4 and DeCtuilm WOUit:
be advised by the President 12 hatIrs in advance.
President Betancourt and two or three otter Latin
American heads of state might be notified an hour
ahea
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or two ahead of the operation. However, it is
doubtful that any Latin American head of state could
he given as much as 12 hours notice without jeoparoitLu??
possibility of surprise.
Oa the same day Lauthorisetion would be souot
to convene the GAS Organ of Consultation and the MAC
would oleo be advised, preferable by a high level
emissary of the President.
44ternatprfil Ttoo
The sane pfichadulik would be followed except that
a prior approach would be made to ihrushchsv and Castro
24 hours in advance. They would not be notified ot the
nature of the proposed operation or of its timin4 but
they would be advised that some early sett= me
pleased.
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Advantages.
An ?potation conducted without advance notice
would be most economical since it could exploit the
element of surprise. Cas can argue, in fact, that the
major reason for limiting the *potation to the
specific missile targets is in order to justify action
against than without prior consultation. Since
the targets were about to bocoma operational it
could be argued that the rtoptireneots did not
permit advance discussions.
An edditional argument for this alternativo La that
the toholo operation could presumably be eamplieted
within en hour. It would thus be a hal
MI before thew* would be a chance for any roost am.
In a MIK 00000 it can be argued Want the
IIIIIMIDEUM preventative actin" of taking out the
missile sites would not be milks Ehruslachav.a actions
in shooting down the 17-2.
atiLtlinallatt
The disadvantages relate not only to the reactions
of Ihrushaborty and Castro but also to the reactions
of our MO allies and to a lessor extent to
maiberos of the S. Ithrushchev night mil foal
that he had been Inamiliated and, therefore under
compoislm to alike some counter-strike. Castro
could ;use the incident as an evidence of the
callousness and arrogance of the United States 10
suddenly *tucking a small matins without notice.
Be night well be respond by killing primmest by an
attack on Contumacy or even by an isepolsivo raid
against some United States coastal city or installa-
tion.
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The advantages of this alternative are that
by offering a time for Ebrusbchev and Castro to
respond to our 4emerc4eA we would possibly
provide then and the United states with a way
out without bloodshed. Moreovert'we would, in
the eyes of the world, be using the pattern of
Sues.
Dia0vantemes
Tbe obvious disadvantage of the secom4
alternative is that it compromises the element
of security. It may therefore reader the
operation mot only more costly but even
impossible of fulfillments since, with advance
notices the Romians miLbt get the weapons %tower
cover. However, if the advance notice were
limited to 24 hours or less, the possibility of
effective diepersel would be greatly reduced.
Another possible disadvantage to that
advance notice might result in Ebrushchev being
led to make some bard threats which would
commit bin to take reckless action after the
event.
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kirgANNICEtlal.RWSEIVAGARXIL
I. Messame tot ilbrushchom
Under alternative 1, this message would be
delivered ilassItaneously to Dobrynin in Washington and,
hopefully, by Ambassador Kohler to Kbrushchev in Moscow.
If the operation wars undertaken at down this would :mean that
the speasage would be delivered to Um:Whey in tbe latter
part of the afternoon.
Whether delivered in advance or simultaneously,
the tone of the swag* would be wore sorrow than lager:
It would:
(a) Underline the PresidentesAdmock at
discovering uncballengable evidence of
an MUM installation in Cubs;
(b) point out that the Preeident bad been
assured by Xbrusbabev that the Soviet
Union would put no: offensive weepoes
in Cube;
(c) recall that the President had stated
publicly that in the wept the Cubans
ware given any offensive capability,
he would take appropriate action;
(d) recite that the President was taking
action to eliminate the specific MUIVe
so far identified and that similar
action would be taken against any
additional nuclear installations as
soon as they were discovered; and
put Xbrushcbev on notice that, seas-
while. the United States would, 41 2
matter of self defense, fly lou-level
reconnaissance missions over Cuba.
(a)
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2. Mesta'. to Csatro
The messes* to Castro, which, would be made public
at the time of the attack, would:
(s) point out the prior warning given by
the President;
(b) the determination of the United States
to act for the defense of its ova interests
and those of the other American states;
and
(e)
the decision of the United States to
take action egeinst this specific target.
The messes" would point out that the
action was limited to the target but
that it 'would be repeated against any
other offensive installation that might
be later identified, and that in the
meantime the United States would fly
close surveillance missions.
hgajaltainsetaluarlizataiv_witak
The President would at the time of the attack
also issue a statement pointing out:
(a) that Limited military action was being
taken in defense of the security of the
United States and the other American
states;
(b) recalling the Ptesident's prior warning
on this subject and emphasising that the
operation was being so designed as to
result in the minims jeopardy of human
life;
(e) asking
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(c) making slur that the. mission had to be
undertaken an an emergency basis so as
to assure that the installations woad
not become operational;
referring to Chairman Skrushcherss
assurances that no offensive vesper%
mould be placed in Cuba;
recalling the President's prior marnins
that, la the wont Cuba were armed with
offensive weapons. the United States
wad take necessary SCUM;
(1) pointing out that this action was taken
reluctantly and that no prior consulta-
tion vas possible because of the
ismdment danger
(40
of ths
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nen
of the weapons becoming operational;
(g) emphasising that the operation was limited
to the narrow objectives of destroying the
particular weapons and that it was designed
to minimise casualties;
(h) making digger, however, that the United
States would feel compelled in the future
to take similar action against any further
offensive weapons that might appear; and
dominant
(1) that for purposes of its own defense and in
fidelity to its treaty obligations to the
other American states, it mould find it
necessary to fly, close surveillance missions.
sauaguanwicsedatese
That message might include a call for a summit con-
e. It could, point out that the introduction of offensive
weapons in Cuba in violation of the assurances of Chairman
Bhxushabov had created greatly increased tensions to 444 to the
other problems between the Western powers and the Coit Bloc.
Mose circumstamoes made it imperative that an immediate conference
be held at the summit -- presumably on a bilateral basis in
order to permit the Chairman and the President to discuss the
whole range of problems between theCommunist Bloc and the
*sato= powers. Otherwise the situation might rapidly deteriorate.
O. PopsilAel Cubes Responowe
The major defect of this plan, from a military point
of view, is that, in providing for the elimination sorely of
the known KM installation, it leaves intact other Cuban
offensive capabilities. Thus there is a danger that Castrc
sittisrrivA
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might respond to our attack by a counter'. strike against a
Florida city, such as Nisei, or an ASJUielle military
installation in the Southeast, such as Cape Canaveral.
In answer to this, it can be imitated that Castro would
be unlikely to rt.& the almost certain destruction that
would follow an offensive action against the United States --
particularly if it were made clear at the time of our air strike
that it was limited to the known itialM installation.
Another objection to the plan is that it would leave in
tact other possible Cuban nuclear capabilities, such as
airborne nuclear weapons or FIRBK site* not disclosed by
*oriel reconaissence.
S. SqvI.4 1401,00ne,
It is possible that, in view of the speed with which
the attack could be concluded, it might pass am a relatively
minor =cadent. in that event, ihruobehow could treat it as
of no mom importance than his OM abootins doom of our 0-2
in 1960. On the other hand, ono cannot rule out the
possibility that he would feel it necessary to make a military
response against Berlin or pfissibly Turkey.
F. atjutakALASTRAtallinSM
Male there might be some disposition on the pert
of certain of the NATO countries to suggest en impolite
analogy to Sues, the fact that the UnitedStates was compel ed
to act quickly in order to prevent the miseile from
becoming operational would tend to blunt the indignation that
might result from a failure to mie undertake prior consultations.
Indignation would be further blunted if the President were
to make a simultaneous call for a summit conforanco, which
would meet the expressed or unexpressed wishes of a amber
of the NATO a countries.
The effect
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The effect en the members of the OAS would undoubtedly
be mised. There would be an uncoascious resentment agaiast
United States intervention in Cuban affairs. Certain of the
Caribbean a countries might feel regret that the action vas
not more definitive. Other Latin American countries would be
relieved that the air strike mos so limited.
VETO!' scRgT
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