(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 26, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CE NT RAL I NTELLIGENCE AGENCY
:A~nrnrurLkL-1
THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
Information as of 0600
26 October 1962
NGA Review Completed.
State Department review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
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26 October 1962
SUMMARY CONTENTS
I. Surveillance of 25 October shows that the con-
struction of IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba is proceeding
largely on schedule; Low level photography confirms that
the MRBM bases will use the 1,020-nautical.-mile SS-4 mis-
sile. No additional sites, launchers or missiles have
been located, but there is road construction around Re-
medios which suggests the fourth IRBM site we have been
expecting there. We estimate that it would cost the USSR
more than twice as much and take considerably longer to
add to its ICBM strike capability from the USSR as great
an increment as the potential salvo from Cuban launching
sites.
II. Only two Soviet freighters--and five tankers,
one of them already past the quarantine line--still are
headed for Cuba. The BELOVODSK, with twelve MI-4 heli-
copters, is inthe North Atlantic; the PUGACHEV appears to
have slowed or stopped several days west of the Panama
Canal. A total of 16 dry cargo ships now are carried as
having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October.
Moscow highlights Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's
appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations. Peiping,
however, is irritated that the Soviet response to US action
is not stronger. The Communists still deny there are any
offensive weapons in Cuba.
IV. There is no major change or significant new devel-
opment in non-bloc reaction to the crisis. Most of the OAS
nations have offered to participate in some form in the
quarantine, and NATO members have agreed with minor reser-
vations to deny landing and overflight rights to Soviet
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SAN CRISTOBAL
MRBM COMPLEX
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26 October 1962
I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA
Photograph Ishows continued rapid con-
struction activity at each of four MRBM sites. The use of
camouflage and canvas to cover critical equipment at these
sites continues.
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It now is estimated that San Cristobal Site 2 will
achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead
of 25 October. Heavy rain has recently fallen on this site.
The four Soviet cargo ships originally en route to Cuba
which were suspected to be delivering ballistic missiles
are continuing their eastward course towards the USSR.
The cost of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba,
including military equipment already supplied plus that
whici will be needed to complete the missile sites under
construction, is estimated to amount to at least $750 mil-
lion, and may be as much as $1 billion. One-third of this
is accounted for by the IRBM and MRBM systems. Although
the cost of setting up these sites in Cuba appears high,
it would probably cost the USSR more than twice as much
to establish a comparable increment in the USSR to the pres-
ent Soviet ICBM strike capabilities against the US. More-
over, MRBM/IRBM systems can be positioned in Cuba in con-
siderably less time than would be needed to construct ICBM
bases in the USSR.
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Military traffic is heavy on most of the country's high--
ways, and several roads and beach areas have been closed to
all civilian use. Press reports from Havana state that the
city is bristling with gun emplacements and other evidences
of military readiness. Che Guevara reportedly has established
a military command post at the town of Corral de la Palma in
Pinar del Rio Province, and Raul Castro is alleged to have
gone to Oriente Province--his usual post during previous mil-
itary alerts. Fidel reportedly remains in Havana.
The general public continues its display of outward
tranquility
Oc-
tober broadcast from Santa Clara, capital of Las Villas Prov-
ince, reported drastic new consumption controls on gasoline
and motor oil; similar measures may have been instituted
elsewhere. The broadcast also described reports of food
and fuel shortages as "rumors spread by the counterrevolu-
tion at the service of Yankee imperialism," The broadcast
was presumably aimed at discouraging scare buying, which
has been reported from several Cuban cities.
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II. SOVIET SHIPPING AND FLIGHTS TO CUBA
Only two Soviet dry cargo shi
be en route to Cuba-
oes. The BELOVODSK
The other ship, the E. PUGACHEV, which is en
route from Vladivostok,may have slowed down or temporarily
stopped in the North Pacific, several days out from the
Panama Canal.
Five Soviet tankers also are en route to Cuba, one
having already passed into the quarantine zone. In addi-
tion, four European satellite ships, including an East Ger-
man passenger ship, appear to be continuing their voyages
to Cuba.
A total of 16 Soviet dry cargo ships now are estimated
to have altered their courses and headed back toward the
USSR on 23 October. Most--if not all--are believed to have
been carrying military cargoes.
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B. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Khrushchev's prompt acceptance of U Thant's appeal on
Cuba is calculated to strengthen Soviet efforts to involve
the US in protracted negotiations. The Soviet leaders
clearly believe that a temporary suspension of arms deliv-
eries would be a small price to pay for arrangements which,
they hope, will effectively forestall further US actions
against the military buildup in Cuba.
In commenting on Khrushchev's reply to U Thant, Pravda
this morning urged that the US exercise caution in the pres-
ent crisis. This advice is backed up by a Red Star article
entitled "Cuba is Not Alone," which repeated pre iv ous claims
concerning the accuracy and destructiveness of Soviet rock-
ets and reiterated that the USSR has "successfully solved
the problem of the antimissile missile." Numerous reports
appear in today's Soviet press of meetings in the USSR pro-
testing US "aggressive actions" and pledging support of the
policies of the Soviet government.
There has been no change in the tone or substance of
Moscow's approach to the US revelation of the presence of
Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. In his rebuttal to US
photographic evidence of missile bases in Cuba, Zorin in
the UN charged that the photographs were forgeries and?re-
iterated there was no need to establish such bases outside
the USSR. Repeating this theme, Soviet propaganda contin-
ues to claim that the US is making use of the "big lie"
technique in its charges against the Soviet Union and to
deny that there are any offensive weapons in Cuba.
Elsewhere, bloc spokesmen remain cautious in their
private statements on 'the Cuban issue, suggesting that they
have not as yet been given a line for dissemination to
foreigners. Some bloc representatives have sought to give
the impression that Cuba was not importa1t enough to the
USSR to cause it to go to war at present.
Communist China apparently is irritated because the
Soviet Union has not adopted a more aggressive posture.
Peiping has portrayed the cautious Russian statement of
23 October as a declaration of intent to "smash" US aggres-
sion, called the US a "paper tiger," and urged a "resolute
blow-for-blow struggle" to combat American moves. Chinese
Communist press statements tend to minimize the Russian
role in the Cuban crisis while playing up the importance
of support for Cuba by the Chinese--called "the most reli-
able friends of the Cuban people."
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In the only East European comment thus far on develop-
ments at the UN, the East German news agency described the
President's reply to U Thant as "a noncommittal US propa-
ganda maneuver," adding that the announcement that the
quarantine would continue "confirmed that'US President Ken-
nedy is not prepared to accept the proposals of U Thant
and N. S. Khrushchev...."
Hungarian and Bulgarian authorities may have interfered
with communications between the US Legations in Budapest
and Sofia and the Department of State. Both legations use
local, national-owned circuits, communicating with Washing-
ton via Vienna or Frankfurt. The Legation in Sofia reported
the telex circuit out of operation during the night of 23-
24 October and the circuit from the Legation in Budapest
was subject to frequent interruptions during the day on 24
October. The US Charge protested to Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry officials, who assured him that there would be no
further difficulty.
Anti-American demonstrations of varying scale have
been staged in four of the five East European satellite
capitals where there are US missions. A Hungarian news
agency reported that 10,000 inhabitants of Budapest had pro-
tested in front of the US Legation on 24 October, but the
Charge reports "the local scene is quiet."
The same day some 500 students at Warsaw Polytechnic
Institute organized a protest rally, but returned to class
when extra police hurriedly were stationed around the Em-
bassy. The Gomulka regime reportedly does not intend to
permit demonstrations or conduct an internal propaganda
campaign for fear of sparking a war scare and a run on food
stocks, which are already low.
Also on 24 October, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry offi-
cial assured the US Minister that "if a demonstration was
organized, protection also would be organized." Three hours
later, the arrival of a strong police guard at the Legation
dampened preparations for a demonstration, and a crowd of
youths dispersed.
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Yesterday, 1,000 Czechs pulled down the flag and
smashed windows at the US Embassy in Prague. Police ear-
lier refused to clear a path through the demonstrators
for am embassy car returning the Chargd from an official
luncheon.
The Ulbricht regime has called for "solidarity demon-
strations." Yesterday East German police directed a US
Army patrol into a street where such a rally was underway.
The car was beat upon and lost radio contact with US head-
quarters in West Berlin before breaking free and returning
to West Berlin.
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IV. NON-BLOC REACTION
The UN Security Council has suspended its debate on
the Cuban crisis indefinitely following the announcement
by Acting Secretary General U Thant that he would consult
privately with representatives of the US, USSR, and Cuba.
Pending the outcome of these consultations, the "non-aligned
group" has also halted its plans for sponsoring a resolu-
tion in the Council.
Except for some reduction in the nervousness of the
West German press, there is little reflection in non-bloc
comment of the turnaround of Soviet ships and the US and
Soviet responses to U Thant's proposals for avoiding a
confrontation on the high seas.
There are continuing instances of demonstrations in
Asian, European and Latin American countries, but partici-
pation is limited largely to Communist and avowedly paci-
fist elements. At this hour none seems likely to assume
massive proportions.
The Shah of Iran has not commented publicly, but For-
eign Minister Aram told Ambassador Holmes on 24 October
that the Iranian delegation at the UN was being instructed
to give full support to the US program, including exten-
sive lobbying among the Afro-Asians with an eye toward
possible General Assembly consideration of the crisis.F_
General Lebanese opinion is reported almost "jubilant"
at what is considered a great free world victory, particu-
larly because the US challenge is directed at the USSR
rather than "pygmy Castro." The official Greek attitude
is that a NATO public endorsement of the US quarantine is
preferable to statements by individual governments. Athdens'
permanent representative in Paris has been instructed to
support a move in this direction.
Ankara is apprehensive that equation of US bases in
Turkey and Soviet installations in Cuba may lead to Commu-
nist pressures on Turkey. Foreign Minister Erkin told Am-
bassador Hare on 24 October that it is essential for Turkey
to receive needed military equipment quickly.
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Algerian Premier Ben Bella, granting an appointment
to charge Porter only after a two-day delay, expressed hope
for continued US economic aid, but reiterated his convic-
tion that as a matter of principle "Cuba must be supported."
He charged the US violated the UN charter by resorting to
unilateral military action. The Moroccan acting foreign
minister concedes the U Thant plan for a moratorium on mili-
tary shipments to Cuba is unrealistic without guarantees.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Diallo of Guinea has assured
Ambassador Attwood that his country has no intention of grant-
ing the USSR landing or overflight rights for air movements
to Cuba. He stated that Guinea had refused a Soviet request
for this purpose in September.
Asian reaction remains in low key, partly because of
preoccupation with the Sino-Indian border clashes. Cam-
bodia, however, has announced its decision to establish
diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Uruguay has now joined the other members in support of
the OAS resolution. All OAS members except Brazil, Bolivia.
Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay have offered to participate in
some way in the quarantine.
The two Argentine destroyers to be used in the quaran-
tine will sail on 28
I
Mexico, traditionaly against intervention, has some-
what reluctantly agreed to support whatever measures the
OAS adopts. There has been no indication whether this sup-
port would include active participation in the use of force,
but President Lopes Mateos has said that any action should
be under the control of international organizations.
Socialist presidential aspirant Senator Allende of
Chile is reportedly unhappy about the effect of the bloc_.k-
ade on Chilean politics because he believes the firm US
stand has changed the public mood against the leftist coal;--
tion, FRAP. Allende's chances of being elected in 1964
have been considered good but his pro-Castro stand now may
work against him.
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Brazil sees itself as a peacemaker in the Cuban situa-
tion, proposing that the UN undertake denuclearization of
Latin America. Rio feels this would permit Cuba and the
Soviet Union to save face thus diminishing the danger of
direct confrontation
The Communist parties and other pro-Castro groups in
Latin America were apparently caught unprepared by Presi-
dent Kennedy's action. They are believed to have plans for
large-scale strikes, sabotage, and demonstrations in case
Cuba is invaded or a counterrevolution breaks out, but
they seem not to have thought out in advance what to do in
less drastic situations. Actions now being organized call
for demonstrations and marches and for telegrams to govern-
ment officials, together with a propaganda barrage protest-
ing the "blockade." The Communists in Latin America may
feel that precipitous action in this less-than-all-out sit-
uation is likely to provoke drastic reprisals which could
cripple their potential for large-scale strikes and sabo-
tage in future emergencies. The Communist Party of Brazil
has instructed the Communist-dominated maritime federations
to organize a boycott of US ships.
The scattered violence and bombing which is taking
place in several countries may be the work of Communists
already unhappy with Moscow's reluctance to support wide-
spread revolution in Latin America or of other hot-headed
pro-Castro groups. These terrorist activites appear badly
planned and largely ineffective.
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Canada placed itself solidly in support of the US ac-
tion with strong speeches in Commons on 25 October by Prime
Minister Diefenbaker and Liberal leader Pearson. While
stressing the need to find a peaceful solution, Diefenbaker
said that Cuban missiles were a "direct and immediate men-
ace to Canada," and he brushed away arguments about the
legality of the quarantine with the comment that they were
largely "sterile and irrelevant." He announced that Cana-
dian Norad forces now are on the same readiness footing as
US unTfs.
Nowegian Foreign Minister Lange, addressing parliament
on 25 October, expressed s ort only for direct negotiation
betwee t
In Italy, Prime Minister Fanfani's somewhat equivocal
line grows out of his fear of upsetting the delicate balance
in the center-left government. We now have reports that
Nenni's Socialist party will take a line sympathetic
to Cuba rather than the US, although one spokesman earlier said
that in any showdown a majority of Socialists would side with
the West.
Officials in Spain and Portugal are supporting the US.
A strong statement is expected from The Hague. The Belgiar
reaction. is "better than expected," and officials are sur-
prised that the US has not yet put Cuba on the COCOM list.
In the British House of Commons on 25 October, Labor
leader Gaitskell expressed sympathy for the US, but also
anxiety over possible Soviet retaliation, Macmillan endorsed
the President's action and said the missiles were unquestion-
ably ofeosive, Any Cuban settlement, he said, would have to
include an accurate check on their removal, after which the
world leaders should try for "wider negotiations."
At their 23 October meeting, the EEC Foreign Ministers
showed "striking unanimity of support and understanding" for
the US position, but felt that henceforth itThwill be ere was consider-
able separate the Cuban and Berlin problems. and
plans,
able dissatisfaction with the Berlin continzency
Spaak felt that the fruitless East-West "soundings" should be
replaced by a "serious" conversation.
In West Germany, where there apparently is panic buying,
Defense Minister Strauss told the US MAAG chief on 25 October
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that the National Defense Council was unanimous in agreeing
that Bonn should go to any length to support the US, even
if it courted great danger.
The French press on 25 October reported that French
armed forces have been put on "Number Two alert," the final
stage before general mobilization. Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville, however, does not believe there will be any
Soviet action in regard to Berlin.
With certain minor reservations by some countries,
agreement now has been reached within NATO to deny landings
and overflights to Soviet aircraft on Cuban runs. The US
now is requesting that Czech and Cuban aircraft be given
similar treatment, or that they be harassed. The Canadian
decision to search Cuban and Czech planes is cited as an ex-
ample of effective harassment,
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