CUBA: NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010032-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORT

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P-& I AL a
State Dept. review completed
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JBJECT. CT. Brt # Now ' n rk xftqotivrinnp
GEN93 L CONSIDE !! TIMPS
Please be guided by the following in your Now York negot_>atiaaa
whose entire purpose is to reach final solution,, in fraaaaswork of
exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchevq of pro l
created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cubk,
In spite of Kua netsov ? s aeserness to discuss disarmament_ bases.
25X1 and other broader questions
the present negotiation
should not include issues beyond mate objective, which is vert.f'.ed
dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at aer h:,et
possible date.
Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic .mute-re 4
to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that iv
line with established Soviet daetzlae. Kuanetsov?a insistence on iv~
physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is a=sin-
tially non-negotiabl, . It is probable, therefore, that we shad h w&
to rely on aerial surveillance and Post-removal inspection to nat.t*6
ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are re -
from Cuba or destroyed.
While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection
as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection tca, *tbn .
with high and low aerial au ?litancer during both the dissanti-f p r td
and the post.-evacuation period should. if efficiently carried ' P
provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be
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2. DEFINITION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
The offensive weapons which the United States insists be
removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those
enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23.
The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber air-
craft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; war:ieads
for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment
to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority
granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special
Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition
of surface-to-surface miss Iles covers a prohibition of missil=:
ropellants and chemical compounds capable of being used
power missiles. I~k'-"J A ks-e-,*_& --
Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-
tirface missiles and surfa.-.c-to-surface missiles designed for use
sea. Notice also that mechnical and electronic equipment
operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of
communications, supply and missile-launching equipment Z; including
Komar class motor torpedo boat].
Suggest you start with wider definition, including swop: . iient
to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we
-)uld insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.
Not incladed in formal definition are Soviet troops and
,r. cians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev
. ,:cer of October 26 that "the necessity for the presence of
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/Soviet/military specialists in Cuba would disappear" trio;.
with the offensive weapons they are manning and protec%ing;.
Also not included within the definition are fighter aur-
craft, /Komar class motor torpedo boats/ and surface-to-air
missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any
petroleum products other than missile propellants. It wou,a
be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed .as
well, but the USG is not. willing to pay a price to have m em
destroyed or removed.
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3. TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.
The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program,
each requiring specific control measures:
(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and
would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the'SC that
they have dismantled and-withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since
the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation
of weapons withdrawal, as !iuznetzov has already indicated, we
assume they are unlike:: to accept on-site inspection during
the period when wespons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably
will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on
(i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection
of incoming shipments.
(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC
convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to
authorize establishment of a UN on-situ inspection system.
i
During this period, verification of compliance would be accom-
plished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) con-
tinued inspection incoming cargoes; and (;ii) ground inspection.
This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the
SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.
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4. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.
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Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential-
This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or nn-
existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done
either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job
be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information
sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.
We recognize that (unlike US) UN will wish to overfly Cuba
only after explidt clearance by Cuban authorities.
US would of course need access to photos resulting from
UN reconnaissance.
Two types-of air surveillance should be considered -- phc:to-
graphic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the
aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance
of missile transport movements.
The Canadian government has offered to have Canadian pilots
fly UN (US supplied) RF-101'aircraft. USG endorses use of
Canadians and RP-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant
to accept. Alternatively we could make available C -130s and within
two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico,
Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (Li. crews) and Indonesia
(10 crews) already have competent yews which would take only brief
period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN
markings and, high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now
available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 air-
craft to Australia and are currentt]. -in thh md~tt ,r~~ft~~
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negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile.
The UN has been informed that the USG is prepared to provide
rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable
to the UN from anywhere in the world.
Another highly attractive possibility"1woald be for Mexico or
Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-lls (C-45s) and crews which
DOD believes would be fully capable to do kind of job we want.
They have adequate high-quality camera equipment. Mexico has
six aircraft and Argentina has a comparable number. Also Sweden
has made available for the Congo operation two reconnaissance
PT-9s (single-jet aircraft). It is'understood that they have a
number of such aircraft fully equipped with photographic :quipment.
Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided
to operate in Havana on at whatever place UN would wish to use
as base of operations.
You'should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly
urging him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support
of UN surveillance, however, should. not (repeat not) be tied
io
to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that QTE The United
States will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon'
the effectiveness of UN operations UNQTE can be made, but we
should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air
surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.
It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate
substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low sur-
veillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and with-
drawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy
us that offensive weapons have been fuller r r o d 1bb
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5. INCOMING CARGOES.
As indicated DEPTEL 1136, we prepared accept ICRC
inspection incoming cargoes on all-ships, of whatever flag,
embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection,
ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to
arrive in Cuba during next three or four weeks. Number Red
Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether
inspection at sea or on shore. Most efficient use manpower
would be port inspection at agreed ports. This would permit
close inspection of vessels, one after another, without transit;
time required to shuttle between vessels at sea. Accordingly,
hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. If inspection done
at ports, we estimate personnel needed. If done on high
seas, estimate would be required.
We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective
examination of cargoes aboard
to assure that no weapons wE
consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide
0
for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to 1Jt
inspectors well in advance of arrival at port.. This wou16
expedite checcing and clearance and help make entire inspection
process more effective.
We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue
until entire verification process completed (i.e., through enu
of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive
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assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming
traffic. US Auld thus be in position to renew immediately the
enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such
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weapons withdrawn and relkted facilities dismantled. During
this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but
US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not.
be stopped or searched-by US, but we would keep a watching brief
on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and
action.
6. VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba
establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization
operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba,
.would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to
the "weapons US considers offensive", a Security Council mmtirg
(a) Terms of Reference': UN/Cuba
UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling,
those sites which identified by US as missile bases as
well as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers
. iid any other area where we have reason to believe there
may have been concealment of offensive weapons. Such
teams should have unrestricted confidential communication
facilities with their headquarters,units, and free access
--to-areas required for the performance of their duties.
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US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to
bo covered.
(b) Number of Observers
The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily
will depend on length ,f time permitted to accomplish task and
on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such
verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for politicaa
ccoasons Communists wolz_Ld profer keep number UN inspectors
relatively small, suggo'st UN consider possibility utilizing
number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared
make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams
maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that
team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could
accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover.
any UN aerial observers should participate in verification
(c) Composition ?
While we assume that probably only citizens of certain
types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources
f
o
UN ground observers, it is important frmm our standpoint
1-ech-noea.llc `t'nai,,adL rZ.,rsa-rtheL. that eligibility be restricte3" tngenuinely reliable
ar-S
mwwa-j
2 grave demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis.
For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens
in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements made by their
a~ Y
Delegates
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Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria
indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland,
Austria,igeria India and Ireland. When it comes to UN
air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have
neutral personnelt Canadians and Argentines, for example, might
prove acceptable.
ADMINISTRATION AND-FINANCE
(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN
operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group,
port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate
under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the
International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it
should (as indicated DEPTEL 1136) operate as executive
agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar
.capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva
Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted alsc as
executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.
(b) We believe financing all verification measures
should come under $2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget
for small-scale peace and security operations. If total,
cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem
will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.s.
position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.
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MONDAY
October 29, 1962
5:22 p. m.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR MC CLOY
M said they just came back from Thant and understands Ball gave
the Sec a rundown but M will film more: There may be a time element -,
wanted announcement to go out about the freezing of the quaranting (read it).
M asked It has gone out yet and. Sec said no - thought tomorrow a. in. ivi
thinks that does not matter. Thinks It should be in that form and only that
and no talk about its coming back on. Sec said trouble is he is not going to
get to see the sites. M said that is the reason - anxious to have you put in
accordance with his request....
Kuznetsov said re Red Cross they would permit them to insect cargoes
to see no arms at all coming in from the Soviet Union to Cuba but did not want
personnel to be boarding from American men-of-war - should be from. as--tan
or neutral vessel. Re operating within the ports - o. k. with him if Castro a(I:ees.
Sec said would Red Cross take on a political job like that? M does not know it
there was a communication with someone and the upshot was they were anxious
to be of service and so perhaps they would be ready. K said he did not make t a
condition but prefers personnel should be composed of neutrals or non - ali; ned
ld be
people. Sec said make it Swiss then. M said o. k. and thinks they wou
competent. We did not commit on Red Cross. M thinks you might get good.
personnel from Swiss rather than otherwise - this for inspection at sea or at
port if Castro agrees. M said they made it clear there is a problem in the
interim because Kuznetsov made it definite there could be no on-site nspect On
until dismantling had been done. M said we can't be sure they are gone until there
Is inspection. It ended by our indicating to him we would reserve our right
through a UN reconnaissance satisfactory or us or our own air reconnaissarics
during the period they were saying they were dismantling and then see re - site
inspection thereafter. M replied this was K but thinks he was talking about ox-
site. They agreed we could workout some arrangement on that. M said to ':ant
we have to make up our mind whether we would be satisfied in the interval with
aerial reconnaissance mdrom minus assurances on site. M thinks air is better
but on site could supplement aerial. Whether K is ready to take that or whether
this T thinks he would(?)
he is just talking about on-site Those re the saM lient not fknow eatures but
of .
object to aerial inspection. T
Re Cubans: He wanted to make it clear they had made no commitment
whatever to the existence of UN body on the Island. They would welcome Thant
to talk about it but would negotiate out what they were prepared to dour In ; orv
with Thant re guarantee to Cubans - he saw a copy of letter Stevenson sel
:
yesterday - talking about continuation of absence of weapons: would it me-.
ask for that he felt the Cubans would ask fc~,,zc
? If
you
permanent inspection
right 17 visitation of CIA establishments around the Caribbean. :;ec six id it
would involve a lot of inspection in Cuba. T said if you don't mean pit
he does not think we will face the problem and he won't bring it up.
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M said Yost was with him and checked to see if he left anything out. TOHI'i ^ d
indicated he was on the extension and asked what weapons were included? M
said we would give him a list of weapons which Sec said Khrushchev mentionec.
J sent to Ball some notes on this which might be of help. M said they would
watch for those. M said it was clear when he talked about Red Cross inspe: t1on
he was talking about any weapons. M said the procedure would be when Ru:>si