NOTE ON COLOMBIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010033-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 19, 2004
Sequence Number: 
33
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 31, 1962
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010033-8.pdf361.39 KB
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Apprdlve4 For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 31 onto 62 COLOMBIA: Crisis expected in the cabinet within the next three days. President Valencia's two month old government is under fire for not taking foreceful action against rural banditry, but also there are personal animosities and jealousies -- some of this brought into open by dissension over support- ing US stand on Cuba. Valencia pro-US on matter; Defense Minister Ruiz hanging back. State Department review completed Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP80 0~,,67?ff0 00010033-8 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 cables renort the USSR has requested clearance for a flight of an IL-18 carrying Mikoyan to Havana via ILL anada, and New YBrk. Mikoyan is to leave Moscow I November, stop over one day in New York and then proceed to havana. No reason is given but it is speculated that he is to put pressure on Castrd. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA 31 October 1962 PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 TOP SECRET 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CI - 1800010033-8 I 25X1 THE SITUATION IN CUBA Further analysis of low-level photography 25X1 Oprovides clear evidence that construction and con- cealment have continued at the MRBM sites in Cuba since Limited and poor photograp precludes a posit ve assessment of construction activity at IRBM sites. There is no evidence that the Soviets are dismantling or vacating any of the sites. Many of the missile erectors at the MRBM sites have been moved from their hardstands and are no longer visible. There is evidence that at least one of these erectors and most of the missile-associated equipment have been concealed in the woods. As long as missile erectors remain near the MRBM sites, their full operational capability is not af- fected. Launch stands, cabling, and other launching compon- ents remain in place at each of the MRBM sites. Removal of the cabling would probably be the first step in disman- tling operations. Construction activity at 25X1 bunkers has continuedt Sagua La Grande= 25X1 MRBM Site 2 and at San Cristobal MRBM Sites 1 and 3. -1- Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : Cl R001800010033-8 TOP SECRET"" 7 25X1 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-R 01800010033-8 25X1 Analysis of Soviet merchant ship movements indicates that it would take a minimum of two weeks, and more prob- ably three, to assemble in Cuban ports those Soviet dry- cargo ships with hatches suitable for loading missiles. Dismantling and movement of essential missile facili- ties to port areas could probably be accomplished within about 24 hours, but about a week would be required for loading. Inside Cuba, the armed forces remain mobilized. Cu- ban radios have announced military exercises, which began yesterday and areltot-continue through 2 November. I I The Krons a -c ass su c a went aground near Banes on 28 October has still not been refloated. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-Rq 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 20U5TO~TC1 -RDP80B01 768001800010033-8 25X1 U Thant's conversations with Castro yesterday went badl 25X1 the Cubans refuse any form of inspection or any foreign presence in their territory. U Thant still has hopes of "shaking them out" of this position in meetings set for this morning. If not, he may call a Security Council meeting for Thursday to seek more guidance. guarantee would be acceptable to him--be injected into ITN discussions of the issue. Soviet propaganda media have be- gun to refer to these as "just Cuban demands." that Castro is insisting that his "five points"--deman for major US concessions before any US non-aggression Cuban propaganda themes yesterday strongly suggest 25X1 Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov yester- day again assured Ambassador Stevenson "emphatically" that the offensive missiles in Cuba would be dismantled and re- moved, after which verification could be undertaken by any means the US desired. He said Khrushchev had told him dis- mantling would take two or three weeks. Kuznetsov referred several times to removal of US "bases which threatened the Soviet Union as they hadremoved their base in Cuba which threatened the US." The UN Secretary-General's office has already beer, in touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has agreed to inspect shipping reaching Cuba. The ICRC is thinking in terms of a staff of 30 which would be briefed in New York before beginning its work. Foreign Minister Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler yes- terday that the USSR wants to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters. -3- Approved For ReleaTOP5/9 22" A_ DP80B01676R J01800010033-8 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-R Soviet UN officials appear to be trying to convince neutralist representatives that the lesson of the Cuban crisis is "the sinister nature" of all foreign bases and the need for their liquidation, in particular Guantanamo. In the Geneva talks on a nuclear test ban, a Soviet delegate argued that the Cuban settlement reduces interna- tional tension to a point where the West should drop its demands for international controls and on-site inspection. REACTION AND PROPAGANDA Moscow propaganda expresses concern that the US still harbors aggressive intentions against Cuba and that Cuban exile groups are plotting against the Castro regime. Mos- cow has warned that the crisis has not ended and has called for "strict fulfillment" of US pledges of "noninterference in the :internal affairs of Cuba . " Soviet propaganda thus far gives no clear indication of policy decisions concerning future diplomatic efforts. A Moscow commentator, however, has endorsed Castro's five demands of 28 October as "just proposals," and the East German Neues Deutschland also has called for the US to evacuate its Guantanamo base. Additional themes which have received a fair amount of emphasis in Soviet broadcasts are calls for removal of the US quarantine of Cuba and for'the removal of US missile bases in Turkey. Izvestiya yesterday gave readers a relatively clear picture of Soviet withdrawal in the face of US threats, but otherwise Moscow has shown considerable sensitivity to suggestions of a Soviet retreat, hailing the settlement as "a major victory for Soviet policy." TOP SECRE1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA- 25X1 1800010033-8 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA RDP80B0167 R001800010033-8 Chinese Communists are making their opposition to Soviet policy on Cuba increasingly clear. The editorial in today's People's Daily says that President Kennedy has given nothing but "empty promises" and that his "so-called assurance" against invading Cuba is only a "hoax." 25X1 25X1 Approved For ReleassedQ05~f2;, I- ~DP80B01176R001800010033-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA- 25X1 25X1 there are five Soviet tankers (LISICHANSK, MIR, KARL MARX, GROZNY and VLADIMIR), four Soviet dry-cargo vessels (BELOVODSK, E PUGACHEV, MICHURINSK and CHERNYAKOVSK) and one Czechoslovak dry -cargo vessel (KLADNO) en route to Cuba. the GROZNY and the 13ELOVODSK were waiting, dead in e wa er, near the quarantine line. KLADNO was hove to in the same areal Approved For ReleEpU4605AVk 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22: G NDP80B016~ 25X1 October 31, 19?.2 THE SITUATION IN CUBA 25X1 o I the main difference we see is improved camouflage and conceal- ment. There is no indication of preparations to dismantle the sites. 25X1 Some of the medium-range missile erectors have beer. re- moved from sight, but at least one of these is concealer in the woods near its previous position. As long as the er3c- tors stay near their sites, full operational capability is not reduced. 25X1 0 We estimate that it would take at least two weeks, Pore probably three, to assemble the Soviet ships we believe to be missile transporters in Cuban ports. The missile facili- ties could actually be torn down and moved to port in 24 hours, but loading would take a week. U Thant's conversations with Castro yesterday made lit- tle headway. The Cubans refuse any form of inspection or foreign presence on their territor;T. Kuznetsov, however, yesterday emphatically assured A%- bassador Stevenson that the missiles will be dismantled and removed in two or three weeks, after which we can have a.ny verification process we want. The International Red Cross has agreed to provide insp tors for shipping reaching Cuba. Approved For Release 200-5/04/22 : CIA-R V R001800010033-8 I _~ZYj9 ,., 25X1 Approved For Release 201PIP419 3oviet diplomats and propagandists continue t'aetr e'- forts to broaden the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement to suc!i matters as control of Cuban exile activities, and even tie issues of Guantanamo and US missiles in Turkey. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Releasp=5/?Q4j, 1676R001800010033-8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8 Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010033-8