CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: November 9, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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CONTROLLED DISSEM
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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATV
CASTRO' S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITI ES
IN LATIN AMERICA
NOTE: This is an advance copy cf th = estimate as approved by ti s (-
United States Intelligence Board. The printed text will be circuiatt-d
within five days of this issuance.
Central Intelligence Agency
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The following tei'ltcia r +:~> oryar r,; a rt`i r oarticipatea in the
preparation of is esihnute: The C'c t~.?rcrl ntelligence Agency
and the intelh nee or i,trrizatrona t)f a e f}etportme is of
State, Defense, lie Ar ,n : , the 1 'auij, he it Force, and A SA.
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UNITCI Sr1 ` i I':h;> INTEL .I , e CE BOAT .
o)n 9 Novemba .I9 2. C2oncurYbE,
Intelligence an A`cseaych, Deptuir trrj
tor, Defense Ir, Iliyer ca. ,1 4/envy; the
for Intelligence fie/are r tr ien/ of the .~1 ~,~xrt
of Naval Open ions lr, a r ^llic~nce,i L'
the Assistant ( pi f rya ~ , if, Intelli rencc,
for Inlelligencc Joint Siaft,? the 4s,si
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Security Agen 1. The I torrric. I;'nertq,
sentative to l i `411 , abstained. I'lie
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
9 November 1962
SUBJECT: SNIE 85-4-62: CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES
IN LATIN AMERICA
To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet
help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America
after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal
of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commit-
ment not to invade.
NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw cap-
abilities, taking note of, but not working out in de-
tail, US and Latin American capabilities for counter-
action.
A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails through-
out much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities
GROUP 1
S-E-C-R E T Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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and historic circumstance; it is not the creation of Castro and
the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this
situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced
significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba
as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date
than other subversive activities. Catro's influence in Latin
America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was
further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet
strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the
Soviet decision to withdraw them.
B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR
whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US
committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro
with a new immunity and a greater freedom for subversive action:
throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential i?;
realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward
Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin Amerii--an
governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There
are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communi:;t
subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro
in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to
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his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the
missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's vubversive activities
will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractive-
ness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American govern-
ments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will prob-
ably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to in-
vade Cuba.
C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would
be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba:
(1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic
and military support ranging from present up to substantially in-
creased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably re-
duce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are un-
likely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would man-
tain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present
levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake
amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in
targets.
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1. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES FORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS`
1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has
sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for
others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces through-
out Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions
in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had
the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.
2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in
Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in
Nicaragua.. Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of
these n= successful and he turned to other means.
3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal
instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main tran?--
missions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a
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great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs
devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen
selected countries.* A major effort has been made through Prensa
Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist
propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into
most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and
personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from
indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for
Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda out-
lets.
4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba;
about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many
hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla
warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel be-
tween Latin America and the Bloc.
5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary
groups in a number of countries, although the cases on which we have
reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipment. have
also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to quantities
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican
Republic.
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shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions.
believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America
directed from Havana.
6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist
groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been
Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal
or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident.
Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionarieE,
e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored
new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, crud
Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up
of Communist and moderate leftists.
Evaluation
7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba
to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our atten-
tion are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, tk:e
effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along
with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influ-
ence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly
strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations
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subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in s
number of Latin American countries -- notably Venezuela, Brazil,
British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers
arise from political and social tensions which existed long before
Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but
with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow
up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism sur-
vives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.
8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad
appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist assccr-
tiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advan-
tage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important
American
influence in the Latin/situation than Castro's other subversive ac-
tivities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a force to be
reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries.
Certain governments felt obliged to move in the direction of neu-
tralist and leftist positions. This influence waned, however, after
Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless.
the appeal of Castro's movement continued to be a source of major
concern to almost all governments and seriously restricted their
willingness to associate themselves, at least publicly, with the US.
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II. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POrI'ENTIAL IN THE AFTER ATEI OF AN AGREEMENT
UNDER WFICHr TILE SOV'..E'"S WOULD W ` DRMoJ T}IR STRATEGIC MISSILES
AM) THE US GIVE ASSURANCES TUPIT IT WOTJU) NOT INVADE CUBA
9. Castro's subversive capabilities -- and his disposition
to use them -- will be enhanced by the sense of security provided
by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the
withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if re-
tained, and other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be im-
portant in this regard. A US commitment not to invade Cuba will
further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost
certainly encourage him to intensify subversive activities in other
Latin American countries.
Response of Castro Su-.porters to Missile Base Crisis
10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with fell
though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in
Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with
effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrCtions.
Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in
judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American
governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, in-
cluding deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects,
a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely.
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There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist
followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in
response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the
anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide
guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judg-
ment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on
the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolu-
tionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base
crisis, is limited.
Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future
11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, con-
siderably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a
Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets
to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has
alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, ani
even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. $an
Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and
an author of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican of-
ficials have publicly expressed their disenchantment.
12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only im-
portant force on which Castro can now count, but even their support
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has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the
question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American
Communist parties.
Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity
13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of
arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stares of arms
inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces
and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has
apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive
purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his
disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubans air-
lines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circum-
stances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive
purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has
many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms. The
6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 p-6 motor torpedo boats, and 12 Komar
missile boats obtained from the Bloc could also be used for arms
deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers
-- both Cuban and Soviet -- could be used for arms deliveries. If
Soviet submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports,
they, too, could be used in support of subversive activities. We
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see no evidence that Cuba has or is developing a sophisticated
amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of
arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary mea-
sures by Latin American military and naval forces,.
]A. P_ opaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine re-
mains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions
are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the
past, both because of new precautions by local governments and be-
cause of a reduction in the cumbers of cooperative volunteers out-
side the organized Communist groups.
15. Money and equipment. Despite differences between Castro
and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we be-
lieve that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money,
supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have
certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intel-
ligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.
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16. Organization. The organization of Castro's subversive
assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to
be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make
a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will con-
tinue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus,
both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran
officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activ-
ity such as Mexico City and Montevideo.
Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend
17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement
stated in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked
before the missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have
most of the arms and equipment which were delivered in the post-
July buildup, as well as enhanced capabilities provided by acceler-
ated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same,
or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for
resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow
Castro than they had before the crisis -- almost certainly not more.
Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and eco-
nomic problems, there is no reason to believe that anti-Castro
activities are any more likely to jeopardize his position than they
did before the crisis.
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18. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage in subver-
sive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength
and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and
economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive
effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and
strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and
re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in
Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to de-
pend even more upon those of the Soviets.
19. Alternative Soviet policies. There are several cour3es
of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to
consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic
and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the
plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe,
however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet
center in Latin America is still too high to abandon. The stake in
Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did
make a decision to withdraw support either from Castro or from Cubti,
we believe that Cuban capability for subversion in Latin America
would be greatly reduced, at least for a time. This capability
would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets' withdrawing sup-
port from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone.
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20. An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue
to extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could
range all the way from the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its
present condition, including support of the expanded military estab-
lisbment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably
reduce considerably Castro's internal problems and thus give him
additional freedom to engage in external subversion and sabotage.
Additions to Castro's stocks of small arms would not in themselves
change his capability for subversive activity, as he already has
supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide
substantial additional air and sealift capability, the Cubans
would be able to mount large scale subversive interventions in
neighboring countries. Furthermore, whatever degree of success is
achieved in improving Cuba's position and in expanding its physical
resources, Cuba's met capability for subversion and sabotage will
in the last analysis largely be determined by the overall situation
in Latin America.
21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet fore-
see what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long, tern
on their relationship. The crisis has probably created difficulties}
of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can
readily solve, however determined they mzy be to do so. Castro may
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have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of
the Soviets to consider modifying his relationship with them and
seeking to improve his relations with the OAS and possibly even the
US. This would be most likely if the Soviets chose to pursue course
one or two above. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find
feasible ways of reducing his dependence upon them. The Soviets
certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising
control over Castro. Furthermore, his repeated assertions of con-
tinued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism make it unlikely that he is
seriously contemplating a restoration of relations with the Qt-S, or
that he could succeed if he tried.
22. Policy of other American nations. Castro's subversive cco-
abilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions
of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe
that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since
22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are
unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sen-
timents. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for
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countersubversive action by Latin American States, on their own and
in conjunction with the US, are improved. Many responsible Latin
Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that fire-
and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from
Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be les4 will-ire
to take coordinated action against Communist inroads if the US comm'-ts
itself not to invade Cuba.
Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage.
23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and
other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the
complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are,
he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them.
Some of the more obvious targets are:
a. US missions and personnel. US missions and personnel
all over Latin America were designated as targets for attack in the
various calls for action which went out during the recent crisis.
Action against such targets has a primarily political and propt,6anda
value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US
policy. It is also relatively easy for Castro to promcte attacks
against official US installations in a crisis situation and to ;et
help from all the various elements which are opposed to American
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influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situa-
tions in which Castro feels that public resentment of US polic:
exists or can be stirred up.
b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage
effort. Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and
business installations in which there is a large proportion of US
capital, which are otherwise associated with the US, or which are
so important to the local economy that damage to them would create
difficulties for governments which are anti-Castro and cooperating
with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and
water pipelines to the refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and
similar facilities are likely to be chosen as targets for Cuban
sabotage. Installations for the handling of Venezuelan iron ore
are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be
attacked.
c. Port and communications facilities are generally vul-
nerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other
Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are coop-
erating with the US and whose communications media are taking an
anti-Castro line. Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facili-
ties, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and
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transformer stations, are potential targets. Selection of targets
for sabotage will depend on the importance of particular facilities
but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to
them.
d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation. Po-
litical instability throughout Latin America, in elmo_t every case
characterized by pressures from below upon relatively conservative
and generally anti-Communist government, provide Castro with op-
portunities for subversive political activity. Particularly un-
stable situations include the following:
(1)
Venezuela, where Communist-inspired disorders
have been kept in check by the government, but
where continued Communist and leftist violence
may lead the military to take control. In a
country such as Venezuela, where the stability
of an anti-Castro and anti-Communist government
depends heavily upon one man, assassination is
another danger.
(2) Nicaragua, where Communist-led groups, in antic-
pation of coming elections, may seek to incite or
exploit violence against the Somoza regLme.
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(3) Guatemala, where President Ydigoras' position
(i+) The Dominican Republic, where the problems of
political reconstruction after a generatijn of
dictatorship have proved almost more than the
caretaker government can handle, and where some
political groupings amenable to Castro's influ-
ence are seeking to gain a footing.
(5) Bolivia., where the struggle for dominance within
the ruling NW Party between the moderates and
those on the far left is ready made for e:cploi-
ta.tion by Castro.
(6) Brazil., where Communists have penetrated the
government and military to some limited ei:tent,
the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is
strong, and depressed socio-economic conditions
and inefficient government administration pro-
vide Castro many opportunities, especially in the
northeast.
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