THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 19, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For Release 2004/03/18 :
SEI
,QP80B01676R00180P 0 7
Mf
SPECIAL
NATI(,~ NAB., INTELLI EI (l," E ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85--,,3--t:,2
(Supp'emenis N E 85 ?2-62)
The Military Buid
p in tuba
Submitted by the
)IRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN ~I"ELLIGENCE
t#r a
Concurred in by
NITED STATES INTELLK EI"CE BOARD
As indicated oven l
19 SEPTEMBER P ^';,P2
SECRET 411
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03S ,FtA-RDP80BO1676RO01800050003-7
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Del art-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Aqency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Director of the National Security Agency
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the subject beng
outside of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibite?J.
(BROUP t
c.xdudocl from aut,matiA
downgrading and
declassifieatiar
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-3-62
The Military Buildup in Cuba
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
T POLICY IN CUBA .
II. THE BUILDUP TO DATE .
3
Implications of the Current Buildup . . . . . . . ?
6
III. POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION OF THE BUILDUP . .
6
Use of Cuba as a Soviet Strategic Missile Base . . . . . . .
8
IV. LATIN AMERICAN REACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS . . .
9
Page
1. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING SOVIE
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
THE MILITARY
BUILDUP IN CUBA
THE PROBLEM
To assess the strategic and political significance of the
recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future
development of additional military capabilities there.
CONCLUSIONS
A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba
primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it,
and consequently that the main purpose of the present mili-?
tary buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime
there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to
be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or an-
other to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter
any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabili-
ties and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the
same time, they evidently recognize that the development of
an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military
intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. (Paras.
1-11)
B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet;
deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal
defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is
that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 Septem-
ber, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continua-
tion of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discour-
agement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat,
inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that,
the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home.
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting
revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18-21)
C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted
to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defen-
sive in purpose, but of a more "offensive" character: e.g.,
light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-
range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to
provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on
the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced
without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22-28)
D. The USSR could derive considerable military advan-
tage from the establishment of Soviet medium and inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the estab-
lishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these
two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the
more likely. Either development, however, would be in-
compatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy
as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater
willingnesa.,to in_ereaser the level of risk in Us-Soviet relations
than the US?.. ha-s displayed thus far, and... consequently
would have importantolicy__cations with respect to
otther^areas and: gtl~e ,---pr le y. in _East-West relations.
(Paras. 29-33)
E. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence
of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to
the technical implications of the military buildup. Many
Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intru-
sion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one
to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We esti-
mate the chances are better now than they were at Punta
del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority
for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action
aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was
establishing an "offensive" base in Cuba, most Latin Ameri-
can governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by
whatever means were necessary, but many of them would
still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras. 34-37)
2 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
DISCUSSION
1. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING SOVIET
POLICY IN CUBA
1. We believe that the USSR values its pcsi-
tion in Cuba primarily for the political ad-
vantages to be derived from it, and that the
main purpose of the present military buildup
in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist re-
gime there against what the Cubans and the
Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US
may attempt by one means or another to over-
throw it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter
any such attempt by enhancing Castro's de-
fensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet
military retaliation. At the same time, they
evidently recognize that the development of
an offensive military base in Cuba might pro-
voke US military intervention and thus de-
feat their present purpose.
2. The Soviets consider that the Cuban
Revolution and their association with it have
severely damaged the prestige of the US and
greatly enhanced that of the USSR, through-
out the world. They see in the case of Cuba
an effective demonstration that, anywhere
in the world, a "colonial" people can throw
off the "imperialist yoke" and, with the in-
dispensable aid and protection of the USSR,
successfully maintain its independence against
"imperialist" counteraction. They especially
value the effect of this demonstration in Latin
America and also value Cuba as an advanced
base for the support of radical revolutionary
elements in Latin America.
3. Although initially the Soviets were
guarded in their relations with the Castro
regime, in the past year both they and Castro
have undertaken moves which make their ties
much closer. Thus Moscow's commitment to
the survival and success of the Cuban Revolu-
tion is deepening. The Soviets have appar-
ently concluded that they must invest more
heavily to protect their stake in Cuba.
4. Because of heightening Soviet cos ncern
over the state of the Cuban economy, Mcscow
last spring agreed substantially to expand
and liberalize its economic assistance program
to Cuba. Indeed, Soviet economic aid to Cuba
now involves an extensive program planned
to sustain and gradually to develop the econ-
omy. The Soviets have thus clearly demon-
strated their belief that Cub; , wide ; oviet
support, can achieve sufficient progre,s to
serve as a stimulus for revolutionaries else-
where in Latin America.
5. During roughly the same period (last
spring), the Soviets also apparently concluded
that the Castro regime would have to be pro-
vided with accelerated military aid. Castro
almost certainly had long demanded a mnuch
more substantial Soviet program. More im-
portant, however, we believe the decision re-
flected Soviet concern that its _,xpandin;,, role
in Cuba might be terminated by a JS move
to overthrow the Castro regime. The rapid
military buildup in Cuba was thus int(nded
in large part to impress the US with the in-
creased costs and risks of any attems)t to
overthrow the Cuban regime by form.
6. In line with this objective, the soviet
statement of 11 September was in part de-
signed to dissuade the US from making any
decision to intervene in Cuba. By str(ssing
the "defensive" nature of the Cuban buildup,
it sought to convince the US < and the world
at large) that the military buildup in Cuba
does not constitute a threat. At the same
time, however, by raising the spectre of gen-
eral war, it stressed the gravity of the risks
involved in US intervention. The statement
as a whole is probably a substitute for the
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
guarantees which the Castro regime almost
certainly has demanded. While it carefully
avoids an explicit commitment to defend Cuba
in the event of US attack, it does further en-
gage Soviet prestige to ensuring the survival
of the Castro regime.
7. The absence of such an explicit commit-
ment reflects the Soviets' basic disinclination
to hazard their own safety for the sake of
Cuba. They are willing, indeed anxious, to
deflate US prestige and power in Latin Amer-
ican opinion and to provide the Cubans with
the economic instruments of survival and
progress, but they remain wary of provoking
the US-or of allowing Castro to provoke the
US--by going too far and too fast with a mili-
tary buildup. In their 11 September state-
ment they sought to undercut speculation
about Soviet missile bases in Cuba for possible
use against the US by, inter alia, stressing
the defensive nature of armaments supplied
Cuba and by denying any military need for
such bases in view of their capability to at-
tack the US from their own territory.
8. While Soviet policies in Cuba may have
initially been devised almost entirely in terms
of Cuba and Latin America, Moscow now also
views the situation in terms of the broader
East-West struggle. They relish the demon-
stration that Soviet power can be extended to
an area adjacent to the US, and are using the
strong US reaction to justify their own resent-
ment of the "offensive" US bases on the Soviet
periphery. Further, in their 11 September
statement, the Soviets implied that US action
against Cuba would be countered by Bloc
moves elsewhere in the world and for the
first time publicly linked the Berlin and Cuban
crises. The Soviets are also aware that a
drastic heightening of tension over Cuba is
an important factor in their general relations
with the US and has an impact on various
other issues. Thus developments in the
Cuban situation probably influenced the re-
cent Soviet decision to let the Berlin situation
simmer, rather than boil, for the time being.
9. The current Soviet buildup marks a
dramatic change of pace in Soviet operations,
probably occasioned by a reappraisal of poli-
cies and increased determination to insure
the survival of the Castro regime. However,
we believe that the military buildup which
began in July does not reflect a radically new
Soviet policy toward Cuba, either in terms of
military commitments or of the role of Cuba
in overall Soviet strategy. Without changing
the essentially defensive character of the mili-
tary buildup in Cuba and without making an
open pledge to protect Cuba under all cir-
cumstances, the Soviets have enhanced Cuban
military capabilities, repeated in stronger
terms their warnings to the US, and tied the
Cuban situation to the general question of the
East-West confrontation.
10. The Soviets themselves are probably still
uncertain about their future military program
for Cuba. Indeed, they probably intend to
test US and Latin American reactions as they
proceed. At the same time they are obliged
to tailor their policy to minimize risks of con-
frontation with the US, avoid friction with
Castro, and maintain the best possible propa-
ganda stance in the eyes of Latin America and
the world in general.
11. The analysis of Soviet policy toward
Cuba given here is based on an overall evalua-
tion of Soviet interests and intentions and on
evidence of Soviet actions in and with respect
to Cuba to date. While it is our judgment
that, even in the light of recent developments,
Soviet policy remains fundamentally unal-
tered, we cannot exclude the possibility that
Moscow is at least considering a change in
this policy. Consequently, in the sections
which follow, we examine in some detail not
only the Soviet military buildup in Cuba to
date and possible developments in that buildup
which might follow, but also the nature and
implications of military assistance which the
4 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
Soviets could provide Cuba in the event of a
major change of policy.
II. THE BUILDUP TO DATE
12. In the first phase of the provision of
military supplies, from 1960 to early 1962, the
Soviets concentrated on substantial amounts
of conventional combat weapons for the
ground forces. A number of Bloc technicians
were supplied and a training program for
Cuban military personnel was inaugurated.
The buildup proceeded at a deliberate pace
and eventually, after some training of Cuban
pilots, about 60 jet fighter aircraft were sup-
plied to Cuba. In addition, some submarine-
chasers and motor torpedo boats were de-
livered. This phase was largely completed by
February 1962 with the result that Cuban
forces were much better prepared to handle
incursions upon their territory.
13. In July the Soviets began a rapid effort
to strengthen Cuban defenses against air at-
tack and major seaborne invasion. Between
mid-July and early September some 70 ships
have delivered various types of military sup-
plies and construction equipment, and more
ships are en route. These new shipments
have consisted in part of further deliveries
of types of weapons already available to
Cuban forces. More tanks, self-propelled
guns and other ground force equipment have
been supplied. But the bulk of the material
delivered is related to the establishment of
SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which
will form the basis for a new air defense
system.
14. Thus far, 12 SA-2 SAM sites have been
installed in the western half of the island.
It is likely that similar coverage will be pro-
vided in the eastern half. Some missile sites
could now be operational. The Soviets are
also providing a number of more advanced
jet interceptors; about a dozen MIG-21's may
have been delivered. The standard arma-
ment for this type of aircraft includes two
infrared homing air-to-air missiles (AAMs) .
It is likely that such missiles have accom-
panied the MIG-21's to Cuba.
15. The current buildup also reflects an
effort to improve Cuba's coastal defenses.
For this purpose, the Soviets have provided
the "Komar" class guided-missile patrol boats
which carry two short-range (10-1b n.m.)
cruise-type missiles, primarily for use against
shipping. This boat has a range, of aboui 650
n.m., but is designed primarily for use in
coastal waters. Eight "Komar" class boats
have already been delivered and other similar
craft may be on the way. In addition, a land-
based cruise-type missile installation has 'jeen
observed near Banes. Our evidence does not
establish all the characteristics of the missile
system employed, but its range is likely to be
limited to 20-35 n.m. by its radar tior zon.
This range might be extended by installing
the radar on a height, or by employing :.hips
or aircraft for forward observation. We be-
lieve that this will prove to be a coast del erase
installation and that others of this type will
be deployed, but we cannot estimate at present
the ultimate size of this prog-'am.
16. Equally important, particularly in terms
of overall Soviet involvement, is the substan-
tial increase in the number of Soviet military
specialists in Cuba, from about 350 early this
year to the current level of about 4,000. We
anticipate that a large proportion of this
group will remain in Cuba for some .ime.
Six months to a year would be required before
the SA-2 and other sites could be ape ated
solely by Cuban personnel.
17. Because of the extent and rapidi?;y of
current deliveries and limitations in our in-
telligence coverage, we cannot yet identi `y all
of the new equipment which has been intro-
duced. Recent shipments include a great
deal of electronic gear, with ma-ty vans, c?ates,
and large boxes which could contain various
types of this equipment. There is tenuous
evidence of the presence of air defense ECM
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
and ELI NT equipment is also SAMs could release some fighter aircraft for
equipment. Although we have no specific evi- siles can be employed against well-defined
deuce of it, we cannot exclude the possibility land targets. Indirectly, the presence of
that COMINT
now present in Cuba.
Implications of the Current Buildup
18. In terms of their military significance,
the current Soviet deliveries are substantially
improving capabilities in Cuba for air and
coastal defense and defensive surface naval
operations. When operational, the SAMs
will assure that interception can be attempted
under any weather condition, at altitudes up
to 60,000 feet, with more limited effectiveness
up to 80,000 feet. The system is probably not
effective below about 3,000 feet. The MIG-21
has generally better performance characteris-
tic,,--, the earlier MIG models, and will
considerably augment defenses against air-
craft flying at medium and high altitudes.'
19. The large number of Soviet military
personnel in Cuba will provide the technical
assistance and training necessary to bring the
newer weapons to operational readiness in the
near future. If necessary, Soviet personnel
could be employed to operate them before
Cuban personnel are fully prepared to do so.
It is likely that training and experience have
already raised the proficiency of Cuban Air
Force personnel somewhat above the low level
noted in NIE 85-2-62, "The Situation and
Prospects in Cuba," dated 1 August 1962
(paragraph 24). Soviet guidance and train-
ing will continue to raise the combat effective-
ness of all branches of the Cuban military
establishment.
20. Some of the new weapons in Cuba could
be used for offensive as well as defensive pur-
poses. MIG fighters can be equipped for
ground attack operations and antiship mis-
I'or a more detailed description of the perform-
ance characteristics of these weapon systems, see
the forthcoming NIE 11-3-62, "Soviet Bloc Air and
Missile Defense Capabilities through Mid-1967,"
scheduled for USIB consideration 26 September.
ground attack missions. Nevertheless, the
pattern of Soviet military aid to date appears
clearly designed to strengthen the defenses of
the island, thereby protecting the Communist
political beachhead in the Western Hemi-
sphere and raising the price the US would
have to pay to eliminate it by military action.
The overall composition of the Cuban mili-
tary establishment remains essentially defen-
sive in character; it has not yet been provided
with a significant strike capability. More-
over, the Cuban armed forces still lack the
air and sealift necessary for military opera-
tions on any significant scale in neighboring
territories.
21. Limited as the offensive capabilities of
the forces in Cuba are, an increased sense of
security instilled by Soviet public statements
and by the presence of new weapons may en-
courage the Cuban regime to engage in small
scale filibustering expeditions. It might also
encourage them to make new demands on the
US regarding the naval base at Guantanamo
and to engage in a program of harassment of
the base.
III. POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION OF THE
BUILDUP
22. The Soviets could expand the present
buildup to include additional types of weap-
ons. However, they are well aware that the
question of offensive as opposed to defensive
weapons in Cuba has become a major political
issue. Their recent statement indicates that
they believe a strong political case can be
sustained for supplying "defensive" weapons
in Cuba. Conversely they seem to realize that
to provide certain other types of weapons to
Cuba would pose a challenge to which the US
might forcefully respond.
23. Among the weapons which the Soviets
might believe they could add to the Cuban
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
arsenal without creating the appearance of
an open defiance of US warnings on offensive
weapons, are a low altitude SAM defense sys-
tem and jet interceptors more advanced than
the MIG-21's. However, both of these are be-
lieved to be in short supply within the USSR
itself, where they are in the early stages of
deployment. Moreover, the military potential
of these weapons can be fully realized only in
conjunction with the USSR's closely inte-
grated system of air defense warning, com-
munications, and control.
24. Apart from such examples, however, the
distinction between defensive and offensive
weapons is ambiguous. The Soviets might
consider supplying BEAGLE (IL-28) light
bombers, for example, which they have already
provided to several non-Bloc states. These
aircraft can be represented by the Soviets
as "defensive" weapons, particularly if present
only in small numbers. On the other hand,
the IL-28 could reach targets in the south-
eastern part of the US and could carry nuclear
weapons. If these aircraft appeared in Cuba,
the US would have to decide whether or not
they were to be taken as representing a serious
"offensive" capability. On the whole we be-
lieve the Soviets might calculate that a modest
number of IL-28's could be supplied to Cuba
without serious risk of US counteraction.
25. BADGER (TU-16) medium bombers
might also be supplied to Cuba, ostensibly for
such "defensive" uses as armed reconnaissance
against invasion shipping, but the offensive
capabilities of these aircraft are considerably
more obvious than in the case of IL-28's. We
believe the Soviets would not supply them
to Cuba.
26. It is possible that the Soviets would con-
sider placing other short-range surface-to-
surface missiles (SSMs) in Cuba. The SS--1,
a ballistic missile with a range of 150 n.m.,
would not threaten US territory other than
Key West,' but the 350 n.m. range of the
SS-2 ballistic missile would extend to Cape
Canaveral. The Soviets also have a 350 n.m.
cruise-type missile available. These weapons
could employ conventional or nuclear war-
heads. It is possible that the Soviets would
believe that some SS-2's would be tolerated by
the US. On the other hand, any real military
usefulness they might have to the Cuban de-
fense establishment would be narginal, and
the Soviets could not exclude that the US
would react very strongly to their presence.
27. Another possibility is the provision of
submarines and destroyers. We believe this
may eventually be done. Some conventional
submarines have already been supplied to
non-Bloc countries, but the Soviets certcinly
realize that such action in Cuba could be
interpreted by the US as violating their stated
intention of limiting supplies to defensive pur-
poses. However, the level of Soviet naval up-
ply to Cuba will probably remain relatively
high in coming months. Soviet merchant
ships and trawlers will continue their frequent
calls. The Soviets could test the US reaction
to visits by Soviet naval ships to Cuban ports.
Depending on US reactions over a period of
time, the Soviets might then consider whe-her
to turn over some destroyers and submarines
to Cuba.
28. Thus the Soviets may experiment with
a number of further steps in the military
buildup. They may feel that some of these
are necessary, if only to demonstrate t ieir
continuing support to Castro and refusal to
be deterred by the US. The SA-2 defense sys-
tem will provide a new degree of protection
and secrecy for masking additional supplies.
But the Soviets would be proceeding over un-
certain ground and could not be sure of US
knowledge of or reaction to each new move,
or that the gains of each further step would
be commensurate with the risks. They would
also have to consider that Bloc personnel
would be required to operate many of the addi-
tional weapons. Thus a decision to pro- vide
such weapons as bombers, submarines, or ad-
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
SECRET
ditional types of short-range missiles depends
greatly on whether the Soviets estimate that
these weapons can be introduced without
precipitating a US intervention. They will
realize that the nature of the US reaction will
depend not only on types and numbers of
weapons, but also on the offensive capability
of the total military establishment in Cuba.
Use of Cuba as a Soviet Strategic Missile Base
29. The establishment on Cuban soil of So-
viet nuclear striking forces which could be
used against the US would be incompatible
with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.
It would indicate a far greater willingness to
increase the level of risk in US-Soviet rela-
tions than the USSR has displayed thus far,
and this would have important policy implica-
tions in other areas. However, Soviet military
planners have almost certainly considered the
contribution which Cuban bases might make
to the Soviet strategic posture and, in that
connection, the feasibility and utility of de-
ploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba.
Therefore this contingency must be examined
carefully, even though it would run counter
to current Soviet policy.
30. Soviet planners might see some utility
in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in
order to supplement the limited number of
ICBMs now believed to be operational in the
USSR and to reach targets beyond the range
of submarine-launched missiles. Cuban-
based MRBMs with a range of 1,100 n.m. could
reach targets as far north as Philadelphia and
Cleveland and as far west as Oklahoma City;
the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could reach all US tar-
gets except some points in the Pacific North-
west. All of these targets can now be covered
by ICBMs launched from the USSR. How-
ever, MRBMs or IRBMs deployed in Cuba
would permit nuclear blows at an increased
number of targets and would increase the total
weight of the attack which could be delivered
a;'ainst the US in the event of general war.
31. The establishment on Cuban soil of a
significant strike capability with such weap-
ons would represent a sharp departure from
Soviet practice, since such weapons have so
far not been installed even in Satellite terri-
tory. Serious problems of command and con-
trol would arise. There would also have to
be a conspicuously larger number of Soviet
personnel in Cuba, which, at least initially,
would be a political liability in Latin America. k
The Soviets might think that the political ef-
feet of defying the US by stationing Soviet;
nuclear striking power in so menacing a posi-
tion would be worth a good deal if they could
get away with it. However, they would almost
certainly estimate that this could not be done
without provoking a dangerous US reaction.
32. A Soviet submarine base in Cuba could
be of considerable military value to the USSR.
Submarines operating from a Cuban base
could be maintained on station off the US
coast for much longer periods than can now
be sustained in operations from Northern
Fleet bases. Such a forward base would per-
mit Soviet missile and torpedo attack sub-
marines, both conventional and nuclear-
powered, more readily to conduct routine
patrols off the US coast. It is possible that
the Soviets might seek to establish such a
base in connection with the provision of some
submarines to the Cubans. They might
reason that even when Soviet use became ap-
parent, the US, with naval bases at Holy Loch
and Guantanamo, would be in a poor position
to protest. In terms of both feasibility and
utility, the establishment of a Soviet sub-
marine base appears more likely than the de-
ployment of Soviet nuclear-armed missile
forces to Cuban soil. Even so, the Soviets
would probably calculate the risk of US inter-
vention as too great for such an undertaking
at the present time.
33. Although the Soviets may see some mil-
itary advantages in Cuba as a strategic strike
base, the risks would be great and the political
8 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
implications would run counter to the kind
of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin
America. They do not propose to win the
region for communism by military conquest.
They count instead on a process of political
action which will build a mass following for
Communist or Communist-allied leaders who
would then be capable of replacing existing
governments.
IV. LATIN AMERICAN REACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
34. Much of the Latin American public will
react to the military buildup in Cuba and to
evidences of Soviet intent to protect Castro
without taking account of the particular
weapons involved or of their capabilities and
without reading between the lines of Soviet
statements. Most of these Latin Americans
will consider this intrusion of an extra-
continental power to be a bad thing in itself,
but at the same time will regard the problem
as one to be met by the US and not their re-
sponsibility. Any disposition on the part of
the Latin American governments to do some-
thing about it would depend greatly upon the
lead given by the US, and this disposition
would tend to fade if the US failed to come up
with feasible courses of action. Some Latin
Americans, of course, will be quick to note
that the Soviets had intruded into the Hemi-
sphere and will infer that the US had failed
to rebuff this intrusion because it lacked the
power or the will to do so.
35. In the Caribbean states there will be a
much more pronounced tendency than else-
where to interpret the military buildup in
Cuba as a direct threat. They are not timely
to expect that missiles will be fired at, them,
but that Soviet weapons and Soviet support
will encourage Castro to intervene in their
countries on behalf of radical revolutionists.
36. Among Latin American governments
there are wide differences of opinion as to the
role they as individual governments and as
members of the OAS should play in the cur-
rent situation. We estimate the chances are
better now than they were at Punta del Este
to obtain the two-thirds majority in the OAS
required for sanctions and oth, r steps snort
of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it
became clear that the Soviets were estab.tish-
ing an offensive base in Cuba most Latin Ainer-
ican governments would expect the US to in-
tervene and eliminate it, but many of them
would still seek to avoid direct involvement.
37. In the longer run, if the Castro regime
remains securely in power and the Cuban
economy is developed substantially with So-
viet help, the cohesion of the inter-American
system will probably weaken further. Sev-
eral countries would probably assume an "in-
dependent" position like that of Brazil. They
would thereby position themselves for a closer
accommodation with the Soviet Bloc, if and
when desired, and would attempt to obtain
assistance from both sides, in the manner of
India and Indonesia.
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
 Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800050003-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. ii
copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under r
jurisdiction on a need to know basis.. Additional essential disser4n4uriun in(
be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Se-cretarr
Defense
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the
the Department of the Army
d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Dep