INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP

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CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4
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RIPPUB
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T
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86
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December 19, 2016
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November 10, 2005
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5
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August 1, 1962
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 NSA, DIA reviews completed JCS review(s) completed. 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP August to mid-October 1962 DIA, JCS and NSA review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 roved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 20 November 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Handling of Intelligence Information During the Cuban Arms Build-up 1. On 5 November 1962, you asked me to investigate the input of raw information during the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba with particular reference to reporting that suggested installation of weapons of offensive capability. My report of investigation was submitted on 12 November 1962. 2. You asked that certain points be clarified or expanded and that certain additional information be included. A copy of the report of investigation (revised) is attached. 3. Also attached is a list of the questions you asked and the comments you made regarding the original report of invest'- gation. These questions and comments are numbered consecutively on the list. The numbered tags that are clipped to various of the pages of the revised report correspond to the numbered questions and comments on the list. Instctor General cc: DDCI Executive Director I Copy 1 of k 25X1 25X1 Approved For R 51 2M!8/0I3/17 : CIA-RDP801301676R001800060~05-4 25X1 STAT Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 Director's Comments Regarding the IG Report of 12 November 1. The original report listed a ban on publication of intell_genev on offensive weapons in Cuba without express permission o the President. DCI COMMENT: What ban? 2. This section of the original report dealt with an order by the Director in mid-August to make sure that reports were checked with NPIC. DCI COMMENT: This sounds like an excuse. What DCI order actual, probable, or possible MRBM's f.:'om c. Did CIA have anything in hand which might have caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRBM mi;sile:: were there? 25X1 Approved ForW4e5964M /03/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R001800 60005-4 25X1 STAT Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 25X1 5. The last sentence in our original report read: 25X1 I Ichief of the Current Support staff Of ulun, no-es a was most effectively blocked in attempts to impu-,e some significance to the arms deliveries. DCI COMMENT: By whom? What is CI procedure of coo.?dina-,Aa A 6. These paragraphs of our original report concerned the res-rict'-:)n; on the September overflights. DCI COMMENT: a. Why was the original flight plan of September proposed? b. Did NRO participate? 7. Our original report listed the missions flown d. I think our right to publish in the pretty well extinguishes th:s point. not believe we were seriou:;ly hurt nor any conviction re MRBM's sup.-Dress(-3 because of this. c. Was any consideration given to flying over known SAM sites to find out wha-_ the,, were protecting? d. Was any consideration given to DC_ September 7 request for "frequent coverage"? DCI COMMENT: But say what kind of missiles. 8. Our original report said: series of Clandestine Services reports, in addition to a selected DD/P distribution, went to standard addressees o-itsid of the Clandestine Services." DCI COMMENT: How many? Approved For RS as 3/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R0018000 0005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 25X1 9. This paragraph of our original report read in part: "The distribution of is typical of that made of reports in the series. That message distributed on 2 October, reported the observation on f MA, S 25X1 being unloaded at the port of Mariel." DCI COMt?NT: "SSM's" underlined. Marginal note: This not clear. 10. Our original paragraph begins: "Taking as an example the message whose distribution is discussed above, this is the sequence of processing between date of observation and date of receipt by the user." DCI COMMENT: What did this contain? 11. This paragraph in our original report concerned the I DCI COMMENT: Question mark in the margin alongside the paragraph. 12. Our original paragraph read in part: "But at the time ME E 85-3-62 was under discussion there were as yet no valid report:. of an offensive build-up." DCI COMMENT: ". . no valid reports of an offensive build-up" is underlined. Question ma:?k in the margin. 13. The first sentence of our paragraph read: "Mr. Sheldon sw_ressed the lack of credibility in Clandestine Services reporting." DCI COMMENT: "Clandestine" is underlined. Marginal note: "or refugee?" 14. Our original paragraph read: "However, we do think that -he publishing ban had the effect of prolonging this skepticio;m until the eleventh hour. If the ban had not existed an i71em on the possible presence of MRBM's in Cuba could have appeared in the CIB in the last days of September, providing it could have survived the coordination process, and it might have changed some people's minds." DCI COMMENT: Did this item appear in the 25X1 Approved For R gl ,a 02 tRff/ 3/17: CIA-RDP80BO1676R00180006 005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 15. Our original paragraph read in part: ". . there was little excuse for demeaning the validity of CIA. reporting indicating a shift to offensive weapons." DCI COMMENT: What such CIA reporting? 16. This section of the original report dealt with the preparing o SNIE 85-3-62. DCI COMMENT: Marginal note between paragraphs dealing with the situation as of 19 September when the USIB approved SNTE 85-3-62 and the first reports suggesting offensive missile activity: "DCI views on 85-3-62." 17. This section of the original report dealt with the views ,)f the Director of Central Intelligence. DCI COMMENT: Did you find any analytical effort as contrasted with philosophical conclusions? 18. You asked whether, once the SAM sites had been establishe.t, anvo-n sat down and asked why; for what purpose; were they given to tle Cubans just to keep the U-21s away? 19. This paragraph of the original report listed the Current Intelligence publications. DCI COMMENT: 20. This section of our original report dealt with "Restrictitns o._ Overflights." DCI COMMENT: Why and under what circumstances were CIA September flights--two over eastern ca,astat area--changed to four covering about the same area? 21. Our original Annex B listed abstracts from the CIB. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For ReleaseTQ$0"bffiffl CIA-RDP80B01676R00180006 005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 22. This section of our original report dealt with the 22 Aug_Lst Current Intelligence Memorandum summarizing recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba. DCI COMMENT: Suggest full wording of the report be incladei. 23. Our original paragraph dealt with a CIB draft concerning arrivi of MIG-21's. We said: "DIA refused either to coordinate it or to insert a footnote." DCI COMMENT: Why? 24-. Our original paragraph said: "But until 10 October CIA a -id DI,4 were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pie-yes of" information." DCI COMMENT: Examples. Chronology of differing reports. 25. You asked for the names of the ships in Mariel on 19 and 23 September. Were they missile carrying ships in light f information we now have? 26. You asked if there was any evidence that our analysts ran a computation on what the Soviet ships could have been carrying other than SAM equipment, and whether any thought or analysis was given to what other cargo the ships might have been carrying. I realize that this annex does not fully answer your quesL-ion, but it makes clear that our information on Soviet shipping was incomplete and that no precise analysis was possible. 27. You asked whether any thought was given to a quantitative estimate during the critical period based on the mass of ~?hipping which had been reported. This annex, again, reveals more than anything else the incompleteness of information available to us. Navy simply has been unable thus far to provide inforrma- tion on all Soviet shipping. -- 5 Approved For RRUM 28 / 3/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676RO018000 0005-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 HANDLING OF RAW INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP Page The NPIC Caution . . . . . . 2 The Publication Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Coordination Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Restrictions on Overflights . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The 22 August Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Increase in Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Missile Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 How the Reports Were Selected . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Distribution of Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Speed of Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Mistrust of Clandestine Services Reporting. . 28 Analyses and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Action Taken on the Views of the Director of Central Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Publishing the Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB . . . . . 38 25X1 25X1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 Handling of Raw Intelligence Information During Cuban Arms Build-up 1. This paper will discuss the movement and use of raw intelligence information during the intensive Soviet arms build-u)) in Cuba from mid-July to mid-October 1962, with particular emphasis on the period beginning in late August. Except during a few days at the end of the period when the I Iwas in force, the flow of intelligence reports was normal. They were delivered to all officers at all levels who needed them, both in CIA and else- where in the intelligence community. 2. However, there were certain limitations on the formal publication of this material in community-coordinated publications which may have diluted the impact of this information upon the community at large. These limitations were: a. A caution on publishing information about Soviet military preparations in Cuba before determining whether or not it was contrary to photographic evidence in the possession of NPIC. b. A ban beginning on 6 September on publication, ether than in the of intelligence on o:t ensi' nt id P th weapons in Cu Da w . e res e ou e ission of c. Difficulties in inter-agency coordination. d. Restrictions on reconnaissance overflights, as veil as delays caused by weather, which hindered verification: of information and delayed acquisition of additional informations 3. In a recent memorandum to the DCI, Mr. Richard Lehman ha, discussed in detail the broader aspects of CIA action during thi.; period. 25X1 Approved For ReeSKW3 17: CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060 05-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 ii. Beginning in May 1962, the analysts began the practice of checking out with NPIC any report that was susceptible to photo- graphic verification. The following, which we have confirmed, appears in Mr. Lehman's memorandum: "In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of formal reports (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba) in which the reports referred to NPIC were evaluated in the light, of photographic coverage. In the seven issues of this publication, published between 31 May and 5 October, NPI" examined 138 reports referred to it for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity which could not be directly linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated these three." 5. According to Mr. Walter Elder, in mid-August the Director briefed the President on the increasing volume of refugee and agent reports on the Soviet build-up in Cuba. The President directed that every effort be made to check out these continuing reports. The Director instructed the DD/I to check every available source, particularly including NPIC. This instruction from the Director was passed onward orally. 25X1 6. Chief, Middle America Branch, Latin America Division, OCI, is the "chief OCI analyst" on Cuba. E(31 was one of the ultimate recipients of the instruction and one of the persons required to take it into account. 0 received the instruction orally. He says that, however the instruction to use NPIC to check informant reporting was intended, he received it., or at least interpreted it, as an outright ban on publishing anything that could not be verified by NPIC--and that, in fact, nothing susceptible to photographic verification was published wh_,ah had not been verified. Although we can offer no written evidence in proof, we believe that this "instruction to check" became a "ban" through a combination of the following: a. Distortion of the Director's instruction as it passedi from mouth to mouth. 25X1 Approved For Re eSEM3 CIA-RDPUU8'UM6bR001 8000 0005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 b. The weight the Director's word carries within th_I Agency is such that the ultimate recipient of it "leans over ba:kwar:!." to comply. In this case, if the ultimate recipients received the instruction as it was originally worded, they read into it a meaning that was not intended at all. c. A procedure for checking reports with NPIC had been in effect since May. When the Director's instruction of mid-August reached the analysts, it is reasonable to assume that they concluded that the existing procedures were inadequate and tht.t a more positive and all-inclusive check was desired. 7. There is other evidence that the Director's instruction came to be considered a restriction. Mr. Lehman is a senior officer in OCI. His memorandum of 7 November on the arms build-up we we11. researched. A quotation from his memorandum is illustrative of the views he found in OCI at the time he conducted his research. "At some point, probably just after 27 September, a-. item on the subject (the arrival of SSM's) might have been witter for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written because the analytic level was under the injunction not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration." It should be noted that an item could have been written for the but none was. Further, when we first discussed this subject with Mr. Sheldon, he said that there had been an outright ban issued in mid-August on publishing anything that could not be verified by photography and that this ban had come from the President. Mr. Sheldon later came to realize that his earlier recollection was wrong, but it is probable that his first impression was a fairly accurate reflection of views widely held within the DD/I complex. 25X1 Approved For Ref ePIIMX3 17: CIA-RDP80BO1676R00180006 05-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 The Publication Ban 8. The ban on publication of intelligence on offensive weapons has the following history. 9. On 0 a U-2 flight confirmed establishment of a missile defense of western Cuba and found a missile site at Banes in Oriente Province. On 31 August the President ordered General Carter not to allow publication of this information pending clarification of U.S. policy. General Carter relayed this ord_er to the USIB. The information on the SAM, sites was released for publication on 5 September. In a memorandum to the DD/I, dated 6 September, the AD/SI reported that: "A preliminary analysis of the technical parameters of the facility indicate that the missile system present is a surface-to-surface cruise type system. . . . P.I. analyE;es of the additional photographic coverage should be available on 7 September. . . ." On 7 September the Director of NPIC and the Chief of the Offensive Systems Division of OSI jointly addressed a memorandum to the DD/I, It read, in part: "The Banes installation is assessed as a surface-to-- surface tactical missile site most likely for cruise-type missiles. The purpose of the system and the effective range of the missile cannot be conclusively determined from the available data. . . . It must be emphasized that, while we cannot definitely exclude the possibility of this missile installation being for offensive purposes, i.e., attack cu Guantanamo Naval Base or possibly the Florida mainland, we believe the evidence is much stronger for the coastal defense role." 25X1 The President was informed that the precise nature of the Banes installation had not been conclusively determined. He ordered General Carter to put a complete freeze on publication of informa- tion on the Banes site. A Current Intelligence Memorandum of 14 September, based on a full readout of the photography, 25X1 says: "We conclude that there is no longer any reason to doubt: that, the Banes site has a coastal defense mission." The information was released for publication. Approved For 6 03/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R0018000 0005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 10. Following his conversation with the President, General Carter received approval from Mr. McGeorge Bundy to allow anaLysta access to such information and provide the results of their analysis to policy-makers on a need-to-know basis. 11. The minutes of an executive session of USIB on 7 September imply a publication ban on all types of intelligence pertaining to offensive weapons in Cuba. There is, however, no explicit written record of the ban's imposition. The DD/I gave the AD/CI order's to this effect, on or about 6 September. The ban was further di.;cussed at an executive session of USIB on 13 September. 12. On 14 September the AD/CI issued the following instruction to certain members of his staff: 25X1 "This is to remind everyone that we are under a White House injunction not to print in any publication which goes outside CIA any intelligence bearing on Cuban offensive military weapons.. At the same time we are enjoined by the DD/I to insure that normal distribution is made of all material bearing on Cuban military capabilities so that analysis of this intelligence may continue, This -nra ~_tion need not apply to the but 25X1 it does apply to all other publications. Any material which might ordinarily be thought to be publishable on this for- bidden subject should be brought to the attention of the AD/CI or the DAD/CI." 13. This restriction, as was intended, resulted in a virtual blackout from intelligence publications of information on offEn-isive weapons. The only exception was publication of information or. the arrival of IL-28 bombers in Cuba. General Carter asked Mr. McGeorpf, Bundy for permission to publish. The request was refused. General Carter then referred the matter to the Director, pointing out that the information had already appeared in Department of Navy puhiiea- tions. The Director himself then called Mr. Bundy and got approval for publication. The information appeared in the CIB and in the Cuban Daily Summary on 11 October. 14. Certain observations are in order as to the probable effect of this publication ban. 25X1 Approved For P@ X6/43/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0018000$0005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800060005-4 15. No CIA reports on offensive weapons were withheld from dissemination. All received full dissemination within CIA and to all other components of the intelligence community. In the cave of Clandestine Services reports, this runs to some 200 copies. None of the reports found their way into intelligence publications because of the ban on publishing reports on offensive weapons. 25X1 16. This ban, of course, did not apply to 25X1 I but none appeared there either. We have compared items appearing in the with those appearing in the CIB and the Cuban Daily S ry . Nothing of any significance appears in the that does not appear in the other publications. None of them makes mention of the offensive build-up. 17. CIA did have reports in hand which might have caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRB1 missiles were being installed. There are eight reports that are quoted in the section on "The Missile Reporting." Four were disseminated between 20 and 23 September, inclusive. The other four were disseminated between 1 and 8 October, inclusive. Mr. Lehman noted in his memorandum that an item could have been written in late September had it not been for the publications ban. We asked Mr. Cline if an oral report had been given to the President. He told us that none had. 18. It can be argued that there were no restrictions on publishing in the Regardless of the original intent of the I we found substantial agreement within the M ,,/I complex that the as been used primarily to call to the attention of the President those particularly significant, solid items of intelligence appearing in the various intelligence publications for the day. The concept of it being a vehicle for passing to the President and a few other senior officials informa- tion not included in formal intelligence publications has larp:ely been lost. The evidence strongly suggests that the practice of orienting the II to solid information did hurt us in this situation. There were reports on the introduction of offensive weapons that were not suitable for use in normal Current Intelli- gence publications. This information pould have been included in the but it was not because the was too closely tied to other publications. 25X1 Approved For R aa( 8/ 3/17: CIA-RDP80B01676RO01800060 05-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 19. This is the evidence on which we base our conclusicans as to the effect of the publications ban: a. With respect to possible in-house CIA reports being withheld, we can report that we found nothing worts disseminating that was not disseminated. b. With respect to our conclusion that the 25X1 25X1 25X1 carried nothing on the offensive build-up, we have attached as annexes to this report extracts from the EI the CIB and the Cuban Daily We have chec e e three publications. Nothing on offensive weapons appears in arty of them. c. With respect to CIA having reports in hand upon which to base oral briefing of the President, we have ci.ed the specific reports and have quoted from them in the section on "The Missile Reporting." Copies of the actual report::. arcs in our hands. 25X1 Mr. Ray Cline, DD/I Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Assistant DD/I Assistant to the DD/I (Planning) Mr. E. J. m , AD7CI Mr. Richard Lehman, Special Assistant to the AD/CI Chief, Latin America Division, OC1 Chief, Middle America Branch, Latir. America Division Officer in Charge of getting out the u an Daily 25X1 Approved For 1e240 6 03/17: CIA-RDP80B01676R001800 60005-4 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 Coordination Problems 20. On 3 August CIA made its first attempt to place an item or 4- the buildu - p the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), noting an unusual number of suspected arms carriers enroute to Cuba. Both NSA and DLA nh ier+te t th e o 25X1 finally coordinated '1ne item, as ., appeared on August, but it was watered do~,nn in the s - significance to the arms deliveries. It should besnoted that, over the years the concept of the CIB being a fully coordinated ar.,d a ?E,e( upon publication has developed. In the past, higher authority wouLC_ not tolerate "split" items presenting differing views. The pcocer,ur(- for coordinating items for the CIB is outlined in the sectior entitled "The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB." vciW7 1.u tuguu u. I CIA chief of the Current Support Staff of ORR, notes that was most effectively blocked by DIA in att t t 25X1 It 21. The stated 25X1 many Soviet ships are involved i au n m ary gear (to Cuba)." The CIA officer who delivered the to the White House on 25X1 that date reported that General Maxwe ay or challenged the statement. According to this officer, he cited this statement, froit the DIA Intelligence Summary of the same date: "The high voL_tme of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade betw.=,en the USSR and Cuba." 22. General Taylor was further quoted as saying that he had seen no hard evidence of armaments going into Cuba, that equipment like trucks and tractors could be used for military purposes but t}1: ,~, he did not think this was the case in Cuba, and that in his opinion the Soviet aid to Cuba was purely economic. 23. This was the day of the U-2 mission which confirmed 3AM sites in western Cuba. According to E: I he was ir_Porn d 25X1 on or about this time by Mr. Joseph Neubert of Mr. Roger Hilsmar`s office in the State Department that General Taylor had requested Staters INR to withdraw a memorandum which noted an upsurge in Bloc vessels traveling to Cuba under conditions suggesting increasing deliveries of arms. The same source said General Taylor had mrtde this request after consultation with Admiral Dennison. Approved For e6 - 60005-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4 24. These incidents illustrate the disagreement which oreva_E16-d throughout August between CIA and the Defense establishment over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba. We have reviewed DIA intelligence publications for August and September and can confirm that DIA did indeed insist throughout August that the increased shipping reflected an increased flow ct economic aid. 25. The USIB Watch Committee placed Cuba on its agenda in late August. This action followed submission to Watch Committee members of an urgently worded 22 August Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI No. 30+7/62) from CIA. Distribution of this paper was as follows: DD/I, 1; A/DCI, 1; OCI, 7; Watch Committee, 25.) Items on the Cuban build-up began to appear in the Combined Watch Report with the 29 August issue. 25X1 26. After the U-2 missions 25X1 coordination of material relating to the speed-up of arms deliveries to Cuba became less difficult. But until 10 October CIA and DIA were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pieces of information. Attached as Annex H is a copy of a memorandum