THE CUBAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 17, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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October 17, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION TODAY, OCTOBER 17, 1962.
1.. The establishment of medium range strike capability in
Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports
since the Soviet buildup was noted in early August.
2. Purposes are to':
(a) Provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power
for use if attacked.
(b) Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United
(c) Establish a "hall mark" of accomplishment by other
Latin American countries, most particularly Mexico, and other
Central American countries within strike range of the United StyeE
3. The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and
the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will
be expanded. There appears to me to be no other explanation for
the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment.
4. In my opinion the missiles are Soviet, they will remain
under Soviet operational control as do ours, they will be equipped
with nuclear warheads under Soviet control (because conventional
warheads would be absolutely ineffective), Cubans will supply most
of the manpower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising
operational command and control. Nevertheless, there will be a
substantial number of Soviets on site at all times.
ILLE
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5. Soviet political objectives appear to me to be:
(a) The establishment of a "trading position" to force
removal of U. S. overseas bases. OL-v;A G3"
(b) To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this
show of determination and courage against the American Imperialist.
6. Consequences of action by the United States will be the
inevitable "spilling of blood" of Soviet military personnel. This
will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation
against U. S. foreign military installations , where substantial U-,';-
casualties would result,
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7. The situation cannot be tolerated. However, the United
States should not act without warning and thus be forced to live with
a "Pearl Harbor indictment" for the indefinite future. I would
therefore:
(a) Notify Grornyko and Castro that we know all about this.
(b) Give them 24 hours to commence dismantling and re-
moval of MRBMs, coastal defense missiles, surface to air missiles,
ILZB's and all other aircraft which have a dual defensive-offensive
capability, including MIG 21s.
(c) Notify the American public and the world of the situation
created by the Soviets.
(d) If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once, we should
make a massive surprise strike at air fields, MRBM sites and SAM
sites concurrently.
John A. McCone
Director
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October 17, 1962
Several alternatives indicated below were posed for con-
sideration at the close of meeting covered by memorandum dated
October 17th.
All dealt with the specific actions U. S. Government should
take against Cuba at this time. The discussions centered around:
(a) Whether military action should be taken prior to a
warning to, or discussions with, Khrushchev and Castro.
(b) Notification to or consultation with our allies, in-
cluding NATO, OAS, and others.
(c) Referral to the United Nations.
(d) Effect on the "balance of nuclear power equation" of
the MRBM installations in Cuba.
Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of
course there are variations of each.
(1) Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed
out clearly that Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other
countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore,
why should the United States be so concerned.
(2) Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably
require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the
interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a
slow strangulation process, but it was stated that "intelligence
reports" indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in
four months. (Note: I have seen no such estimate).
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(3) Military action which was considered at several
levels. The following alternatives are:
(a) Strafing identified MRBM installations.
(b) Strafing MRBM installations and air fields
(d) (a), (b), and (c) above plus all other significant
military installations, none of which were identified.
Discussions of all of the above were inconclusive and it
was asked that the group reassemble , and develop their views
on the advantages and disadvantages and the effects of the
following:
(a) If the response is unsatisfactory, pursuing a
course of military action.
(b) If the response is unsatisfactory, referring to
the OAS and the United Nations prior to taking military action.
(2) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro and if the response
is unsatisfactory, convening Congress, seeking a declaration of
war, and proceeding with an all-out blockade.
(3) Strike militarily with no warning, the level of the
military effort being dependent upon evolving circumstances.
In all probability this type of action would escalate into invasion
and occupation, although the meeting was not agreed on this point.
(4) Blockade with no warning and no advance notice such
as a declaration of war, with the President depending upon existing
Congressional resolutions for authority.
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1. Warning to Khrushchev and Castro:
a. Castro's response would be belligerent and unreceptive to
accommodation. Khrushchev on the other hand has sought among
his basic objectives the removal of the United States overseas
bases and the allied position in Berlin and therefore he would seek
a confrontation with President Kennedy and possibly a Summit
meeting for the purpose of negotiating on Berlin and overseas
bases from a new and different "platform. "
Under these circumstances, the United States could not
pursue the course of military action without encountering strong
opposition from our Allies and from world opinion generally.
Therefore, we could expect a continuation of Cuban-Soviet
build-up, the placing of MRBM's in operational status in increas-
ing numbers, increased surveillance difficulties because the
SAM sites would be operational, and the continuation of Soviet
support of Castro and a long delaying tactic on the part of
Khrushchev while he was trying to negotiate an agreement with
us on his terms.
In addition, Khrushchev would not keep this secret and
would use our approach to his special advantage in Berlin and
all other trouble spots throughout the world.
The United Nations as a body cannot oppose Cuba equipping
herself with offensive weapons any more than it could oppose
the United States establishing and maintaining bases in Spain,
or placing missiles in Italy or Turkey.
The United Nations cannot oppose an alliance or treaty
between Cuba and the USSR and in my opinion it will not f Snq
either one ext3xr actionstaken to date.
The OAS would probably demonstrate the same timidity.that
it has in the past, would look upon the problem as a United States
problem exclusively and in my opinion, it is very questionable that
the OAS would vote the necessary two thirds majority required by
joint action against Cuba.
Therefore warning of Khrushchev and Castro would probably result
in development of a protracted negotiation which would foreclose military
action of any type to our possible disadvantage and from which we would have
great difficulty in finding a way to extract
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2. Warning of Khrushchev and Castro, and if their re-
sponse is unsatisfactory, proceeding with an all-out blockade
after a declaration of war. Undoubtedly the tenor of the response
would be about the same as indicated in (1) above and it would be
exceedingly difficult for us to make a judgment that the response
was "unsatisfactory" and therefore we could proceed with the
course of action. Doing so would in my opinion create great dif-
ficulty with all of the maritime nations and could very possibly
result in retaliatory actions against U. S. flag ships by smaller
maritime nations, such as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Greece,
Liberia, Panama, etc.
Furthermore, actions taken at sea would involve over-
hauling ships, stopping, boarding and search, would involve
provocative actions not against Cuba but against the ship's flag
and hence the result of such action cannot be clearly foreseen,
particularly if the nations of the free world were not in total
sympathy with our Cuban policy.
Discussions to date indicate that most of the Western
European countries and Canada do not share our views concerning
Cuba, and since all would be seriously affected by a blockade, it
appears to me that a blockade would cause us a great deal of
trouble. Furthermore, the Soviets would undoubtedly respond
with a most drastic blockade action against Berlin which is well
within their capability and would be difficult for us to handle.
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