MEMORANDUM FOR FILE FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100017-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 19, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 October 1962 25X1
Early in the morning of October 18th, Secretary McNamara called
Mr. McCone at his residence expressing great concern over the reports
from NPIC as a result of their examination of the two flights run on
October 15th. Lundahl was at the house with the enlargements which
indicated that, in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on
flight October 14th, there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with
fixed launchers zeroed in on the Eastern United States. McNamara felt
that this development demanded more prompt and decisive action.
The group which had been meeting on Tuesday met in the Cabinet
Room at 11:00 a. m. on Wednesday with the President. State tabled
revisions in their papers on covering a limited one-time strike and
blockade, most of which are dated 10/18 - 11:00 a. m.
At the opening of the meeting, McCone gave a brief resume of
current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography.
President questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded
that the photographs presented offensive MRBM missiles. Lundahl stated
probably not and that we must have low-level photography for public
consumption.
Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the last 24 hours
had substantially changed his thinking. He first questioned whether, if
it is necessary to move against Cuba, and then concluded that it. was
because Cuba can become a formidable military threat. He also
referred to the President's recent public statements and indicated a
feeling that if no action was taken, we would free the Soviets to act any
place they wished and at their own will. Also, Rusk stated the failure
on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in
the world. He furthermore indicated that this would be an indication of
weakness which would have serious effect on our Allies. Secretary
pointed out to the President that action would involve risks. We could
expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The President must
expect action in Berlii, Korea and possibly against the United States
itself. Rusk felt a quick strike would minimize the risk of counter
action. He raised the question of solidarity of the Alliance and seemed
to dismiss this question, feeling that the Alliance would hold together.
Rusk stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for
sure what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final
outcome will be. However he felt that the Arrierican people will accept
danger and suffering if they are convinced doing so is necessary and that
they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances
surrounding the outbreak of World War I, World War II, and the Korean
war. These factors militated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev
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and depending on the Rio pact. This, he indicated, might have the
possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means.
The other course open was the declaration of war. Rusk expressed
himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact, but does not dismiss
the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action
we must take. The alternate is a quick strike.
Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed
in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic
effort and stated that military action prior to this would be wrong. He
urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion. He also
stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any
military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion. McNamara at
this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day,
stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would
have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately
into an invasion.
General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the
Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that
it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would
be sizeable, nevertheless necessary.
Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceeded by a
declaration of war; he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade
and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that
Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually
remove the missiles which are now in place.
Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking
to Khrushchev. He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in
discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our
freedom of action would be frustrated. Dillon was very positive that
whatdver action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev.
Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev
might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitted also that he might
step them up as a result of discussions.
President Kennedy was non-committal, however he seemed to
continually raise questions of reactions of our allies, NATO, South
America, public opinion and others. Raised the question whether we
should not move the missiles out of Turkey. All readily agreed they
were not much use but a political question was involved. Bundy
thought this a good idea either unddr conditions of a strike or during a
preliminary talk.
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McNamara discussed in some detail the effects of a strike
indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be
killed; he pointed out that all of the Sam sites were manned exclusively
by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the
MRBMs and at the air fields. He agreed that we could move out of
Turkey and Italy; pointed out the political complications. At this point
McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating
military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of
Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high
and we would not. be able to control it.
Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position
that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not
proceed without discussion with Khrushchev. President Kennedy then
said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that if we made
a move against Cuba, he would take Berlin. McNamara surmised
perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin
anyway. There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the
Soviets taking Berlin and our prospect of retaining it.
President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma stating that
action of a type contemplated would be opposed by the alliance - on
the other hand, lack of action will create disunity, lack of confidence
and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with
countries who have confidence in us.
As a result of discussions of the "price" of a strike, there
followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade, the
advantages of it, and manner in which it would be carried out, etc.
There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the blockade
should be total, or should only involve military equipment which
would mean blockading Soviet ships. Also there were continued
references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there
seemed to be a differentiation in the minds of some in the policy of
blockading offensive weapons as contrasted to blockading all weapons.
There followed discussion as to policies the President should
follow with.respect to calling Congress into session, asking for a
declaration of war, advising the country and authorizing action.
Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev.
There was a discussion concerning the President's meeting with Gromyko
and the position he should take should the Cuban question come up. The
President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he
probably would receive a flat denial that there were any offensive weapons
in Cuba.
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Meeting adjourned with the President requesting that we
organize into two groups. One to study the advantages of what
might be called a slow course of action which would involve a
blockade to be followed by such further actions as appeared
necessary as the situation evolved. Second would be referred to
as a fast dynamic action which would involve the strike of sub=
stantial proportions with or without notice.
JOHN A. McCONE
Director
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