EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING ON 23 OCT.1962 6:00 PM ALL MEMBERS PRESENT PLUS COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100025-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 20, 2003
Sequence Number:
25
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 23, 1962
Content Type:
MF
File:
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Body:
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HR 7~ 23 October 1962
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MEMORAN THE FILE
SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962
6:00 p.m. All members present plus Counsel
for Defense Department
1. Committee reviewed the blockade proclamation and
approved it. It was signed by the President at 6:00 p.m.
2. The President instructed McNamara to review all details
of instructions to the Fleet Commanders regarding procedures to be
followed in the blockade. There was an extended discussion of
actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance
activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing right to board,
(c) ships turning around, heading in another direction, etc.
3. Discussion of the effect on U. S. industry by chartering
and preempting the use of 20 or 30 American ships. Gilpatric
reported that this would have little or no effect on the American
economy. McCone questioned these findings; however Gilpatric
said that this had been thoroughly studied and McCone's concerns
as expressed at the morning meeting were unfounded. The Attorney
General stated that it was within the law to use foreign bottoms,
however decision was made to preempt U. S. bottoms and not worry
about the consequences because they would not be serious.
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4. In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Defense
problems, the President seemed particularly concerned over the
situation if we should launch attacks which might result in four or
five missiles being delivered on the United States. DOD spokesmen
stated that the area covered by the 1100 mile missiles involved
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Approvedr Release 2003/03/05: CIA-RDP80B076R001900100025-6
not equipped for about 40 million. The President asked what
emergency steps could be taken. Replied that many arrangements
could be made without too much publicity, such as repositioning
food, actually obtaining space, putting up shelter signs, etc. I
got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that
whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public
alarm.
Prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara at approximately
7:00 o'clock, McCone (who had not been called upon for an intelligence
appraisal) stated to the President that he felt certain intelligence should
be reported to the meeting prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara
as some items observed by the Intelligence Community might prove of
great significance.
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McCone stated that these significant developments should be drawn
to the attention of all interested elements of the Government. On
morning of 24 October, McCone called Secretary McNamara and
General Taylor, emphasizing the above.
JOHN A. McCONE
Director
JAM/ mfb
Approved For Release 2003/03/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100025-6