CUBAN CONTINGENCY PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100042-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: November 14, 1962
• Content Type: MF

November 14, 1962
'1Y'Ii?ANDt1. }fit': The Uoncrable {icGeorge Handy
CCU r ]S TO: All Principal I lembers of the NSC Executive Committee.
S .f3.L CT: Cuban Contingency Paper.
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cussiou of a course of action that might be taken in the TRI.
IL.-28s. Thi;g includes the text of a draft OAS Resolution and a dism
There is attached a memorandum which seeks to summarize and set
forth the discussion at yesterday's meeting on a possible line of
action which could be considered if the Soviets refuse to withdraw the
U. Alexis /Jo n
Deputy Under Secretary. of State
TIV SECRET
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NEXT STEPS ON THE IL-28's
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Ancumin..g no cooperation on the IL-28's, the following actions would
be taken in the order indicated.
1. ,A "last chance private i assage to Khrushchev, making
perfectly clear how seriously we take the matter of the bombers,
aid iA-d crytint that further measures such as the reinstitution
of tIz-_ quarEntine, together with other measures, might have to
be employed.
2. Political pre-conditions to further action:
(a) Bilateral diplomatic efforts to get others
still represented in Havana to tell the Castro Govern-
ment that the maintenance of Soviet offensive weapons
in Cube: would he an occasion for breaking off diplo-
tatic relations.
(lb) An OAS resolution, reviewing the incot plete-
term oi: the Soviet and Cuban performance under the
Ke:2nady44.bruc`: hev understanding, and calling for con-
tinued close aerial surveillance and tightening of the
blockade. The OAS would report its action, together
with a formal complaint to the Security Council of the
United Nations. (Tab A)
(c) Action in the UN, designed to dramatize the
incompleteness of Soviet compliance with the Kennedy-
Khrushchevv unierstandiug, and designed to get a UN ex-
hortation to Cuba to cooperate with. the UN. (TO) P1 71' t:Ls
3r.viAizes
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involyea bringing to the surface as much as possi-
ble of the effo:?tc U Thant has made to get Castro to
cooperate; U Thant has already threatened to make
public his offer of two days ago, to use the five
Latin American embassies as a UN "presence" for veri-
fication purposes.
(d) Public announcements and statements by the
President and a!-her Administration leaders, contrast-
ing sharply with the relative silence of Administra-
tion officials on Cuba during the last two weeks.
3. Tti htening of the blockade
(a) Suspending the "Suspension of enforcement".
(b) Stopping ships, starting with bloc chartered
ships, then bloc chips, then Soviet ships.
4. Other actic v
(a) Breaking of diplomatic relations and the imposi-
tion of trade embargoes by Latin Amarican states and if
possible other free-world nations whose relations with
Cuba are still. significant.
(b) Widening the proscribed categories under the
blockade to include POL.
(c) "Harassing surveillance" from the air. Regular
aerial reconnaissance would of course be continued right
along.
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along. Up to a point this surveillance can be in-
tensified as a measure of psychological warfare. But
using aerial r, counatosance as a means of provoking
attack on our alanes, which would in turn justify
retaliation from the air on Cuban targets (including
the V.-28's on the gro7aud), is not regarded as an
,eppr c rit to fans of action, at least until all of the
t hove steps bave bee=n played out.
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? TAB A
CONFIDENTIAL
DRM OAS RESOLUTION
The Council of the Organization of American States, meeting as the
provisional Organ of Consultation on October 23, 1962, determined by in-
controvertible evidence that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated
warnings, had secretly endeaa,;ared the peace of the Continent by permitting
the Gino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on
its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads;
At that yeetiug the Orgc= of Consultation called for the immediate
Jigmrtiriling end rr thdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons
,7ith any offensive capability and recom ailed that the member states take
neasures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed
force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba
cannot continue: to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materiel
and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Coa-
tinent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capabilities
from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the
Continent;
The Organ of Consultation also informed the Security Council of the
United Nations of its resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the
Charter of the United Uationt: and expressed the hope that the Security
Council would, in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the
United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest
troy nt;
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? COMPIDI'h M
The President of the Uu%ted States proclaimed that, in accordance
with the resolution of the Organ of Cowisultation, the forces under his
command were ordered, beginning on October 24, 1962, to inter-
dict the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba;
The Governments of Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
E1 Salvador, Guatemala, E,aitL, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela
are Liding in the interdiction of offensive weapons to Cuba;
Tn co-respondence between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev,
it w.as :greed that.
(1) The IISSfl would remove from Cuba, under appropriate
United Nations observat~.ozi and supervision, all weapous systems
capable of offensive use; and the USSR would undertake, with
suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such
weapons systems into Cuba; and
(2) The United States would -- upon the establishment of
adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the
carrying out and continuation of these commitments --
(a) remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect; and
(b) give asourancee against an invasion of Cuba;
Lnespite these undertdkings, it has been determined that medium-range
borbers, which constitute offensive weapons, have not been removed from
Cuba,/
The Government of Cuba has failed to cooperate in arrangements to
assure that all offensive weapons are removed from and not reintroduced
into Cuba;
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CGHIPMENTIAL
As a result of these facts, the threat to the peace and security of
the Continent created by the presence in Cuba of offensive weapons has not
been effectively terminated, and satisfactory arrangements have not been
made to prevent the recurrence of thin threat;
:~HIsE~LO?,; ~
THE COU ?CIF, OFD O:GANIZH9X(V OF AMERICAN STATES, MEETING AS THE
F uC si.Oa+?A , G4. 'A' C cos,-,vYTi Io i, PxStl ns:
1. To recd >?-d that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6
and 0 of the Intar-A rican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, individually
and collectively, in order to bring about the removal of offensive weapons
from Cuba and to safeguard against their reintroduction into Cuba,
cccsfdar taking additional measures, including, but not limited to the
following-.
(a) Sever diplomatic relatiunz with Cuba,
(b) Sever economic relat iot a with Cuba;
(c) Intensify aerial surveillance of Cuba;
(d) Intensify quarantine meaauren against Cuba;
2. To reaffia m in all respects its resolution of October 23, 1.962;
3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this resolu-
tioon in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations;
4. To continua to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation and to
request the Member States to keels the Organ of Consultation duly informed
of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph 2 of this resolution
and paragraph 2 of the resolution of October 23, 1962.
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TAB B
ACTION IN THE UN
It would be difficult to mobilize opinion in the UN to
exert pressure on the USSR to get the ILA-28s out of Cuba
since Communist arguments regarding their obsolete character,
limited ranges and the apparent disequilibrium between such
weapons and our own, would make an impact on a good many
countries. We can expect that a substantial number of membctrs
of the UN will. adopt the view that the Soviets have acted
in good faith and have fulfilled, to the degree possible,
their. ,part of the bargain.
It will be less difficult to dramatize Cuban intransigence
and non-cooperation with the UN. Our strongest point is to
emphasize the need for a UN presence to verify that all
offensive weapons are out of Cuba and., more p.Articularly, toy
safeguard against their future reintroduction.
If this point can be bolstered by a report of the,
Secretary General on his unsuccessful efforts to get the
Cubans to agree to some form of inspection, we could muster
the required support in the Security Council (but the Sovie+;s
would doubtless veto the US resolution).. We could expect
that the UAR and Ghana with the support of the Soviet Union
would seek to broaden the Security Council consideration
to include Castro's five demands. Amendments to our resolution
incorporating these demands are probable. Moreover, while we
would
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would get the required seven votes in the Security Councils,
our friends in the Council will not be; as firm in support
of the United States now that the USSR has removed 42 missiles
and related equipment: o In short 9 we would be confronted
with a general feeling that in large measure the nuclear
peril to the Western hemisphere has ended.
Any US proposal would have greater support if we called
for UN inspection for a limited period pending the establishrrent
of arrangements by the Latin Axrican countries of a denuclearized
zone designed to* get at the long-range aspects of the problem..
Even so.-there are serious doubts that the US position
would receive broad support in the General Assembly if we
should carry the matter to the Assembly after a Soviet veto
in the Counci
On these assumptions the scenario in the Security Council
would be as follows:
1. Our purpose -n the Security Council would be to build
up pressure on the Soviets to get out the IL+281s; to build up
pressure on Cuba to admit UN inspectors; to help prepare the
political climate for possible stronger measures such as
tightening the blockade; and to help justify continuing US
aerial surveillance.
20 The United States would take the initiative in calling
a Security Council meeting at which:
(a) The Secretary
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(a) The Secretary General would make a report on his
efforts to secure agreement of the Cuban Government to
a UN presence;
(b) The USSR would take the line that it had
fulfilled its part of the understandings contained in
the exchange of letters between the President and Chairman
Khrushchev; and
(c) The United States would underscore the incomplete-
ness of compliance ;s evidenced by failure to withdraw the
IL-286 s and to establish a UN presence in Cuba to guard
against future reintroduction of offensive weapons o
3. It would be preferable though not essential for the
OAS, prior to the Security Council meeting, to have adopted a
further resolution calling for close aerial surveillance and
tightening of the blockade.
) In the Security Council the main stress should be laid
by the United States on the need for a UN presence to verify that
all offensive weapons are outs and the need to safeguard against
a future nuclear peril in Cuba, rather than on the IL-28 problem,
The Soviets would make some headway with their wguments on the
IL-28's - their relatively obsolete characters limited range,
and so forth. But Cuba's unwillingness to cooperate with the
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UN is our most persuasive debating point in a UN body.
4. There would be no exchange of declarations between the
US and USSR. In the Security Council, we would submit a
resolution along the following lines:
The Security
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The Security Council of October 27-28, 1962
Noting the exchange of letters/between President Kennedy
and Orman Khrushchev;
Noting with satisfaction that certain offensive weapons
and AMMO facilities have been removed from Cuba;
Deeply concerned that there still remain in Cuba weapons
with ive capabilities;
Believing that the threat to the security of the western
hemisphere and the peace of the world would be removed by
withdrawal of IL 28 bombers under appropriate verification;
Believing further that steps should be taken to safeguard
agains the Future reintroduction of offensive weapons in Cuba;
1. Calls _u_pon the USSR, pursuant to commitments
undertaken by Chairman Khrushchev, to remove from Cuba under
appropriate UN observation and supervision all remaining offen-
sive weapons; and to refrain from reintroducing such weapons
into Cuba.
2. Authorizes and requests the Acting Secretary
General to establish and dispatch a presence, with appropriate
technical staff, with a view to verifying the removal of all
remaining offensive weapons and to assure against their future
reintroduction into Cuba;
3. Calls uRqn the forthwith to the establishmentoofrsuch t a of Cuba to agree
the establishment of the arrangements envisaged in paragraph 5
of this resolution.
11.. Calls for termination of the measures of
quarantine directed against military shipments to Cuba at
such time as the Secretary General reports compliance with
this resolution;
5. Endorses.the resolution adopted by the General
Assembly recommending that countries of Latin America negotiate
arrangements to establish a denuclearized tone with appropriate
verification and urges that discussions on this matter among
the countries concerned start forthwith;
6. Comtaends
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6. Commends the Secretary General for his efforts
and requests htm to continue to render such assistance as may
be appropriate to all concerned.
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