(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900100054-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: December 16, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM; Current Situation in the Congo
1. Adoula's political position has been precarious
since 28 November when opposition deputies in parliament
nearly succeeded in a motion of censure against him. The
opposition, with 50 votes, fell 16 votes short of the re-
quired two-thirds for overthrow, but the vote for Adoula
(47) was less than a'majority. The vote clearly indicated
that Adoula'was critically weak, and that he would be un-
able to get his program through parliament--including the
budget and the new constitution upon which the UN plan de-
pends--without drastic concessions.
2. The opposition is now trying to augment its sup-
porters still further, and is seeking another vehicle to
bring Adoula down. On 7 December it successfully passed
a motion of censure against Adoula's minister of justice,
and other similar moves are probably in the-offing. The
opposition has now introduced a motion to "suspend" the
UN reconciliation plan, a motion which it could probably
pass. A second attempt at a motion of censure is prob-
ably only a question of time.
3. The opposition is a disparate group of radicals,
moderates, and conservatives ranging from Gizengists on
the left to the Katangan deputies on the right. Their
only common objective is to overthrow Adoula. Their mo-
tives are equally diverse: dissatisfaction with Adoula's
failure to solve the Katanga problem; personal disgruntle-
ments with Adoula; desire to'obtain ministerial posts for
themselves. It is almost certain that a successor govern-
ment to Adoula would be more anti-West and anti-UN, and
would seek closer ties with the radical African states
and the Soviet Bloc.
4. The opposition attack has thrown the government
into confusion. Adoula and his supporters are undecided
State Department review
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and uncertain as to what to do. Adoula himself, though
showing more fight than two weeks ago when he repeatedl
talked of resigning, is badly fatigued
5. Soviet bloc representatives in Leopoldville
have been encouraging and financially assisting the oppo-
sition in its attacks on Adoula. At the same time the
Soviets are dangling vague offers of financial support
and military equipment before Adoula's supporters. No
specific offers have yet been made to Adoula himself, but
the Soviets and Yugoslavs have spread rumors and reports
in the Congo army and in the government that sufficient
military would be available to enable them to end Tshombd's
secession should they ch ose to acce t it.
The Congolese,
Iterated ineir requests or have re-
himself has repeatedly said he would not acceptna.Sovietla
offer; he says he would resign and leave the decision to
parliament and the army, although he is sure they would
accept. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would actually
make a specific offer to Adoula, whom they regard as pro-
Western, without seeking considerable concessions. Essen-
tially, the Soviets appear to be awaiting Adoula's down-
fall, in order to deal with a more radical successor.
6. There has been no progress on implementation of
the UN plan since 16 October, when Adoula--convinced that
the UN was favoring Katanga--repudiated a cease-fire and
a preliminary financial agreement his negotiators had
worked out with Tshombd in Elisabethville. Katanga's
military forces remain separate and Leopoldville and
Elisabethville are in wide disagreement over the new UN-
drafted federal constitution. Adoula and UN officials
appear convinced that without new military and economic
pressure on Tshombe, further efforts to negotiate a
settlement are useless.
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7. Adoula has been attempting to exert military pres-
sure on Tshombd in North Katanga, but the Katangan forces
still have the initiative in the area, though outnumbered
at least five to one. Katangan aircraft by bombing and
strafing have been able almost, completely to demoralize
and scatter Leopoldville's (ANC) troops. Mobutu in his
appeals to the US for aircraft has expressed great con-
cern that the army will mutiny or be completely lost if
no wa:K is found to counter the Katangan air attacks.
Ai 4.% in
process of moving UN forces to theKongolov a
rea tow try
to support the ANC.
Tshombd's Position:
8. Tshombd continues to voice his support of the
UN plan for Katanga's reintegration, but has made no
moves jeopardizing his military, political, or economic
independence from Leopoldville. He has continued to
build up his ground and air forces. He is advising and
contributing financially to the anti-Adoula opposition
in parliament. He has described Adoula as incapable of
uniting the Congo, and indicated that he himself would
not be averse to becoming premier. Tshombd also appears
to be playing for time--awaiting Adoula's downfall, and
the withdrawal of the UN.
9?. On 13 December, Tshombd accepted a Belgian pro-
posal that Union Miniere (UMHK) henceforth pay all of
its foreign exchange earnings--some $200 million--to the
UN-controlled Monetary Council in Leopoldville, and that
a division be made of these funds between the UMHK, the
Katangan government, and Leopoldville. The final details
of the plan as presented to Tshombd remain to be worked
out, and reports on the actual division of funds are con-
flicting. The Belgian plan, as we understand it, would
involve a return of about $80 million to UMHK to run its
facilities, $84 million to Tshombd, and about $36 mil-
lion to Leopoldville. Tshombd in his acceptance letter
asked that UMHK receive enough for its need without speci-
fying a figure, and that Leopoldville and Elisabethville
split the remainder as long as he received a minimum of
$60 million. This would be a 50-50 split with Leopold-
ville, but there are indications Tshombd may have been
only referring to a.50-50 split of foreign exchange, and
not to the $40 million he receives in export tax
payments UMHK. Ambassador Gullionf=oncluded from his analysis
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of the Belgian plan, that Leopoldville would in fact
receive considerably less than $36 million and that
Adoula might reject the plan.
10. Having made the gesture, Tshombd.'is again be-
ginning to fuzz the issue. He has asked for UN, UK,
and US guarantees for the plan and attached political
conditions. A late report states Tshombd has refused
to proceed prior to receipt of Western guarantees.
11. Since early December the UN military command
in the Congo has been building up its ground and air
forces in Katanga in an effort to induce Tshombd to
move forward on the UN plan. UN Congo chief Robert
Gardiner in a tough letter to Tshombd on 10 December
informed him that the UN regarded him as primarily
responsible for the failure of.the plan to date and
that accordingly it intended to move on to more drastic
measures. Gardiner said that UN forces would insist on
complete freedom of movement, hinted the UN might round
up Tshombe's mercenaries, and called on Tshombd to halt
his bombings in North Katanga, to lift his blockade
of some $2 million worth of UN supplies at Sakania and
Dilolo, and to remove all Katangan roadblocks in the
Elisabethville area. In New York, UN officials, despite
Tshombe's acceptance of the payment plan, appear to be
moving ahead in their appeals for a Western embargo on
Katangan copper and cobalt. Tshombd has threatened to
destroy "every bridge, every road, every plant" in
Katanga if economic sanctions are applied.
12. UN officials have publicly and privately stated
that they will not mount offensive military action against
Tshombd, and their tactics do appear to be primarily
aimed at exerting psychological pressure on him. They
have, however, indicated that there were certain undefined
"administrative" and "non-military" measures they could
take under present UN mandates, although they admit
these might result in new hostilities. The two measures
UN officials have most frequently discussed are a mili-
tary move to secure control of the principal mining
towns of Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi, and a mili-
tary move to secure control of Katanga's rail exit points
at Dilolo, near the Angolan border, and Sakania, on the
Northern Rhodesian border.
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13. U Thant has given Brussels assurances the
UN will avoid any UN actions which might jeopardize
the success of the UMHK?payments scheme. If Tshomb6
is not forthcoming, however, the UN will probably
then press for Western economic sanctions. UN officials
have few illusions that an embargo would in fact obtain
Western support and some UN officials appear convinced
that more drastic measures should be attempted before
the UN forces are depleted by troop withdrawals or
crippled by. lack of UN funds. About 6000 (half of the
UN combat forces) are scheduled to depart by February
without replacement. This includes the Indian brigade.
The only replacements now expected are the 1800 Indo-
nesian troops.
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