A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ATTACHED REPORT FROM OUR EMBASSY IN BOGOTA CONCERNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved Fo elease 20b3JOI6i 8 CIA-RDP60B01676R001900120025-4
Following is a brief summary of the attached report from our country
team in Bogota concerning the Colombia violence problem:
There is much contradiction, exaggeration, and distortion, especially
in press reporting, of the violence problem in Colombia. Calling the
bandit bands "guerrillas" is misleading. Present violence is confined
to a relatively small, although important, part of the country, and is
essentially criminal banditry. It is not guerrilla warfare in the
classical sense, it is not insurrectional; it is essentially criminal.
The violence problem, which reached its peak during the 1948-53
period, is the result of and part of historical, political, social and.
economic factors. Motivations of the bandits involve some or all of
the following: economic (a means of earning a living); political (desire
for a "war-lord" type of control); social (sheer criminality).
There is little coordination among bandit bands; rivals and
jealousies constitute built-in barriers.
Only a very small amount of current banditry is traceable to
subversive, communist, or political motivation. To describe it as
Communist or Castroist is simplistic.
The danger is that subversive forces might capture the para-
military capability of a band or bands and use it to break down public
order and unleash destruction to the point of bringing the government down.
This danger is more real than the initiation of a straightforward guerrilla
rebellion.
The banditry problem is manageable in its present form and could
be reduced to tolerable levels quickly if the government undertakes determined
efforts.
Colombian violence can be considered active, as typified by
Caudrillas, or bandit bands, or potential, as typified by ex-guerrilla
Caudillos which have a para-military capability not now being used.
Strength of the Caudrillas and Caudillos is difficult to estimate,
but is probably something like this:
State Dept. review completed
ILLEGIB
Approved For Releaser2 03IO8110 CIA-R0P80B01676R'01 900120025-4
 Approved Fr Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80BO R001900120025-4
Caudrillas
Active: 75 bands totaling 997 personnel
Inactive: 65 bands totaling 1, 127 personnel
Caudillo s
Inactive: 29 bands totaling 4, 360 personnel
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