MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (CI) 2 P.M., THURSDAY APRIL 4, 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900150066-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2014
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: April 5, 1963
• Content Type: MFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
April 5, 1963
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group (CI)
2 p.m., Thursday April 4, 1963
PRESENT: Governor Harriman, The Attorney General, Mr. Cilpatric,
Mr. McCone, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Coffin vice Mr. Bell,
Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Murrow, General Johnson vice
General Taylor
Mr. Thompson and Mr. Wood were present for Item 1.
Mr. Jorden and Mk. Cooper were present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Maechling, Mr. Koren, Mr. Janow and Mr. Wolf
were present for the meeting.
1. Discussion with Mr. Thompson on the Situation in Viet-Nam
Mr. Robert Thompson, head of the British Advisory Mission to
Viet-Nam, discussed with the members his observations on the
situation in Viet-Nam. He characterized the situation as one of
requiring patience and exhibiting confidence. Relative to the
latter, he believes that the Vietnamese have confidence in the
ultimate success of the war against the Viet Cong. He cautioned,
however, that there is the danger that we may be over-extending
ourselves in the strategic hamlet program, leaving pockets of
Viet Cong control behind to subvert and harass the peasants. He
stressed the importance of consolidating areas prior to pushing
forward into insecure areas.
Mr. Thompson observed that the infiltration is not a decisive
factor in Viet Cong recruitment, and that only a relatively small
amount of equipment comes into the country by this means. It is
his opinion that the solution to the infiltration problem is to
gain solid control at the village level with military forces
screening in the border areas. Once solid control in the villages
is gained, it will be possible to detect infiltrators as they
attempt to enter these secure areas.
Mk. Thompson stated that it was his belief that U.S. forces
in Viet-Nam are adequate for the task, but by the end of the year
it could be possible to withdraw some of these forces. This move
should be made as an indication that we are winning and tied into
the achievement of a white area, free from Viet Cong attack. He
also brought out that good relations exist between the U.S. and
Vietnamese. However, he believes that reporting in the U.S. papers
on the overall effort in Viet-Nam could be improved.
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2.
He acknowledged that a weakness of the Vietnameseis that
they have been unable to cope with Communist penetration efforts
in the Government, labor, and student organizations, However,
steps are being taken to build up an internal security service
to improve their capabilities in this area.
In commenting on air strikes, Mr. Thompson stated that their
utilization is essential, as the threat prevents the Viet Cong from
concentrating to carry out operations. He agreed that large scale
"clear and hold" operations, although they may have some value,
have not obtained significant results to date. He emphasized
that the most effective method of operations against the Viet Cong
are extended operations of ranger or similar type units in areas
under Viet Cong control.
Mk. Thompson remarked that President Diem is stronger in the
provinces than in Saigon. However, the Government is very dependent
on him, and if he were to fall, the whole Government would collapse.
To counter this possibility, we must encourage the establishment
of a stable administrative system operating from the Ministries down
to the village level, which would eventually lead to a viable
government when the insurgency situation abates. In conjunction
with this effort, planning should be initiated for demobilization,
as well as increased attention to programs to assist in the
agricultural sector.
Mr. Thompson commented that the only valid bench mark to assess
the effectiveness of our effort in Viet-Nam is "when we reach the
level of having sufficient control of the population to deny their
accessibility to actions by the Viet Cong." He believes we might
reach this point by the middle of next year. In conclusion,
Mr. Thompson stated that the key to success in Viet-Nam is the
population and the existence of a strong government, which functions
for the benefit of the people. He believes that this trend is now
slowly developing.
2. Discussion with Mr. Jorden Concernin his Recent Tri to Viet-Nam
Mr. Jorden, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, presented a summany of his findings based
on his recent trip to Viet-Nam. Mk. Jorden pointed out that he
was unable to document and develop any hard evidence of infiltra-
tion from Laos into Viet-Nam after October 1, 1962. Mk. Cooper,
who has just returned from Viet-Nam, stated that it was difficult
to assess the extent of infiltration from Laos; however, he did
observe that the Viet Cong are now infiltrating from the southern
delta area into the northern provinces. In response to a question
from the Chairman, Mr. Jorden stated it would be extremely difficult
to interdict infiltration from Laos, but that reconnaissance and
surveillance operations over the border should help in determining
intelligence on the source of any infiltration.
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3.
Mr. Jorden mentioned that he believes that present press
reporting out of Viet-Nam is about the best that could be
expected under the present circumstances. However, he pointed
out that efforts should be made to provide more background
briefings for the press in Saigon.
Mr. Jorden stated that despite progress and increased U.S.
efforts in Viet-Nam, he did not detect on his recent trip any
significant signs of enthusiasm on the part of the Vietnamese
that the situation was getting better.
3. Report on Feeder Roads
As a result of the recent message (Bangkok 1498) from the
Embassy in Thailand, which stated that we had reached an impasse
with the Thais on the specifications for the Feeder Roads, the
members agreed that this item should be considered at a later
meeting, after further information is received from the Embassy.
4. Assessment of Communist Subversive Efforts in Thailand -
Bangkok 1477 dated March 29, 1963
The members agreed that this matter should be referred to the
USIB for evaluation. The Chairman requested both AID and DOD
review their current programs in Thailand to determine their
adequacy, responsiveness and to determine what additional steps,
any, should be taken.
The Group agreed that, if feasible, this item will be considered
at the next meeting.
Miscellaneous
1. Mr. Coffin informed the Group that AID has authorized the
missions in Chile, Peru, Guatemala, and Ecuador to establish a
special fund of up to $50,000 to be employed in support of economic
and social development activities. This item was last discussed
by the Group on March 21, in conjunctionwitth u progress report on
the Internal Defense Plan for Ecuador.
kf -5130 LIN\
James W. Dingeman
Executive Secretary
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